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In this paper, a supply chain including a farmer, a dairy manufacturer, and consumers is considered in which a particular product is sold through two channels, i.e., formal and informal. In the former, the dairy manufacturer buys the dairy product at a wholesale price from the farmer and sells it to consumers, whereas in the latter, the farmer sells the product directly to consumers. The farmer may add a sort of chemical additive to the product in order to increase its demand in either channel. This may be discovered only if a product safety accident happens. Furthermore, the government, as a regulator, plays an integral role in preventing the production and consumption of contaminated food. We aim to investigate the behavior of players in this supply chain and decide about safety issues and the wholesale price of the product using the game theory approach. To this end, four scenarios, including centralized structure, decentralized structure, cost-sharing contract, and safety guarantee contract, are examined. The experimental results reveal that by enacting appropriate laws, the government can prevent the supply chain players from utilizing unauthorized chemical additives. Furthermore, it is shown that the safety guarantee contract can improve the safety level of the product, which is always at a higher level in the formal channel than in the informal one. It was also revealed that fining the farmer has a greater impact on product safety than fining the manufacturer. Moreover, the farmer has less tendency to use chemical additives when the costs of the product and chemical additives are high or additives pose a high risk to consumers whereas higher product prices tempt the farmer to utilize more additives. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the current study, a supply chain structure is considered consisting of duopolistic manufacturers and monopolistic retailer. In the considered structure, the manufacturers product two substitutable products and deliver them to end customers. One of the manufacturers sells his/her products only through the common retailer whereas another one sells directly to customers as well as through the common retailer. Obviously, a competitive behavior is established in order to price the products under the considered supply chain. In this point of view, a game-theoretic approach is applied including Nash, Manufacturers-Stackelberg, and Retailer-Stackelberg games to analyze the pricing decisions. Then, the equilibrium strategies obtained from the investigated games are discussed and some insights are presented. The results indicate that Manufacturers-Stackelberg and Nash games respectively lead to the highest and the lowest profits for the manufacturers and the whole system. Furthermore, the highest profit for the common retailer is obtained from Retailer-Stackelberg game. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In recent years, the concept of sustainability has attracted a great amount of attention, due to increasing energy resources scarceness. Waste recycling is known as an efficient approach to improve sustainability and save energy. In this view, a sustainable supply chain is established in the current study to investigate the effects of waste recycling on sustainable development. The considered supply chain consists of the government, two manufacturers, a supplier, a waste depot, and a recycler. Under this structure, two substitutable products are made of the virgin and recyclable waste materials. The supplier provides the virgin materials for the first product. The waste depot collects the non-recycled waste, whereas the recycler recycles it and supplies the recycled waste for the second product. Also, the government supports the second product to provide an incentive for its members to collect and recycle more waste. Then, the game theory is applied to make decisions under the considered structure. Finally, the results are revealed and some managerial insights are provided. It is derived that the governmental supportive policies play a significant role in resources conservation and energy storage. Moreover, increasing the quality of the product made of the recyclable waste improves the government's utility., Competing Interests: Declaration of conflicting interestsThe authors declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.