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Regulation fostering Managed Care alternatives in health insurance is spreading. This work reports on an experiment designed to measure the amounts of compensation asked by the Swiss population (in terms of reduced premiums) for Managed-Care type restrictions in the provision of health care. It finds that restrictions on the freedom of physician choice would require an average compensation of more than one-third of the premium, while generic substitution even meets with a small willingness to pay. Marked preference heterogeneity is an argument against regulation imposing uniformity of contract in Swiss social health insurance.

Due to the mixed empirical evidence bearing on the economic determinants, beliefs have been at the centre of attention of research into preferences for income redistribution. We elicit preferences for income redistribution through a Discrete Choice Experiment performed in 2008 in Switzerland and relate them to several behavioural determinants, in particular to religious beliefs. Estimated marginal willingness to pay (WTP) is positive among those who do not belong to a religious denomination, and negative otherwise. However, the marginal WTP is shown to increase with a higher degree of religiosity. Moreover, those who state that luck or connections play a crucial role in determining economic success exhibit significantly higher WTP values than those who deem effort to be decisive. (JEL codes: C35, C93, D63, H29) Copyright The Author 2011. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of Ifo Institute for Economic Research, Munich. All rights reserved. For permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oup.com, Oxford University Press.

Oxford Economic Papers, 63 (1), ISSN:0030-7653, ISSN:1464-3812

In this paper, we address the issue of spurious correlation in the production of health in a systematic way. Spurious correlation entails the risk of linking health status to medical (and nonmedical) inputs when no links exist. This note first presents the bounds testing procedure as a method to detect and avoid spurious correlation. It then applies it to a recent contribution by Lichtenberg (2004), which relates longevity in the United States to pharmaceutical innovation and public health care expenditure. The results of the bounds testing procedure show longevity to be linearly related to these two factors. Therefore, the estimates reported by Lichtenberg (2004) cannot be said to be result of spurious correlation, to the contrary, they very likely reflect an effective relationship, at least for the United States., KOF Working Papers, 227

This paper examines the consequences of introducing mobile number portability (MNP). As MNP allows consumers to keep their telephone number when switching providers, it reduces consumers' switching costs. However, MNP may also cause consumer ignorance if telephone numbers no longer identify networks. As a result, while fostering competition for mobile customers, MNP may also induce operators to increase termination charges for calls to mobile networks, gener-ating ambiguous welfare effects. We examine how extensions such as MNP based on call-forwarding, termination fee regulation, and alternative means of carrier identification affect these findings.

In spite of its "clean" image, electricity is not without external effects, which can be increasingly traced to the households, whose demand is characterized by considerable time-of-day and seasonal variation. Thus, a reduction of this variation may permit the cancellation or at least deferral of additions to production and transmission capacities. This contribution purports to shed light on the relationship between time-dependent household demand for eletricity and the pricing of power. Own price elasticities, estimated from individual data, are significantly negative with few exceptions, and the cross price elasticities positive. Clearly, the pricing policies of power producers have the potential for stabilizing and smoothing household demand for power, thus contributing to the mitigation of external effects.

Applications of zero-inflated count data models have proliferated in health economics. However, zero-inflated Poisson or zero-inflated negative binomial maximum likelihood estimators are not robust to misspecification. This paper proposes Poisson quasi-likelihood estimators as an alternative. These estimators are consistent in the presence of excess zeros without having to specify the full distribution. The advantages of the Poisson quasi-likelihood approach are illustrated in a series of Monte Carlo simulations and in an application to the demand for health services.

Can multinational firms exert more power than national firms by influencing politics through lobbying? To answer this question, we analyze the extent of national environmental regulation when policy is determined in a lobbying game between a government and firm. We compare the resulting equilibrium regulation levels, outputs and welfare for national and multinational firms, depending on such parameters as the potential environmental damages, transportation costs and the influence of the firm. For low transportation costs, output and pollution of a national firm is always as least as high as for a multinational; this changes for high transportation costs and intermediate damage parameters. When there is no lobbying, welfare levels are always higher with multinationals than with national firms. However, the existence of lobbying may reverse this ordering.

We examine a "Rotten Kid" model (Becker 1974) where a player with social preferences interacts with an egoistic player. We assume that social preferences are intention-based rather than outcome-based. In a very general multi-stage setting we show that any equilibrium must involve mutually unkind behavior of both players, endogenously generating negative emotions rather than positive altruism. In a large class of two-stage games that includes principal-agent and gift-giving games, this prevents equilibrium from being materially Pareto efficient. Compared to the subgame-perfect equilibrium without social preferences, efficiency is still generally increased. On the other hand, the materialistic player has lower whereas the reciprocal player has higher material payoffs, so that reciprocity does not increase equity: For sufficiently strong reciprocity concerns, the materialistic player ends up with a negligible share of the gains from trade.

Health economists have studied the determinants of the expected value of health status as a function of medical and non-medical inputs, often finding small marginal effects of the former. However, medical inputs may have an additional benefit in the form of a reduced variability of health status. Using the standard deviation of life expectancy in 24 OECD countries between 1960 and 2005, a 10 percent increase of health care expenditure is associated with a decrease of an estimated 0.42 percent. Willingness to pay for such a reduction of uncertainty may well exceed the extra health care expenditure in the United States and Switzerland. This implies that even in these two countries with very high health care expenditure per capita, flat-of-the-curve medicine need not be wasteful.JEL-Classification: I12, J10. Health economists have studied the determinants of the expected value of health status as a function of medical and non-medical inputs, often finding small marginal effects of the former. However, medical inputs may have an additional benefit in the form of a reduced variability of health status. Using the standard deviation of life expectancy in 24 OECD countries between 1960 and 2005, a 10 percent increase of health care expenditure is associated with a decrease of an estimated 0.42 percent. Willingness to pay for such a reduction of uncertainty may well exceed the extra health care expenditure in the United States and Switzerland. This implies that even in these two countries with very high health care expenditure per capita, flat-of-the-curve medicine need not be wasteful.

The paper shows that, in some important respects, the differences between the Nash equilibrium and competing concepts such as the quantalresponse equilibrium are smaller than they appear. I start from the observation that, in many experiments, parameter shifts that leave the Nash equilibrium unchanged affect behavior. I explain the direction of change with a heuristic structural approach, relying on properties such as strategic complementarities and increasing differences. I justify the approach using existing comparative statics results for the Nash equilibrium and new comparative statics results for the quantal response equilibrium. Further, I show that the experimental observations can also be rationalized by a model of adjustment to change that does not rely on any equilibrium concept. Finally, I relate the structural approach to equilibrium selection concepts.

We model non-binding retail-price recommendations (RPRs) as a communication device facilitating coordination in vertical supply relations. Assuming both repeated vertical trade and asymmetric information about production costs, we show that RPRs may be part of a relational contract, communicating private information from manufacturer to retailer that is indispensable for maximizing joint surplus. We show that this contract is self-enforcing if the retailer’s profit is independent of production costs and punishment strategies are chosen appropriately. We also extend our analysis to settings where consumer demand is variable or depends directly on the manufacturer’s RPRs. Keywords: vertical relationships, relational contracts, asymmetric information, price recommendations. JEL Classification: D23; D43; L14; L15.

What makes you a successful cooperator? Using data from the British television game show ``Golden Balls'' we analyze a prisoner's dilemma game and its pre-play. We find that players strategically select their partner for the PD, e.g., they bear in mind whether contestants lied. Players' expectations about the stake size strongly influence the outcome of the PD: The lower the stakes, the more likely players successfully cooperate. Most interestingly, unilateral cooperation is encouraged by mutually promising not to defect and shaking hands on it, but a mere handshake serves as manipulating device and increases successful defection.

Recent work by Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) establishes an empirical modelling strategy which takes full account of the structural, non-(log-)linear impact of trade barriers on trade in new trade theory models. Structural new trade theory models have never been used to evaluate and quantify the role of endogenous preferential trade agreement (PTA) membership for trade in a way which is consistent with general equilibrium. Apart from this gap, the present paper aims at delivering an empirical model which takes into account both that preferential trade agreement membership is endogenous and that the world matrix of bilateral trade flows contains numerous zero entries. These features are treated in an encompassing way by means of (possibly two-part) Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood estimation with endogenous binary indicator variables in the empirical model.

The purpose of this paper is twofold. First, it measures the efficiency in the provision of public goods by local jurisdictions applying Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA). Second, it relates ef- ficiency scores to a fiscal equalization scheme designed to mitigate the negative consequences of Tiebout competition. The data come from the 26 cantons of Switzerland (2000-2004), a country characterized by marked federalism. Results show the equalization scheme to indeed have a negative influence on performance, resulting in an efficiency-equity trade-off (Stiglitz, 1988). However, substitution of earmarked payments by lump-sum payments as part of the 2008 reform is likely to enhance cantonal performance.

In a perfectly competitive market with a possibility of technological innovation we contrast guaranteed feed-in tariffs for electricity from renewables and tradable green certificates from a dynamic efficiency and social welfare point of view. Specifically, we model decisions about the technological innovation with convex costs within the framework of a game-theoretic model, and discuss implications for optimal policy design under different assumptions regarding regulatory pre-commitment. We find that for the case of technological innovation with convex costs subsidy policies are preferable over quota-based policies. Further, in terms of dynamic efficiency, no pre-commitment policies are shown to be at least as good as the pre-commitment ones. Thus, a government with a preference for innovation being performed if the achievable cost reduction is high should be in favor of the no pre-commitment regime.

This paper investigates empirically the effect of import diversity on government size and provides evidence for the love of variety effect on government spending described in Hanslin (2008). I argue that crowding out of firms is an important cost of public good provision. However, due to the access to foreign varieties, national costs of public good provision are lower and therefore, public good provision is higher. Especially for OECD countries this channel seems to exist. The diversity of imported products has a positive effect on government consumption, particularly when these goods are classified as differentiated. In addition, this positive effect is decreasing in home market size. Further, the direct effect of the share of differentiated in total imported products on the government share is negative.

We examine equilibria in competitive insurance markets with adverse selection when wealth differences arise endogenously from unobservable savings or labor supply decisions. The endogeneity of wealth implies that high-risk individuals may ceteris paribus exhibit the lower marginal willingness to pay for insurance than low risks, a phenomenon that we refer to as irregular-crossing preferences. In our model, both risk and patience (or productivity) are privately observable. In contrast to the models in the existing literature, where wealth heterogeneity is exogenously assumed, equilibria in our model no longer exhibit a monotone relation between risk and coverage. Individuals who purchase larger coverage are no longer higher risks, a phenomenon frequently observed in empirical studies.

This paper analyzes the identifying power of weak convexity assumptions in treatment effect models with endogenous selection. The counterfactual distributions are constrained either in terms of the response function, or conditional on the realized treatment, and sharp bounds on the potential outcome distributions are derived. The methods are applied to bound the effect of education on smoking.

The economic concept of the second-best involves the idea that multiple simultaneous deviations from a hypothetical first-best optimum may be optimal once the first-best itself can no longer be achieved, since one distortion may partially compensate for another. Within an evolutionary framework, we translate this concept to behavior under uncertainty. We argue that the two main components of prospect theory, the value function and the probability weighting function, are complements in the second-best sense. Previous work has shown that an adaptive S-shaped value function may be evolutionary optimal if decision-making is subject to cognitive or perceptive constraints. We show that distortions in the way probabilities are perceived can further enhance fitness. The second-best optimum involves overweighting of small and underweighting of large probabilities. Behavior as described by prospect theory might therefore be evolution's second-best solution to the fitness maximization problem. We discuss under which circumstance our model makes empirically testable predictions about the relation between individuals' value and probability weighting functions.

The paper analyzes the effects of more intense competition on firms' incentives to invest in process innovations. We carry out experiments for two-stage games, where R&D investment choices are followed by product market competition. As predicted by theory, an increase in the number of firms from two to four reduces investments. However, a positive effect is observed for a switch from Cournot to Bertrand, even though theory predicts a negative effect in the four-player case. This result reflects overinvestment in the Bertrand case. The results arise both in treatments in which both stages are implemented and in treatments in which only one stage is implemented.

Traditionally, economists make a sharp distinction between stated and revealed preferences, viewing the latter as more fully meeting the assumptions of economic analysis. Here, we consider one form of empirical evidence regarding this belief: the consistency of choices in stated and revealed preference tasks. We show that both kinds of task can produce consistent choices, suggesting that both can measure underlying preferences, if necessary conditions are met. We propose that a necessary condition is that task be either familiar to those facing it or offer contextual cues that substitute for familiarity, such as prices in competitive markets or recommendations from trusted, knowledgeable sources. We show that how well decision makers achieve such understanding is often confounded with the method that researchers use. Considering task familiarity not only clarifies some of the conflicting evidence regarding revealed and stated preference methods, but raises potentially productive questions regarding the roles of social institutions in shaping preferences.

This contribution contains an international comparison of preferences. Using two Discrete Choice Experiments (DCE), it measures willingness to pay for health insurance attributes in Germany and the Netherlands. Since the Dutch DCE was carried out right after the 2006 health reform, which made citizens explicitly choose a health insurance contract, two research questions naturally arise. First, are the preferences with regard to contract attributes (such as Managed-Care-type restrictions of physician choice) similar between the two countries? Second, was the information campaign launched by the Dutch government in the context of the reform effective in the sense of reducing status quo bias? Based on random-effects Probit estimates, these two questions can be answered as follows. First, while much the same attributes have positive and negative willingness to pay values in the two countries, their magnitudes differ, pointing to differences in preference structure. Second, status quo bias in the Netherlands is one-half of the German value, suggesting that Dutch consumers were indeed made to bear the cost of decision making associated with choice of a health insurance contract.

This paper investigates the design of incentives in a dynamic adverse selection framework when agents� production technologies display learning effects and agents� rate of learning is private knowledge. In a simple two-period model with full commitment available to the principal, we show that whether learning effects are over- or under-exploited crucially depends on whether learning effects increase or decrease the principal�s uncertainty about agents� costs of production. Hence, what drives the over- or underexploitation of learning effects is whether more efficient agents also learn faster (so costs diverge through learning effects) or whether it is the less efficient agents who learn faster (so costs converge). Furthermore, we show that if divergence in costs through learning effects is strong enough, learning effects will not be exploited at all, in a sense to be made precise.

Using a general two-stage framework, this paper gives sufficient conditions for increasing competition to have negative or positive effects on R&D-investment, respectively. Both possibilities arise in plausible situations, even if one uses relatively narrow definitions of increasing competition. The paper also shows that competition is more likely to increase the investments of leaders than those of laggards. When R&D-spillovers are strong, competition is less likely to increase investments. The paper also identifies conditions under which low initial levels of competition make a positive effects of competition on investment more likely. Extending the basic framework, the paper shows that separation of ownership and control, endogenous entry and cumulative investments make positive effects of competition on investment more likely. Imperfect upstream competition weakens the effects of competition on investment.

In this paper, preferences for income redistribution in Switzerland are elicited through a Discrete Choice Experiment (DCE) performed in 2008. In addition to the amount of redistribution as a share of GDP, attributes also included its uses (working poor, the unemployed, old-age pensioners, families with children, people in ill health) and nationality of beneficiary (Swiss, Western European, others). Willingness to pay for redistribution increases with income and education, contradicting the conventional Meltzer-Richard (1981) model. The Prospect of Upward Mobility hypothesis [Hirschman and Rothschild (1973); Benabou and Ok (2001)] receives partial empirical support.

The sustainability of the welfare state ultimately depends on citizens' preferences for income redistribution. They are elicited through a Discrete Choice Experiment performed in 2008 in Switzerland. Attributes are redistribution as GDP share, its uses (the unemployed, old-age pensioners, people with ill health etc.), and nationality of beneficiary. Estimated marginal willingness to pay (WTP) is positive among those who deem benefits too low, and negative otherwise. However, even those who state that government should reduce income inequality exhibit a negative WTP on average. The major finding is that estimated average WTP is maximum at 21% of GDP, clearly below the current value of 25%. Thus, the present Swiss welfare state does not appear sustainable. JEL-Code: C35, C93, D63, H29.

There have been many studies of the volume-outcome relationship. In all of these, the unit of analysis is the hospital or physician. However, this level of analysis is mostly limited to the use of in-hospital mortality rates and is particularly sensitive to selective referral. Moreover, the literature on agglomeration economies highlights the importance of information spillovers within regions (Glaeser, 2010). To overcome these problems, our study is the first that examines the volume-outcome relationship on a regional (county or cancer registry) level. Using data from the National Cancer Institute's Surveillance, Epidemiology and End Results program we find that regions with relatively more of the same cancer type exhibit relatively better health outcomes.

Unlike in other disciplines, research output in economics is commonly measured based on the journal titles in which an author has published. Here, I examine how much output measures based on journal titles tell us about the academic interest and relevance of economic papers as measured by citation frequency. Using data from the 2008 Handelsblatt ranking of economists in German speaking countries and interdisciplinary citation data from the Web of Science, I find that researcher scores based on journal titles explain only about one fourth of the variation (variance) in article citations. When the top 10 (20) percent of the researchers according to journal title scores are excluded, the percentage of explained variation in citation frequency drops to 5 (3) percent. These findings empirically confirm the hypothesis that the measures of research output in economics promote narrow and complacent work that is of interest to few, even among an academic audience. They suggest that responsible hiring committees and funding institutions should re-examine existing standards in evaluation and abandon the heavy reliance on journal titles as a measure of individual research output.

This article assesses how the form of the utility function in discrete-choice experiments (DCEs) affects estimates of willingness-to-pay (WTP). The utility function is usually assumed to be linear in its attributes. Non-linearities, in the guise of interactions and higher-order terms, are applied only rather ad hoc. This paper sheds some light on this issue by showing that the linear utility function can be a risky choice in DCEs. For this purpose, a DCE conducted in Switzerland to assess preferences for statutory social health insurance is estimated in two ways: first, using a linear utility function; and second, using a non-linear utility function specified according to model specification rules from the econometrics and statistics literature. The results show that not only does the non-linear function outperform the linear specification with regard to goodness-of-fit, but it also generates significantly different WTP. Hence, the functional form of the utility function may have significant impact on estimated WTP. In order to produce unbiased estimates of preferences and to make adequate decisions based on DCEs, the form of the utility function should become more prominent in future experiments.

The bivariate probit model is frequently used for estimating the effect of an endogenous binary regressor on a binary outcome variable. This paper discusses simple modifications that maintain the probit assumption for the marginal distributions while introducing non-normal dependence among the two variables using copulas. Simulation results and evidence from two applications, one on the effect of insurance status on ambulatory expenditure and one on the effect of completing high school on subsequent unemployment, show that these modified bivariate probit models work well in practice, and that they provide a viable and simple alternative to the standard bivariate probit approach.

In mixed health care systems a crucial condition for the success of Managed Care (MC) plans is to win over a su±cient number of general practitioners (GPs) acting as gatekeepers. This contribution reports on GPs' willingness-to-accept (WTA) or compensation asked, respectively, for changing from conventional fee-for-service to MC practice. Some 175 Swiss GPs participated in discrete choice experiments which permit to put a money value on their status quo bias. Regardless of whether effects coding or dummy coding is used to measure status quo bias, Swiss GPs require at least 16 percent of their current average income to give up fee-for-service in favor of MC practice.

Discrete Choice Experiments (DCEs) designed to estimate willingness-to-pay (WTP) values are very popular in health economics. With increased computation power and advanced simulation techniques, random-coefficient models have gained an increasing importance in applied work as they allow for taste heterogeneity. This paper discusses the parametrical derivation of WTP values from estimated random-coefficient models and shows how these values can be simulated in cases where they do not have a known distribution.

This paper studies the effects of patents and subsidies on R&D investment decisions. The theoretical framework is a two-stage game consisting of an investment and a market stage. In equilibrium, both patents and subsidies induce the same amount of R&D investment, which is higher than the investment without governmental incentives. In the first stage, the firms can invest in a stochastic R&D project which might lead to a reduction of the marginal production costs and in the second stage, the firms face price competition. Both stages of the game are implemented in a laboratory experiment and the obtained results support the theoretical predictions. Patents and subsidies increase investment in R&D and the observed amounts of investment in the patent and subsidy treatment do not differ significantly across both instruments. However, we observe overinvestment in all three treatments. Observed prices in the market stage converge to equilibrium price levels.

This study seeks to provide evidence for deciding whether or not a pharmaceutical innovation should be included in the benefit list of social health insurance. A discrete choice experiment (DCE) was conducted in Germany to measure preferences for modern insulin therapy. Of the 1,100 individuals interviewed in 2007, 200 suffered from type 1 diabetes, 150 from insulin-treated type 2 diabetes, and 150 from insulin-naive type 2 diabetes. The long-acting insulin analogue 'Insulin Detemir' is compared to human insulin as the status quo. The DCE contains two price attributes, copayment and increased contributions to health insurance. As one would expect, non-affected non-diabetics and insulin-naive diabetics exhibit higher willingness-to-pay (WTP) values through copayment (adjusted for probability of contracting diabetes), while affected type 1 and insulin-treated type 2 diabetics have higher WTP through increased contributions. However, WTP values exceed the extra treatment cost in both financing alternatives, justifying inclusion of the innovation in the benefit list from a cost-benefit point of view.

This paper sheds light on some unexpected consequences of health insurance regulation that may pose a big challenge to insurers� risk management. Because mandated uniform contributions to health insurance trigger risk selection efforts risk adjustment (RA) schemes become necessary. A good deal of research into the optimal RA formula has been performed (Ellis and Van de Ven [2000]). A recent proposal has been to add �Hospitalization exceeding three days during the previous year� as an indicator of high risk (Beck et al. [2006]). Applying the new formula to an individual Swiss health insurer, its payments into the RA scheme are postdicted to explode, reaching up to 13 percent of premium income. Its mistake had been to successfully implement Managed Care, resulting in low rates of hospitalization. The predicted risk management response is to extend hospital stays beyond three days, contrary to stated policy objectives also of the United States.

Journal of Population Economics, 22 (4), ISSN:0933-1433, ISSN:1432-1475

This paper explores semi-monotonicity constraints in the distribution of potential outcomes, first, conditional on an instrument, and second, in terms of the response function. The imposed assumptions are strictly weaker than traditional instrumental variables assumptions and can be gainfully employed to bound the counterfactual distributions, even though point identification is only achieved in special cases. The bounds have a simple analytical form and thus have much practical relevance in all instances when strong exogeneity assumptions cannot be credibly invoked. The bounding strategy is illustrated in a simulated data example and applied to the effect of education on smoking.

The credibility of standard instrumental variables assumptions is often under dispute. This paper imposes weak monotonicity in order to gain information on counterfactual outcomes, but avoids independence or exclusion restrictions. The outcome process is assumed to be sequentially ordered, building up and depending on the information level of agents. The potential outcome distribution is assumed to weakly increase (or decrease) with the instrument, conditional on the continuation up to a certain stage. As a general result, the counterfactual distributions can only be bounded, but the derived bounds are informative compared to the no-assumptions bounds thus justifying the instrumental variables terminology. The construction of bounds is illustrated in two data examples.

In October 2003, a new flight regime was introduced at Zurich airport that significantly changed the levels of noise pollution in surrounding communities. We investigate the impact of the new flight policy on apartment prices using a hedonic price model and a non-linear difference-in-differences identification strategy. Our results suggest that rental prices increased by about 3 to 8 percent less in regions affected by the policy change, controlling for several apartment and location characteristics. The noise discount is still significant, although smaller, even after the inclusion of object-speciffc fixed effects. However, we do not find evidence of price changes in the sales market.

This article investigates power and size of some tests for exogeneity of a binary explanatory variable in count models by conducting extensive Monte Carlo simulations. The tests under consideration are Hausman contrast tests as well as univariate Wald tests, including a new test of notably easy implementation. Performance of the tests is explored under misspecification of the underlying model and under different conditions regarding the instruments. The results indicate that often the tests that are simpler to estimate outperform tests that are more demanding. This is especially the case for the new test.

Economics rests upon a set of presumptions about how human beings are affected by income. Yet causal evidence is scant. This paper reports a longitudinal study of randomly selected lottery winners. Remarkably, we show that it takes almost three years before they enjoy their money. We develop a model of dissonance and deservingness. We argue that, despite the tradition of economics, human beings may weight differently the different kinds of income that accrue to them. If so, it is not sufficient to describe utility by a function u(y), and it is not true that �a dollar is a dollar�.

This paper investigates the relationship between income satisfaction of adult children and their relative economic status, using data from the German Socio-Economic Panel and income rank as an indicator of status. The results show that children appear to compare their actual economic status with that of their parents, deriving large satisfaction gains from an income rank that is higher than that of their parents. The effect is asymmetric with regard to parents, as these seem not to be ifluenced by their children's income rank.

This study uses Markowitz mean-variance portfolio theory with forecasted data for the years 2005 to 2035 to determine efficient electricity generating technology mixes for Switzerland. The SURE procedure has been applied to filter out the systematic components of the covariance matrix. Results indicate that risk-averse electricity users in 2035 gain in terms of higher expected return, less risk, more security of supply and a higher return-to-risk ratio compared to 2000 by adopting a feasible minimum variance (MV) technology mix containing 28 percent Gas, 20 percent Run of river, 13 percent Storage hydro, 9 percent Nuclear, and 5 percent each of Solar, Smallhydro, Wind, Biomass, Incineration, and Biogas respectively. However, this mix comes at the cost of higher CO2 emissions.

This paper analyses the equilibrium effects of individual information filters. Information is modelled as advertisements which are distributed across a population of consumers with heterogeneous preferences. An advertisement that provides knowledge about a product with little or no utility for a consumer is considered junk. Filters are characterised by their level of tolerance. The quality of the filter is measured in terms of the share of useful items in the total set of items passing the filter. It is shown that in conditions of decentralised competition, multiple equilibria arise. A social optimum can be achieved by demanding each consumer to reject a certain percentage of advertisements, leaving the choice of what is rejected up to the consumer him/herself.

This study applies financial portfolio theory to determine efficient frontiers in the provision of electricity for the United States and Switzerland. Expected returns are defined by the rate of productivity increase of power generation (adjusted for external costs), volatility, by its standard deviation. Since unobserved productivity shocks are found to be correlated, Seemingly Unrelated Regression Estimation (SURE) is used to filter out the systematic component of the covariance matrix of the productivity changes. Results suggest that as of 2003, the feasible maximum expected return (MER) electricity portfolio for the United States contains more Coal, Nuclear, and Wind than actual but markedly less Gas and Oil. The minimum variance (MV) portfolio contains markedly more Oil, again more Coal, Nuclear, and Wind but almost no Gas. Regardless of the choice between MER and MV, U.S. utilities are found to lie substantially inside the efficient frontier. This is even more true of their Swiss counterparts, likely due to continuing regulation of electricity markets.

In this paper, the amount of income redistribution in the United States, the European Union, and Switzerland is compared and empirically related to economic, political, and behavioral determinants elaborated in the literature. Lying in between the two poles, Switzerland provides unique evidence about the relative merits of competing hypotheses. It tips the balance against the economic explanation, which predicts more rather than less income redistribution in the United States compared to the EU. It only weakly supports the political model linking proportional representation and multiparty structure (which also characterize Switzerland) to redistribution; yet the Swiss share of transfers in the GDP is low. Behavioral explanations receive a good deal of support from the case of Switzerland, a country that shares with the United States the belief that hard work rather than luck, birth, connections, and corruption determine wealth. In this way, the Janus face of Switzerland may help to explain the difference in the amount of U.S. and EU income redistribution.

We argue that, in a simple setting, the relation between the intensity of competition and cost-reducing investment is U-shaped. We consider a two-stage game with cost-reducing investments followed by a linear differentiated Cournot duopoly. We first show that, except for firms that are much less efficient than the competitor, investment in the subgame-perfect equilibrium is minimal for intermediate levels of competition, which is inversely parameterized by the extent of product differentiation. An extensive set of laboratory experiments also provides support for the U-shape, both for symmetric firms and for leaders. Also consistent with predictions, the relation is negative for firms that are lagging behind.

The paper characterizes the mixed-strategy equilibria in all-pay auctions with endogenous prizes that depend positively on own effort and negatively on the effort of competitors. Such auctions arise naturally in the context of investment games, lobbying games, and promotion tournaments. We also provide an experimental analysis of a special case which captures the strategic situation of a two-stage game with investment preceding homogenous Bertrand competition. We obtain overinvestment both relative to the mixed-strategy equilibrium and the social optimum.

The paper analyzes the effects of more intense competition on firms' incentives to invest in process innovations. We carry out experiments based on two-stage games, where R&D investment choices are followed by product market competition. As predicted by theory, an increase in the number of firms from two to four reduces investments. However, a positive effect is observed for a switch from Cournot to Bertrand, even though theory predicts a negative effect in the four-player case.