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INTRODUCTION 1364 I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF POLICE VIDEO 1371 II. THE POTENTIAL BENEFITS OF BODY-WORN CAMERAS 1378 A. Symbolic Benefits 1379 B. Behavioral Benefits 1382 C. Informational Benefits 1392 [...], Since the summer of 2014, community members, politicians, and police executives across the country have called for greater police accountability and improvements in police-community relations. Body-worn cameras ("BWCs") are widely seen as serving both ends. Today, thousands of police agencies are exploring, adopting, and implementing body-cam programs. BWCs are here, and more are coming. Legal scholars have largely responded to this burgeoning new technology by addressing it through the framework of traditional discussions about privacy, police accountability, or the rules of evidence. Relatively few articles have gone further by identifying the potential benefits of BWCs and critically examining whether the adoption of this technology by police agencies can truly do what many proponents claim. This Article falls solidly into the latter camp. Body-worn cameras are a tool. Tools should be used to advance normatively desirable goals when they are an efficient way of accomplishing or facilitating those goals. Body-worn cameras, like any tool, should not be used when the goal itself is inappropriate or when the tool is ill-suited for the job at hand. This Article explores the limits of BWCs as a tool. It does so by first reviewing the historical justifications for, implementation of and lessons learned from an earlier iteration of police video recording technology: in-car cameras. It then offers a simplified way of conceptualizing the multitudinous advantages that BWC proponents have identified, putting them into three categories: symbolic benefits, behavioral benefits, and informational benefits. This classification is a necessary first step in police agencies and communities articulating what they hope to achieve with a BWC program. Whether body cams will advance the desired goals depends on the practical limitations of the technology and our ability to interpret the resulting video footage as well as the policies and procedures that govern implementation. The latter half of the paper is dedicated to a critical examination of the practical limitations and policy considerations that will ultimately determine whether body-worn cameras can live up to the hype.

Within policing, few legal principles are more widely known or highly esteemed than the "objective reasonableness standard that regulates police uses offbrce. The Fourth Amendment, it is argued, is not only the facet of constitutional law that governs police violence, it sets out the only standard that state lawmakers, police commanders, and officers should recognize. Any other regulation of police violence is inappropriate and unnecessary. Ironically, though, the Constitution does not actually regulate the use of force. It regulates seizures. Some uses of force are seizures. This Article explains that a surprising number Of others-including some police shootings-are not. Uses of force that do not amount to seizures fall entirely outside the ambit of Fourth Amendment regulation. And when a use of force does constitute a seizure, the Fourth Amendment is a distressingly inapt regulatory tool. There is, in short, a.jundamental misalignment between what the Fourth Amendment is thought to regulate and what it actually regulates, and there are good reasons to doubt the efficacy of that regulation even when it applies. Put simply, the Fourth Amendment is a profoundly flawed framework for regulating police violence. The Constitution is not the only option. Police reformers have offered state law and police agency policies as promising regulatory alternatives. What has largely evaded academic attention, however, is the extent to which state courts and police agencies simply adopt or incorporate the constitutional standards into state law or agency policies. In this way, the Fourth Amendment's flaws have spilled over into the sub-constitutional regulation ofpolice violence. This Article details the substantial shortcomings in constitutional jurisprudence, describes the problem of Fourth Amendment spillage, and argues that the divergent interests underlying the various regulatory mechanisms should lead state lawmakers and administrative policymakers to divorce state law and administrative policies from constitutional law. In doing so, it advances both academic and public conversations about police violence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Every day, law enforcement officers across the country don their uniforms, strap on their gun belts, and head to work. They carry the equipment and weapons they have been issued and bear the badges that symbolize their authority, but they are not all reporting to the government agency that employs them. Instead, many are "moonlighting." From directing traffic at a busy church parking lot, to making arrests at a packed nightclub, to using deadly force--uniformed off-duty officers exercise the full panoply of police powers while working for private employers. The private employment of off-duty officers blurs the line between private and public policing, raising questions about accountability, officer decision-making, police-community relationships, and the role that police agencies play in modern society. Thus far, however, the employment of off-duty officers by private companies has almost entirely evaded the attention of legal scholars. This Article is the first to provide an empirical assessment of moonlighting in the United States, reporting the results of an original survey of nonfederal law enforcement agencies that collectively employ over 143,000 full-time sworn officers, almost a fifth of all state and local officers in the country. A substantial majority of agencies--about 80%--allow officers to engage in moonlighting, and tens of thousands of officers at those agencies log millions of hours every year working for private employers. Yet governing law and agency policies reflect substantial variation in how off-duty employment is regulated. Moonlighting may be the norm, but as the multitudinous justifications for it, the many issues its raises, and the inconsistency in statutory and administrative regimes suggest, there is a strong need for attention to this area. This Article starts down that path by identifying stakeholders and considerations necessary to the development of professional best practices. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on evolution of modern policing tracing emergence of now-lamiliar police department from a mixed heritage of public and private efforts. It mentions domestic adoption of English institutions such as shire-reeves, constables, night watches, and thief-takers for law enforcement efforts. It also mentions distribution of police resources and regulation of policing with spectrum of public and private behaviors and police function was not fulfilled by governmental agencies.

The author argues that the core values and principles of policing must be reformed in order to alter how police officers view their duties and relationship with the communities they police, particularly concerning an adjustment in what is referred to as law enforcement's adherence to a Warrior ethos to the concept of rightful policing. The article discusses the London, England, Metropolitan Police Force, the concept of Community Policing, and offers several guiding principles.

The article focuses on the regulation of policing in the U.S. in 2014. Topics include the development of the 'law of police' in the U.S., the reformation of police practices, and the laws governing the law enforcement industry. Information is provided on the creation of police services and police officer decision making in use of force investigations.

The United States Supreme Court's understanding ofpolice practices plays a significant role in the development of the constitutional rules that regulate officer conduct. As it approaches the questions of whether to engage in constitutional regulation and what form of regulation to adopt, the Court discusses the environment in which officers act, describes specific police practices, and explains what motivates officers. Yet the majority of the Court's factual assertions are made entirely without support or citation, raising concerns about whether the Court is acting based on a complete and accurate perception. When it comes to policing facts, the Court too offen gets it wrong. This Article explores the influence that the Court's conception of policing has on the creation and modification of constitutional norms. It demonstrates that misunderstandings about law enforcement have led to constitutional rules that fail to align with the world that they were designed to regulate. Confusion about the facts upon which a rule is built creates a gap between the conceptual justification of the rule and its practical consequences, between the effect that the rule was intended to have and the effect it actually has. Thus, misalignment results in the under- or overregulation of officer behavior and correspondingly, the under- and overprotection ofliberty and privacy interests. This observation offers one explanation for why the Court's constitutional pronouncements oflen fail to have the anticipated result. Having identified the effects that follow from basing a rule on a faulty factualpremise, I explore ways to narrow the gap. When constitutional rules are predicated on empirical information, a more accurate understanding of police practices will better align those rules with reality, leading to both more precise constitutional rule making and more efficacious liberty protections. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]