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U.S. journalists must walk a fine line when reporting on hate speech. Journalists have a vested interest in standing up for the First Amendment, which gives them the freedom to do their work. However, the legal protection that people who spew hateful rhetoric enjoy vastly outweighs any protections upon which the victims can rely. As such, dealing with hate speech in the United States is an inherently ethical issue. Applying the ethics of care to their reporting would allow journalists a clear framework with which to counter hate speech. This study examines if and how journalists used the ethics of care framework when covering the Snyder v. Phelps Supreme Court case through analysis of articles published in U.S. newspapers. Using these articles as a representative sample for the national coverage of the case, the study finds that journalists failed to consider the human impact of their reporting. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In state courts across the Nation, an absolutist conception of the First Amendment is preempting common law speech torts. From intentional infliction of emotional distress and intrusion upon seclusion, to intentional interference with contractual relations and negligent infliction of emotional distress, state courts are dismissing speech tort claims on the pleadings because of the broad First Amendment defense recognized by Snyder v. Phelps in 2011. This Article argues, contrary to the scholarly consensus, that Snyder was a categorical departure from the methodology adopted by New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, the landmark 1964 case that first applied the First Amendment against state common law. Sullivan, on the one hand, was a classical common law decision, taking the internal point of view with respect to state common law. Snyder, on the other, was only concerned with the existence of protected speech, an issue for which state common law was irrelevant. This Article contends that Snyder's absolutism has negative systemic consequences for judicial federalism: courts are unnecessarily prevented from judging certain conduct right or wrong under the local standards of state tort law, even if the First Amendment ultimately immunizes a defendant from liability. Sullivan's methodology is better than Snyder's because it embraced cooperative judicial federalism. Sullivan has underwritten fifty years of productive state-federal judicial dialogue; in just seven years, Snyder has censored every significant opportunity for cross-systemic judicial conversation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the 2011 NSP X-File case decision, for the first time in Korean judicial history, the Supreme Court of Korea adopted the legal standard of "unusual public concern" to decide whether to hold a person who knowingly disclosed a recorded conversation--which had been previously, and illegally, intercepted by a third party--criminally liable. The "public concern" standard had formerly been used in defamation cases, but never in cases involving wiretapping. The Supreme Court of Korea borrowed the phrase "unusual public concern" from the U.S. Supreme Court case Bartnicki v. Vopper. Although the language used in the NSP X-File case was identical to Bartnicki, the Supreme Court of Korea adopted a completely different interpretation of the standard. As a consequence, the outcome in the NSP X-File case was drastically different from that of Bartnicki. This article analyzes the social, cultural, and historical attitudes that influenced the highest courts in the United States and Korea to reach different interpretations of the same words. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on providing legal protections to entities providing information on business products and services in the U.S. Topics discussed include news media in the digital age; laws governing defamation system in the country; and history of Better Business Bureau organizations and for-profit companies. It also discusess Snyder v. Phelps court case on the same.

In the following essay, I argue that the U.S. Supreme Court decision inSnyder v. Phelps, together with the symbolic and spatial contexts surrounding funeral picketing, enables and constrains particular modes of community response to hate speech. Exploring community responses to Westboro Baptist Church’s hate speech reveals a mode of resistance based in corporeal presence, as counter-demonstrators’ bodies are used to shield mourners from messages of hate. The corporeal nature of these responses reasserts the boundaries between the public and private, and the sacred and profane, in ways that judicial responses do not. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The article looks at the decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in the "Snyder v. Phelps" case in which the Court held that speech on a public sidewalk, about a public issue, cannot be liable for a tort of emotional distress. It mentions that the case came before the court as Albert Snyder father of Matthew Snyder, a Marine who died in the Iraq War, alleged Fred Phelps of the Westboro Baptist Church (WBC) for intentional infliction of emotional distress during his son funeral.

There are increasing tensions between the First Amendment and the common law torts of intentional infliction of emotional distress, defamation, and privacy. This Article discusses the conflicting interactions among the three models that are competing for primacy as the tort law governing expressive activities evolves to accommodate the requirements of the First Amendment. At one extreme there is the model that expression containing information which has been lawfully obtained that contains neither intentional falsehoods nor incitements to immediate violence can only be sanctioned in narrowly defined exceptional circumstances, even if that expression involves matters that are universally regarded as being of no public interest. At the other extreme is the model that some expression which, though lawfully obtained, reveals to a wider audience intimate private information about another should be subject to sanction, as should verbal abuse of a private figure even if there is no implicit threat of physical violence. Some provisions of the American Restatement adopted with scant attention to constitutional developments have taken, and to some extent continue to take, that position. Finally, there is an intermediate model--now gaining wide-spread support in Europe and to some extent in America, even among some members of the United States Supreme Court--that expression which does not concern matters of "public concern" can be subject to public sanction even if it has been lawfully acquired and involves no threats of physical aggression against others. This Article sets out how this confusing impasse has come about and the dangers that this lack of clarity present for freedom of expression. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Courts generally craft speech-tort jurisprudence as a binary proposition. Any time state tort law and the First Amendment come into potential conflict, courts typically hold either that the First Amendment comes into play and the defendant is completely exempt from traditional tort liability, or that it does not come into play and the plaintiff is entitled to the full complement of tort remedies. In other words, courts generally adopt an unspoken assumption that in speech-tort cases, liability and full tort remedies necessarily go hand-in-hand. This rigid approach, however, significantly limits courts' ability to craft a nuanced balance between First Amendment and tort interests. In individual cases, it forces them to choose only one set of interests to be vindicated to the complete exclusion of the other, and on a jurisprudential level, it gives courts only the bluntest of instruments to tailor speech-tort doctrine to widely varying facts. Furthermore, the current approach exacerbates the distributional problem inherent to speech-tort cases: any time the First Amendment intervenes to completely invalidate a subset of common law tort liability, plaintiffs left without liability or remedy are effectively forced to subsidize the costs of free speech, the benefits of which are shared broadly by the public at large. In this Article, I argue that courts should incorporate a greater degree of remedial flexibility into speech-tort doctrine. Rather than simply adhere to an all-or-nothing approach, courts should consider intermediate approaches in which the First Amendment applies not to vitiate a finding of tort liability but merely to limit or eliminate the damages to which plaintiffs are entitled. These approaches allow courts to shape the complex balance of speech and tort interests with a scalpel rather than a chain saw, both on a case-by-case basis and on the broader level of doctrinal design. In recent years, this remedy-based approach to speech-tort jurisprudence has rarely been discussed by courts and commentators, while the shadow cast by the First Amendment over tort law has expanded well beyond the defamation context. This calcification of a rigid, binary approach to speech-tort cases represents a significant lost opportunity for courts to design more sensible and equitable doctrines. By providing a detailed account of the benefits underlying the use of flexible remedies, evaluating potential critiques to such an approach, and laying out concrete examples of what a remedy-based regime might look like in practice, this Article seeks to rekindle judicial, legislative, and academic interest in adopting such approaches within speech-tort doctrine. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This Article analyzes how the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in the Westboro Baptist Church funeral-protest case of Snyder v. Phelps is now affecting lawsuits brought against media defendants for intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED). The pro-First Amendment result three years ago in Snyder pivoted largely on the Court's expansive definition of "public concern." Using a quartet of post-Snyder cases as analytical springboards, the article examines how Snyder and the concept of public concern are being deployed by both courts and media defense attorneys in IIED cases premised upon the publication of allegedly outrageous speech. Ultimately, none of the judges in the post-Snyder cases studied here heeded Chief Justice John Roberts' statement that Snyder should be viewed narrowly. Instead, the notion of public concern was broadly stretched far beyond the factual confines of Snyder. In only one case, in fact, did a Snyder-based, publicconcern defense not win the day. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses cyberbullying liability in the U.S. in relation to the legal aspects of cyberspace and public schools in America as of 2014. The First Amendment to the nation's Constitution is examined, along with intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) claims, web hosting liability, and privacy laws in the U.S. Education laws in America are assessed, as well as the bullying case Vosburg v. Putney and the U.S. freedom of speech matter Snyder v. Phelps.

On March 2, 2011, the U.S. Supreme Court determined in Snyder v. Phelps that protests by members of Westboro Baptist Church, a small group of religious fundamentalists committed to communicating their beliefs publicly in spectacular fashion, were protected under the First Amendment based on a dual standard of "public concern"; that is, their speech dealt with sociopolitical issues and their speech attracted media attention. This rhetorical conflation of sociopolitical issues with subjects of media interest provides legal encouragement for the creation of media spectacles on the part of hate groups and other ideologues and discourages the development of the very public reason taken for granted by the Court. To defend this claim, we first provide a brief history of the Westboro Baptist Church and its strategic manipulation of the mass media and free speech law, situated within competing traditions of public sphere theory. After next providing a history of the judicial evolution of Snyder v. Phelps, we engage in a close reading of the majority and dissenting Supreme Court opinions to reveal the rhetorical conflation of "public issues" and "public concern," and we conclude with reflections on the relationships among that conflation, the role of different forms of spectacle in advanced capitalist societies, and the possibilities for more informed democratic citizenship. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this Article, we revisit the clash between private law and the First Amendment in the Supreme Court's recent case, Snyder v. Phelps, using a private-law lens. We are scholars who write about private law as individual justice, a perspective that has been lost in recent years but is currently enjoying something of a revival. Our argument is that the Supreme Court's theory of private law has led it down a path that has distorted its doctrine in several areas, including the First Amendment-tort clash in Snyder. In areas that range from punitive damages to preemption, the Supreme Court has adopted a particular and dominant, but highly contested, theory of private law. It is the theory that private law is not private at all; it is part and parcel of government regulation, or "public law in disguise." Part I is a brief overview of how that jurisprudential view came to be, as well as a sketch of a competing view of private law as individual justice. In Part II, we briefly trace the development of the doctrine surrounding the tension between the First Amendment and private law, particularly tort law, and how it helps lead to the view of private law as government regulation displayed in Snyder. We also point out how the intentional infliction of emotional distress tort, the main claim at issue in Snyder, is a particularly poor vehicle for the Court's theory of private law. A relatively recent tort, it was developed by scholars and judges as a means of redress for plaintiffs who had been wronged, but were left without a remedy. Part III presents the central claims of the Article. We argue that the conception of private law as government regulation in Snyder arises from a combination of (1) the doctrinal tools that judges use in First Amendment cases, (2) the unitary nature of the state-action doctrine, and (3) the influence of instrumentalism, specifically in obscuring the plaintiff's agency and the state interest in redress, and in privileging a particular view of compensation. In Part IV, we present some normative or prescriptive implications of our analysis, and then conclude. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article examines the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Snyder v. Phelps (Snyder), which was related to the applicability of the U.S. Constitution First Amendment in protecting protests of public protestors at a funeral against tort liability. It describes the courts' ruling holding that speech on a public sidewalk, about a public issue, cannot be liable for a tort of emotional distress, even if the speech is found to be outrageous. It highlights that Snyder clarifies court's decision in Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, which provided the U.S. First Amendment protection to political satire and parody. It analyzes the well planned and executed protests of the Westboro Baptist Church in Topeka, Kansas, which largely dictated the outcome of Snyder.

The article discusses the process of interpreting pain in adjudication and reflects on the gap between rights and remedies in legal order. It examines legal cases originating from an acute instance of suffering and involving a tension between competing legal principles, one influencing in favor of redress and the other in favor of dismissal. The cases examined include Snyder v. Phelps, Brown v. Plata, and Connick v. Thompson.

The article evaluates the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., regarding the defamatory speech and the U.S. Constitution First Amendment Protection in context to distinctions of public and private figures. It manifests that due to internet public figures do not possess greater access to communication channels. It also discusses the U.S. Supreme Court Snyder v. Phelps case, wherein the Westborough Baptist Church was sued for inflicting distress by defaming a deceased.

Speech has the potential to cause devastating emotional injury. Yet it has been less than a century since intentional infliction of emotional distress--a tort designed to punish a person who, through outrageous conduct or speech, intentionally causes severe distress to another--has entered the scene. When the tortfeasor acts through speech alone, the First Amendment is inevitably implicated. In 2011, the Supreme Court took its most recent stance on the constitutionality of punishing distressing speech when it decided Snyder v. Phelps. Despite the reprehensibility of the speech involved, the Court properly immunized the speech from tort liability for emotional distress. The Court has already suggested that IIED actions face a constitutional bar for public figures and for private figures embroiled in a matter of public concern. This Note picks up the lIED doctrine where Snyder left off and argues that the First Amendment should bar most lIED actions even against a private figure where the speech relates to a matter of private concern. This result flows from the difficulty in distinguishing between public and private matters, the danger of silencing unpopular speech, and the positive value that injurious speech can have. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An essay is presented on the relationship between the print and broadcast media in America and the U.S. Supreme Court (USSC) under the leadership of Chief Justice John G. Roberts as of December 2012, focusing on the USSC's rulings in several cases involving traditional media outlets such as the case FCC v. Fox Television Stations, as well as the non-traditional media case Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Ass'n. The protection of unpopular speech is addressed in cases such as Snyder v. Phelps.

The article discusses the relationship between the media and the courts in America as of December 2012, focusing on a historical overview of the U.S. Supreme Court through its decision in the case New York Times v. Sullivan, and provides information on the role of the court as a news editor. The 2011 case Snyder v. Phelps, which deals with military funeral protests and freedom of speech rights, is addressed. Sanctions against a journalist are examined in the case Dorr v. United States.

The article focuses on the first amendment protection in the U.S. constitution for publisher's freedom of speech about important public issues. It presents information on several cases from the U.S. Supreme Court that examines the protection of free speech by publishers including Garcetti v. Ceballos, Snyder v. Phelps and Bartnicki v. Vopper. It also examines the legal reasons of shut down of publisher WikiLeaks that includes prior restraint and the Espionage Act.

In Snyder v. Phelps, the Supreme Court ruled that the Westboro Baptist Church had a First Amendment right to picket the funeral of a young soldier killed in Iraq. This decision reinforces a view that has become increasingly dominant in First Amendment jurisprudence--the view that the state may not regulate public discourse to protect individuals from emotional or dignitary injury. This Article contends that this view not only sacrifices the law's protections for individual personality but also undermines the normative foundations of public discourse itself. The Article then presents an alternative theory of the First Amendment which holds that the same values of human dignity and autonomy that support free speech also give rise to other fundamental rights. Thus, speakers should have a duty to respect the personality and rights of others. Drawing extensively on the record in Snyder as well as on other materials, the Article argues that Westboro's funeral picketing should not receive First Amendment protection, for the picketing is intended to condemn the deceased and to inflict severe distress on the mourners in violation of their rights to privacy, dignity, emotional well-being, and religious liberty. Finally, the Article shows that although Westboro prevailed in Snyder, this may prove to be a Pyrrhic victory, for the Court also suggested that states can protect mourners through carefully drawn buffer-zone laws. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article offers information on the development and role of the matters of public concern doctrine in defamation, termination of employment and publication of allegedly private facts under the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. It discusses the judicial decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in the case of Snyder v. Phelps, in which the Court differentiates between matters of public concern and matters of mere private interest.

In this article, the author comments on the U.S. Supreme Court case decisions of Snyder v. Phelps and United States v. Alvarez in the context of public versus private ordering. He mentions that both the cases implicate military honor and the Supreme Court ruled that First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution prevented efforts to protect military honor. He believes that the decisions exacerbated misuse of the First Amendment and betrayed a misunderstanding of tort law.

The article focuses on several Supreme Court cases in the U.S. relating to issues of freedom of expression during 2011-2012. It discusses the U.S. Supreme Court case Snyder v. Phelps, in which the claimant Albert Snyder, father of a Marine who died in the Iraq War alleged that protests speech made during Fred Phelps, pastor of the Westboro Baptist Church in Topeka Kansas led protest during his son's funeral caused intentional emotional distress. It also talks about the case Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Association where the court found California law banning the sale of violent video games violets the First Amendment to the U.S. constitution relating to freedom of speech.

The article focuses on Snyder v. Phelps Supreme Court case. The case was brought about after Fred W. Phelps and his followers from Westboro Baptist Church picketed at the funeral services of Lance Corporal Matthew Snyder. The court, although gave them first amendment protections and gave a ruling in there favor, it still issued a stern warning to Phelps stating that such picketing against deceased Gays is actions against God. Justice Samuel Alito, who was the only judge to rule against Phelps, stated that Snyder was a private person and his funeral services should not have been picketed.

The article focuses on Snyder v. Phelps Supreme Court case. The case was brought about after Fred W. Phelps and his followers from Westboro Baptist Church picketed at the funeral services of Lance Corporal Matthew Snyder. They stated in the court that there intentions were not to hurt the sentiments of Snyder family. The court, although gave them first amendment protections and gave a ruling in there favor, it still issued a stern warning to Phelps stating that such picketing against deceased Gays is actions against God.

The article focuses on scope of first amendment protections in terms of Freedom of Speech. This was brought about following an 8 to 1 ruling by the U.S. Supreme Court in Snyder v. Phelps case. Funeral services of Lance Corporal Matthew Snyder were disrupted by Fred W. Phelps and his followers of Westboro Baptist Church who said that homosexuality is God's punishment to the U.S. Army. Albert Snyder, Corporal Snyder's father brought a case against this picketing of funeral services against Phelps. However, at that time the state of Maryland had no laws against such picketing thereby the Supreme Court had top provide first amendment protections against Phelps and his followers.

The article focuses on the Supreme Court Case of Snyder v. Phelps. The U.S. Supreme Court had in 2011 given an 8 to 1 ruling in favor of Fred Phelps and his Westboro Baptish Church their right to picket outside the military funeral of Marine Lance Corporal Matthew Snyder. Corporal Snyder had died in Iraq War. Before the Supreme Court's ruling The U.S. Court of Appeals Fourth Circuit had ordered Albert Snyder, father of Corporal Snyder to pay 16150 U.S. Dollars to Baptish Church as legal costs. Only Justice Samuel Alito gave verdict agasint the Church because of damages caused by the Church to Snyder and his family.

On March 2, 2011, the Supreme Court ruled in Snyder v. Phelps that the First Amendment protected a religious group's offensive speech at a protest the group held during the funeral of an American soldier killed in Iraq, primarily because the speech was on matters of "public concern." In one of the most talked about cases in recent memory, the Court confronted the hurtful speech of what may be one of the most outspoken and disliked hate groups in the early twenty-first century--the Westboro Baptist Church ("Westboro"). Fred Phelps, the leader of Westboro who founded the church in 1955, believes that it is his "duty" to deliver the church's message at funerals, a message that frequently includes statements such as "God Hates the USA," "Thank God for Dead Solders," "Fag Troops," "Semper Fi Fags," and "AIDS Cures Fags." Snyder v. Phelps has been described as a case that addresses "the clash between two fundamental and long standing American values: freedom of speech and 'the right to be let alone."' Not surprisingly, Snyder has already been labeled "the most charged on the Supreme Court docket [in 2011]." Despite the emotional setting of a controversial protest at a soldier's private funeral, and Westboro's plainly hateful and hurtful speech during and after the soldier's funeral that resembled more of a personal attack on the soldier and his family than a public rally, most First Amendment scholars have hailed the decision as the correct one. However, Snyder effectively leaves plaintiffs with legitimate Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (IIED) claims with little recourse, and may serve as a protection for speech the First Amendment was not designed to protect, i.e., private hurtful speech that injures private plaintiffs. In fact, a thorough review of Snyder and the Court's prior speech/tort precedent suggests that the Snyder Court struck an improper balance between free speech interests and the state's interest in protecting its citizens from IIED. When Snyder is viewed in the context of the Supreme Court's prior speech/tort cases, it appears that the Court's decision places too much emphasis on the nature of Westboro's speech, provides little consideration for the nature of Mr. Snyder's injuries or his rights as a private citizen, and may be inconsistent with the Court's longstanding tradition of balancing First Amendment interests with state-tort claims. This article explores Snyder's shortcomings and its dangerous implications for future private plaintiffs hurt by speech-causing IIED. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article reviews the limitations already placed upon outrageous speech in the U.S. Particular focus is given to the Snyder v. Phelps and U.S. v Alvarez decisions and the legal issues which is associated with the contemporary regulation of outrageous speech directed at individuals that do not hold political office under the fighting words doctrine. It also looks at the broad implications for First Amendment jurisprudence and the need to craft a statute allowing to right to private grief protected from outrageous conduct at funerals.

Extreme speech forms pose acute questions for liberal democracies. Abstract, non-absolute constitutional commitments to freedom of speech/expression are required to be interpreted against countervailing values such as equality, privacy and social harmony. On this side of the Atlantic, the rich body of First Amendment analysis generated by the US jurists is frequently dismissed as an outlier among the group. The emphasis there upon individual freedom and distrust of state power is said to miss the collective dimension of human existence and the rightful role of the state in promoting caring, empathetic communities. In what follows, tensions between the United States and UK/European attitudes towards the limits of constitutional protection for speech are analysed through the lens of the US Supreme Court's ruling in Snyder v Phelps. I argue that, despite the undoubted nastiness of the speaker's words and intentions in that case, the more censorious European response to such abuse is underpinned by a troubling attempt to enforce a degree of homogeneity upon political discourse. The state's aim in so coercing may appear benign. However we should not lose sight of the fact that, so empowered, temporary political majorities may impose a range of speech restrictions that ultimately diminish personal autonomy under the guise of advancing the common good. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A conference paper about protection of rights under the tort law is presented in March 2011 at the University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law Symposium on The Global Impact and Implementation of Human Rights Norms. It discusses the U.S. Supreme Court case Snyder v. Phelps regarding protection of the values such as self-determination, freedom from oppression and civil liberties under the common law tort principles.

The article focuses on the U.S. Supreme Court case Snyder v. Phelps, which dealt with freedom of speech in the U.S. and compensatory damages for the infliction of emotional distress. Topics include tort liability laws in the U.S., the constitutionality of 'buffer zone' laws, and the rights of privacy afforded to funeral mourners.

From New York Times Co. v. Sullivan through Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, the Supreme Court of the United States established a reasonable balance between the rights of private persons to be free from unwarranted verbal attacks by groups or persons whose primary goal was self-aggrandizement. The framework for that protection was the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress, which required plaintiffs to overcome an onerous standard of proof in order to prevail. In March 2011, however, the Court ruled in Snyder v. Phelps that the verbal attack of the Westboro Baptist Church against Albert Snyder during and after the funeral of Snyder's son, a Marine killed in Iraq, was protected because it involved matters of public concern. In making its ruling, the Court avoided tort law precedent related to public and private figures and diverted the issue from intentional infliction of emotional distress to matters of public debate, even though the Snyder case involved no public debate. In so doing, the Court all but eliminated intentional infliction of emotional distress as a speech-based tort. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes’ belief that the Constitution calls for the principle of free thought—“not free thought for those who agree with us but freedom for the thought that we hate”—was severely tested when the father of a fallen Marine sued members of the Westboro Baptist Church who picketed near his son's funeral service. Consistent with its traditions and precedents, the Supreme Court of the United States ruled 8-1 that the First Amendment protected church members’ offensive speech from tort liability. In ruling as it did, the Court properly chose to consider only the case elements it was presented, refused to create a new category of unprotected speech, and in turn eroded the reach of intentional infliction of emotional distress in speech-related cases. “The Court is out of the business of creating new categories of unprotected speech. Get over it.”1 Kathleen Sullivan, attorney and former dean, Stanford University Law School, remarks at Communication Law in the Digital Age conference of the Practising Law Institute, New York (Nov. 10, 2011). [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The article presents information on the impact of free speech in public issues and public debates in the U.S. with respect to the protection of the First Amendment of the Constitution of the U.S. The courts case Snyder v. Phelps deals with the issue of suburbanizing and privatization of the landscape of the U.S. by constructing shopping malls. Information on the decision of the Supreme Court of the U.S. regarding the court case with respect to the constitutional implications on the trend of suburban developments in the country is also presented.

An essay is presented on the positive benefits of bad speech (hate speech) as of January 2012, focusing on an analysis of various types of speech, including unfocused declaratory speech and focused bad speech. The Westboro Baptist Church's use of unfocused bad speech during protests against homosexuality is addressed, along with an examination of the U.S. Supreme Court's ruling in the case Snyder v. Phelps.

The article discusses U.S. Supreme Court Chief Justice John Roberts' narrow framing of the court's holding in the case Snyder v. Phelps which deals with the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and the Westboro Baptist Church's decision to protest the funerals of several fallen American soldiers. Roberts' reported judicial minimalism in the Snyder case decision is addressed through an examination of the philosophies of constitutional scholar Cass Sunstein.

The article presents information on desecration. It focuses on problems faced by the U.S. Supreme Court in separating protected speech from unprotected desecration. It discusses the U.S. Supreme Court case Snyder v. Phelps that involves a homophobic demonstration near the funeral of a soldier. It informs about the protection of the U.S. First Amendment to expressions such as cartoon and the demonstrations against the military near a soldier's funeral, reflected in Synder case.

The article offers information on the judicial ruling of the U.S. Supreme Court in the case of Snyder v. Phelps, in which the courts addressed the conflict between the First Amendment protections to constitutional speech causing emotional distress and state tort law. Topics also discussed the speech-based tort claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress, freedom of speech, and difference between public and private speech.

In Snyder v. Phelps, the United States Supreme Court struck down a damages award against Reverend Fred Phelps Sr. and the Westboro Baptist Church for picketing a military funeral. Although the Court asserted that its holding was narrow and the legal issues involved were straightforward, this Article argues that Phelps ultimately raises more questions than it answers and almost guarantees increased confusion in First Amendment jurisprudence. The Court in Phelps explained that the First Amendment prohibits tort damages when the comments at issue involve matters of public concern, yet failed to explain whether private speech that was juxtaposed with public, political speech also warranted the protection of the First Amendment. The Court also neglected to provide guidance on how its holding fits into the current defamation and privacy jurisprudence; in addition, it left unanswered pertinent questions about the constitutionality of a growing number of funeral protest statutes. Lower courts are likely to feel frustrated by this decision and, consequently, a relatively clear area of the law is likely to become muddled. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on concerns related to homosexuality and violation of intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) tort in the U.S. It discusses the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Snyder v. Phelps, Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, and Brandenburg v. Ohio. In Synder's case, Kansas-based Westboro Baptist church was sued by Marine Lance Corporal Matthew Snyder's father for distressing his son. The Court allowed proceedings under the tort.

The article focuses on speech-based torts and what can be considered free speech under the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. The author discusses the courts' determination of private v. public figures in relation to free speech and when a tort liability is created. The U.S. court case of Snyder v. Phelps which dealt with hate speech at a military funeral is examined.

The article discusses the protection of harmful speech on matters of public concern with respect to the U.S. First Amendment. It was explained in Snyder v. Phelps by the U.S Court of Appeal for the Fourth Circuit that the defendants' were entitled to judgment as the statement made by defendant was on matters of public concern and thus protected under first Amendment. The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Fourth Circuit.

The article discusses U.S. Supreme Court cases Snyder v. Phelps and Hustler magazine v. Falwell. It notes that the court faces the issue on the public/private status of the parties and the statement under the Hustler standard. It mentions that the court will also be criticized by the public with its decision particularly those who feel as though the rights of Snyder have been violated in a fundamental way if it decides to affirm the decision of the Fourth Circuit and rule in favor of Phelps.

The article discusses the U.S. Supreme Court case of Snyder v. Phelps which includes concerns related to the freedom of expression considering formalistic time, place, and manner in giving a judicial decision. The Westboro Church in Topeka, Kansas conducted defaming protests during Matthew Synder's funeral, a heterosexual Lance Corporal, and caused his family mental stress. Civilized people dread licentiousness as a rule to maintain social order and the Court associated liberty with license.

The article focuses on U.S. Supreme Court Justice Samuel Alito and his rulings in cases dealing with the First Amendment protections. Topics include his notions of morality and merit, his thoughts on freedom of speech and freedom of expression, and his ruling in the U.S. court cases Snyder v. Phelps and United States v. Stevens.

The article focuses on the preservation of decision of the U.S. Supreme Court corresponding to the First Amendment right for free expression of hateful and disfavored minority groups. It discusses the implementation of various laws and regulations both domestically and abroad in order to suppress hate speech at the expense of freedom of belief and freedom of expression. It also analyzes the Supreme Court case Snyder v. Phelps with respect to upholding of constitutional rights.

The article discusses several supreme court cases of the U.S. including Snyder v. Phelps, Skinner v. Switzer, and Alameda Books Inc. v. City of Los Angeles. It mentions about the court case of Snyder v. Phelps which is related to complaining state tort claims of civil conspiracy, emotional distress, and intrusion upon seclusion. It also describes the court case of Skinner v. Switzer which is related to the claim filed by the state prisoner of Texas, Henry Skinner for injunctive relief.

The article discusses the U.S. Supreme Court case Snyder v. Phelps wherein petitioner Albert Snyder filed a lawsuit against Fred W. Phelps, Sr. of Westboro Baptist Church Inc. for five counts related to the picketing of Marine Lance Corporal Matthew A. Snyder's funeral. It mentions that the district court ruled in favor of Snyder but the circuit court and the U.S. Supreme Court ruled against Snyder addressing that First Amendment protected Westboro from liability for their controversial speech.

The article discusses the protection of some forms of harmful speech under the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution as of January 2011, focusing on freedom of speech and the regulation of harm-producing activities. Several legal cases are examined, including Snyder v. Phelps which deals with the alleged intentional infliction of emotional distress at a soldier's funeral. A 2005 California law prohibiting minors from accessing violent video games is also mentioned.