Search

Control banding (CB) strategies offer simplified solutions for controlling worker exposures to constituents found in the workplace. CB is a risk assessment and control process developed by industrial hygienists that is utilized primarily for reducing work-related chemical exposures and has become an important component for identifying and evaluating hazards in laboratories. This process qualitatively generates exposure scenarios according to a "banding" principle. Due to the inherent simplicity of the modern CB approaches, toolkits that address chemical use and exposure reduction with these principles have gained international support. Our question is whether the CB principles might also apply to occupational safety as an accident prevention approach. For safety, probably "barrier banding" (BB) is a better title. Although the development of injury prevention toolkits is a proper goal for BB, some research is necessary before a similar success can be achieved as CB. The excellent efforts of the Workgroup Occupational Risk Model (WORM) research team have generated a number of considerations for BB research. Among these are developing safety exposure limits and time-weighted exposure principles that can be derived for a more aggregated level industry like construction. Optimizing a singular approach for both work-related injury and illness prevention in industry requires a simplified and multidisciplinary strategy utilizing a common risk communication language that CB and BB might provide. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A Safety Research project was carried out in an ammonia plant of OCI Nitrogen, located at the Chemelot site in Geleen, The Netherlands. This research focused on the development of a method to monitor accident processes in the chemical industry mainly caused by mechanical integrity of static equipment like vessels, tanks and heat exchangers. A significant part of the mechanical integrity failure scenarios originates from material degradation and corrosion mechanisms which may develop over a relatively long-time period, possibly taking months, years or even longer. Mechanical failure scenarios from two process units have been worked out and visualized using a bowtie. The research project shows that the monitoring of early warnings can provide information about the current development of mechanical failure scenarios. In addition, early warnings can be used to initiate inspections if there is a likelihood that the mechanical failure scenario has been activated. Considering the shift from breakdown maintenance to preventive and predictive maintenance and risk-based inspection (RBI), inspections based on early warnings could also be a new step in the field of maintenance efficiency. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Control banding (CB) strategies offer simplified solutions for controlling worker exposures to constituents found in the workplace. CB is a risk assessment and control process developed by industrial hygienists that is utilized primarily for reducing work-related chemical exposures and has become an important component for identifying and evaluating hazards in laboratories. This process qualitatively generates exposure scenarios according to a “banding” principle. Due to the inherent simplicity of the modern CB approaches, toolkits that address chemical use and exposure reduction with these principles have gained international support. Our question is whether the CB principles might also apply to occupational safety as an accident prevention approach. For safety, probably “barrier banding” (BB) is a better title. Although the development of injury prevention toolkits is a proper goal for BB, some research is necessary before a similar success can be achieved as CB. The excellent efforts of the Workgroup Occupational Risk Model (WORM) research team have generated a number of considerations for BB research. Among these are developing safety exposure limits and time-weighted exposure principles that can be derived for a more aggregated level industry like construction. Optimizing a singular approach for both work-related injury and illness prevention in industry requires a simplified and multidisciplinary strategy utilizing a common risk communication language that CB and BB might provide. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

• 1980s and 1990s are a very productive years regarding safety theories, models and metaphors. • All theories, models and metaphors emphasize organisational aspects of major accidents. • The context is dynamic, a retreating government and a strong market and technology influence. • Safety science does not yet have a unifying theory or model, reflecting its young age as a science. • Many companies suffer from sloppy management, with a limited insight into possible disaster scenario's. What is the influence of general management trends and safety research on managing safety? A literature study which is limited to original English and Dutch books, documents, and articles in relevant scientific journals, for the period 1988–2010. Safety science does not yet have a unifying theory, which betrays its young age as a scientific discipline. In the period concerned, well-known theories, models and metaphors are established or re-issued, including the High Reliability Theory, the Man-Made Disasters and the corresponding Disaster Incubation Theory, and the Normal Accident Theory. The Swiss cheese metaphor takes its final form, the bowtie metaphor and the Drift into Danger model are published. All these theories, models and metaphors emphasize organisational aspects of major accidents in high-tech-high-hazard sectors. General management trends highlight the importance of external stakeholders, which are only reflected in the Drift into Danger metaphor. These developments must be considered in the context of a dynamic influence of external factors, like a decrease in government influence coinciding with strong market and technology developments, which can conflict with safety requirements for high-tech-high-hazard companies. Organisational/safety culture and risk/safety management systems take off during this period, both in terms of academic research and consultancy activities for companies. Whether these concepts will have a lasting influence on safety levels in companies is yet to be seen, given the unclear relationship with major accident processes. Research findings show that many companies suffer from sloppy management, having only a limited insight into possible disaster scenarios. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

• No new theories are published on accident processes of occupational accidents. • Accident models, metaphors explain occupational accidents within a socio-technical system. • Quality of safety management systems research is poor. • Organisational learning did not enter the occupational safety domain yet. • Safety culture and climate have no clear relation with accident processes. What is the influence of general management trends and research into causes of accidents on safety management? The literature study is limited to English and Dutch books, documents and articles in the scientific, professional, and technical literature from the period 1988–2010. Quite some developments occurred in the occupational safety domain. During the period concerned three models are developed, the Dutch Tripod Model, the Swedish Occupational Risk Unit Model (QARU), and the Dutch Occupational Risk Model (QRM), a barrier based model founded on the bowtie metaphor. These models address occupational accidents from different perspectives, and surprisingly similar factors. While terminology differs, these factors are called basic risk factors, situational, or management factors. Self-regulation of companies has been a strong stimulus for research on safety management systems and audits. Traditionally research in management related topics has not been part of safety research, and thus it has to be developed. While the quality of this type of research is rather low, a general structure of safety management systems is related to the Rhineland management concept. Such evidence is found in new management models such as the EFQM/INK and, to a lesser extent, Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR). While organisational learning, its quality and effectiveness on occupational safety is not researched in this period, research interests are focussing on other organisational aspects like safety culture and climate, including a renewed interest in human behaviour. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

• Review of knowledge development on complex domino accident processes. • Research is dominated by quantitative risk analyses, and models to calculate probabilities. • Research is closely related to political, and private decision making. • Research on barrier quality and quality of risk management is in its infancy. • Research on initiating scenarios as a starting point for domino-effects is necessary. Major accidents in Western countries, receiving a lot of media attention in the 1970s, are starting point for research into internal and external domino effects in the chemical and petrochemical sectors and clusters. Initially, these reports are published by government institutions and government-related research centres. With the upcoming quantitative risk analyses in the 1970s and 1980s, the so-called öcoloured books', published in the Netherlands, play a prominent role in quantifying these domino effects. Since the mid 1990s, the second European Seveso Directive encourages scientific research on domino effects, shown in substantially growth of academic publications on the topic. Research in Western countries is dominated by risk assessments, probabilities, and failure mechanisms are calculated for the complex phenomenon of domino effects and its consequences. Previous works are closely related to political, official and private decision-making. A transition towards risk management is still in its infancy. A future transition is necessary to understand initial scenarios as starting points for domino effects. In India a wake-up call for domino effects occurs in the mid-1990s. Chinese publications on domino effects in the international scientific press appear from the mid-2000s onwards. Due to a rapid industrialisation, the numbers in China country are overwhelming, versus chemical companies, as versus of many major accidents in this sector. This article will discuss results of research on domino effects, conducted in the period 1966–2018, as well as major determinants of these accident processes. Also present, and future transition in this research domain will be discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Major accidents in Western countries, receiving a lot of media attention in the 1970s, are starting point for research into internal and external domino effects in the chemical and petrochemical sectors and clusters. Initially, these reports are published by government institutions and government-related research centres. With the upcoming quantitative risk analyses in the 1970s and 1980s, the so-called ocoloured books', published in the Netherlands, play a prominent role in quantifying these domino effects. Since the mid 1990s, the second European Seveso Directive encourages scientific research on domino effects, shown in substantially growth of academic publications on the topic. Research in Western countries is dominated by risk assessments, probabilities, and failure mechanisms are calculated for the complex phenomenon of domino effects and its consequences. Previous works are closely related to political, official and private decision-making. A transition towards risk management is still in its infancy, A future transition is necessary to understand initial scenarios as starting points for domino effects. In India a wake-up call for domino effects occurs in the mid-1990s. Chinese publications on domino effects in the international scientific press appear from the mid-2000s onwards. Due to a rapid industrialisation, the numbers in China country are over-whelming, versus chemical companies, as versus of many major accidents in this sector. This article will discuss results of research on domino effects, conducted in the period 1966-2018, as well as major determinants of these accident processes. Also present, and future transition in this research domain will be discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Highlights • Dutch safety professionals have gone through major transformations. • From company safety inspectors in the 1920s, safety technicians in the 1950s. • In the 1970s safety officers are dealing with employee behaviour, and organisational aspects. • In the late 1990s safety services are privatized, and safety officers become to safety consultants. • There is a major gap between academic and professional developments in safety. Abstract The origin of occupational safety, as an area of main interest of the government, the industry, the unions, and scientists starts in the Netherlands at the end of the 19th century. Roughly in the same period occupational medicine becomes a separate domain. Only just after World War II are safety professionals organised in associations. Starting as a 'Club/werkgroep van veiligheidsinspecteurs' (Club/Working group of Company Safety Inspectors) in 1947, it changes in 1962 into the 'Nederlandse Vereniging van Veiligheidstechnici, NVVT' (Dutch Association of Safety Technicians). In 1978 there is another change into a professional association, and the 'Nederlandse Vereniging van Veiligheidskundigen, NVVK' (Dutch Association of Safety Professionals) is formed. In 1986 this association is transformed into a knowledge association, the 'Nederlandse Vereniging voor Veiligheidskunde, NVVK' (Dutch Association of Safety Science). Nowadays the NVVK is still a knowledge platform for and by safety experts in the Netherlands. The association is a network of 3000 safety experts in various disciplines and departments, and by far the biggest network of experts on working conditions in the Netherlands. The NVVK is actively involved in changes in legislation and regulations, and also represents the interests of members and safety experts in general. During these 71 years of organised safety professions, major changes in position and content have occurred. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Objective Which general management and safety models and theories trends influenced safety management in the period between Three Mile Island in 1979 and Piper Alpha in 1988? In which context did these developments took place and how did this influence Dutch safety domain? Method The literature study was limited to original English and Dutch documents and articles in scientific and professional literature during the period studied. Results and conclusions Models and theories of human errors, explaining occupational accidents were still popular in the professional literature. A system approach was introduced into mainstream safety science, starting in process safety, and subsequently moving into occupational safety. Accidents were thought to be the result of disturbances in a dynamic system, a socio-technical system, rather than just human error. Human errors were also perceived differently: they were no longer faults of people, but consequences of suboptimal interactions during process disturbances. In this period quality of safety research increased substantially, also in the Netherlands. Major disasters in the 1980s generated knowledge on process safety, and soon process safety outplaced developments in occupational safety, which had been leading before. Theories and models in this period had advanced sufficiently to explain disasters, but were still unable to predict probabilities and scenarios of future disasters. In the 1980s ‘latent errors’ appeared in safety literature, and in The Netherlands the concept of ‘impossible accidents' appeared. Safety management was strongly influenced by developments in quality management. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Objective This article discusses the rise of European postgraduate courses in safety science and the content and quality of the Management of Safety Health and Environment (MoSHE) course of Delft University of Technology. Materials and methods Literature search, document analysis, interviews. Results The different MoSHE years show a varied picture of this post academic program. In the Netherlands the course is unique with a central focus on risk management and sustainability, supported by scientific developments in the areas of safety, health, environment, organizational science and psychology. In all year-groups the quality of the course was assessed with a short questionnaire, collecting opinions of course members on individual presentations and the course as a whole. Quality of the course was regularly discussed through the contacts of the course coordinator with module leaders, and at meetings of course committees, and leading to changes in content of modules. After MoSHE 1 (1989), 14 (2008), and 17 (2012) the courses’ structure, organization and content was changed radically. Only, the quality system of the course remained implicit. Using the model of the European Foundation for Quality Management a first set-up for a quality system is presented. Over the years the academic nature of the program has changed substantially. This is one of the challenges for the future to find a balance between the domains taught and between an academic approach and practical skills. The course could benefit from a greater input of process safety and safety in high-tech-high-hazard sectors. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Objective What influence has research conducted by general management schools and safety research had upon the causes of accidents and disasters in relation to the managing of safety between 1970 and 1979? Method The study was confined to original articles and documents, written in English or Dutch from the period under consideration. For the Netherlands, the professional journal De Veiligheid (Safety) was consulted. Results and conclusions Dominant management approaches started with (1) classical management starting from the 19th century incorporating as a main component scientific management from the early 20th century. The interwar period saw the rise of (2) behavioural management which was based on behaviourism, this was followed by (3) quantitative management from the Second World War onwards. After the war it was (4) modern management that became important. A company was seen as an open system, interacting with an external environment with external stakeholders. These management schools of thought were not exclusive, but existed side by side in the period under consideration. Early in the 20th century, it was the U.S. ‘Safety First’ movement that marked the starting point of this knowledge development in the sphere of safety managing, with cost reduction and production efficiency as the key drivers. Psychological models and metaphors were used to explain accidents resulting from ‘unsafe acts’. Safety was managed by training and targeting reckless workers, all in line with scientific management. Supported by behavioural management, this approach remained dominant for many years until long after World War II. Influenced by quantitative management, potential and actual disasters occurring after the war led to two approaches; loss prevention (up-scaling in the process industry) and reliability engineering (inherently dangerous processes in the aerospace and nuclear sectors). The distinction between process safety and occupational safety became clear after the war when the two evolved as relatively independent domains. In occupational safety in the 1970s human error was thought to be symptomatic of mismanagement. The term ‘safety management’ was introduced to scientific safety literature alongside concepts such as loosely and tightly coupled processes, organizational culture, disaster incubation and the notion of mechanisms blinding organizations to portents of disaster scenarios. Loss prevention remained technically oriented. Until 1979 there was no clear link with safety management. Reliability engineering that was based on systems theory did have such a connection with the MORT technique that served as a management audit. The Netherlands mainly followed Anglo-Saxon developments. In the late 1970s, following international safety symposia in The Hague and Delft, independent research finally began in the Netherlands. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Highlights: [•] In safety science, the medical domain became dominant after WW II. [•] The theory of ‘task dynamics’, and the hazard-barrier-target model were developed. [•] Causes of accidents shifted from workers behavior to task and managerial causes. [•] Complexity in process and military industry created disasters and risk assessment tools. [•] Accident proneness remained popular in the professional safety domain. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Highlights: [•] Research of a tower crane accident in The Netherlands was conducted by the Dutch Safety Board. [•] The direct accident scenario is ‘load instability’. [•] The tower crane accident was a ‘normal accident’, caused by structural design errors. [•] A CE mark of the crane did not prevent the accident, neither did safety audits and inspections. [•] Once on the market there was no effective safety net to detect the defects. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Summary: The available literature on construction safety is not very optimistic about the chances of evidence-based safety in the construction industry exerting a positive influence. Many articles indicate that the structures and processes that are designed to ensure safety in the industry are poor. Safety management systems do not work, or are limited, the business processes executed are fragmentary, it is not clear who is responsible for safety and parties lower in the construction hierarchy tend to be saddled with the consequences. Safety detracts from the primary production process and is seen as a bureaucratic burden. But there are some positive developments as well. Lists of prevalent accident scenarios and central events are available and information is published on barrier failures. What is missing is a reliable exposure gauge of the relative importance of scenarios and the identification of pivotal events. The more clearly the cause-effect chains of accident processes can be recorded, the more specific the measures, solutions and interventions can be when it comes to avoiding or reducing the effects of accident scenarios. Audit methods have also been developed, such as the Safety Index, which can be used to not only negatively but also positively assess safety. Finally an approach that can best be described as ‘frappez toujours’ seems to yield noticeable results. In such cases it does not really matter what safety intitatives are taken. Simply highlighting the issue is a factor that can, in itself, have an effect. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Abstract: The education of safety professionals shows a high variety in their level of approved qualifications, ranging from a technician level up to university master courses, and more recently, doctoral programs. In European countries, it seems that there are some differences in what regards the characteristics of the courses. These may be due to national particularities and legal issues, but also to the nature of the institutions and people ‘behind’ the courses. This paper presents the results of a survey carried out in the scope of an European research project and it aims to provide a basic understanding of the range and diversity of the OHS post-graduation courses. With an estimated average answer rate of 50%, the survey has only included courses with more than 120 teaching hours, from a post-graduation level, and with complete programs. Results are presented for 90 courses, from 18 countries, mainly (84.4%) from universities. It is possible to highlight the fact that, as expected, the majority of the courses (59%) are Masters (or equivalent), and are organised primarily by Engineering, Applied Sciences and Management schools/faculties, which together accounted for nearly 65% of the courses. In what regards the adopted quality systems reported by respondents, there is a predominance (65.8%) of the use of “internal” tools, such as the students and teachers evaluations and internal audits. One of the main conclusions is that there is a large variability amongst the analysed courses. However, it should be emphasised that these results are not representative of the situation all around Europe, as it was not possible to obtain information from all OHS courses. Considering the identified differences within all the European countries, the harmonisation of post-graduation courses on OHS, if it is to occur, has a long way to go. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Abstract: The 19th century and first half of the 20th century is one of those periods in history of rapid economical, technical and social changes. There is an ongoing mechanization, followed by a movement to rationalize production and to make it cost effective. This has created a heavy burden of occupational deaths amongst workers. In this period occupational safety is developing into a professional field. Engineers are enclosing hazards and fencing heights, shaping up safety technique, and writing very practical publications on occupational safety. These publications, predominantly published in the United States, are leading to quite some safety related metaphors, with the iceberg and the domino’s as the most famous ones. Sociologists, psychologists, and physicians are more concerned with questions related to accident causation, and these specialists are conducting research leading to two different safety theories. Causes of occupational accident are found either in the workers’ capacity to handle hazardous situations, or in external causes, like very long working hours, dangerous machines and the increased pressures of work and speed of production. The Pittsburgh survey, the first extended analysis of occupational accidents in a steel district, strongly advocated the environmental hypothesis, while the so-called ‘individual hypothesis’ is favored by the American Safety First Movement, starting as a private initiative in 1906 by US Steel, and later spreading out over Western European countries. The British Industrial Fatigue Board has given the individual hypothesis its scientific justification. Despite scientific criticism just after World War II on the concept of accident proneness and ‘unsafe acts’, its popularity is not fading. Even nowadays the famous metaphors are still part of the vocational training of safety experts, also in The Netherlands. Apparently professional and scientific developments in occupational safety are belonging to two separate worlds. Before World War II, The Netherlands is not a leading country in occupational safety but a follower, first of France and the German speaking countries. After World War I its focus is directed towards the Anglo-Saxon countries. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

• (Post)graduate education of safety experts gains some interest in the international safety literature. • Publications on the quality of these programs is almost absent. • Main quality indicators are internal, like reactions from trainees, results from examinations. • A better indicator is the transfer of safety knowledge and skills to companies and organizations. Professionalization of safety is gaining some interest in international safety literature, including (post)graduate training and education of safety experts. Different from research, there are hardly any publications and discussions on the quality of (post) graduate safety education in the academic safety literature. This article starts with a short historical picture of safety education. After this picture, a description of the ten (post) graduate safety courses involved is presented with a special reference to the assessment of the quality of these courses. It shows that an internal evaluation of quality, like reactions from trainees, and results from examinations, and tests are presently the main quality indicators. Discussions on how quality assessment can be performed has led to an overview of literature on educational objectives and educational models, and possible options for this assessment. The article concludes that the transfer of safety knowledge and skills to companies and organizations is a highly desirable elaboration of the quality concept. But it is also clear that traditional safety indicators can provide no, or only unreliable, information about the degree of this transfer. An overview of possible minor and major accident scenarios of the company or organisation concerned might be a better option, combined with the activities of the trainee to influence and prevent activation of these scenarios. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Evidence of a managerial influence on occupational risk prevention is largely lacking. The incidence of major accidents in high-hazard sectors of industry does not show a downward trend. Also, the decline of fatal occupational accidents in industrialized Western countries may well be attributed to the growing employment in the relatively safe service sectors and to a phenomenon known as export of hazards. Looking more closely at accidents and disasters, we now believe they are not only caused by direct physical events, nor by human errors alone. They have their roots in organizational settings and in the sociotechnical system companies are active in. Whatever their cause, we know that (major) accidents almost always take us by surprise. Despite all our efforts and systems, we seem unable to foresee or predict these events. It seems our management systems are looking at the wrong items. Critics from small- and medium-sized enterprises also point in that direction; management systems are too bureaucratic and lack a focus on hazard and risk identification. Apparently, we fail to incorporate the main ingredients of accident causation in our management systems. This article will discuss current models and presentations. In reference to the title of this article, the possibility to integrate these presentations into management systems will be discussed. This article is based on the presentation given at the 4th International Conference on Occupational Risk Prevention, Sevilla, Spain, May 10–12, 2006. © 2008 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: The present study analyzes HSE hazard scenarios at the research areas of an international company that specializes in the exploration and production of oil and gas. Objective is: [I.] to analyze the major HSE hazard scenarios for the experimental facilities in the new research location; [II.] to be able to reduce those hazards to a pre-defined minimum through optimal design; [III.] to be able to reduce the amount and severity of future research-related incidents/near-misses. To analyze the ten major hazard scenarios, which were developed in a previous study, use is made of the Tripod ß technique. With this technique, also barriers and general failure types are determined for the major hazard scenarios. The most frequent barrier is the checking of design, systems and installations. Second frequent barrier is (centrally guided) maintenance. Further frequent barriers are the use of adequate material/equipment parts, periodic inspection and safety device. Most frequent general failure type is design, followed at a distance by maintenance management, organization, procedures and other types. To reach the above mentioned reduction of incidents, it is proposed to improve these barriers and general failure types. Although focusing on the Dutch part of the company, results are also usable for the equivalent facilities in the USA. The research presented in this article is based on a final report of the post graduate master course ‘Management of Safety, Health and Environment’ of the Delft University of Technology. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Abstract: This article describes a model and a case to assist designers in construction industry. Using the presented model it is possible to make decisions based upon risk during execution phase. The case itself is a comparison between two floors in an office building. The case shows that it is possible to reduce risk and possible accidents by making an risk assessment in design phase and preparation phase. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

There is a great need for health and safety advisers/managers to act as agents of change, both in respect to the technology of the company and the design of its workplaces, and in the organisation of the company health and safety management system. This article reports on the development of training to meet these increasing needs. The postgraduate masters course ‘Management of Safety, Health and Environment’ of the Delft University of Technology has now introduced a course-module of 1 week, addressing the issue of the learning organisation and the specific role of the safety adviser/manager. The course-module starts from the assumption that for a health and safety adviser/manager his or her personal effectiveness and ability to influence and stimulate others are qualities as important to a company as the quality of a safety and health management system. This paper will describe the development in the role of the safety adviser/manager and the mainstream thinking on change management and training. The consequence for the content and programme features of the course-module is presented as well as the results of the evaluation of its effectiveness. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

• Safety has improved spectacularly the last decades, and will continue to do so. • Scientific safety insights seem hardly a source of practical knowledge. • The inability to foresee safety related conflicts creates limits for design options. • A method is developed to assess time-dependant advancements of accident scenarios. • As a thought experiment, skip all safety laws, focus on accident processes. Ever since safety started to be investigated in a consistent manner, around 150 years ago, there has been a tremendous improvement, both in our understanding of accident processes, and in reduction of harm and damage caused by these occupational and major accidents. Major improvements in safety theories, models and metaphors were made after World War II, with the late 1970s till the late 1990s as the 'golden years'. But still these major accidents occur and they will keep prompting future scientific developments in safety, as they have done in the past. Reducing the frequency of major accidents remains challenging. Improving design and automation, as starting point for safety has its limits due to the complexity of processes and the inability to foresee all safety related conflicts. The modern emphasis to assure the capacity to handle unforeseen events, such as resilience promises to deliver, will become even more important in the future. Inherent safe design on the other hand make a sensible approach when designing production processes for emerging and future technologies, like nano- and biotechnology. Also, it will remain difficult for small and medium sized enterprises to adhere to complicated laws and regulations. In addition, an increased participation of stakeholder groups makes future safety decision-making even more challenging than it already is today. Yet we foresee that there may be grounds for change in which safety rules, laws and regulations are set aside, the bureaucratic approach towards safety is stopped and the focus is on dynamic accident processes detection. Today, methods are developed to automatically assess time-dependant advancement of accident scenarios and barrier degradation. This direction will contribute substantially to a future higher level of safety in different industrial sectors and might alleviate the emphasis on bureaucracy. We end with developments in two countries where safety and safety science is emerging. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

OCI Nitrogen, one of Europe's largest fertilizer producers, is investigating the extent to which it is possible to take targeted measures at an early stage and stop the development of major hazard accident processes. An innovative model has been developed and recently explained and elaborated in a number of publications. This current paper contains a validation of the model by looking at the BP Texas City incident in 2005. The bowtie metaphor is used to visually present the BP Texas City refinery incident, showing the barrier system from different perspectives. Not only is the barrier system looked at from its trustworthiness on the day of the incident but also from the perspective of the control room operator, and from a design to current standards of best practice. The risk reductions of these different views are calculated and compared to their original design. In addition, evidence and findings from the investigations have been categorized as flaws and allocated to nine organizational factors. These flaws may affect the barrier system's quality or trustworthiness, or may act as 'accident pathogens' (see also Reason, 1990) creating latent, dangerous conditions. This paper sheds new light on the monitoring of accident processes and the barrier management to control them, and demonstrates that the BP Texas City refinery incident could have been foreseen using preventive barrier indicators and monitoring organizational factors. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

OCI Nitrogen seeks to gain knowledge of (leading) indicators regarding the process safety performance of their ammonia production process. The current sub-study raises the question whether major hazard accidents in the ammonia production process can be predicted from organizational factors, also called management delivery systems. This paper links organizational factors to accident processes and their barrier systems, using the bowtie metaphor. It is shown that organizational factors indirectly impact accident processes as they strongly influence the quality or trustworthiness of the barrier systems. By putting the right focus on organizational factors during audits or reviews, major accident processes get the attention they deserve, and the necessary actions are taken at the right management level. Qualitative and quantitative monitoring of organizational factors can provide a picture of their operation and efficiency. Using an example on retrospective data it is demonstrated that information from organizational factors could have stopped the development of the near-accident prematurely. However, organizational factors should first be qualitatively assessed before they are quantitatively monitored. A quantitative assessment has been worked out for one of the management delivery systems so to provide an example of management indicators. Determining these (management) indicators from threshold values is an intricate matter due to the complicated influence of organizational factors on accident processes, and requires more follow-up research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A Belgian manufacturing company uses pallet movers for internal transport. Despite the company's efforts to improve occupational safety, accidents with pallet movers remain noteworthy. In order to control occupational accidents, it is crucial to have a clear view of the potential accident scenarios that are present in a company. The bow-tie method is a way to capture and visualize these accident processes in an integrative way. Included in the bow-tie are safety barriers (both technical as organizational and human) and management delivery systems that can intervene in these accident processes. Once bow-ties are composed, they are an excellent point of departure to assign indicators to the safety barriers and management delivery systems in order to control (i.e., prevent or mitigate) accident scenarios. Two types of indicators can be distinguished. Firstly, there are general indicators that are assigned to management delivery systems interrupting multiple accident scenarios, which can yield a higher safety gain (as they intervene in multiple accident scenarios). Secondly, there are scenario-specific indicators targeting one specific accident scenario, which can be valuable as they target a specific problem in the company. For the development of the bow-ties, a multi-method design with the inclusion of different data sources was used, leading to a comprehensive overview. This makes the bow-tie analysis of internal transport with pallet movers transferable to other settings where pallet movers are used for internal transport. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The production of nanotechnology based products is increasing, along with the conscience of the possible harmful effects of some nanomaterials. Along with technological advances, there is the need to improve knowledge of safety and health and apply that knowledge to the workplace. The "safety-by-design" approaches are attracting attention as helpful tools to develop safer products and production processes. The Systematic Design Analysis Approach could help to identify the solutions to control workplace risks by defining the emission and exposure scenarios and the possible barriers to interrupt them. When managing risks during a photocatalytic ceramic tiles development project, it was possible to identify relevant nanoparticles emission scenarios and related barriers. Possible ways to reduce them could then be defined, which would in turn, lead to an inherently safer production process. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Worker's health and occupational safety are critical to the development of nanotechnology applications, since some nanomaterials present a risk of adverse effect on human beings. This paper describes the application of the Systematic Design Analysis Approach based on the hazard process model (bow-tie) as well as design analysis of the production process, during a development project to produce a new type of ceramic tile with photocatalytic properties. Applying the bow-tie model together with the design analysis to the production process, it is possible to identify the emission and exposure scenarios and the related barriers based on the unit operations and the different technological options to perform them. Alternatives to the production process were considered, falling back on solutions to reduce emissions, and consequently the exposure to nanoparticles. The intervention model proposed will allow occupational safety and hygiene to be integrated into the development process that will involve a multidisciplinary team. Systematic Design Analysis Approach is a suitable method for occupational safety and hygiene risk management. This approach proved to be effective in generating relevant emission and exposure scenarios, as well as identifying possible barriers to control such emission scenarios. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The occupational risks in the nanotechnology research laboratories are an important topic since a great number of researchers are involved in this area. The risk assessment performed by both qualitative and quantitative methods is a necessary step for the management of the occupational risks. Risk assessment could be performed by qualitative methods that gather consensus in the scientific community. It is also possible to use quantitative methods, based in different technics and metrics, as indicative exposure limits are been settled by several institutions. While performing the risk assessment, the information on the materials used is very important and, if it is not updated, it could create a bias in the assessment results. The exposure to TiO 2 nanoparticles risk was assessed in a research laboratory using a quantitative exposure method and qualitative risk assessment methods. It was found the results from direct-reading Condensation Particle Counter (CPC) equipment and the CB Nanotool seem to be related and aligned, while the results obtained from the use of the Stoffenmanager Nano seem to indicate a higher risk level. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In a rural area widespread pollution of friable and non-friable waste products was present, used to harden dirt tracks, yards, and driveways during 1935–1974. Exposure to environmental asbestos was assessed by a site approach, based on number of polluted sites within postal code areas, and by a household approach, based on number of households in the close vicinity to polluted sites within postal code areas. Based on asbestos soil investigations, 293 sites were identified with asbestos waste material at the surface, of which 77% contained crocidolite fibres as well as chrysotile fibres. The 293 sites-at-risk varied from 5 m2 to 2722 m2 and were surrounded by 347 households within 100 m of these sites. Distance to the plant was associated with the number of sites (r=0.36), and with the number of households (r=0.52). However, categorization of postal code areas into low, intermediate or high likelihood of exposure to asbestos showed a modest agreement between the site and household approach. In the site approach a total of 2.3 million person-years at risk were estimated with an average exposure of 1674 fibres/m3 and an expected 1.8 cases of malignant mesothelioma each year. The household approach resulted in estimates of 1.2 million person-years at risk, and 0.9 cases of malignant mesothelioma per year, respectively. This study illustrates that asbestos waste on the surface of roads and yards in an area with over 130,000 inhabitants may result in long-term exposure to asbestos that will cause several cases of malignant mesothelioma each year. Although distance to plant, number of polluted sites and number of exposed household were associated, the modest agreement among these measures of exposure indicate that the exposure assessment strategy chosen in a particular study may result in considerable misclassification. Without detailed information on individual behaviour within the polluted area, it is difficult to show that a more individually oriented approach will perform better than an ecological approach. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Serious incidents in the 1970s and continuous growth of factories producing and/or using hazardous substances formed the basis of a quantitative approach to risk. While discussions of risk were conducted in all industrialised countries they were particularly important in The Netherlands due to space limitations and short distances between industrial plants and residential areas. This article is part of a series covering the history of the safety science discipline (Swuste et al., 2015; Van Gulijk et al., 2009; Swuste et al., 2010). The concept risk entered the Dutch safety domain before the 1970s in relatively isolated case studies and in managing flood defences in The Netherlands. Since the 1970s these case studies paved the way for the development of mathematical models for quantitative risk analysis that were based on experience from nuclear power plants, the process industries and reliability engineering from operations research. ‘External safety’ was a focal point for these early developments in the process industries: adverse effects of dangerous goods outside the factory’s property boundaries. The models were documented in standardised textbooks for risk analysis in The Netherlands, the so-called ‘coloured books’. These works contributed to the development of the Seveso Directive. For internal safety (taking place within property boundaries) semi-quantitative approaches were developed simultaneously. The models for quantitative risk analysis were deemed reliable, but the acceptability of a quantified risk was another matter. Making decisions on risk relates to complex societal issues, such as ethics, stakeholder perception of risks, stakeholder involvement, and politics, all of which made the decision making process far from straightforward. With the introduction of the abstract concept of risk in the Dutch safety science domain, the question of risk perception became important in Dutch safety research. The concept risk and methods for quantitative risk analysis first entered into Dutch law in environmental risk regulations. It took a while for risk to be accepted by occupational safety experts, but just before the turn of the century ‘occupational risk inventory and evaluations’ or RI&E methods were introduced into Dutch occupational safety legislation. This finalised the paradigm shift to risk-based safety-decision making in the Dutch safety science domain. While methods for quantifying risk are now widely applied and accepted, the proper use of risk perception and risk in the political decision process are still being debated. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]