7 results on '"STRONG GOVERNANCE"'
Search Results
2. The Three Pillars Of Integrity-Based Forest Management: Ecosystem Integrity, Strong Governance And Effective Planning
- Author
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Morgan, Edward, Cadman, Tim, and Mackey, Brendan
- Subjects
forests ,climate change ,strong governance ,Climate change science ,forest management ,effective planning ,ecosystem integrity - Abstract
Effective management of forests is an essential component of global efforts to address the climate emergency and the biodiversity crisis. Yet, despite increasing recognition of the importance and significant value of the carbon and multiple other benefits provided by forests, and especially primary forests,1,2 forest loss and degradation continue to increase, especially in the tropics.3–5 A large contributor to the decline of forests is unsustainable industrial demand for timber, beef, soy and palm oil products.6–8 However, poor forest management is also a significant cause of forest loss and degradation.9–11 Conversely, effective management can play a key role in maintaining, enhancing and restoring forests – actions that demonstrate and uphold their ecological attributes and societal values. This policy brief sets out the basis for a new framework for forest landscape management built on the three pillars of ecosystem integrity, strong governance and effective planning. This new approach is needed because the current suite of forest and land management approaches is far from ideal. The existing models are sector-specific, focusing on industrial forestry (sustainable forest management SFM), agriculture (sustainable land management SLM) or management for conservation. Each of these management systems have their merits, but all struggle to address landscape management in a holistic and integrated way, and often fail to recognise the multiple benefits and address key drive rs to forest loss and unsustainable land use change. While there is widespread agreement within policy and practice on the need for landscape approaches to address these issues,12–14 it remains unclear what a landscape approach requires and how it should be different to existing efforts. The purpose of this policy brief is to highlight tools we can use to help implement and evaluate better landscape approaches. The Three Pillars Framework (Figure 1) – outlined in Morgan et al. (2020) ‘Integrating forest management across the landscape: a three pillar framework’ 15 – addresses this complexity and ambiguity by synthesising three key sets of principles. The framework is designed to be straightforward enough to provide guidance for the development and assessment of landscapelevel management, but also flexible enough to be applicable to multiple forest, and potentially other, landscape contexts. The three pillars – ecosystem integrity, effective planning and strong governance – are essential components to ensure both healthy forest ecosystems and sustainable, just and legitimate management of the landscape. Supporting landscape approaches requires activities, policies and strategies that address all three pillars.
- Published
- 2022
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
3. A Superior Way for the Transforming China: The Ultimate Ideal or a Feasible Solution?
- Author
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Zheng, Shaodong
- Abstract
The restoration of political radicalism in China can be attributed to a number of factors; similarly, the successful construction of a civil society to untangle the mess caused by the transformation does not rely on spontaneous fulfillment of the society itself, for it involves more factors than have been realized and discussed, such as the state (i.e., the government), the ruling party, society, and the context of globalization. Without a comprehensive study on the cause of this problem, any prescriptive suggestion or discussion on how to go beyond radicalism is no more than an idealistic path for China's political reconstruction. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2015
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
4. From Companies to Markets--Global Developments in Corporate Governance
- Author
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International Finance Corporation
- Subjects
DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION ,INTERNAL AUDIT ,STOCK MARKET ,ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES ,COMMUNICATION ,DECISION-MAKING ,SECURITIES MARKET ,SHAREHOLDERS ,FINANCE CORPORATION ,SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS ,LEGISLATIVE BODIES ,GOVERNANCE FAILURES ,STATE OWNERSHIP ,FINANCIAL SECTOR ,NATIONAL LEVEL ,STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES ,INDEPENDENCE ,DECISION-MAKING PROCESS ,NATIONS ,RESOURCE ALLOCATION ,OVERSIGHT ,FINANCIAL CRISIS ,COMPROMISE ,GOVERNMENTS ,CONSTITUTION ,SHAREHOLDER ,RISK MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS ,OPERATIONAL EFFICIENCY ,INVESTORS ,INTERNAL CONTROL ,FINANCIAL SYSTEMS ,REGULATORY REGIME ,CORPORATE GOVERNANCE STANDARDS ,REPRESENTATIVES ,RISK MANAGEMENT ,AUTHORITIES ,TRANSPARENCY ,MARKET CAPITALIZATION ,REGULATORY REGIMES ,FEDERATION ,FINANCIAL MARKETS ,INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS ,STRONG CORPORATE GOVERNANCE ,INFORMATION SYSTEMS ,GOVERNANCE PRACTICES ,INTERNATIONAL FINANCE ,REGULATORY FRAMEWORKS ,CORPORATE GOVERNANCE ,GLOBAL INVESTOR ,FINANCIAL STATEMENTS ,GOVERNANCE MONITORING ,BANKING ,NATIONAL GOVERNMENTS ,STOCK EXCHANGE ,DECISION MAKING ,RISK MANAGEMENT PROCESS ,TRANSPARENCY INITIATIVE ,LACK OF CLARITY ,INTERNAL CONTROLS ,VOTING ,PUBLIC SECTOR ,DECISION-MAKING PROCESSES ,REGULATORY AUTHORITY ,STATES ,SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT ,FINANCIAL SERVICES ,CONSENSUS ,SECURITIES EXCHANGE ,REPRESENTATION ,DISCLOSURE ,JURISDICTIONS ,FINANCIAL INFORMATION ,AUTHORITY ,ENFORCEMENT ,REGULATORY POLICY ,INVESTMENT CLIMATE ,MINISTERS ,OWNERSHIP STRUCTURES ,AUDITS ,CITIZENSHIP ,EXCHANGE ,TAXATION ,SHAREHOLDER PROTECTION ,SHAREHOLDER ENGAGEMENT ,IDEOLOGIES ,MARKET DEVELOPMENT ,CAPITAL MARKETS ,GOVERNANCE ,REGIONS ,REGULATORY FRAMEWORK ,STATE ,COMPLEX RISK ,FINANCIAL SYSTEM ,OUTPUT ,FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS ,HUMAN CAPITAL ,REGULATION ,INTERNAL AUDIT FUNCTION ,INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE ,CORPORATE GOVERNANCE SYSTEM ,REGULATOR ,GOVERNMENT ,GOVERNANCE DIMENSION ,FORMAL STANDARDS ,LEGAL FORM ,GOOD GOVERNANCE ,STRONG GOVERNANCE ,REGULATORY SYSTEM ,HUMAN RESOURCES ,LEGISLATORS ,RISK MANAGEMENT COMMITTEE ,PUBLIC OFFICIALS ,PUBLIC POLICY ,GOVERNANCE PRACTICE ,EXECUTION ,LEGISLATION ,SECURITIES ,FUTURE ,CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY ,ANTI-CORRUPTION ,COALITIONS ,REGULATORS ,INVESTOR ,MEMBER STATES ,FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE ,INTEREST ,RESPONSIBILITY ,AUDIT STRATEGY ,CORRUPTION ,LEGAL FRAMEWORK ,CONFEDERATION ,FINANCIAL RESULTS ,SHARE ,RISK MANAGEMENT PRACTICES ,SOCIAL RISKS ,AUDIT ,LEGISLATIVE PROCESSES ,ACCOUNTABILITY ,LAW - Abstract
In May 2015, the IFC Corporate Governance Group called together 40 experts in the field and members of the IFC Corporate Governance Private Sector Advisory Group. These participants explored key changes in international corporate governance standards and codes of best practice in the wake of the recent global financial crisis and how these changes have helped draw corporate attention to sustainability issues. The group found that many issues that became evident regarding banks in the financial crisis, and led to changes in the governance of banks, also have flowed through into broader corporate governance developments. This publication arises from the issues and information from these discussions. Specifically, part A discusses developments from global or regional groups involved in corporate governance. Part B addresses developments in corporate governance practice, and part C looks at developments in corporate governance codes and standards.
- Published
- 2016
5. The Dark Side of Disclosure : Evidence of Government Expropriation from Worldwide Firms
- Author
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Liu, Tingting, Ullah, Barkat, Wei, Zuobao, and Xu, Lixin Colin
- Subjects
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE ,TAX RATES ,INVESTMENT ,GROWTH RATES ,TAX ,STARTUPS ,COUNTRY FIXED EFFECTS ,CAPITAL STRUCTURE ,FINANCIAL OBSTACLE ,DEPOSIT ,ECONOMIC REFORMS ,INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT ,FINANCING ,EXTERNAL FINANCING ,FIRM SIZE ,STATE OWNERSHIP ,LICENSING ,BANK LENDING ,FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION ,COMPETITORS ,INCOME ,GOVERNMENT EXPROPRIATION ,INVESTMENTS ,STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES ,INDEPENDENCE ,CAPITAL INVESTMENTS ,RED TAPE ,FINANCIAL CRISIS ,GOVERNMENT OWNERSHIP ,INFORMAL SECTOR ,WORLD DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS ,GOVERNMENTS ,INVESTORS ,COMPANY ,FINANCIAL MARKET ,FIRM ,INFORMATION SHARING ,STATE GOVERNMENT ,AGENCY COSTS ,TAX COLLECTION ,TRANSPARENCY ,COMPANIES ,FIRMS ,CAPITAL INVESTMENT ,FINANCIAL MARKET DEVELOPMENT ,INITIAL PUBLIC OFFERINGS ,MARKETS ,INVESTMENT OPPORTUNITY ,BUSINESS PERFORMANCE ,GOVERNANCE INDICATORS ,PRICES ,LINE OF CREDIT ,CORPORATE GOVERNANCE ,CREDIT RATINGS ,FINANCIAL STATEMENTS ,REPUTATION ,PROPERTY RIGHTS ,BANKING ,CONSUMER PRICE INDICES ,ENTERPRISES ,FINANCIAL OBSTACLES ,GOVERNANCE INDICES ,LEGAL CONSTRAINTS ,INVESTOR PROTECTION ,TAX COLLECTIONS ,REAL GROWTH RATE ,CLIENT ,LIQUIDITY ,SMALL BUSINESS ,UNDERDEVELOPED MARKETS ,COST OF CAPITAL ,FISCAL ,STATES ,MARKET ,INDIVIDUAL FIRM ,MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES ,FINANCIAL CONSTRAINTS ,OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE ,POLITICAL INSTABILITY ,FIRM PERFORMANCE ,ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ,DISCLOSURE ,FINANCIAL INFORMATION ,FIXED ASSETS ,SALES GROWTH ,CUSTOMERS ,CITIZENS ,POLITICAL ECONOMY ,BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT ,LENDERS ,LINES OF CREDIT ,EXCHANGE ,TAXATION ,LEGAL SYSTEM ,SECURITY ,PARTIES ,MARKET DEVELOPMENT ,ENTERPRISE ,GOVERNANCE ,INFORMATION ASYMMETRY ,STATE ,SEE ,CORPORATE FINANCE ,SUPPLIERS ,INVESTMENT DECISIONS ,REGULATION ,INSURANCE ,CURRENCY ,DIVERSIFICATION ,PRICE ,TAXES ,BUSINESS ENVIRONMENTS ,GOVERNMENT ,FUTURE PROSPECTS ,FINANCIAL INSTITUTION ,STRONG GOVERNANCE ,FOREIGN COMPANY ,COMPETITION ,PRIVATIZATION ,LOAN ,FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT ,GROWTH RATE ,DEVELOPING COUNTRIES ,POOR GOVERNANCE ,FUTURE ,PRIVATE SECTOR DEVELOPMENT ,EXPOSURE ,FOREIGN OWNERSHIP ,INVESTOR ,CORPORATE DISCLOSURES ,INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT ,BUSINESS LICENSING ,EXTERNAL FINANCE ,CORRUPTION ,FINANCIAL HEALTH ,SMALL FIRMS ,FIRM GROWTH ,SOCIAL CAPITAL ,FOREIGN COMPANIES ,FINANCIAL STATEMENT ,SHARE ,LOCAL CURRENCY ,AUDIT ,LAW ,EXPENDITURE ,COUNTRY DUMMY - Abstract
This paper studies the effects of voluntary accounting information disclosure through auditing on firm access to finance, exposure to corruption, and sales growth. Relying on a data set of more than 70,000 firms in 121 countries, the analysis finds that disclosure can be a double-edged sword. On the one hand, audited firms exhibit a slightly lower level of financial constraints than unaudited firms. On the other hand, audited firms face a significantly higher level of corruption obstacles. The net effects of voluntary information disclosure on firm growth are negative, which can largely be explained by the fact that most of the countries in the sample are developing countries where institutions are weak. The beneficial effect of disclosure increases as a country’s property rights protection improves. The qualitative results are robust to considerations of the endogeneity of auditing and to alternative measures of corruption and financial constraints. The findings reveal the dark side of voluntary information disclosure: exposing firms to government expropriation where institutions are weak.
- Published
- 2015
6. Moldova Financial Sector Assessment Program : Corporate Governance Review of the Moldovan Banking Sector
- Author
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World Bank
- Subjects
MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS ,INVESTMENT ,TAX ,PENSION FUNDS ,INFRASTRUCTURE ,BANKING SYSTEM ,COMMUNICATION ,GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT ,BANKING SUPERVISION ,OPERATIONAL RISK ,SHAREHOLDERS ,FINANCE CORPORATION ,DEPOSIT ,LIQUIDATION ,CRITERIA ,BAD DEBTS ,FLOW OF FUNDS ,CREDIT CONTROL ,FINANCIAL SECTOR ,MANAGEMENT OVERSIGHT ,LENDING ,BANK CUSTOMERS ,INVESTMENTS ,PRODUCTIVITY ,BANK OPERATIONS ,SHAREHOLDER ,BALANCE SHEETS ,PENSION ,INVESTORS ,COLLATERAL ,ACCRUALS ,PRIVATE PENSION ,SHARES ,FINANCIAL MARKET ,AUDITING ,BANK ,RISK FACTORS ,INTERNAL CONTROL ,LOANS ,AUDITORS ,CONFLICTS OF INTEREST ,DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS ,RISK MANAGEMENT ,INTERESTS ,TRANSPARENCY ,BANK OFFICE ,STRATEGIES ,EMERGING MARKETS ,EXPOSURES ,BANK ACCOUNTS ,FINANCIAL MARKETS ,BORROWER ,BORROWERS ,CREDIT RISKS ,RAPID EXPANSION ,DEPOSITS ,INDUSTRY ,MARKETS ,CLIENT COUNTRIES ,GOVERNANCE PRACTICES ,FINANCE ,ACCOUNTING PROCEDURES ,SYSTEMIC RISK ,INTERNATIONAL FINANCE ,WAGES ,CORPORATE GOVERNANCE ,DEPOSIT RATES ,TRANSFERS ,PROPERTY RIGHTS ,BANKING INDUSTRY ,BANKING ,ENTERPRISES ,STOCK EXCHANGE ,OPERATIONAL RISKS ,THE NATIONAL BANK OF MOLDOVA ,INTERNAL CONTROLS ,FOREIGN BANKS ,LIQUIDITY ,RISK TAKING ,SERVICES ,DEBT ,CREDIT RISK ,BANKING SECTOR ,ASSET GROWTH ,SMALL COUNTRY ,SAVING ,PROPERTY ,DEBTS ,OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE ,PROFITABILITY ,SHAREHOLDERS’ RIGHTS ,CONNECTED LENDING ,JURISDICTIONS ,NATIONAL BANK ,ENFORCEMENT ,DEPOSITORY ,OWNERSHIP STRUCTURES ,CORPORATE GOVERNANCE FRAMEWORK ,FINANCIAL SECTORS ,AUDITS ,FOREIGN EXCHANGE ,CUSTOMERS ,PORTFOLIO ,FOREIGN NATIONALS ,EXCHANGE ,ACCOUNTING ,INCENTIVE STRUCTURES ,COMMERCIAL BANK ,CONSOLIDATION ,VALUE ,RISK ,MARKET PARTICIPANTS ,CONFLICT OF INTEREST ,ECONOMIC CRISES ,RATING AGENCIES ,SHAREHOLDER ACTIONS ,CAPITAL MARKETS ,GOVERNANCE ,OVERSIGHT PROCESSES ,FINANCIAL CRISES ,REGULATORY FRAMEWORK ,FINANCIAL SYSTEM ,FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS ,FINANCIAL STABILITY ,INSURANCE ,REVENUE ,INTERNATIONAL BANKING ,EXTERNAL AUDITORS ,REGULATOR ,EQUITY ,BANKS ,MARKET CONDITIONS ,FINANCIAL INSTITUTION ,STRONG GOVERNANCE ,INTEREST RATE RISKS ,LOCAL BANKS ,COMPETITION ,PUBLIC POLICY ,DOMESTIC BANKS ,GOVERNANCE PRACTICE ,CREDIT ,LEGISLATION ,SECURITIES ,COMMERCIAL BANKS ,JUDICIAL SYSTEM ,MICROFINANCE ,NONBANK FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS ,CONFLICT OF INTERESTS ,PRIVATE SECTOR DEVELOPMENT ,CREDIT EXPOSURES ,CREDIT RISK MANAGEMENT ,CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REFORMS ,CUSTOMER ,SUBSIDIARY ,CREDIT QUALITY ,REGULATORS ,FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE ,INTEREST ,LEGAL FRAMEWORK ,REGULATORY BODIES ,LAWS ,SAVINGS ,SUPERVISORY AGENCIES ,MONEY LAUNDERING ,LIQUID ASSETS ,SHARE ,INTEREST RATE ,AFFILIATE ,MARKET ECONOMY ,AUDIT ,ACCOUNTABILITY - Abstract
The banking sector in Moldova is in the midst of structural changes with worrisome corporate governance issues at the core. Corporate governance is at the center of a stable and profitable banking sector which is essential to support economic growth and productivity. However, the banking system in Moldova suffers from critical governance weaknesses which the National Bank of Moldova (NBM) has been unable to effectively address. The illicit schemes used to gain control of the majority of the banking sector’s assets have involved raider attacks by unidentified individuals whose subsequent, de facto, related party transactions have caused the deterioration of bank balance sheets. The recent changes in controlling ownership have resulted in nontransparent appointments of board members and Chief Executive Officers (CEOs). This has led to substantial blurring of the roles and responsibilities of ownership, oversight (board), and management, resulting in no clear accountability. The legal and institutional corporate governance framework in Moldova is weak. Sound corporate governance is first and foremost dependent upon the motivations of owners and the resultant business culture they instill through their selection and appointment of board members. In Moldova, a few actors control the majority of the banking system. They demonstrate dubious motives by acting obscurely through others and through companies to own and control important banks. These actions create a system that is held captive to serve the needs and pleasures of a few at the expense of many: the depositors, general public, and ultimately, the taxpayer.
- Published
- 2014
7. SOE Reform : Time for Serious Corporate Governance
- Author
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Speakman, John
- Subjects
CORPORATIONS ,MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS ,STATE BANK ,INTERNAL AUDIT ,STOCK MARKET ,ECONOMIC GROWTH ,SUSTAINABLE REFORM ,GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT ,REINSURANCE ,REGULATORY BODY ,WEAK CORPORATE GOVERNANCE ,FINANCE CORPORATION ,ACCOUNTABILITY MECHANISMS ,ECONOMIC REFORMS ,EXTERNALITIES ,GOVERNMENT RESPONSIBILITY ,BAD GOVERNANCE ,STATE OWNERSHIP ,FINANCIAL SECTOR ,AMOUNTS OWED ,AUDIT COMMITTEE ,CHIEF EXECUTIVE ,NATIONAL LEVEL ,STAKEHOLDERS ,PRODUCTIVITY ,STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES ,NATIONS ,STAKEHOLDER ,RED TAPE ,FISCAL BURDEN ,GOVERNMENT OWNERSHIP ,INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS ,PUBLIC PROCUREMENT ,GOVERNANCE ENVIRONMENT ,PERFORMANCE INDICATORS ,BOARDS OF DIRECTORS ,INTERNAL CONTROL ,CONFLICTS OF INTEREST ,DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS ,EXCHANGE COMMISSION ,REPRESENTATIVES ,PRINCIPAL-AGENT ,TRANSPARENCY ,SERVICE DELIVERY ,EMERGING MARKETS ,CORPORATE OWNERSHIP ,FINANCIAL MARKETS ,PRIME MINISTER ,DISTRIBUTION COMPANIES ,PRIVATE SECTOR CREDIT ,STRONG CORPORATE GOVERNANCE ,ENTRY POINTS ,LIMITED ,INFORMATION SYSTEMS ,GOVERNANCE PRACTICES ,MARKET STRUCTURE ,PRIVATE SECTOR REPRESENTATIVES ,CORPORATE GOVERNANCE ,FINANCIAL STATEMENTS ,GOVERNANCE REGULATIONS ,GOVERNANCE REFORM ,STOCK EXCHANGE ,ASSET MANAGEMENT ,BALANCE SHEET ,CIVIL SERVICE ,PUBLIC ENTERPRISES ,NATIONAL ECONOMY ,BOARD MEMBERS ,REFORM PROGRAM ,PUBLIC SECTOR ,DEBT ,CONTINGENT LIABILITIES ,COST OF CAPITAL ,REGULATORY AUTHORITY ,FINANCIAL SERVICES ,GOVERNMENT AGENCIES ,CONSENSUS ,COMPANIES ACT ,PROFITABILITY ,CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT ,ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ,CENTRAL BANK ,DISCLOSURE ,NATIONAL BANK ,DIVIDENDS ,MARKET REGULATIONS ,AUTHORITY ,MANAGEMENT INFORMATION SYSTEMS ,MINISTERS ,CAPITAL MARKET ,MINISTRY OF FINANCE ,ENTERPRISE REFORM ,FINANCIAL SECTORS ,FINANCIAL SUSTAINABILITY ,KEY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS ,TRANSFER OF OWNERSHIP ,PRIVATE ENTERPRISE ,POLITICAL ECONOMY ,CEO ,OUTPUTS ,MONOPOLY ,REGULATORY FRAMEWORK ,INSURANCE ,INTERNAL AUDIT FUNCTION ,PRIVATE SECTOR GROWTH ,REGULATOR ,CEOS ,JOINT VENTURE ,BANKS ,LIFE INSURANCE ,GOOD GOVERNANCE ,STRONG GOVERNANCE ,HUMAN RESOURCES ,PRIVATE COMPANIES ,BUREAUCRACY ,ACCESS TO CAPITAL MARKETS ,INDUSTRIAL COMPANIES ,PRIVATIZATION ,COMPETITION COMMISSION ,LEGISLATION ,SECURITIES ,COMPETITIVE MARKET ,POOR GOVERNANCE ,HOLDING COMPANIES ,CONSULTATIVE PROCESS ,GOOD CORPORATE GOVERNANCE ,LABOR MARKETS ,HARD BUDGET CONSTRAINTS ,CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REFORMS ,CORPORATE STRUCTURE ,EXTERNAL ACCOUNTABILITY ,FOREIGN INVESTMENT ,REGULATORS ,FINANCIAL AUTONOMY ,HOLDING COMPANY ,STATE BANK OF PAKISTAN ,FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE ,FISCAL PROBLEMS ,LEGAL FRAMEWORK ,GROWTH PATH ,AUDIT COMMITTEES ,REGULATORY BODIES ,TRANSPORT ,FINANCIAL SUPPORT ,INDIVIDUALS ,POLITICAL PARTIES ,CHAIRMAN AND CEO ,MARKET ECONOMY ,ACCOUNTABILITY ,LEVEL PLAYING FIELD ,HUMAN RESOURCE - Abstract
This policy paper is motivated by the Government's 'Pakistan: framework for Economic Growth (FEG) 2011' which places weak corporate governance at the top of the 'software' constraints to growth. The efforts to reform the State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) have stalled in Pakistan for almost five years with significant negative implications not only in terms of fiscal losses, but also deteriorated and cost-ineffective service delivery. The paper suggests a number of urgent policy measures designed to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of SOEs. These include basic governance reforms, revamped commercialization processes and enhanced market regulations. The paper also provides some perspectives on international experience on SOE reforms combined with some suggestions on how the Government can move forward.
- Published
- 2012
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