1. Holdout Litigation during the Debt Restructuring of Defaulting Sovereigns: A Plain Vileness or a Necessary Evil?
- Author
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Oluyeju, Olufemi and Oluyeju, Maria
- Subjects
DEBT relief ,PUBLIC debts ,DEFAULT (Finance) ,DEBTOR & creditor ,CAPITAL market ,ACTIONS & defenses (Law) - Abstract
The article investigates whether holdout litigation during the debt workout of defaulting sovereigns is a plain vileness or a necessary evil for an efficient sovereign debt market. Typically, litigation is one of the rare options available to creditors to contest adverse terms of the debt restructuring. Critics have nonetheless linked holdout litigation to higher borrowing costs and the inability to access global financial markets. They contend that litigation disrupts sovereign debt workouts and is the primary cause of slow and ineffective debt restructuring. Conversely, protagonists of holdout litigation have argued that litigation is crucial to having an efficient sovereign debt market and, hence, an essential part of the market. The authors argue that although litigations can create holdout problems, they are beneficial and necessary for a functional or effective market for sovereign debt as they guarantee an efficient market and streams of private credit for capital creation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2024
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