Search

According to Turkish journalist Ismail Saymaz, Syrian refugees have turned Turkey into a 'three-ring circus.' He may have meant it ironically, but in fact, they have -literally. The Syrian civil [...]

After reviewing recent literature on international organizations' autonomy and co-operation, this article explores the unprecedented partnership between the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons--implementing body for the Chemical Weapons Convention--and the UN Secretariat during the 2013-2014 chemical weapons disarmament in Syria. The article explores how this collaboration, embodied on the ground through the creation of a Joint Mission, evolved from hesitant, bureaucratic rivalry to an increasingly intense relationship in the aftermath of a large-scale attack near Damascus in August 2013. The research is based on wide-ranging interviews with senior OPCW and UN staff, and relevant state officials. The article shows how international shocks, high-level support from key Member States, and leadership at the Secretariat level produced requisite intra- and interorganizational consensus to mitigate turf wars. Relative autonomy of mission staff and bureaucratic flexibility further allowed skilled boundary spanners to build trust and increase the mission's leeway, allowing it to navigate complex political challenges. Keywords international organizations--interorganizational cooperation--United Nations--Security Council--Syria--chemical weapons--disarmament--OPCW, When governments decide to use intergovernmental organizations, they work. (1) 1 Introduction During a 2016 visit by UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon to the headquarters of the Organization for the Prohibition [...]

This commentary provides an analysis of the Turkeys relations with the U.S. and Russia in the context of the Syrian civil war. Owing much to the dynamics of the Syrian civil war and the American support to the PYD/YPG, Ankara has recently made considerable changes in its foreign policy and its relations with Washington and Moscow. As the U.S. government has failed to understand Turkey's security concerns, Turkey, despite being a NATO member, now seems to be closer to Moscow than to Washington., Although a member of NATO, which continues to stress its attachment to the alliance, in several policy areas Turkey is now closer to Moscow than to Washington. This paradox has [...]

The exodus of around 5 million people from Syria has evolved into a transnational 'social question', requiring a transnational response. The latest Syrian assault on Idlib in February 2020, creating one of the worst humanitarian crises of this brutal civil war, brought this to the world's attention again. Highlighting the scale of this 'social question' on the eve of a Covid-19 pandemic, it shows that displaced Syrians of Idlib had been trapped between the advancing Syrian regime and Russian troops. In response, Turkey, already hosting almost 3.5 million Syrians and closing its border in 2015 to prevent a further influx, let refugees – Syrians and migrants from other countries – head for the EU. Aiming to cajole the EU into heeding its demands, Turkey linked this to its Syria cause. Once again, the latest crisis showed that Turkey had reached the limit of its capacity to absorb more Syrians. This paper deals with Turkey's response and alternatives for the most relevant stakeholder, the EU. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Alliances under unipolarity operate with different logic than under bipolarity. Unipolarity makes the twin dangers of abandonment and entrapment more likely for the weaker states that need the unipole for the pursuit of their regional security interests. The article takes the US-Turkish relations within the context of Syrian conflict as exemplary and shows how the strategic discrepancies between the US-Turkish positions paved the way for Turkey's abandonment in Syria. The article concludes that the unipole's strategic alliance commitments are no longer reliable for regional allies to assume risky regional restructuring roles as they face the risk of abandonment on the halfway. Keywords: Alliances, Unipolarity the US, Turkey Syria Itifaklarin tek kutuplulukta isleyis mantiklari iki kutupluluktakinden farklidir. Tek kutupluluk, guvenlik cikarlari icin tek kutup-devletin destegine ihtiyaci olan zayif mutefiki terkedilme ve tuzaga dusurulme ikiz tehlikelerine daha cok maruz birakmaktadir. Bu makale, Suriye krizi baglaminda Turk-Amerikan iliskilerini tek kutupluluk altinda itifak iliskilerinin bir ornegi olarak ele almakta ve Turkiye'nin Suriye politikasinda stratejik mutefikince nasil terkedildigini anlatmaktadir. Sonuc olarak makale, tek kutup-devletin itifakina veya diplomatik taahhutlerine tam olarak guvenilemeyecegi savina dayanarak tek kutup-devlete bagli bolgesel yapilandirma girisimleri gibi riskli guvenlik politikalarinin yari yolda birakilma tehlikesini eskisine gore daha yuksek oranda barindirdiginin altini cizmektedir. Anahtar Kelimeler: Ittifaklar, Tek kutupluluk, ABD, Turkiye, Suriye, Under unipolarity, the reliability and credibility of the alliances are at stake as the fulfillment of the commitments is at discretion of the unipole. (1) Differently from alliances under bipolarity, [...]

Over the past fifteen years, nation branding has become a popular subject of study, and a formative enterprise in the creation of national character. The aim of nation branding is to create positive feelings in people's minds toward the economic, political, social and geographical conditions of a nation. The aim of this paper is to examine the role of TIKA in the context of Turkey's nation branding in general, with special attention to the Syrian refugee crisis. Further, this paper aims to explain the effects of the Turkish humanitarian assistance process on the Syrian people who live in Turkey as refugees, and to bring a nation branding perspective to how and why nations pay attention to public diplomacy in their attempts to keep their national image strong., The Relationship between Nation Branding and Humanitarian Assistance Nation branding is an important concept in today's world; it can be described as the increase in a country's positive recognizability in [...]

The Levant has constituted one of the core areas of interest for US foreign policy since the Second World War. The aim of this article is to shed light on the US policies towards the Levant, mostly during the last two American administrations, to understand how the vicissitudes of the region and of American politics made Washington's policy towards the Levant look biased, at times incompetent, and most importantly inconsistent. This article examines the changes in approach to the region as a whole from one administration to the next on issues such as the protection of Israel's sovereignty, supporting friendly regimes, fighting terrorism, and containing Iran. The hesitations and shifts in policy towards Syria are given a longer treatment as they speak both to the yet not finalized American policy towards the Levant but also to show how the US has shifted track and moved away from unseating President Assad to focus more on containing and ifpossible rolling over Iran.Keywords: Levant, Middle East, US Foreign Policy, the Syrian Uprising, Post- Islamic StateLevant bolgesi, Ikinci Dunya Savasi'ndan bu yana ABD dis politikasinin oncelikli cikar alanlarindan birini olusturmaktadir. Bu makalenin amaci, ABD'nin, bilhassa da son iki Amerikan yonetiminin, Levant'a yonelik politikalarini acikliga kavusturmayi, bolgede ve Amerikan siyasetindeki degisimlerin Washington'un Levant'a yonelik politikasinin nasil yanli, zaman zaman beceriksiz ve daha da onemlisi tutarsiz gorunmesine neden oldugunu anlamayi hedeflemektedir. Makale, bir yonetimden digerine Israil'in egemenliginin korunmasi, dostane rejimlerin desteklenmesi, terorizmle mucadele ve Iran'in kontrol altina alinmasi gibi konularda ve genel itibariyle bolgeye yonelik yaklasimdaki degisiklikleri incelemektedir. Suriye'ye yonelik politikadaki tereddutler ve degisimler daha detayli ele alinmistir. Nitekim bu konular Amerika'nin Levant'a yonelik politikasinin henuz son halini almadiginin, daha da otesinde gelismeler karsisinda ABD'nin nasil yon degistirdigini ve Esad'i yerinden etme hedefinden uzaklasarak Iran'i kontrol altina alma ve eger mumkunse boyun egdirmeye odaklandigina isaret etmektedir.Anahtar Kelimeler: Levant, Orta Dogu, ABD Dis Politikasi, Suriye Ayaklanmasi, Islamcilik Sonrasi Devlet, IntroductionThe term Levant, which derives from the Italian Levante, meaning the rising of the sun in the east, is used to refer to the eastern part of the Mediterranean that [...]

This article examines the policies of the Russian Federation in the Levant region against the backdrop of dramatic global, regional and domestic changes. Russia's strategy is analyzed through the prism of the Syrian and the Palestinian-Israeli conflicts. The Syrian conflict marks Moscow's new activist policy in the region. On the one hand, it has provided for the astonishing diversification of its relations with the various Middle East actors, Turkey, Iran, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Hamas, to name just a few. On the other hand, Moscow, striving for a new world order, has been faced with the fact that despite its cooperation with the US in Syria the two countries' approach to solving international problems are so distinct that even a fight against terrorism could not mend their relationship. The Palestinian-Israeli conflict has always been perceived in Russia as the key factor in explaining the instability in the region. Russia's participation in the international structures dealing with the conflict resolution has been motivated primarily by a search for peace in the area. Instrumentally, Russia has always sought to keep open at least some channels of cooperation with the West, as these serve as a crucial means for decreasing international tensions.Keywords: Russia, Terrorism, Regime Change, De-escalation Zones, De-confliction.Bu makale kuresel, bolgesel ve ulusal degisimler baglaminda Rusya Federasyonu'nun Levant bolgesine yonelik politikalarini incelemektedir. Rusya'nin stratejisi Suriye ve Filistin-Israil catismalari odakli olarak analiz edilmektedir. Suriye catismasi Moskova'nin bolgede yeni ve eyleme donuk politikalarina isaret etmektedir. Bu durum, bir taraftan Rusya'nin Orta Dogu'da Turkiye, Iran, Israil, Suudi Arabistan ve Hamas benzeri farkli aktorlerle iliskilerini cesitlendirmesine neden oldu. Yeni bir dunya duzeni arayisindaki Moskova, diger taraftan, Suriye'de ABD ile yurutulen isbirligine ragmen, iki ulkenin uluslararasi sorunlara cozum bulma yaklasimlarinin birbirinden cok farkli oldugu ve terorizmle mucadele yaklasiminin dahi iliskileri iyilestirmeye yetmedigi gercegiyle yuzlesti. Filistin-Israil catismasi Rusya tarafindan her zaman bolgedeki istikrarsizligi aciklayan ana faktor olarak algilandi. Rusya'nin catisma cozumuyle ilgilenen uluslararasi kuruluslara katilimi, agirlikli olarak bolgede baris arayisi cercevesinde gerceklesti. Bu cercevede Rusya Bati'yla iliskilerinin devamliligi adina, en azindan aracsal olarak uluslararasi gerilimin azaltilmasina katki sagladigina inandigi bazi isbirligi kanallarinin acik kalmasini saglamaya calismistir.Anahtar Kelimeler: Rusya, Terorizm, Rejim Degisikligi, Catismasizlik Bolgeleri, Catismayi Onleme., IntroductionRussia's interests in the Levant cannot be separated from its global interests and calculations. The increasingly diverged interpretation of national sovereignty, territorial integrity, and the role of military interference as [...]

This article examines the 2009–2015 peace process between Turkey and the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK). It draws from conflict resolution literature to present the five transformers framework that is used to analyse the main transformations the Kurdish conflict in Turkey has undergone during the past two decades. The article argues that the peace process was not an outcome of external intervention but was an organic process derived of powerful, post-nationalist intellectual leadership where strategic calculations about the benefits of peace motivated dialogue. It concludes that the peace process collapsed due to context and structural transformations following war in Syria and Iraq that empowered the Kurdish PKK movement in a sudden, rapid and large fashion. The result caused strong Turkish fears about implications to status quo. In the end, the parties returned to war in order to gain more control and concessions from future negotiations. Concurring with the authors of the five transformers framework, the personal tranformation of a leader strengthens potential for dialogue when they have a change of heart about how to resolve the conflict. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Turkey is home to 1.2 million child refugees whom has been the most vulnerable since the beginning of the Syrian conflict, which is considered to be the worst humanitarian crisis of this century. More than 50% of school age child refugees are out of school (UNICEF, 2017) in Turkey. This paper reports one of the findings of a case study of a temporary non-formal education project (Learning Turkish) (1), that focused on supporting 4-6-year-old Syrian children with Turkish language and literacy development. The purpose of the paper is to focus on the teachers' and administrators' experiences in learning to teach young refugees in the time of crisis. Data sources include in-person interviews and observations. Findings from this study confirm that in times of crisis teachers and administrators focus on being in the moment, teaching in the moment and learning to teach refugee children. Teachers and administrators reported that the experience in this project contributed to their teaching and personal development and enhanced their civic responsibility and personal growth. This study also confirmed that improvements are needed in making schooling available to all refugee children and training teachers to work with students who have experienced trauma. One of the limitations of the project was its unsustainability due to funding. The paper concludes with implications for educational policy makers and non-formal education providers.KeywordsRefugee education, non-formal education, early childhood, language learning, IntroductionUNHCR identified Turkey as the country hosting the largest number of refugees worldwide. As of January 2018, Turkey was a home to 3.46 million Syrian refugees (UNHCR, 2018). Of the [...]

The seemingly discordant literary imagery of Ps 110 has been a point of contention for scholars. Many have been troubled by the reference to king as priest in verse 4 since the psalm is otherwise dominated by imagery of the deity at war and the king enthroned over his enemies. Arguments over this verse have drawn data primarily from biblical texts and from other ancient Near Eastern literature. Scholars employ various methodologies to make sense of this verse and its imagery. Some resolve this crux by claiming that warfare and priesthood were integrated within the role of the king in the ancient Near East. Others argue that the roles of king and priest were not connected in ancient Israel. Still others contend that, even if such a connection existed, it would not have been emphasized in a royal psalm until after the exile when the position of priest became far more important than in earlier periods. A turn to ancient Near Eastern iconographic data provides new insight on this discussion. This article demonstrates that constellations of priestly, royal, and violent imagery in ancient Near Eastern iconography assist us in understanding the literary imagery presented by Ps 110. This article, then, contributes to the understanding of the literary image of the king in Ps 110:4, while also clarifying the interconnection between the roles of kingship and priesthood in ancient Syria-Palestine. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses Turkey's venture into Syria to create a safe zone. It mentions about effort to silence and resettle the undesired and unwanted Syrian refugees in Turkey to Northern Syrian territories currently occupied by a confident Syrian Kurdish political movement that had recently helped defeat the Islamic State threat.

Much has been made of the once brotherly relationship between Syrian President Bashar al Assad and the Turkish President Recep Teyep Erdogan. Indeed, this relationship formed the bedrock of Turkey's much-vaunted move towards the Arab world and its re-engagement with regions on which Ataturk and his successive Kemalist Generals had shut a door. Yet, more than fifteen years after the historic first visits by the Turkish and Syrian leaders to each other's capitals, the Syria-Turkey relationship lies in ruins. Whilst much of the focus of the war in Syria has been on the exaggerated sectarian divide in the Middle East and the great power rivalry between the United States and Russia, a key aspect overlooked is the fundamental relationship between Turkey and Syria. The last two decades of this relationship have been defined by Assad and Erdogan. As Turkey slowly begins to re-engage with Syria one can trace the tumultuous relationship between the two neighbours in the immediate aftermath of the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire. The Arab nationalists and Turkish nationalists have been at daggers drawn over the make up of the border. Syria has never forgotten the land-grab of the Turks in the aftermath of the French exit of the Levant. Furthermore, the diverse set of communities – the Greeks, the Armenians, the Kurds and the Syriacs – that make up the inhabitants of the region still suffer from the effects of the mismanagement of the French exit and what is seen by many of these communities as an illegal annexation by Turks and Arabs. However, under the Syrian Arab Republic the Christians of all denominations including the Armenians and Greeks flourished whilst Turkey forced only one identity upon its once diverse people. This article will argue that the relationship between Syria and Turkey has ebbed and flowed – and this dynamic is rooted in history where successive Turkic dynasties have favoured Syria as their pivot to control the region. Similarly, when Syria became less important, the very foundation of the Turkic and later Turkish influence became weak in the region. The close relationship between Erdogan and Assad overturned more than six decades of animosity, but once Erdogan turned his back to Assad and supported the overthrow of the Syrian government the relationship fell apart. As the end of the war nears, a defining factor to end this war will be how Turkey and Syria reconcile or interact. The Syrian Kurds now seem to be back in Assad's corner as they prefer to be under Damascus' sovereignty then under attack from Ankara across the border. The Kurdish question is of significant value to both Syria and Turkey; it has been a major reason for both countries to be at peace and war. A closer look at the history of these two countries' relationship proves that the Assad-Erdogan relationship has mirrored the history of the two states since the fall of the Ottoman Empire. Their future in more than one way is now inter-twined on how they interact with each other. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper analyses the alliance between Syria and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia during the years 1970–1989. The relations between the two Arab powers were characterized by cooperation and support amid ideological and 'structural' differences. This was a stark contrast with the conflictual relations of the previous decade. The change was driven mainly by a reshaping in Syria's regional policy. The new 'realist' foreign policy imposed by Hafiz Al-Assad created an overlapping of interests between Syria and the KSA. Riyadh valued Syria's role in the region and used its support of Damascus vis-à-vis Israel as a tool to obtain domestic and regional legitimacy. On the other hand, Syria benefited from the KSA's generous economic and diplomatic help. This study will use an approach based on neoclassical realism to show how domestic and international factors led to these changes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Information is provided about United States, Israel and the Palestinians discussed at a symposium convened by the Middle East Policy Council held on October 25, 2019 . Topics include the shift of focus in middle east issues from the Arab-Israeli conflict to other issues in the region such as internal conflicts among Syria and Yemen, and protests in Iraq and Lebanon, possibility of two-state solutions for Palestine, and captivity of Palestinians in West Bank and Jerusalem.

The Syrian conflict is a very complex war that draws the entire world's attention. Understanding the Syrian war is not easy because it is not a conventional war between two visible enemies. The on-going civil war in Syria arose first internally as a civil war in the wake of the Arab Spring and became a multisided complex war with many external actors and motives involved. However, in every kind of hostility, it is always the civilians who suffer greatest losses. In order to prevent such disastrous wars in the future, it is important to understand the basic underlying reasons that paved the way for the Syrian crises. This article analyzes the Syrian crises through two lenses, an inside-out and an outside-in approach, to determine which is the more important to focus on to improve the Syrian situation and to prevent such chaos elsewhere in the future. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the past seven years, the massive influx of Syrian refugees into Lebanon has placed the country and its people under significant political, socio-economic, and humanitarian stress, where now one [...]

This article examines the role of Iran in post-2003 Iraq and in the ongoing Syrian conflict. It also investigates and analyses Iran's political strategy in relation to both countries. The aim is to assess Iran's foreign policy and its use of proxy warfare in Iraq and Syria in order to identify Iran's strategic goals in these two countries and in the Middle East in general. It also attempts to analyse the actions and reactions of Iran's regional rivals, namely Saudi Arabia and Qatar. The article argues that the religious affiliation of the Syrian and Iraqi regimes, and their strategic location connecting Iran to Hezbollah, are the most significant driving forces behind Iran's involvement in Syria and Iraq. Also, the article argues that Iraq is a political tool used by Iran to advance its regional power ambition in order to keep the balance of power in the Middle East. To achieve this goal, Iran aims to create a parallel army in Syria and Iraq similar to its own, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Key Words: Iran, Iraq, Syria, Sunni, Shia, Iran's Foreign Policy, Sectarianism, Balance of Power, Proxy war, After its creation by Britain in 1921, Iraq was ruled by the minority Arab-Sunnis who make up 20 percent of Iraq's population. The regime lasted until 2003 when the United [...]

The article argues that sovereignty claims and counterclaims are still very much at work in international and civil conflicts involving state actors. Focusing on the case of the Syrian conflict, the article engages in methodological triangulation using Critical Discourse Analysis and international relations theories. It finds that the sovereignty-first narrative adopted by Syrian President Bashar al-Assad's regime, and its external allies such as Russia, has built an 'effective' discourse that has been adopted in a coherent, consistent, and resonant manner, as well as a 'credible' discourse which combined words with actions (i.e. performatives and constatives of sovereignty). The effectiveness and credibility of the sovereignty-first narrative is also judged by the absence of effective and credible contending narratives demonstrated by the tepid application of concepts like the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) by the United States and its European allies. In making these comparisons, the Syrian conflict can be contextualised by relating it to the Arab Spring and geopolitical shifts in international affairs. It is within this contextualisation that the article demonstrates broader claims about the endurance of the 'territorial state' in the Middle East. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The main focal point in this study analyzing the change of Turkey-Syria relations during the Arab Spring is the agent-structure problem. The change that took place in Turkey-Syria relations is analyzed in the light of "the beginning of the demonstrations in Daraa and the Siege of Hama", "shooting down of Turkish RF-4E reconnaissance aircraft", "violation of rules of engagement", and "Operation Euphrates Shield" in the framework of Dynamic Foreign Policy Analysis Model (DFPAM) developed by Carlsnaes based on Margaret Archer's Morphogenetic Approach. It is concluded that Turkey's Syria policy changed in the process as a result of the interaction with the "structure" and that these foreign policy actions led to a new structuring at the same time. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the implications of relations between Syria and Turkey and the former's conflict for latter's border security. In addition to defending the its border, Turkey organized several border-securing operations in order to prevent spillover from the Syrian conflict. The article further states that both the countries were involved into a water-sharing dispute over cross-border river flows and a territorial dispute over Hatay.

This article addresses the Justice and Development Party's economic rapprochement towards Syria since 2002. While, the literature tackling the Turkish economic foreign policy has mainly focused on the reasons behind the rise of Turkey's trade, this study argues that Turkey's economic policy contributed to the alleviation of the Hatay issue, a historical territorial conflict that marked bilateral relations for long decades. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The employment of diverse forms of security and control on territorial borders have led to the production of numerous events of border crossings, smuggling, banditry and death along with stories of separation, loss, mourning, pain, and yearning in the everyday life of border people. The Naqshbandi Khaznavi order has an expansive interpersonal social network across the political borders of Turkish and Syrian nation-states. This work analyzes the ways in which Sufis dealt with diverse aspects of the Turkish-Syrian border by unbinding shackles and orders of political system that were fabricated constantly from the 1920s to the early 1980s. The life stories and narratives of the Sufis document the existence of a religious-cultural landscape, diversifying the perception of place, time and fear which have transcended political borders for decades, contradicting official cartographic imagination and the modern-secular understanding of place and time. Besides, in addition to analyses of religious orders as social, economic and political entities, this work aims to elucidate emotional aspects of relations and faith that coexist between Sufis and their Sheikh in the context of spatial distance, political border and fear of death. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Syrian civil war exacerbated sectarian divisions between the Alawite-ruled Syrian government and Syria's Sunni population, straining also the relations between the Sunni majority and Alawite and Alevi minorities of the neighboring Turkey. The Alawites and Alevis of Turkey were predominantly supporting Syria's president Bashar al-Asad, while the Turkish government greatly supported the Sunni insurgents of Syria. The paper aims at examining how Alawites and Alevis have influenced the relations between Turkey and Syria in the light of the Syrian civil war, the reasons behind the sympathy of Alevis for the Syrian government and the implications that Turkey's Syria policy has had domestically. It finds that the Alevi / Alawite factor has had some restraining effects on Turkey's antagonistic policy towards Syria. In the introductory part, the article touches upon the differences and the similarities between Alevis and Alawites, then it analyzes the developments in regards Turkey's policy towards the Syrian crisis that were also reflected in Ankara's domestic policy vis-à-vis its Alevi and Alawite minorities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses relations between Syria and Iraq by referring to its importance in politics for Arab countries, the Iran-Iraq War period from 1980-88, and factors that determined the conflict between Syria and Iraq. Topics discussed include Syrian-Iraqi relations when Saddam Hussein, former President of Iraq, and Hafez al-Assad, former President of Syria, were in power, foreign-policy agendas of Syria and Iraq, and the behavior of Presidents Hussein and Assad during the Iran-Iraq War.

This article looks at Russia’s exercise of power politics in Ukraine and Syria as a way of improving its international status. Russia’s recent willingness to use power and coercion is theoretically counterintuitive as it appears to be in dissonance with the prevalent characterisation of the country as a status-overachieving inconsistent power. We argue that this behaviour is not the result of a consistent weighing of status against capabilities, but rather reflective of both internal and external dynamics. We analyse issues of identity, opportunity and costs as factors that influence Russian foreign action, showing that power politics will not solve Russia’s status-inconsistency problem in the long run. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of History Studies (13094688) is the property of History Studies and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

One morning last summer, the former East German city of Chemnitz awoke to discover that history had returned. In the aftermath of the annual festival to celebrate Chemnitz's founding, a [...]

ABSTRACT In the aftermath of the victory by pro-Syrian government forces in Aleppo in December 2016, many see an opportunity for a political resolution to the Syrian civil war. Although [...]