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Traditional approaches to monitoring road safety have primarily focused on measuring outcomes such as the number of fatalities and injuries. While effective in capturing overall trends, this macroscopic approach often overlooks the underlying causes of unsafe conditions. Recognizing these limitations, many countries now embrace a safe system-based approach, which emphasizes a holistic view of road safety, considering various elements and their interactions. In response to this shift, this study introduces a five-step framework designed to provide comprehensive coverage and tailored assistance in selecting and utilizing appropriate Road Safety Indicators (RSIs) for more effective performance monitoring. The framework integrates a novel RSIs taxonomy aligned with critical elements of the safe system. It also incorporates an MCDA-based approach to account for decision-makers' preferences when selecting suitable RSIs. A case study demonstrates the practical application of the proposed steps, including the identification, classification, selection, and development of descriptive sheets for each selected RSI, as well as the continuous updating of the RSIs set. The findings offered valuable insights into the commonly used indicators in international road safety reports, while also revealing the limitations of currents metrics and data in fully capturing critical elements and hierarchical level within the road safety management system. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Self-explaining roads (SERs) have become a leading principle of road design, essentially forming one of the pillars of the Safe System approach. The basic idea of SERs is that the drivers' perception of the road and road environment influences their behavior. According to the SERs concept, through the appropriate selection of features and design, drivers receive consistent affirmation of the type of road they are driving on and its function, from which they will infer the appropriate driving behavior. The study attempts to identify the theoretical constructs that explain driving behavior, and the design requirements and considerations under the SERs concept. The development and implementation of SERs involves considerable multi-phased work. The proposed approach to modifying the appearance of roads on the basis of design principles for SERs might demonstrate that road agencies support road users when the road network discourages errors and protects them. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Safe System approach is a commonly adopted approach internationally to address road traffic injuries. Existing research has identified that the approach has multiple descriptions, and there have been noted difficulties associated with implementation. Practitioners have an important role in rolling out road safety interventions, and thus are a key point for translating Safe System into practice. However, there has been limited investigation of how practitioners view and understand Safe System. Of particular importance is practitioners' interpretation of Safe System's purpose and the facilitators and barriers to application. Four hundred and sixty-nine respondents completed an online survey which investigated perceptions regarding Safe System's purpose.The results highlight that practitioners view Safe System as being multidimensional, with a range of ideas about what the overall purpose is. Safe System was perceived as both visionary and practical, with the majority of respondents reporting that it defines a broad outcome for road safety and provides direction on how to respond to road traffic injury. Additionally, two thirds of respondents identified that they applied Safe System to the last project or program they worked on and were broadly supportive of the approach. However, multiple impediments to application were identified, with these barriers effected by the practitioners' demographics, role and organisation. For practitioners, Safe System represents a complex approach that aims to reduce injury and deaths, however, effective application can only occur when barriers are reduced.

The Safe System approach is a commonly adopted approach internationally to address road traffic injuries. Existing research has identified that the approach has multiple descriptions, and there have been noted difficulties associated with implementation. Practitioners have an important role in rolling out road safety interventions, and thus are a key point for translating Safe System into practice. However, there has been limited investigation of how practitioners view and understand Safe System. Of particular importance is practitioners' interpretation of Safe System's purpose and the facilitators and barriers to application. Four hundred and sixty-nine respondents completed an online survey which investigated perceptions regarding Safe System's purpose. The results highlight that practitioners view Safe System as being multidimensional, with a range of ideas about what the overall purpose is. Safe System was perceived as both visionary and practical, with the majority of respondents reporting that it defines a broad outcome for road safety and provides direction on how to respond to road traffic injury. Additionally, two thirds of respondents identified that they applied Safe System to the last project or program they worked on and were broadly supportive of the approach. However, multiple impediments to application were identified, with these barriers effected by the practitioners' demographics, role and organisation. For practitioners, Safe System represents a complex approach that aims to reduce injury and deaths, however, effective application can only occur when barriers are reduced. • Safe System application continues to be a challenge. • Practitioner interpretation of the purpose of Safe System has been under researched. • A forty-item survey explored practitioners' perspectives of Safe System. • The majority of respondents reported that Safe System had multiple purposes. • Putting Safe System into practice requires a clearer concept and policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Road traffic related death and injury continues to be a major challenge globally. Unsafe road use is particularly evident in low- and middle-income countries while also being a growing concern for private sector organisations. The Safe System approach is recognized internationally as the leading approach to improving road safety and previous work has codified the essential management functions and interventions evident in its successful implementation. Tracking the development of Safe System adoption within the public and private sectors is of interest for several reasons. This paper presents recent development and use of road safety maturity frameworks and discusses the utility of these approaches for road safety practitioners and researchers.

Fatal and serious crashes on our roadways remain a persistent public health crisis. Vision Zero, based on the principles of a Safe Systems approach, is an initiative that has grown in popularity in the United States in the past decade. While the importance of cross-sector collaboration and the need for a supportive community culture in order to realize community change is well established, such tools and frameworks have not been applied as commonly for road safety initiatives as in other fields. We adapted and utilized the Community Readiness Assessment (CRA) tool, a well-established model within public health for assessing and informing community-based interventions in seven Vision Zero communities in one U.S. state. Three communities assessed were determined to be at an overall readiness level of four out of nine, or at a “preplanning” level and four of the communities scored a level of three, or at a “vague awareness” level. However, levels of readiness across the six dimensions measured varied, with community-related dimensions (e.g., community climate) scoring lower than readiness levels for stakeholder knowledge, leadership, and resources. Additionally, communities with more advanced stages of implementation had higher readiness scores, on average. Assessment results provided unique insights to inform next steps for local initiatives, particularly related to discrepancies between the readiness of the wider community and the readiness of leadership and available resources. Therefore, the CRA represents a potentially beneficial tool for communities pursuing Vision Zero initiatives.

Safe System has been the dominant approach to road safety in Victoria for over fifteen years, guiding the development and implementation of policy. Limited attention has been paid to the development and application of Safe System in a public policy setting. The aims of this research were to describe the intentions of Safe System in Victoria, and analyse how well this aligns with models of successful public policy. Using a qualitative approach, semi-structured interviews were undertaken with Australian and international experts (n = 10). These experts represented a range of organisations and leadership levels that were either directly involved in the development or had a detailed understanding of the development of Safe System in Victoria. The interview results were analysed using a policy success model. The findings suggested that Safe System can provide a framework to address road safety in Victoria, however successful public policy needs to ensure that the development of policy addresses the identified problem and that the results are maintained for some time. Safe System meets some of these requirements, but principally lacks explanation for how its overarching approach is meant to be understood and utilised. Practically, road safety professionals need to clarify the purpose of the Safe System concept in order for it to be successfully integrated into public policy. Whilst Safe System requires additional clarification, it has garnered additional interest and debate in road safety and from this perspective has advanced public policy.

Many countries and international organizations have put a significant amount of effort into improving road traffic safety by setting their own road traffic safety goals and strategies. This study aims to provide a conceptual framework for road traffic safety through an international comparison of traffic safety goals and strategies. Such a comparison can help improve mutual understanding and communication among stakeholders in different countries and international organizations. Based on a review of previous traffic safety literature and comparing traffic safety strategies of several different countries and international organizations, this study proposes a conceptual framework for road traffic safety consisting of a common vision, traffic safety indicators, a safe system including the 3Es and some additional Es, and a traffic safety culture, which is the basis of the framework.

• Motorcycle fatalities are pushing up the total road crash fatality rate in LMICs in the previous decade. • Helmet laws existed but enforcement of wearing helmets is low in LMICs. • Increasing helmet use rates decreases motorcyclist deaths in Low- and Lower Middle- Income Coutries. • Particular attention should be paid to rapidly growing motorcycle crashes in LMICs. • National strategy for motorcycle safety considering Safe System principles is key. Introduction: Road crash fatalities have increased significantly in Low- and Middle- Income Countries (LMICs) between 2006 and 2016. This study presents how road safety characteristics have changed in LMICs by comparing data over time and relationships between the road crash fatality increase and a wide range of data from LMICs. Parametric and nonparametric methods are used to test significance. Method: There were 35 countries in the Latin America and Caribbean region, the Sub-Saharan Africa region, the East Asia and Pacific region, and the South Asia region, where the population rate of road crash fatalities consistently increased as per country reports, World Health Organization and Global Burden of Disease estimates. In these countries, the proportion of fatalities involving motorcycles (including powered two or three-wheelers) substantially increased (44%) over the same time (statistically significant). In these countries, the helmet-wearing rate was only 46% for all passengers. These patterns were not observed in LMICs with decreasing population fatality rates. Results: Motorcycle helmet usage rates strongly correlate with decreasing fatalities per 10,000 motorcycles in Low-Income Countries (LICs) and LMICs. Effective interventions (including increasing helmet usage) are urgently needed for motorcycle crash trauma in LMICs, especially where the economy and motorization rapidly grow. National strategies for motorcycle safety, conforming to the Safe System principles, are recommended. Conclusions: For evidence-based policy formulation, there is a need to continue strengthening data collection, sharing, and use. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Of all the components of Road Safety, perhaps the two with the potential for maximum impact which can be brought in systematically are - Road Design and Construction and Road Safety Audit. While the former ensures that safety is 'built-in' the road, the latter helps with timely identification and rectification of errors. Both take into account the fact that providing a 'safe system' overall is required to help minimize the impact of expected and unexpected human errors, negligence and frailties. Road designs and construction is the foundation on which all other tenets of road safety policy can be raised. Many nations have come up with an idea of establishing a nodal agency or lead agency wholly responsible for setting standards and monitoring implementation of these standards by way of audits at both levels initial approval and periodical. They have laid down uniform guidelines and set the standards which are binding on the contractors and builders. In this paper, author will explore the issues concerning safe road engineering with particular emphasis on two interrelated concepts - road design and construction and road safety audits. In our discussion, we not just look at these issues from a domestic lens, but consider some international experience and perspective as well. Finally, author will make some policy recommendations comprising of - the composition, functions, and powers and funding of the lead agency so that it becomes capable of enforcing safe road engineering and audit. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The safe system approach is considered the best practice. Different international organizations highly recommend the implementation of such an approach to significantly improve their road safety performance. The safe system has become a normative approach, a way of thinking. It rests upon different pillars, which represent the framework to be implemented. Among the different dimensions, the management pillar is crucial, which calls for a detailed investigation. First, the aim of this contribution is to understand the implications and requirements of implementing a safe system management model (SSMM). This contribution presents this model and challenges its aims and its limits, especially the promoted management framework. Six main limits of the SSMM are discussed. The different limits of the SSMM emphasize the importance of thinking about singularities and contingencies of the institutional order as well as considering and understanding the context in which a policy is implemented. Second, this contribution proposes an alternative conceptual approach applied to the managerial dimension of the road safety system. It develops the institutional-strategy-environment (ISE) model for elaborating road safety public strategy. This conceptual elaboration is based both on a proven theoretical corpus and on numerous field observations, and expert activities carried out in various countries. The ISE dimensions are essential because they are seldom discussed, even though they are the underpinning of more and more public road safety policies. In this respect, this contribution proposes an alternative approach by considering these three interdependent dimensions. The institutional dimension rests upon a layered approach, while strategy is considered with an adapted SWOT matrix. The environmental dimension is assessed with a Pestel model. The application of such an approach to the road safety field and to test its explanatory power is particularly challenging but opens new avenues for implementing road safety public policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Roadway mortality increased during COVID-19, reversing a multi-decade downward trend. The Fatality Analysis Reporting System (FARS) was used to examine contributing factors pre-COVID-19 and in the COVID-19 era using the five pillars of the Safe System framework: (1) road users; (2) vehicles; (3) roadways; (4) speed; and (5) post-crash care. Two study time periods were matched to control for seasonality differences pre-COVID-19 ( n = 1725, 1 April 2018-31 December 2019) and in the COVID-19 era ( n = 2010, 1 April 2020-31 December 2021) with a three-month buffer period between the two time frames excluded. Four of the five pillars of the safe system had road safety indicators that worsened during the pandemic. Mortality was 19.7% higher for motor vehicle occupants and 45.1% higher for riders of motorized two-wheeled vehicles. In adjusted analyses, failure to use safety equipment (safety belts/helmets) was associated with 44% higher mortality. Two road user groups, non-motorized bicyclists and pedestrians, did not contribute significantly to higher mortality. Urban roadway crashes were higher compared to rural crashes. Additional scientific inquiry into factors associated with COVID-19-era mortality using the Safe System framework yielded important scientific insights to inform prevention efforts. Motorized two-wheeled vehicles contribute disproportionately to pandemic-era higher mortality and constitute an emerging road safety issue that deserves further attention.

Introduction: While collaboration and cooperation are regarded as foundational to Vision Zero (VZ) and Safe Systems initiatives, there is little guidance on structuring VZ collaboration, conducting collaborative goal setting, and aligning tangible action across organizations. As part of a larger VZ mutual learning model, we developed a VZ Leadership Team Institute to support communities in collaborative VZ strategic planning and goal setting. The purpose of this paper is to describe the development and evaluation of the Institute, which can serve as a foundation for other initiatives seeking to move VZ planning and implementation forward in a collaborative, systems-aware manner.Methods: In June 2021, eight multi-disciplinary teams of 3–6 persons each (n = 42 participants) attended the Institute, representing leaders from communities of various sizes. Surveys were administered pre, immediately post, and 6 months following the Institute. We measured confidence in a range of skills (on a 5-point scale, 1: not confident to 5: very confident). Surveys also measured coalition collaboration pre-Institute and 6 months post-Institute (on a 4-point scale, 1: strongly disagree to 4: strongly agree).Results: The largest increases in confidence from pre- to immediately post-Institute were for collaboratively drafting objectives and actions for VZ goals (pre-mean: 2.6, SD: 0.9 to post-mean: 3.8, SD: 0.9); incorporating equity into goals (pre-mean: 2.8, SD: 1.0 to post-mean: 3.9, SD: 0.8); and knowing how to keep VZ planning and implementation efforts on track (pre-mean: 2.6, SD: 1.0 to post-mean: 3.7, SD: 0.7). For all measures, average confidence in skills decreased from immediately post-Institute to 6 months post-Institute, but remained greater than average scores pre-Institute. Several measures of coalition collaboration maintained high agreement across time, and mean agreement increased for reporting that the future direction of the coalition was clearly communicated to everyone (pre-mean: .6, SD: 0.8; 6 months post-mean: 3.1, SD: 0.4). However, average scores decreased for feeling like the coalition had adequate staffing (pre-mean: 3.0, SD: 0.6; 6 months post-mean: 2.3, SD: 0.5).Discussion: The Institute utilized innovative content, tools, and examples to support VZ coalitions’ collaborative and systems-aware planning and implementation processes. As communities work toward zero transportation deaths and serious injuries, providing effective support models to aid multidisciplinary planning and action around a Safe Systems approach will be important to accelerate progress toward a safer transportation system.

• First known cyclist market survey focused specifically on the experience of cyclists related to safety around trams. • Track-skid incidents are more common than track-wedge incidents, track-wedging more likely to result in injury. • In the last five years, 21% of respondents were involved in at least one tram-track-related crash. • Track-skidding was found to be associated with wet conditions and having low experience of cycling. • Track-wedging was more likely amongst those cycling > 10 years and aged < 45 years. Tram systems present safety risks to cyclists, however only limited research has explored this topic, of which most has focused on crash and hospital data, and severe crash events. This paper presents the first known cyclist market survey focused specifically on the experience of cyclists related to safety around trams, including unreported incidents and those that did not result in hospital attendance. Findings suggest that track-skid incidents are more common than track-wedge incidents, in contrast to previous research that emphasizes track-wedging as a larger issue than skidding. This is may be explained by the differing outcomes, with track-wedging more likely to result in injury. This research is thus significant in identifying track skidding as a major risk concern, causing a majority of crashes, while also confirming that track wedging is the major severity concern. In the last five years, 21% of respondents were involved in at least one tram-track-related crash. This was less than the share of respondents involved in falls (50%), crashes relating to road defects (36%) or collisions with motor vehicles (29%). However, half of survey respondents (52%) reported cycling on roads with tram tracks for 0–20% of their cycling, which might suggest that tram track-related crash rates are high given that most inner-city cycling occurs on roads without tracks. Track-skidding was found to be associated with wet conditions. Those involved in at least one track-skid in the last five years where more likely to have been cycling more than 3 years, but involvement in track-wedging was more likely amongst those cycling > 10 years and aged < 45 years. Implications for research and practice are suggested. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Safe System has been the dominant approach to road safety in Victoria for over fifteen years, guiding the development and implementation of policy. Limited attention has been paid to the development and application of Safe System in a public policy setting. The aims of this research were to describe the intentions of Safe System in Victoria, and analyse how well this aligns with models of successful public policy. Using a qualitative approach, semi-structured interviews were undertaken with Australian and international experts (n = 10). These experts represented a range of organisations and leadership levels that were either directly involved in the development or had a detailed understanding of the development of Safe System in Victoria. The interview results were analysed using a policy success model. The findings suggested that Safe System can provide a framework to address road safety in Victoria, however successful public policy needs to ensure that the development of policy addresses the identified problem and that the results are maintained for some time. Safe System meets some of these requirements, but principally lacks explanation for how its overarching approach is meant to be understood and utilised. Practically, road safety professionals need to clarify the purpose of the Safe System concept in order for it to be successfully integrated into public policy. Whilst Safe System requires additional clarification, it has garnered additional interest and debate in road safety and from this perspective has advanced public policy. • Safe System is the dominant approach to road safety in Victoria, Australia. • Semi-structured interviews were undertaken with key informants with Safe System development knowledge. • Results indicate different perspectives of how Safe System is to be interpreted. • It is unclear what the Safe System concept is designed to achieve or how it is meant to be implemented. • Safe System has progressed public policy in road safety despite its limitations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Many countries and international organizations have put a significant amount of effort into improving road traffic safety by setting their own road traffic safety goals and strategies. This study aims to provide a conceptual framework for road traffic safety through an international comparison of traffic safety goals and strategies. Such a comparison can help improve mutual understanding and communication among stakeholders in different countries and international organizations. Based on a review of previous traffic safety literature and comparing traffic safety strategies of several different countries and international organizations, this study proposes a conceptual framework for road traffic safety consisting of a common vision, traffic safety indicators, a safe system including the 3Es and some additional Es, and a traffic safety culture, which is the basis of the framework. • Different road traffic safety strategies are discussed and compared. • Besides engineering, education, and enforcement (3Es), other Es such as emergency response system need to be emphasized. • A common conceptual framework for future road traffic safety development is proposed. • Conceptual framework comprises common vision, safety indicators, safe system with "3Es+ α ", and traffic safety culture. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Many jurisdictions globally have adopted a zero road trauma target by 2050 and an interim target of a 50% reduction by 2030. The objective of this study was to investigate what the road system will need to look like in order to achieve these respective targets. Utilising human tolerance to injury as the key design factor, this study defined the combination of vehicle, infrastructure, and travel speed requirements to manage crash energy in order to: 1. prevent all fatalities and serious injuries by 2050 in an Ultimate Safe System scenario; and 2. significantly reduce fatalities and severe injuries by 2030 in an Interim Safe System scenario. Victoria, Australia and its Movement and Place (M&P) framework was employed as a case study. With the vehicle and infrastructure countermeasures currently available coupled with appropriate travel speeds it is possible to construct an Ultimate Safe System that can manage crash forces to achieve zero trauma and an Interim Safe System that can significantly reduce the most severe injuries in Victoria. This study has demonstrated a potential pathway from the current situation to 2030 and then 2050 that can achieve safety targets while meeting the core objectives of the transport system. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In Europe, heavy goods vehicles (HGVs) are disproportionately involved in serious and fatal collisions with vulnerable road users (VRUs). An interrogation of 2019 national crash data for Great Britain (Stats19) suggested that detection of cyclists and pedestrians in the nearside and front blind spots of HGVs is still a significant problem during forward or left-turn manoeuvres of the HGV. To improve detection, Transport for London introduced Direct Vision and Safe System Standards in 2021 for HGVs entering the Greater London area. This research assessed the efficacy of one of the Safe System requirements—the fitment of sensors to detect vulnerable road users on the nearside of the vehicle. A physical testing procedure was developed to determine the performance of a sensor system meeting the Transport for London Safe System requirements. Overall, the Safe System compliant sensor system missed 52% of expected detection nodes on the nearside of the vehicle. A total of 56% of the "stop vehicle" nodes, 45% of the "slow down" and 48% of the "proceed with caution" nodes were not recognised. The most forward sensor did not fully cover the front-left corner blind spot, missing 70% of the desired detection nodes. Nearside sensor systems fitted to Safe System requirements may cover a reasonable area but could still leave many undetected zones to the left and front of the vehicle. Standardising sensor range and location could help to eliminate sensor blind spots. Mandating additional front sensors would help cover the blind spot at the front-left corner of the HGV. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As crash speed increases, so does the probability of injury. The vulnerability of different road users varies greatly, in part due to differences in their protective equipment. Therefore, for the same speed, their injury probabilities are different. The objective of this study is to define injury risk curves, mathematical relations between closing speed (the relative speed between two crash partners) and injury outcome, for different road users. These risk curves can be used to rank road user vulnerability and define safe speeds, i.e. speeds not exceeding tolerable injury probabilities. Crashes involving pedestrians, cyclists, motorcyclists, and car drivers impacting the front of another passenger car (i.e. frontal impacts from the other car’s perspective) were extracted from the German in-depth accident study (GIDAS). The injuries were modelled as a function of closing speed and road user age using a weighted binary logistic regression. In accordance with the Abbreviated Injury Scale 2015 revision, three injury severities were modelled: at-least-moderate injury severities, at-least-serious injury severities, and fatal injuries. The constructed risk curves predicted injury outcomes with an average Area under the Curve ranging from 0.66 to 0.94 in cross-validation. A 10% risk of sustaining at-least-serious injuries corresponds to a closing speed of 29 km/h for pedestrians, 44 km/h for cyclists, 48 km/h for motorcyclists, and 112 km/h for car drivers. If a 10% risk of serious injury is acceptable, the closing speeds can be translated into safe speed limits of 25 km/h for cars with pedestrian encounters; 20 to 25 km/h for cyclists, motorcyclists, and cars when they encounter each other; and 55 km/h for cars in head-on impacts. These safe speeds align with current speed limits of 20 to 30 km/h in urban centers but bring into question the current practices of much higher speed limits on rural roads shared by bicycles, motorcycles, and cars. However, safe speed limits could be increased (maintaining a 10% serious injury risk) if road users have more protective equipment and Automated Emergency Braking reliably reduces impact speeds in all crash types.

The safe system approach is considered the best practice. Different international organizations highly recommend the implementation of such an approach to significantly improve their road safety performance. The safe system has become a normative approach, a way of thinking. It rests upon different pillars, which represent the framework to be implemented. Among the different dimensions, the management pillar is crucial, which calls for a detailed investigation. First, the aim of this contribution is to understand the implications and requirements of implementing a safe system management model (SSMM). This contribution presents this model and challenges its aims and its limits, especially the promoted management framework. Six main limits of the SSMM are discussed. The different limits of the SSMM emphasize the importance of thinking about singularities and contingencies of the institutional order as well as considering and understanding the context in which a policy is implemented. Second, this contribution proposes an alternative conceptual approach applied to the managerial dimension of the road safety system. It develops the institutional-strategy-environment (ISE) model for elaborating road safety public strategy. This conceptual elaboration is based both on a proven theoretical corpus and on numerous field observations, and expert activities carried out in various countries. The ISE dimensions are essential because they are seldom discussed, even though they are the underpinning of more and more public road safety policies. In this respect, this contribution proposes an alternative approach by considering these three interdependent dimensions. The institutional dimension rests upon a layered approach, while strategy is considered with an adapted SWOT matrix. The environmental dimension is assessed with a Pestel model. The application of such an approach to the road safety field and to test its explanatory power is particularly challenging but opens new avenues for implementing road safety public policy.

Traffic injuries remain a leading health concern in most low- and middle-income countries (LMICs). However, most LMICs have not established institutions that have the legislative mandate and financial resources necessary to coordinate large-scale interventions. Argentina provides a counterexample. Argentina is a federal country where the decentralization of authority to provincial governments was a key barrier to effective national interventions. In 2008, Argentina passed a law establishing a national road safety agency and subsequently received a World Bank loan to build the agency’s capacity to coordinate actions. Although traffic injuries in Argentina have not yet begun to decline, these developments raise important questions:Why did Argentina come to view road safety as a problem?Why was institutional reform the chosen solution? What was the political process for achieving reform? What are the broader implications for institutional reform in LMICs?We explore these questions using a descriptive case study (single-case, holistic design) of Argentina. The case illustrates that focusing events, like the Santa Fe tragedy that killed nine children, and advocacy groups are important for raising political attention and creating an opportunity for legislative reform. It highlights the importance of policy entrepreneurs who used the opportunity to push through new legislation. Though the political dynamic was predominantly local, international actors worked with local advocates to build demand for safety and develop solutions that could be deployed when the opportunity arose. Most important, the case emphasizes the importance of developing institutions with the resources and authority necessary for managing national road safety programs.

Road transport is failing pedestrians more than other road users. For pedestrians, roads are not safe or improving: Globally pedestrian deaths have increased at nearly twice the rate of other road crash deaths (12.9% increase from 2013 to 2016, vs. a 6.6% increase for other road users). Pedestrians commonly lack safe crossings, safe speeds, and in many locations, footpaths. This paper briefly identifies successes and failures for pedestrian safety, reviews weaknesses, and limitations to actions for pedestrian safety, and identifies barriers to effective action. Barriers include current culture on road usage, victim blaming, under-estimation of the pedestrian crash death problem in particular, and other crash data issues. Advocacy, policies, and actions are recommended to overcome these barriers and to improve pedestrian safety.

Purpose: Comparison of effective road safety approaches with those of relatively similar countries can be used to identify possibilities for safety improvement. Since there is no clear and comprehensive study of countries' current and successful approaches to road safety in the world, the aim of this study was to identifying common road safety approaches in the world.Methods: This study was performed using scoping review and thematic analysis. The study followed the approach proposed by Arksey and O'Malley. In this study all articles were selected without time limit by searching in the following databases: Web of Science, PubMed, Scopus, ProQuest, and Embase. An initial search of 5612 papers was found and finally, 20 papers met the inclusion criteria and were analyzed.Results: There were different road safety approaches in different countries around the world, which were classified in three themes: traditional approach, systemic approach, and vision zero. The traditional approach includes the sub-theme of the road-user approach, and the causal approach. The systemic approach also includes sub-themes of sustainable safety, safety system, and the United Nations plan for decade of action.Conclusion: A systemic approach to road safety seems to be welcomed by most developed and developing countries, and a paradigm shift towards a safe system has taken place. Also, given the successful results of implementing vision zero in leading countries, most countries are trying to design and implement this approach. Finally, the choice and implementation of road safety approaches varies according to the principles, priorities and infrastructure of each country. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Objective: Safe vehicle speeds were identified as a key element in a safe system approach to road safety. The City of Yarra in Melbourne, Australia has a 40 km/h default speed limit across their municipality, but wished to reduce the speed limit in local residential streets to 30 km/h. The Monash University Accident Research Center provided Council with a design for a demonstration trial and agreed to evaluate its safety benefits over 12 months. The trial was expected to show significant reductions in speed and increased community support.Method: A before and after design was employed with a control (untreated) area to evaluate the safety outcomes of the trial. Speed limits were reduced to 30 km/h in the trial area for 12 months but kept at kept at the current 40 km/h (25 mph) limit in the control region. Vehicle speeds were measured at around 100 selected sites in the trial and control areas, and resident surveys were undertaken in both regions before and after the trial.Results: The findings showed a small but modest reduction of 1.1% in average speed in the trial region but a surprising 2.7% in the control region. On further examination, significant reductions were observed in the percent of vehicles exceeding 40 km/h (25 mph) and 50 km/h (31 mph) in both the treated and control regions, but not at 30 km/h (19 mph). A regression analysis further showed a significant treatment effect of 11% at 40 km/h and 25% at 50 km/h when adjusting for differences between treated and controls. Among other findings, the survey results found increased support for the lower speed limit of 17% with little adverse consequences.Conclusion: The findings give support for the likely safety benefits of the 30 km/h trial with increased support from the residents. Speed reductions in the control region suggested a carry-over of the effects of the trial but also added support by local residents for reduced speed limits in the region. Potential injury savings were estimated at a 4% reduction in the risk of a pedestrian injury from the observed treatment effect in the trial region. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Highlights • Crash causes, countermeasures, and policy implications are interrelated. • There are problems in definition of 'causes' and development of countermeasures. • Taxonomies of causes are biased by methodology, and researcher's assumptions. • The safe system approach provides a balanced and promising one to countermeasures. Abstract There are interrelationships between crash causes, countermeasures, and policy implications, but they are not necessarily direct and obvious. Part of the problem is the definition of a cause. The seminal 1979 Indiana University "Study of Accident Causes" has cemented some false assumptions that must be overcome to yield an effective crash countermeasures policy. The taxonomy of crash causes and the prevalence of different causes are determined by the investigators, who are biased in different ways. The prevalent notion that approximately 90 percent of the crashes are due to human errors or failures is due to a threshold bias, and the implied notion that 90 percent of the countermeasures should be directed at changing these behaviors is based on an erroneous assumption that the cure must be directly linked to the stated cause. A more balanced approach to the definition of a cause and to the search for crash countermeasures is needed, and the safe system approach appears to be a most promising one. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Traffic injuries remain a leading health concern in most low- and middle-income countries (LMICs). However, most LMICs have not established institutions that have the legislative mandate and financial resources necessary to coordinate large-scale interventions. Argentina provides a counterexample. Argentina is a federal country where the decentralization of authority to provincial governments was a key barrier to effective national interventions. In 2008, Argentina passed a law establishing a national road safety agency and subsequently received a World Bank loan to build the agency's capacity to coordinate actions. Although traffic injuries in Argentina have not yet begun to decline, these developments raise important questions:Why did Argentina come to view road safety as aproblem?Why was institutional reform the chosen solution? What was the political process for achieving reform? What are the broader implications for institutional reform in LMICs?We explore these questions using a descriptive case study (single-case, holistic design) of Argentina. The case illustrates that focusing events, like the Santa Fe tragedy that killed nine children, and advocacy groups are important for raising political attention and creating an opportunity for legislative reform. It highlights the importance of policy entrepreneurs who used the opportunity to push through new legislation. Though the political dynamic was predominantly local, international actors worked with local advocates to build demand for safety and develop solutions that could be deployed when the opportunity arose. Most important, the case emphasizes the importance of developing institutions with the resources and authority necessary for managing national road safety programs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

• Maximum delta-v and impact speed can both predict occupant MAIS2 + F injury risk. • Both predictors were significant in frontal vehicle-vehicle head-on crashes. • Impact speed was not significant in frontal vehicle-barrier and front-to-side crashes. • The US and Sweden have similar occupant and vehicle characteristics. • The US injury risk curves appear suitable to guide safe speed definitions in Sweden. Vision Zero is an approach to road safety that aims to eliminate all traffic-induced fatalities and lifelong injuries. To reach this goal, a multi-faceted safe system approach must be implemented to anticipate and minimize the risk associated with human mistakes. One aspect of a safe system is choosing speed limits that keep occupants within human biomechanical limits in a crash scenario. The objective of this study was to relate impact speed and maximum delta-v to risk of passenger vehicle (passenger cars and light trucks and vans) occupants sustaining a moderate to fatal injury (MAIS2+F) in three crash modes: head-on vehicle-vehicle, frontal vehicle–barrier, and front-to-side vehicle-vehicle crashes. Data was extracted from the Crash Investigation Sampling System, and logistic regression was used to construct the injury prediction models. Impact speed was a statistically significant predictor in head-on crashes, but was not a statistically significant predictor in vehicle-barrier or front–to–side crashes. Maximum delta-v was a statistically significant predictor in all three crash modes. A head-on impact speed of 62 km/h yielded 50% (±27%) risk of moderate to fatal injury for occupants at least 65 years old. A head-on impact speed of 82 km/h yielded 50% (±31%) risk of moderate to fatal injury for occupants younger than 65 years. Compared to the impact speeds, the maximum delta-v values yielding the same level of risk were lower within the head-on crash population. A head-on delta-v of 40 km/h yielded 50% (±21%) risk of moderate to fatal injury for occupants at least 65 years old. A head-on delta-v of 65 km/h yielded 50% (±33%) risk of moderate to fatal injury for occupants younger than 65 years. A maximum delta–v value of approximately 30 km/h yielded 50% (±42%) risk of MAIS2+F injury for passenger car occupants in vehicle-vehicle front-to-side crashes. A maximum delta–v value of approximately 44 km/h yielded 50% (±24%) risk of MAIS2+F injury for light truck and van occupants, respectively, in vehicle-vehicle front-to-side crashes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

• The role Safe System plays in Victoria's public policy environment has been under-researched. • Safe System forms an implicit part of the policy development process. • Victoria has partially integrated Safe System into its policy environment. • Consistent, dedicated application of Safe System into road safety policy is required. The Safe System approach has globally become the dominant means to address road trauma, with bodies such as the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, European Union, World Bank, World Health Organization, National and State Australian Governments and the United Nations encouraging its uptake. However, whilst there has been significant growth in its application, limited attention has been paid to the extent to which Safe System is integrated into public policy. Anecdotally, as an early adopter of the Safe System approach, Victoria's experience acts an instructive case for other jurisdictions applying the concept to policy. Using an interpretive qualitative case study approach, this study explored whether a) Safe System has influenced Victoria's road safety policy development to date, and b) if the extent to which Safe System has been integrated into public policy. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with Victoria's strategic, government-based, road safety decision-makers. Interviews were structured around the World Health Organization's Policy Development Process framework. The results indicate that Safe System has an implicit role in Victoria's road safety policy. When viewed through the lens of a policy integration framework, the analysis found only partial integration of the Safe System concept within road safety policy in Victoria, with limited flow-on effects of the framework on the policy frame, subsystems, goals and instruments. Governance frameworks, management structures and policy objectives are all influenced by Safe System, with the road safety problem having clearly been established as a cross-cutting issue. However, additional refinement of policy instruments to articulate the role of Safe System as well actively employing the approach in the policy development process is required. These findings confirm that while Victoria's use of Safe System is noteworthy, it may be beneficial for the framework to feature more prominently in policy for it to have the intended effect on road safety. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]