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As in other countries, regulated savings in France are intricately woven into dense regulatory frameworks driven by explicit governmental objectives. The anticipated marketization of the French economy should have eradicated them; however, a substantial portion of regulated savings has managed to evade this process. Is this phenomenon attributable to the tenacious grip of the French state-led tradition? Not entirely, as another subset of these savings has indeed undergone marketization. The landscape of French regulated savings is notably distinguished by a growing dichotomy: on one side, non-marketized products offered by banks, and on the other, increasingly marketized products provided by insurers. Drawing upon process tracing, we contend that these ostensibly conflicting developments emanate from the distinct and precise institutional dependencies between state and private actors in which these products are enmeshed. The prevailing status quo within the banking sector is owed to banks' engagement in a mutually advantageous, long-term exchange of favors with state actors. Faced with the trade-off between offering less lucrative products and risking the endangerment of this relationship, banks have opted for the former. In contrast, an assertive strategy has gained traction in the insurance industry. Yet, strategies for the marketization of regulated savings aligned with state priorities have been implemented, even when insurers expressed opposition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

For many cities, the entry of financial actors into housing opens new geopolitical relations with overseas entities, including state-backed investors such as sovereign wealth funds. These transformations raise the question of the extent to which real estate enables the urbanisation of state capitalism, understood as the expansion of the state's role as promoter, supervisor, and owner of capital. Our paper answers this question through an analysis of Manchester Life, a residential real estate joint venture between Manchester City Council and the Abu Dhabi United Group, an investment firm linked to the Abu Dhabi royal family. In doing so it explores state capitalism as a form of extended urbanisation, with oil revenues from the Persian Gulf used to extract urban land rents in the Global North. It further highlights urban geopolitical implications, theorising Manchester Life as an organisational fix that reworks the geographies of value extraction while eroding democratic accountability. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Confronting the coming five decades from our present conjuncture demands – to paraphrase Antonio Gramsci's famous mantra – both critical pessimism and a wilful politics of hope. In this article, we engage with the politics of climate breakdown and the responses to wider socio-ecological crises with a necessary critical pessimism. Specifically, we confront the capture of green transition imperatives by finance capital, as well as the troubling orientation of transition towards building new structures of accumulation around the vision of an electrified consumer society. We also see the coming decades being marked by the ever-increasing wealth of global asset-owning classes – who, by definition, enclose the atmospheric commons faster than any other community. Against this dystopian picture of increasingly concentrated wealth, corporate excess, and terrestrial crisis, we focus on the stubborn reproduction of socio-ecological life through various grounded projects across the world. We engage with communities who work against structural constraints to reproduce life from below through urban commoning, food sovereignty, Indigenous organising, and caretaking economies – all of which are scaling out their visions through alternative internationals. All of these projects, we argue, present a planetary and multiscalar political economy in practice, which connects grounded experience with resistance to the dynamics of capitalism at the state, corporate, and transnational levels. With lessons from these communities in mind, we call for a 'planetary political economy of the global majority', which prioritises the reproduction of socio-ecological life according to the visions of grounded anti-systemic projects. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on critiquing Ryan Murphy's stance on the developmental state in Singapore, emphasizing the importance of understanding the concept of developmental state capitalism and its broader implications in academic literature and policy practice. It argues that Murphy's response overlooks the essence of the earlier argument and demonstrates a lack of comprehension regarding the nature of developmental state capitalism.

As China has emerged as a great economic power in the 21st century, comparativists and China scholars have sought to explore the characteristics of China's statist development model. Most accounts, however, have not taken seriously the policy implications of China's macroeconomic imbalance and its tendency to overproduction since the mid‐1990s. This article examines China's industrial‐policy‐centred responses to waves of overproduction crises from the late 1990s to the 2010s. China's expansive industrial policy incorporates demand‐side macroeconomic policy and long‐term planning for upgrading. This policy framework, designed to preserve the status quo, has been inherently lopsided, and has only served to reproduce China's macroeconomic imbalance. In the context of this persistent imbalance, China's industrial‐policy‐centred responses have contributed to periodic investment expansion of the state sector relative to the private sector, deepening ambitions around upgrading, and growing controversies regarding its statist model. In short, the statist features of China's economy have been periodically amplified by its particular responses to overproduction. This research shows that far from a statist shift engineered by President Xi Jinping, China's recent statist tendency has deeper historical and structural‐macroeconomic roots. This implies that the Chinese state adjusted and intensified its state interventions just as it underwent a profound process of marketization in the late 1990s. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article aims to critically discuss the foreign policy of communist Romania, especially towards Western Europe and the socialist bloc. It does this firstly by reviewing Elena Dragomir's recent ample analyses of communist Romania's foreign policy. Its second section consists in a critical problematization of the allegedly "pragmatic" and "adaptative" nature of communist Romania's dealings with its Western and Eastern partners, as established both by Dragomir's recent contributions, as well as the traditional scholarship. The paper ends with some more general methodological and conceptual reflections on the role, weight, and meaning of "pragmatism," "realism," "context" and "ideology" in historiographical reconstructions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article reflects on the spatial history of agrarian capitalism in the state of Veracruz, Mexico, through the lens of a French farming colony on the Nautla river. While, during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, this region's rural landscapes were ostensibly redesigned at the hand of liberal state programs and capitalist desires, a closer look shows a more checkered reality. Using textual and geographic archives, my analysis examines the tensions and "cracks" that emerged in this process of economic "modernization," with an eye for the fugitive histories fashioned by French colonists in the face of capitalist abstraction. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Towards the end of the Cold War, the vocabulary of global power, space and economy received a qualitative update. Amongst the terms rapidly gaining prominence since the early 1990s has been the notion of geoeconomics, the coining of which has frequently been attributed to the strategist Edward N. Luttwak. In his interpretation, it signified a transition away from Cold War ideological and military geopolitical competition towards commerce and market‐based geo‐power. Over the past three decades, a 'geoeconomics boom' set in, characterised by think tanks and a varied body of politico‐economic literature making extensive use of the term. Conventionally treated as a neologism, the provenance and earlier iterations of geoeconomics, some dating back more than a century, have been largely ignored by both celebratory and critical accounts. In this paper, we trace and contextualise these earlier instances, leading us to the Geopolitik era in Germany and references to geoeconomics in the United States in the decades after WWII. We thereby offer a critical genealogy of geoeconomics, conceptualised as an object of definitional struggle. Proponents of the term sought to position it variously as a tool of national economic cohesion and competition or as a way of understanding and harnessing shifting global power relations, whilst others sought to subsume geoeconomics to geopolitics. These past struggles track forward into ongoing dialectical tensions between geoeconomics and geopolitics as competing but related geostrategic visions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Under what conditions can the state discipline private equity firms into delivering the investment required to meet the coming needs of industrial transformation? States have sought to crowd in private capital to finance industrial development, but the results have so far been less than satisfactory. Prevailing accounts of financial industry power largely characterise an arms-length state-finance relationship that has unfolded in private-led markets where private equity firms have contributed to the secular growth in non-productive economic activity. This article problematises the assumption of private-led markets and argues that state-led markets present a counterfactual in which the disbursement of public money entails strict policy discipline and tight embedding between the state and private equity firms, which provides the conditions for them to emerge as unlikely champions of industrial policy. Two cases of co-investment between Chinese and European sovereign wealth funds demonstrate the power dynamics at play. Where PE firms in the Sino-Irish co-investment facilitated the international scaling of Irish firms in China, the PE firms operating in Europe failed to embed Chinese firms into regional supply chains in the Sino-Belgian co-investment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Two rival visions of Europe's place in the world economy competed for primacy throughout the post-war era. The idea of an 'Atlantic Europe' promoted close economic ties to the United States and integration into the liberal international order. An alternative 'Fortress Europe' vision aimed to carve out a sphere of relative European autonomy backed by trade barriers and industrial protectionism. While many argued that the 'Fortress Europe' vision was defeated during the globalization of the 1990s and 2000s, concepts such as economic sovereignty, industrial strategy and 'strategic autonomy' have returned to EU circles. Is a rebuilding of 'Fortress Europe' taking place in this context? This paper argues that the old tension between 'Atlantic' and 'Fortress' Europe is re-emerging but in a new form and under a new set of international conditions. A 'selective fortification' of European industrial strategy and trade policy is taking shape, as EU policymakers develop targeted instruments and institutional capacities that aim to insulate European firms from new patterns of international competition. The selective refortification of European capitalism has implications for debates within international political economy (IPE) on the future of liberal international order, new patterns of competitive regionalization, and the restructuring of the relation between the state and global capitalism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) was created in the early 1990s to promote the transition to a market economy and advance democracy in the post-communist countries of East Central Europe. How and why did this international organization, established for an entirely different purpose, then become an active investor in Egypt? Building on field theory, we explain the EBRD's move to Egypt as an attempt to overcome the hysteresis effect of its anachronistic operational logic (habitus) within a changing field. Once in Egypt, the EBRD aspired to leverage its symbolic capital of technical assistance, democratic commitment and the privileging of the private sector. However, given Egypt's increasingly autocratic and state capitalist evolution, it found delivering on its symbolic capital problematic. Its solution was to adapt to the very active European development finance field's modalities. However, the European field's logic ultimately de-prioritized democracy, human rights promotion, and poverty reduction and instead focused on sustainable investment, migration mitigation and containing Europe's geo-economic rivals. In our case study, we demonstrate that the EBRD operated deftly within this field, while it also gained permission and even reward for its mandate management. It is a problematic finding for the future of the EU development policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This essay explores 'territories of accelerated development' (TORs) to reconstruct the economic policy-making, development institutions and macroeconomic framework of late Putinism since the 2010s. It argues that even with Russia's integration into the world economy and the developmental rhetoric of state elites, TORs and the national developmental regime around them reproduce the patronal management and recycling of rents rather than the transformative and state-permeated facilitation of productive investments and capitalist profits. This upscaling of rents has been systemic. The result—rentierism—challenges common understandings of rent-seeking and commodity rents as incidental features of Russian 'state capitalism', and, instead places them at the centre of a non-capitalist order of its own. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Londongrad is at once a place, a process and a paradox. As a place, it refers to the manifold ways in which London has acquired a reputation for being a safe harbour for dirty money largely on account of a secure system of property rights, a cluster of professional enablers and a neoliberal politics that actively cultivated it. As a process, it illustrates the premier role that London plays in the global system of secrecy jurisdictions. As a paradox it signals the bizarre alignment of two nominally opposed systems, authoritarian state capitalism in Russia and neoliberal capitalism in the UK. Before the war in Ukraine, it was tacitly assumed that Londongrad was impervious to reform because no single political jurisdiction had the reach or the remit to confront this baroque system. Dismantling Londongrad is therefore a belated attempt to regulate the dark geography of dirty money. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Chinese state capitalism may be transitioning towards a technology-assisted variant that we call "surveillance state capitalism." The mechanism driving this development is China's corporate social credit system (CSCS) – a data-driven project to evaluate the "trustworthiness" of all business entities in the country. In this paper, we provide the first empirical analysis of CSCS scores in Zhejiang province, as the Zhejiang provincial government is to date the only local government to publish the scores of locally registered firms. We find that while the CSCS is ostensibly a means of measuring legal compliance, politically connected firms receive higher scores. This result is driven by a "social responsibility" category in the scoring system that valorizes awards from the government and contributions to causes sanctioned by the Chinese Communist Party. Our analysis underscores the potential of the CSCS to nudge corporate fealty to party-state policy and provides an early window into the far-reaching potential implications of the CSCS. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper critically examines China's national security review regime of foreign investment and compares it with that of the United States. Over the years, China has gradually established a comprehensive legal framework for national security review of foreign investment. Recent efforts were made to refine the public enforcement mechanism of the review in tandem with a new "pre-establishment national treatment plus negative list" system under the 2020 Foreign Investment Law. The United States also enacted the Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act of 2018 to enhance its national security review regime. By analyzing the law and practices of China and the United States, this paper finds that the national security review regimes of the two jurisdictions have functional convergences despite some formal divergences caused by diverse political-economy landscapes. Their functional convergences are highlighted by China's local practices, such as the de-facto national security screening in the name of anti-monopoly review. There are many factors affecting China's national security review regime for foreign investment, including the ongoing (and escalating) US-China competition (or conflict) at the international level and the evolution of state or party capitalism at the domestic level. These research findings will not only contribute to the existing comparative law scholarship but also benefit multinational enterprises that seek to enter Chinese and the US markets. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite the marked transformation in E. Asia's financial systems, regulators continue to employ hard paternalistic approaches to their stock markets that are viewed as counterproductive to their development. This article argues that the persistence of hard paternalistic regulatory practices can be explained by a regulatory vision—a common analytical framework to order complex uncertain environments that serve as regulatory first principles—centered on an irrational investor. A regulatory vision works alongside pressures emanating from foreign investment, state capitalism, and state-business relations. This understanding of investor rationality is in marked contrast to a liberal market variant, which emphasizes a rational investor, and thus provides a distinctive comparative lens to understand regulatory behavior in a moment of global financial hybridization. The study draws on over 90 elite interviews of senior regulators, stock exchange officers, and market practitioners conducted in China, Japan, Korea, and Taiwan, from 2015 to 2019. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The solution to the accumulation of authoritarian power enhanced by the Internet will not emerge from within the Internet itself; rather, the only radical and enduring response to the kind of networked authoritarianism that is becoming pervasive globally must regard attacking the extractivist foundation of Internet materiality as the primary and most effective antifascist tactic. Far from being a recent emergence of authoritarian infrastructure, however, the Internet was developed by the US military‐industrial complex and has always carried the imprint of authoritarian utility. The Internet is now a pervasive infrastructural feature of global capitalism and its state accomplices, and the deliberate temporary stoppage of Internet functioning by state actors, a so‐called Internet "shutdown" or "kill switch," illustrates the primary purpose of this infrastructure is to defend state power and capitalist commerce. Liberal attempts to reform the Internet are misguided, and anti‐authoritarians should adopt an abolitionist position regarding the Internet as infrastructure. The primary strategy for such a form of abolitionism should focus its efforts on shutting down the extractive industries that provide the material substrate of the Internet. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Bringing the literature on state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and state capitalism in conversation with studies on offshore financial centers (OFCs), this paper dissects the post-2000 internationalization of Russian SOE Gazprom via the OFC of Amsterdam, the Netherlands. Not adhering to the conventional financial logics of private firms, nor exclusively following political orders of the Kremlin, Gazprom is one of the exemplary state-capital hybrids of the new state capitalism. Where Gazprom steadily increased Russia’s geopolitical leverage over Europe’s energy needs prior to the 2022 military invasion of Ukraine, we stress that “it takes two to tango”, as the internationalization of Gazprom could not have occurred without active and passive help of capitalist states elsewhere. We argue that the Netherlands functions as a transnational capitalist state in the service of foreign capital, including state capital, with Amsterdam’s corporate services providers having long provided the legal stepping stones and corporate respectability enabling Gazprom to expand internationally. In this sense, the prevalent “othering” of SOEs and state capital neglects how the global ascent of state capitalism could not have happened without dedicated assistance orchestrated in leading Western OFCs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

• We reinterpreted Hall and Soskice, 2001 by adopting State-permeated capitalism. • A model with factor of state influence in the market for innovation is proposed. • Econometric analysis with continuous factors in an expanded framework is suggested. • We identify which factors of VoC affect innovation and to what extent they do so. • Empirical results in Hall and Soskice, 2001 are reexamined based on the recent data. Hall and Soskice's (2001) Varieties of Capitalism provides a background for explaining institutional benefits for specific types of innovation. Extensive research has been conducted to verify their claims, but controversy remains because the criteria of radical innovation are ambiguous. In this study, the numerous indicators for radical innovation presented in previous research are comprehensively verified. In addition, the expanded framework, including the concept of state capitalism, is used to reflect real-world economic circumstances in which state involvement in the market drives economic growth and innovation. By expressing the components that serve as the basis for clusters of market economy types as continuous variables, we identified which factors affect innovation and to what extent they do so. The results of a patent analysis support Hall and Soskice's (2001) claims, while those based on a trade analysis show conflicting results. A trade-off exists between state involvement in the market and innovation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article explores the role of state‐owned enterprises (SOEs) in the globalisation of China's infrastructure capital. Examining how accumulation strategies of Chinese SOEs are driven by a complex set of political and economic, state and private, interests, it foregrounds the inherently hybrid nature of China's state capitalism. We use Kenya's Standard Gauge Railway (SGR) as a case study to analyse how state infrastructure capital traverses borders, and the specific ways that contradictions of accumulation in China are relocated through the improvised hybridity of SOEs. In Kenya, China Road and Bridge Corporation, the main SGR contractor, shifted and adapted its strategies as the pursuit of economic productivity gave way to political priorities in China, simultaneously responding to changing socio‐political circumstances in Kenya and across East Africa. Analysing these dynamics, we highlight the contingencies of, and limitations to, structural reorganisation of actually existing forms of state capitalism in China and beyond. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Environmental state debates focus on the governance and steering functions of politics. Concurrently, many states stand out as large global owners and investors in carbon industries. Via various investment vehicles, states control around half of all global oil and gas reserves as well as other carbon assets. We know very little, however, about where these states are invested; how they conduct their carbon investment; and what possibilities and constraints carbon-owning states have to decarbonise. Yet, these aspects – the geography, investment profiles and domestic state carbon capital dependence – are key to assess the possibilities and limitations of climate action states as carbon owners have. Based on new fine-grained firm-level data, we deliver conceptual and empirical insights into all three issues. Our intervention fills an important gap in our knowledge about the environmental state, while drawing the attention of researchers and policymakers to a blind spot, but also to transformation potentials of the carbon-owning state in the following decade. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recent formulations of state capitalism tend to present it as a distinct system, anchored in China, in opposition to a neoliberal model represented by the United States and its global armatures. As an alternative to this binarism, this paper argues for Gillian Hart's relational-comparative approach to the geographies of the new state capitalism. It outlines three of Hart's theoretical-methodological principles—multiple trajectories, conjunctural analysis, and articulation—and demonstrates how they can be used to analyze the interrelations between "statist" and "liberal" development trajectories, through an empirical account of conjunctural struggles in and between China and the World Bank during the Tiananmen Square crisis. It argues that Tiananmen was an inflection point in the relation between the development trajectories of the Chinese state and the World Bank, where conflicts over the continuity of economic reform were simultaneously struggles over the boundaries of the state. Examining these institutions conjuncturally shows that China's "state capitalism" is not an opposite of the Bank's liberal model, but has been, in part, produced through power-laden contests over the meaning and materiality of state and market in multiple arenas. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The theme issue "Making Space for the New State Capitalism" brings together insights from critical economic geography and heterodox political economy through a series papers published in three installments, each accompanied with an introductory essay written by the guest editors. In this, the third of these introductory commentaries, we explore the challenges and opportunities associated with thinking conjuncturally, followed by a final collection of papers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Monetary policies are not usually considered as part of the repertoire of 'state capitalism'. However, unconventional monetary operations performed by central banks in recent years make this exclusion increasingly problematic. This paper thus explores whether recent central bank interventions should be considered manifestations of 'new' state capitalism. Analysis focuses on the actions of three central banks from the advanced capitalist core in the West – the US Federal Reserve, the European Central Bank and the Bank of England. By mobilising the 'financial chains' perspective, this paper highlights the fact that, under financialisation, contemporary central banks have assumed a pivotal role in shaping Western capitalism and its uneven geographies. Through these recent unconventional interventions, central banks have in effect become 'creators' or 'generators' of (financial) capital. As such, their role in shaping uneven economic geographies across space (well beyond their official territorial boundaries) has expanded. Spatial ramifications of central banks' capital-generating operations could thus fit easily within the framework of 'uneven and combined state capitalism'. The possibility of considering the unconventional operations of central banks as state capitalist could also go hand in hand with a modified definition of state capitalism. Indeed, the rubric of state capitalism could potentially be enlarged to include configurations of capitalism where the state plays a particularly strong role not only as promoter, supervisor and owner of capital but also as a 'generator' of capital. This capital-generating role appears to be essential for the survival of contemporary capitalism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the internationalisation of Chinese state-owned commercial banks in London's financial centre from the 2010s onwards. These banks have transformed from primarily servicing Chinese state-owned enterprises to making up four of the largest banks globally by balance sheet and undertaking a range of operations including RMB clearing and cross border settlement and yet their future international trajectory remains uncertain. My analysis positions Chinese bank internationalisation within the wider project of RMB internationalisation, arguing that financial centres can serve as important methodological, empirical and conceptual entry points into understanding how state and market interests play out unevenly across time and space. By focusing on place-based policy experimentation in London, my analysis points to the entangled, multi layered and often contradictory formations of actually existing state capitalism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The 2008 financial crisis allowed for the rising power of China to expand deeper into more (semi-)peripheral regions: in the past decade, the role of China and Chinese SOEs has increased markedly in Eastern Europe. This has been in step with China's geopolitical and geoeconomic expansion, hallmarked by the Belt and Road Initiative; the reconstruction of the Belgrade-Budapest railway line constitutes one of its flagship projects in Europe. This paper aims to explore the complexities of the current reconfiguration of state-capital nexus through an empirical analysis of this particular development project; in doing so, we hope to contribute to the scholarly debate about the heuristic use of 'new' state capitalism in three specific ways. First, instead of conceptualizing the state as a territorially confined power container, we propose to scrutinize the state-capital nexus from a multi-scalar and relational perspective. Second, we claim that the study of funding, financing and governing of large-scale infrastructural investments is a fruitful analytical entry point to theorize the changing relations between 'state' and 'capital'. Finally, we argue that from the perspective of contemporary shifts in global power structures, the emergence of state capitalist modalities in the Eastern peripheries of Europe should be understood as a 'co-production' of the geopolitical rivalry and elite capture of domains of infrastructure. In terms of methodology, in order to show how state-capital relations are produced, enacted and redrawn, the study builds on the analysis of media sources, policy documents, company networks, semi-structured interviews, and non-participant observations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The rise of digital platforms as a new form of business organisation concentrates power in the United States and China. Platform capitalism further intersects with and reinforces pre-existing trends towards state capitalism, where states more actively direct economies in response to economic turbulence and heightened geopolitical tension. The concentration of global business power within two states, combined with the increasing capacity for these states to leverage and direct platform activities for their own geopolitical–economic ends, has catalyzed the rise of 'state platform capitalism' (SPC). This paper develops the notion of SPC as an emergent logic of competition for both states and firms – in particular, the ways in which Beijing and Washington instrumentalise and mobilise domestic platform firms in pursuit of geopolitical–economic objectives, while platforms become increasingly interdependent with their home state institutions. Competition in the global political economy is increasingly centred on the recruitment of users and nations to these rival state-platform nexuses (national 'stacks') as a means of establishing and exercising extraterritorial economic and political power. Empirically, we identify variations between American and Chinese modes of practicing state platform capitalism, and we examine three axes within which this competition unfolds internationally: currencies, standards and cybersecurity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The book "African countries and the global scramble for China" by Ngonlardje Kabra Mbaidjol provides an alternative perspective on China's involvement in Africa. The author, drawing on academic debates and personal experience working for the UN, challenges the notion that China is scrambling to gain a foothold in Africa and argues instead that there is a global scramble for China. The book explores topics such as south-south cooperation, state capitalism, and relational regulation, and highlights the impact of China's growing influence on African states. The author also addresses the historical context of China's involvement in Africa and its relationships with neighboring Asian countries. The book contributes to the ongoing discussions and debates surrounding China's role in Africa and its implications for global geopolitics and economic development. [Extracted from the article]

"Global Finance, Local Control: Corruption and Wealth in Contemporary Russia" by Igor O. Logvinenko explores the paradox of how Russia remains financially integrated into the global economic system while functioning as an autocracy with weak rule of law. The book provides an economic history of Russia, focusing on key moments in the transition from state socialism to state capitalism. Logvinenko argues that Russia's political and business elites have strategically used financial openness to legitimize their ill-gotten fortunes and avoid domestic political and legal reforms. While the book offers valuable insights, it suffers from conceptual problems and a lack of precision in its analysis. Nonetheless, it is recommended for those seeking an overview of the Russian political economy or an understanding of kleptocratic authoritarianism in Russia. [Extracted from the article]

Structural transformation is widely recognized for being instrumental to the betterment of socio-economic conditions of low and middle-income countries. Yet, its transformative outcome is often conditional on the creation and distribution of surplus value realized by the state. By expanding the understanding of state-led systems of accumulation in Uzbekistan, the article offers a three-fold contribution. First, it strengthens the theoretical linkages between the debate on primitive socialist accumulation and state-led accumulation to understand today’s strategies of structural transformation. Second, it argues for the need to look at the inter-temporal and contextual structures in which social agents and interests interact within the dominant logic of state-led accumulation. Finally, it uses the case of Uzbekistan to show how pre- and neoliberal forms of state-led accumulation led to distinctive social and economic outcomes of structural transformation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has been theorised as a spatial fix to China’s overaccumulation problem, and as such, an implicitly productivist endeavour. This article opens up conceptual space to consider how historically and geographically mediated forms of financialisation have tempered the unfolding of the BRI in peripheral economies. Drawing on the Serbian post-socialist transition context, financialisation has been characterised by underinvestment and a persistent dependency on foreign, market-based capital inflows which have (1) precipitated state transformations to mobilise Chinese financing for BRI projects, strengthening the role of the state in industrial rejuvenation; and (2) created an institutional palimpsest conducive to non-productive forms of surplus value appropriation that demonstrates the hybridity of accumulation imperatives underlying the BRI. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In contrast to Sciamma's Bande de filles/Girlhood (2014), little scholarly attention has been accorded to space in Naissance des pieuvres/Water Lilies (2007). Featuring quiet neighbourhoods in the Parisian suburb of Cergy, Naissance's backdrop is unassuming. However, its association with consumerism, capitalism and the French state is a rich and hitherto underexploited topic for analysis. Considering the town's relative novelty, this article interprets Sciamma's on-screen environment as a partial 'non-place' as defined by Marc Augé. Such a town produces superficial social connections characterised by contractual exchanges. Meanwhile, the detached pavillons in Naissance retain a proximity to countryside that suggests freedom and banality, but the tension between nature and state generates oppressive effects. This article argues that Naissance's backdrop is punctuated by an underlying sense of entrapment. Space is a vector for exploring human relationships, extending themes of feminism and sexuality that permeate Sciamma's wider oeuvre. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Scholarship on global agri-food regulation would contribute much to new state capitalism debates, which to date largely ignore this field. Contradictions within the global arrangement of corporations, international agencies, national governments and trade architecture governing agriculture in the 1990s set the stage for more robust state roles post-2008. Food price volatility catalyzed neomercantilist policies while, paradoxically, deepening global market relations. States' on-going interventions to manage repriced food offer crucial windows into this paradox of new state capitalism, while centering socioecological dimensions that remain peripheral to new state capitalism debates. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

State capitalism is experiencing a revival as a term to capture the current capitalist constellations and departures from neoliberalism. Unlike, neoliberalism, however, the term state capitalism has a long history reaching back to the age of imperialism in the late 19th century. Although state capitalism has been used as a prerogative term by Marxists, liberals, and neoliberals alike, it has served as a programmatic label for developmentalist and neomercantilist projects in reaction to imperialism in the periphery. This paper argues that we need to bring the intellectual history of state capitalism into the 'new state capitalism' debate. China has played a major role in the revival of state capitalism in the social sciences, but the long history of China's engagement with state capitalism as a concept and program dating back to the late Qing reformers has been overlooked for the most part. State capitalism is by no means new to China, from Liang Qichao, Sun Yatsen, and Mao Zedong to Deng Xiaoping, the idea that China had to create a modern nation-state and industrial capitalism in the name of economic progress and to get ahead in the global competition is a recurring theme. What is new is that for the first time, the ambition to use state capitalism as a means to catch up with the West is bearing fruits in ways that could undermine the predominance of Western economies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The portrayals of "new state capitalism" in both the popular media and policy-making circles have become a potent geopolitical category. This politically realist categorization is understandably popular because of its simplicity—states proactively participating in capital accumulation are construed as threats to institutions underpinning the "free market". This paper complicates this portrayal by framing what appears to be a "rise" of state capitalistic maneuvers from China as a dynamic sovereignty–accumulation nexus. Specifically, Chinese state capitalism—and arguably state capitalism in general—constitutes the reproduction of sovereign rule. Underpinning this tension-filled process is territoriality: the use of territory for political, economic, and social ends. This dynamic relationship will be illustrated through an examination of how and why Yunnan, a southwestern Chinese province that was economically marginalized for several decades, emerged as a geostrategic platform for facilitating new rounds of capital accumulation. Through large-scale infrastructural investments in Yunnan, the Chinese state generated new territorial configurations that (a) enabled the positioning of Yunnan as a "bridgehead" of Chinese economic statecraft and (b) encouraged investments aimed at capturing new growth opportunities. While this state-led developmental process partially resolves tensions generated by previous rounds of capital accumulation, it also generates new tensions. Building on this case study, the paper demonstrates how Chinese state capitalism more accurately exemplifies a state-building process that is embedded in and is constituted by a central contradiction between the territorial and capitalistic logics of power. It concludes by presenting two directions for future research on Chinese state capitalism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper comments on the unexamined bifurcation of new state capitalism studies into two camps: changes in liberal capitalism and analyses of illiberal state forms. I characterize these aspects as Lazarus meets Loch Ness: Lazarus-like when focused on the ever-reborn market interventions of the liberal capitalist state, and Loch Ness-like in its rediscovery of the resurfaced 'other.' [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Alami and Dixon instead treat state capitalism not as a well-defined analytical category but rather a "flexible means of problematising...trajectories of state intervention and the role that it plays in the (geo) political re-organisation of global capitalism" ([1]: xx). One way this query might be posed is where in the world the phenomena described under the rubric of state capitalism are most pronounced or perhaps newly apparent; in which countries or in what parts of the world do we see a more muscular or interventionist state? Keywords: State capitalism; hegemonic cycles; macrohistorical sociology EN State capitalism hegemonic cycles macrohistorical sociology 770 773 4 05/16/23 20230501 NES 230501 The term "state capitalism" dates from the late nineteenth century, when it was coined by Marxists seeking to understand the growing role of the state as an owner of capital and orchestrator of production in European countries. [Extracted from the article]

This paper introduces an Exchange section dedicated to the question of the new state capitalism. It is suggested that the new state capitalism, both as an ascendant concept and as marker of socioinstitutional facts on the ground, signals a significant geohistorical moment, perhaps not a new "era" as such, but a notable inflection point. This warrants critical attention, even if first-generation treatments of the phenomenon itself may have been somewhat wanting. Contributions follow from Ilias Alami, Jennifer Bair, Isabella Weber, Marion Werner, and Heather Whiteside, each of whom provide a critical take on (debates around) the new state capitalism from their own theoretical perspective and vantage point. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The theme issue 'Making Space for the New State Capitalism' brings together insights from critical economic geography and heterodox political economy through a series of papers published in three installments, each accompanied by an introductory essay written by the guest editors. In this, the second of these introductory commentaries, we explore the consequences of embracing relationality, spatiotemporality and uneven development, together with the second group of papers. Introducing a final group of papers, the third installment will address the challenges and opportunities of thinking conjuncturally. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Global capitalism is currently experiencing a turbulent and polymorphous (geo)political reordering, encompassing multiple transformations in the landscapes of state intervention, and a drastic reconfiguration of the state's role as promoter, supervisor and owner of capital across the world economy. Can the concept of state capitalism aid us in grasping these transformations conceptually? My answer is yes, with the proviso that state capitalism is neither conceptualised as a national (or regional) variety of capitalism, nor as a new regime of accumulation, but as a flexible means of problematising this historic arc in the trajectories of state intervention. Based on this approach, I offer in this essay ten theses on the new state capitalism, its roots in the dynamics of capital accumulation, its relations to broader material conflicts and its potential futures. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

With the rise of 'new' state capitalisms, control over transport infrastructure has returned to the forefront of competition in the global economy. This article investigates how different state capitalisms interact to enable economic developments in ports. It tracks the relationship between state-owned firms in the shipping and ports sectors through a case study of the port of Valencia in Spain and COSCO shipping group. The article identifies state capitalisms as variegated and relational to analyze the ways in which qualitatively different state capitalist dynamics interact at different scales. The article identifies two state capitalist dynamics which have been dominant in determining relations between Spanish and Chinese state capitalisms: 1) A commercial dynamic of maximizing Spanish ports profits by establishing new relationships with Chinese firms; and 2) an expansionary dynamic of increasing market share of Chinese state-owned firms in European shipping markets. These two dynamics are synergistic and have contributed to the competitiveness of Spanish ports and Chinese shipping firms by providing new capital to the port of Valencia and expanding the port's profile as a hub in the eastern Mediterranean, while also further solidifying COSCO's position in European shipping markets and its internalization and vertical integration strategy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The COVID-19 pandemic has resulted in governments playing increasingly prominent roles as active economic agents. However, state capitalism does not necessarily serve broad developmental purposes, and rather can be directed to supporting sectional and private interests. As the literature on variegated capitalism alerts us, governments and other actors regularly devise fixes in response to a systemic crisis, but the focus, scale, and scope of the interventions vary considerably, according to the constellation of interests. Rapid progress with vaccines notwithstanding, the UK government's response to COVID-19 has been associated with much controversy, not only because of an extraordinarily high death rate, but also because of allegations of cronyism around the granting of government contracts and bailouts. We focus on the latter, investigating more closely who got bailed out. We find that badly affected sectors (e.g. hospitality, transportation) and larger employers were more likely to get bailouts. However, the latter also favored the politically influential and those who had run up debt profligately. Although, as with state capitalism, crony capitalism is most often associated with emerging markets, we conclude that the two have coalesced into a peculiarly British variety, but one that has some common features with other major liberal markets. This might suggest that the eco-systemic dominance of the latter is coming to an end, or, at the least, that this model is drifting towards one that assumes many of the features commonly associated with developing nations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The phenomenon of state capitalism is attracting growing attention in economic geography and political economy. We contribute to the debate by exploring the authoritarian state capitalism variant whereby the state moves beyond a predominantly regulatory role and appears as the dominant actor. We take Russia to be a prominent example of authoritarian state capitalism because the central state has subjugated economy, created organisational structures and designed development strategies to serve the interests of the kleptocrat, inverting the conventional meaning of 'state capture'. The paper illustrates the centrality of the state by exploring two state-sponsored megaprojects: (i) the upgrade of the Northern Sea Route and (ii) the construction of innovation clusters (Skolkovo). In the first case, the state directs resources to the Northern Sea Route to secure Russia's control of the Arctic. In the second case, the state attempts to replicate the perceived developmental success stories of the West by fostering technology clusters. Each illustrative case offers an instructive insight into Russia's authoritarian state capitalism characterised by tensions between its own political and economic repertoires and a contentious relationship with the Western-dominated liberal capitalist world order. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We respond to the special issue's call for a multiscalar, historicised approach to state capitalism through an exploration of Sovereign Wealth Fund investment into London real estate. We point to how the UK's ostensibly market-led recovery since the 2008 financial crisis has relied in part on attracting 'patient' state capitalist investments. In this, we contextualise the relational regulation of real estate markets as the outcome of intersecting state projects by considering the investment motivations of the single largest owner of London real estate, the Qatari Investment Authority, and the utilisation of their investment by UK governance actors. Focusing on Qatari Investment Authority's involvement in London's Olympic Village, we highlight how this strategic coupling in the real estate market realised domestic and geopolitical aims for the Qataris while facilitating the UK government's strategy to ameliorate London's housing shortage by fostering a 'build to rent' asset class. In doing so, we contribute to readings of state capitalism as an 'uneven and combined' process beyond the traditional state/market binary by placing sovereign wealth fund investment into the context of city governance, the geopolitics of real estate and resultant relational forms of regulation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explores the intersections and overlaps between state capitalism and global production networks. A key feature of the so-called new state capitalism is the combination of state ownership and corporatisation, which creates a system that can be characterised as a hybrid of public–private governance in both corporate and network terms. Moreover, the internationalisation of state hybrids adds an extraterritorial dimension to the state, which can influence the configuration and governance of global production networks. This paper develops a conceptual framework (H–E–N) that foregrounds the relationships between hybrid governance (H), extraterritoriality (E) and global production network configurations (N), thereby promoting an integrated analysis of the implications of the new state capitalism for global production networks. This framework is mobilised to explain how state capitalism in Singapore has influenced the development of the city-state's position in upstream, midstream and downstream oil global production networks over the 1959–2019 period. The study demonstrates that hybrid governance, as part of a wider strategy of state capitalism, has been critical in the development of Singapore's position in oil global production networks. The hybrid nature of the institutional forms associated with state ownership – for instance state-owned enterprises and sovereign wealth funds – goes beyond market facilitation to encompass active state participation in markets. Hybrid governance not only allows the state to influence domestic outcomes but – through the extraterritorial strategies of hybrid entities – can also influence global production network configurations beyond its borders. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Scholars have argued that megaprojects' turn away from issues of employment, and mass housing are among the core traits of neoliberalism. Turkey, though once seen as a paragon of neoliberalism, problematizes this generalization. Erdoğanist megaprojects have created jobs and residence for millions, and garner consent. 'Embedded neoliberalism', a concept frequently used to explain increasing state involvement under neoliberalism, sheds light on the governing AKP's power, but is insufficient in explaining its core dynamics. Whereas the 'embedded neoliberalism' literature downplays the role of the government as a producer, the 'state capitalism' literature, as applied to Turkey, overrates the extent to which this country has moved away from neoliberalism. The concept 'neoliberal statism' (which puts the emphasis on the consent-generating and political aspects of the new economy) better captures the AKP's path. Megaproject-driven growth and popular consent, however, are restricted by vulnerabilities that also afflict neoliberal statism as a broader growth strategy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper reexamines African socialism, the Ghanaian political economy under Kwame Nkrumah (1957–1966), Nkrumah's intellectual genealogical heritage, and African intellectual history as a genre that transcends the bounds of the Atlantic world. First, I sketch the lives of Black Marxists—Nkrumah, C.L.R. James, George Padmore, and Bankole Awoonor-Renner—from Africa and the Americas, to the Soviet Union, to England and Ghana, to rethink Black bodies not merely as theorists of racial and decolonial questions but also as sites, carriers, and manipulators of political-economic theories. In constructing connected and overlapping histories, I demonstrate how controversial and contested Soviet ideas became key sites of interrogation among global Black Marxists. By reframing travel as an intellectual process, I reconceptualize the movements of Black Marxists to the USSR, the United States, England, and Ghana as critical intellectual and historical processes in their understandings of Lenin's state capitalist ideas. Second, I revisit the Ghanaian political economy under Nkrumah to argue that combining socialist and capitalist development paths was not a contradictory Marxian policy but was embedded within Black Marxist understandings of Lenin's state capitalist ideas. In so doing, I argue that we must situate African political ideologies not solely within a romanticized Afrocentric origin but as ideas that emerge out of contemporaneous global political and ideological struggles. I draw on global Black Marxists' correspondence; newspaper and magazine articles; British and American espionage files; and Ghanaian, American, and British state and inter-state departmental documents in imperial, colonial, and postcolonial British, Ghanaian, American, and Russian archives. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While state-owned enterprises (SOEs) have been a controversial issue of the international trading system, sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) pose new challenges to existing international economic governance. As active players in the global investment market, SWFs will attract the scrutiny of the General Agreement on Trade in Services and international investment law. By becoming involved in the technology sector in various ways, SWFs may play a role in facilitating technology transfer, which may lead to the examination of the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights Agreement. This Article offers a thorough examination of the way(s) that international economic governance deals with the status of state enterprises in the investment market and their technology investment and transfer activities. It reveals a series of challenges SWFs may face when they become involved with the technology sector. This Article argues that the World Trade Organization (WTO) serves as a more appropriate forum to regulate SWFs than the International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID). Additionally, in order to properly address state capitalism, it is important to view state capitalism more broadly and objectively, and separately from U.S.-China geo-economic competition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article adopts an analytical framework that prioritises the importance and contingent nature of class power and relations in competitive global capitalism, explaining the ways in which power struggles amongst key interests over material gains have produced volatile relationships between the CCP and Chinese tech conglomerates. In doing so, this article contributes to the literature on Chinese state capitalism and debates around the Chinese state's recent crackdown on private tech capital. In contrast to Chinese state capitalist models, which posit the Party as dominating over market forces, I argue that the actual patterns of collaboration and confrontation between the Party and private tech capital, which oscillate from time to time, can be better understood in relation to the contingent power and leverage exercised by state actors and private capital at particular points in time. Influencing these interactions are important structural forces within and beyond China, which have transformed domestic and international landscapes for development. In this analytical framework, the state–capital relationship in China is understood to be volatile, varied and far from unidirectional; it is subject to changing narratives of national interests and is influenced by dispersed sources of power and contention over the control of essential assets. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]