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Critics of antidiscrimination law have long lamented that the Supreme Court is devoted to a shallow, formal version of equality that fails to account for substantive inequities and stands in the way of affirmative efforts to remediate systemic injustice. But these criticisms are primarily focused on the Supreme Court's interpretations of race discrimination law. The Court's most recent foray into statutory sex discrimination law, Bostock v. Clayton County, employed formalistic reasoning to move the law in an expansive direction, interpreting Title VII's sex discrimination provision to prohibit discrimination against lesbian, gay, and transgender employees. Examining post-Bostock developments, this Article asks whether formal equality might have more potential to advance civil rights than previously thought. It argues that "formal equality" is not a single legal inquiry; rather, in practice, it takes the form of at least three distinct tests. These tests lead to different results in different sex discrimination controversies, such as whether it is discrimination to treat someone adversely for being bisexual or nonbinary; to single out pregnancy, menstruation, breasts, or other aspects of reproductive biology for disparate treatment; to enforce sex-specific dress codes; to exclude transgender people from restrooms consistent with their gender identities; to ban genderaffirming health care; or to restrict who can change the sex designations on their identity documents. Although no formal test neatly maps onto prevailing normative theories and sociological insights about what discrimination is, in recent cases, courts have used formal tests to achieve results consistent with those theories. This account suggests that, rather than insisting that courts adopt substantive tests, civil rights scholars might reconsider the virtues of formalism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Following the emergence of #MeToo, sexual harassment at work attracted sustained attention all over the world. In Australia, this resulted in multiple reports which confirmed high rates of sexual harassment and led to protracted agitation for law reform. Although the ensuing recommendations have been widely praised, this article argues that the continuing privatisation of the complaint process is a noted limitation because survivors are estopped from speaking out, while harassers remain free to harass others. With regard to the Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth), the article sets out to support the thesis as it pertains to the various steps associated with the individual complaint-based mechanism -- namely, conciliation, non-disclosure agreements, litigation and the destruction of complaint files. While litigation is a public process, barely 1% of sexual harassment complaints proceed to a formal hearing, and there are strong disincentives for them doing so. Privatisation also ensures that the cumulative knowledge associated with individual complaints is denied to the public. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the role of Equality Act in protecting LGBTQ+ communities from discrimination in the U.S. Topics mentioned include the history of the Civil Rights Act, the use of sex discrimination jurisprudence, the implications of the Act for bisexual and nonbinary individuals, the influence of religious freedom issues on the passage of the Act, and the decisions of the court on the case Bostock v. Clayton Country.

The article illustrates why the status of women in the U.S. still calls for stronger constitutional protections. Topics discussed include the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) in the Constitution, Fourteenth amendment jurisprudence, and gender inequality in the country. Also mentioned are the sources of protection against sex discrimination in the Constitution, states' equal rights amendments, and legislative measures necessary to strengthen the protections provided by the ERA.

The article examines the significant role played by U.S. Supreme Court Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg in the changes in the U.S. law's response to claims of gender discrimination. Topics discussed include Ginsburg's opinion in the case, United States v. Virginia that challenged the exclusion of women from Virginia Military Institute, her opinion in Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. Inc., and her litigation of the case, Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld.

The Supreme Court of India in two landmark decisions – Secretary, Ministry of Defence v. Babita Puniya and Union of India v. Annie Nagaraja – emphatically struck down subordinate legislation governing defence forces on the basis of an anti-stereotyping principle. While these decisions have furthered Indian discrimination law by finding the use of gender stereotypes to be constitutionally impermissible, they have also left certain important questions unanswered. The interplay between Articles 15 and 33 of the Constitution remains unexplored, leaving open the possibility of the prohibition against gender discrimination being abrogated by laws pertaining to armed forces. Moreover, the scope and application of the anti-stereotyping principle are yet to be ascertained. Finally, the principle as it stands may meet with considerable difficulty if and when applied to cases outside Article 15(1), specifically those falling under Article 15(3). We argue that a different approach to the principle is warranted to accommodate such concerns. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The central case methodology captures the features that something must have in order for it to be that thing. As applied to the field of discrimination law, the methodology helps identify both the central cases of discrimination as well as the key features of discrimination law which address such discrimination. Theorists typically conceive central cases of discrimination law from norms prohibiting discrimination on particular grounds, such as race or sex. This gives the impression that discrimination based on more than one ground is not a central case of discrimination or not prohibited by discrimination law. This article challenges that impression. It argues that, although discrimination based on a combination of grounds ('intersectional discrimination') is considered no more than a peripheral case in discrimination law, it should actually be considered 'more than' a central case itself. This is because it is epistemically able to capture discrimination in a wider sense. With this, the article seeks to orientate the theoretical discourse in discrimination law to the correct application of the central case methodology which necessitates the consideration of intersectional discrimination. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Women were excluded from both branches of the legal profession before the Sex Discrimination (Removal) Act 1919. Whilst campaigning for women's entry to the law was also part of wider efforts to make the law more accessible. Before and after the 1919 Act, middle-class women were able to offer legal support to working-class women, through feminist and trade unionist networks and the professions that were open to them—factory inspection and social work. By examining key women's organisations between the 1890s and 1930s, we trace the development of work to both educate women and girls on their legal rights and to directly tackle problems and breaches of the law. We argue that, by looking at the legal activism of women in the factory inspectorate, social work, trade union and women's organisations, fresh insight into the development and 'mainstreaming' of working-class claims on citizenship in the early twentieth century can be found. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article examines the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Bostock v. Clayton County, Georgia in 2020 on the application of Title VII sex discrimination protections in sexual orientation and gender identity employment discrimination cases. Topics discussed include the marginalization of queer identities in society and law, development of doctrinal anti-stereotyping tactics in such cases, and accomplishment of lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and queer (LGBTQ) protections through textualism.

The 2014 judgment in Richardson v Oracle Corporation Australia Pty Ltd (' Richardson ') had a seismic effect on workplace sexual harassment claims in Australia. Overnight, the 'general range' of damages awarded for non-economic loss in such cases increased from between $12 000 and $20 000 to $100 000 and above. The judgment has made Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth) litigation considerably more attractive for plaintiffs and resulted in greater judicial recognition of the pain and suffering experienced by sexual harassment survivors. Richardson 's impact has also been felt beyond that immediate context, with the judgment cited in support of higher damages in discrimination cases and employment disputes. However, six years and over 40 judicial citations later, Richardson 's broader significance remains unclear—particularly following the emergence of the #MeToo movement. Drawing on a doctrinal analysis of subsequent case law and qualitative interviews with prominent Australian legal practitioners, this article evaluates Richardson 's legacy and considers how sexual harassment litigation may further evolve to reflect changing societal norms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article explores corporate oppression doctrine as a potential alternative for partners to combat gender discrimination and harassment in closely held companies in the U.S. Topics discussed include jurisprudence addressing when an owner is an employee for purposes of employment discrimination statutes, enforcement of fiduciary obligations, and substantive requirements of discrimination and oppression claims.

The article explains the decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in Bostock v. Clayton County, Georgia on the Civil Rights Act Title VII sex discrimination prohibition. Topics discussed include the decision to cover employees dismissed in the consolidated cases for sexual orientation and gender identity under Title VII, implication of the decision for equality jurisprudence and transgender people in the country, and the need for the court to provide a broad definition of the term sex in Title VII.

Constitutional doctrine and public opinion often move in tandem, particularly in the area of equal protection decisions. The Supreme Court tends to use the clause to invalidate unreasonable or oppressive discrimination, where what is unreasonable or oppressive is determined not by the values of 1868 but by those of contemporary America. This Article offers a microstudy in applied constitutional theory by juxtaposing the development of the Supreme Court's sex discrimination jurisprudence and the evolution of Disney Princesses. The analysis expands beyond confirming that prevailing cultural norms inform Supreme Court decisions; it also offers insight into the limitations of constitutional sex equality doctrine and possible paths forward outside the Court. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Korea's Constitution, Article 11(1) prescribes, 'All citizens shall be equal before the law, and there shall be no discrimination in political, economic, social or cultural life on account of sex, religion or social status'. The Constitution prescribes equal protection of citizens regardless of their gender. In this article, the efforts and tools for ensuring gender equality in Korea are introduced. The discussion mainly focuses on gender impact assessment and how it improves equal protection in Korea. Gender impact assessment is necessary because it contributes to policy improvement by removing gender discrimination in law and policy. The assessment also helps in preparing a substantial policy that guarantees gender equality through equal policy benefit, equal participation, and equal budget distribution for men and women. This article also covers the role of the Constitutional Court of Korea as a reviewer of the constitutionality of gender-based laws. The Constitutional Court has the authority to judge a law as unconstitutional. This can be seen as a form of legislative evaluation in Korea. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the developments in issues pertaining to women in Australia, as of March 2021, since the implementation of the Sex Discrimination Act (SDA) in 1984 and the Affirmative Action (Equal Employment Opportunity for Women) Act in 1986 led by Australian politician Susan Ryan. Topics covered include how women were discriminated in the 1980s, the changes following the SDA and the outcomes in employment rate, gender segregation and sexual harassment.

The Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrmination against Women ("CEDAW") is the most important binding international treaty for women. The only international human rights treaty with the principal goal of protecting and promoting women's rights and eliminating discrimination against women, it has achieved almost universal ratification. Despite this importance, it has been overshadowed by the sheer number of global indices designed to measure progress on gender equality that have emerged in the last two decades, particularly those promoted by the development sector. This Article is premised on the idea that attempts to quantify success in moving towards the goal of gender equality would be both more effective and meaningful if grounded in the women's rights standards established in CEDAW, an approach that is rarely adopted. This Article argues in favor of the "quantification" of CEDAW and offers practical ways, using the Gender Legislative Index, to demonstrate the feasibility of an index founded in international women's rights norms, in order to improve accountability for embedding women's rights in domestic legislation. In order to do this, this study first discusses the shortcomings of newer systems of quantification; second, it identifies how CEDAW, a living instrument that speaks to multiple forms of discrimination, better allows for systematic, comprehensive and universal monitoring of women's rights; and finally, it offers the Gender Legislative Index ("GLI") as an example of a legal index grounded in CEDAW. This Article gives readers a sense of the potential of such a CEDAWbased index to work concurrently with development sector indices in order to accelerate and cement progress on gender equality. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Discrimination during voir dire remains a critical impediment to empaneling juries that reflect the diversity of the United States. While various solutions have been proposed, scholars have largely overlooked ethics rules as an instrument for preventing discriminatory behavior during jury selection. Focusing on American Bar Association Model Rule of Professional Conduct 8.4(g), which regulates professional misconduct, this Article argues that ethics rules may, under certain conditions, deter the exclusionary practices of legal actors. Part I examines the specific history, evolution, and application of revised Model Rule 8.4(g). Part II delves into the ways that ethics rules in general, despite their limited use, can spur legal and cultural change. Focusing on jury exclusion, Part III shows how Model Rule 8.4(g) in particular might be applied to more effectively challenge and sanction instances of race- and sex-based discrimination during voir dire. In so doing, this Article reaffirms the productive role that ethics rules can play in preventing forms of misconduct that undermine confidence in the American jury and justice system. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on decision of Great Britain's Court of Appeal in the cases Ali v Capita and Hextall v The Chief Constable of Leicestershire Police on unlawful sex discrimination for an employer to pay a man taking shared parental leave less than a woman taking maternity leave. It mentions Court found that a differentiation between maternity pay and shared parental pay was neither direct nor indirect sex discrimination. It also mentions cases under section 66 of the Equality Act 2010 (EQA).

The article focuses on law of gender nonconformity, setting forth why and how sex discrimination law protects against discrimination on this basis. It mentions development of the new law of gender nonconformity, documenting courts' initial rejection of transgender discrimination as sex discrimination and the shift towards recognition. It also mentions transgender discrimination as sex discrimination avoids the harms of the gender nonconformity doctrine.

How can antidiscrimination law treat men and women "equally" when it comes to the issue of pregnancy? The development of U.S. law on pregnancy accommodation in the workplace tells a story of both legal disagreements about the meaning of "equality" and political disagreements about how best to achieve "equality" at work for women. Federal law has prohibited sex discrimination in the workplace for over five decades. Yet, due to long held gender stereotypes separating work and motherhood, the idea that prohibiting sex discrimination requires a duty to accommodate pregnant workers is a relatively recent phenomenon--and still only partially required by federal law. This Article documents how decades of internal political conflict about what was best for working women resulted in tortured Supreme Court precedent on, and divergent legislative approaches to, accommodating pregnancy at work. While a diverse feminist movement took a variety of strategies to support pregnant workers, this Article focuses on one core debate in antidiscrimination law: the struggle between a formal or "sameness" and a substantive or "difference" approach to gender equality around pregnancy. It then documents how a third, "reconstructive" approach helped modern advocates move beyond comparing women to men as workers and toward critiquing gendered workplace structures. Striking a hopeful tone, the Article proposes that gender advocates' legal and political gains have now set the stage for U.S. law to close the remaining gaps in pregnancy accommodation-- to fully reflect the fact that pregnant women work and that a significant portion of workers become pregnant. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on history of United States Civil Rights Act of 1964'sTitle VII's prohibition on sex discrimination, tracing the additions of pregnancy discrimination, sexual harassment, and sex stereotyping as cognizable forms of sex discrimination over time. It mentions rationales to conceptually link sex and sexual orientation discrimination without reinforcing "monosexism." It also mentions Title VII's protections requires a rejection of tests that look for a disparate impact.

The distinction between formal and substantive equality is theorized then illustrated by sexual harassment law in the United States and in international legal developments. The convergence of sexual harassment concepts with prostitution, hence of sex discrimination law with the Nordic/Equality Model, is explained and explored. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article urges Professor Andrew Koppelman to reconsider his assessment of how the resistance to lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and queer (LGBTQ) rights in the U.S. should impact thinking about the wedding-vendor cases. Topics tackled are conflicting gay rights and religious liberty claims adjudicated by laws prohibiting sexual-orientation discrimination in places of public accommodation, and comparison of sexual orientation to race and not to other characteristics in civil rights laws.

Section 3(c) of the Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth) provides that one object of the Act is 'to eliminate, so far as is possible, discrimination involving sexual harassment in the workplace, in educational organisations and in other areas of public activity'. This article argues that the Act, in its current form, is not adequate for achieving that object for two reasons: first, its operative provisions reflect a normative principle that has, as its aim, the compensation of harm but not the prevention of future harm; and second, it fails to recognise some systemic harms caused by sexual harassment. The article proposes a structural approach to workplace sexual harassment regulation, which involves a positive duty for organisations to take reasonable steps to prevent sexual harassment and a regulatory framework aimed at putting in place the necessary motivations and incentives to ensure compliance with that duty. The article draws on insights from regulatory theory to explain how this regulatory approach can better serve the object of eliminating sexual harassment so far as is possible. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the decision of U.S. Supreme Court in the case Bostock v. Clayton County ushers in new threats to the safety, well-being, and constitutional rights of many Americans. It mentions validity of the statutory interpretation reflected in the decision and Supreme Court's holding that sex discrimination in Title VII now includes discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity. It also mentions significant interests required to accommodate gender identity.

Both corporate theory and sex discrimination law start with presumptions that CEOs seek to advance legitimate ends and design the internal organization of business enterprises to achieve such ends. Yet, a growing literature questions why CEOs and boards of directors nonetheless select for Machiavellianism, narcissism, psychopathy, and toxic masculinity, despite the downsides associated with these traits. Three scholarly literatures--economics, criminology, and gender theory--draw on advances in psychology to shed new light on the construction of seemingly dysfunctional corporate cultures. They start by questioning the assumption that CEOs--even CEOs of seemingly mainstream businesses--necessarily seek to advance "legitimate" ends. Instead, they suggest that a persistent issue is predation: the exploitation of asymmetries in information and power to the disadvantage of shareholders, creditors, customers, or employees. These literatures then explore how such CEOs may rationally choose to employ seemingly dysfunctional practices, such as "masculinity contests," which reward employees more likely to buy into ethically dubious activities that range from predatory lending to sexual harassment. This Article maintains that questioning the presumption of legitimacy has profound and largely unexplored implications for corporate theory and anti-discrimination law. It extends the theory of "control fraud" central to white-collar criminology to a new concept of "control predation" that includes conduct that is ethically objectionable, if not necessarily illegal. This Article concludes that only by questioning the legitimacy of these practices in business terms can gender theory adequately address women's workplace equality. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article argues that the anti-fraternization policy of the New Orleans Saints' cheerleaders with National Football League (NFL) players discriminates against the female cheerleaders based on their sex. Topics discussed include Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, history of cheerleading and cheerleading in the NFL, and relevant laws to sex discrimination claims filed by Saints cheerleader Jacalyn Bailey Davis with the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC).

This article examines the legal nature of sex-segregated services as provided for in the Equal Treatment Directive 2004/113 and its positioning in relation to positive action measures. The Directive prohibits discrimination in the access to goods and services on the grounds of sex, while allowing the provision "exclusively or primarily to members of one sex " under certain conditions (art.4(5)) and positive action measures to promote equality between the sexes (art. 6). This raises questions: do these provisions differ and, if so, how? How do they fit into the system of equality law? The analysis sets off with a general investigation into the principle of equality and then locates positive action measures and sex-segregated services within the equality law structure. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article argues how genital exceptionalism is root of much of harm that is inflicted upon both the transgender and intersex communities in the U.S. It further explores ways in which genital exceptionalism would be beneficial for activists from each of the two groups to join forces in advancing their causes. It also highlights the need of overturning the discriminatory transgender bathroom law and legislation that forbids the performance of genital-normalizing surgery on children.

In 2013, one of the final acts of the Gillard government was to amend Australia's Sex Discrimination Act to add sexuality, gender identity and intersex variations as protected categories. This was not the first time the Commonwealth had considered anti‐discrimination legislation protecting LGBTI people. The most prominent example was the Democrats‐sponsored Sexuality Discrimination Bill, introduced to Parliament in November 1995, which included provisions to protect transgender people as well as gays, lesbians and bisexuals. The Senate referred the bill to an inquiry by the Senate Legal and Constitutional References Committee, which received 436 submissions. Approximately 100 of these submissions specifically addressed transgender discrimination, some advocating for the rights of transgender Australians, and others focusing their attacks against the bill based on the transgender provisions. This article draws on the concept of transgender citizenship to examine the transgender‐related aspects of the inquiry and the debates in parliament, to understand the ways that the public and politicians framed transgender rights in the mid‐1990s. These debates are telling in how transgender issues and anxieties over gender fluidity have consistently become an easy target in wider debates about equality for sexual and gender minorities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents a study which examined the cross-country patterns on the relationship between gender-discriminatory laws and different women's economic agency indicators. Other topics include the efforts to advance women's legal rights, women's asset ownership and labor force participation, as well as wage gap and discrimination in wage work and parental leave.

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act protects employees from discrimination "because of sex," which the Supreme Court found includes gender and sex/gender stereotyping. The circuit courts, however, are split on whether discrimination against transgender people is "because of sex." In the circuits that extend Title VII's protection to transgender people, the courts differ as to whether a claim must be based on sex stereotyping or based on a person's status as transgender or transitioning alone. This issue was recently granted certiorari by the Supreme Court. Not only do the circuit courts conflict but government agencies disagree on this matter as well. In 2014, the Department of Justice considered discrimination against transgender people to be because of sex but rescinded this policy in 2017. Conversely, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission regards discrimination based on transgender status as discrimination because of sex under Title VII. Currently, no federal law exists that provides protections for transgender people in the workplace. Proposed acts that have aimed to provide protections have failed, due to their broad protections and conservative opposition. However, two states have passed laws that prevent against discrimination by the systematic misuse of one's preferred pronouns, known as misgendering, but were met with claims of First Amendment free speech violations. This Comment will first examine the concepts of sex, gender, gender identity, and gender expression, and their relation to the transgender community. Next, this Comment will discuss federal protections for transgender people, First Amendment rights in the workplace, and the Circuit Split. Finally, this Comment will recommend that the Supreme Court hold that Title VII protects transgender people based on (1) their status as transgender and (2) sex stereotyping under Price Waterhouse. Lastly, this Comment will propose a federal law that would protect transgender people from intentional misgendering discrimination in the workplace. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

At a time when the law is transforming gay rights, the LGBTQ community finds itself at the climax of its latest civil rights challenge: federal employment non-discrimination protections. This Note addresses the federal circuit split regarding whether Title VII's prohibition against sex discrimination includes a prohibition on the basis of sexual orientation. By integrating the Seventh Circuit's analysis in Hively v. Ivy Tech Community College within the frameworks of intersectionality, identity performance, and queer theory, this Note evaluates how an evolving understanding of Title VII's protections affect members of the LGBTQ communities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study is the first to empirically demonstrate widespread discrimination across the United States based on perceived sexual orientation, sex, and race in mortgage lending. Our analysis of over five million mortgage applications reveals that any Fair Housing Administration (FHA) loan application filed by same-sex male co-applicants is significantly less likely to be approved compared to the white heterosexual baseline (holding lending risk constant). The most likely explanation for this pattern is sexual orientation-based discrimination--despite the fact that FHA loans are the only type of loan in which discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is prohibited. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this Article, I argue that sexual orientation meets the burden established by Supreme Court jurisprudence for suspect classification and, therefore, should receive heightened scrutiny under Fourteenth Amendment equal protection analysis. After decades of using the fundamental rights analysis to aid lesbian, gay, and bisexual individuals in their pursuit of equality, addressing the fundamental right to marry and the fundamental right to privacy, the Supreme Court must address the elephant in the courtroom: that sexual orientation meets all of the factors set by the Court in equal protection cases for suspect classification. Gays, lesbians, and bisexual individuals (LGBs) meet the burden for suspectness in that they are a discrete and insular minority, with a long history of discrimination, and are effectively politically powerless. Furthermore, sexual orientation is an immutable characteristic, irrelevant to an individual's ability to participate in and contribute to society. While the Supreme Court has not determined which factors are weighed more heavily than others in its award of suspect classification, sexual orientation meets all of the factors addressed by the Court in previous cases and therefore must be a suspect class and granted heightened scrutiny under the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite four major Supreme Court opinions involving lesbian, gay, and bisexual ("LGB") rights, how courts should treat sexual orientation under equal protection remains unknown. This ambiguity will persist until LGB advocates abandon the essentialist theoretical model of sexual orientation as a status derived from nature and instead promote a social constructionist framework that conceptualizes sexual orientation as a status derived from sex. Scholars assert that social constructionist arguments are "risky arguments" because they challenge the perceived natural order and incite anxieties about nonincremental change. Surprisingly, federal courts have become increasingly willing to conceptualize sexual orientation as a dynamic concept derived from sex and subsequently, to find that sexual orientation discrimination is a form of sex discrimination. Courts and scholars have indeed talked about sexual orientation discrimination as sex discrimination, and some scholars have discussed individual cases. This article is the first to take a broad theoretical approach to this growing trend in federal courts. It argues that underpinning this striking development is a profound theoretical shift in how sexual orientation is conceptualized. It systematically reviews the three legal arguments that courts have used when adopting this approach: comparative, associational, and gender-stereotyping. It analyzes a comprehensive dataset of seventy-one cases to determine which of these arguments is gaining the most traction. Understanding sexual orientation through the lens of sex discrimination not only promises to clarify how courts should approach LGB equality, but also better reflects the diverse reality and fluidity of modern gender identities, and it makes sense, normatively, theoretically, and strategically. This theoretical argument is now the less "risky argument." In short, this article (I) provides groundbreaking theoretical insights to a remarkable shift in how courts are treating sexual orientation, (2) challenges scholarly notions of how LGB social justice litigation should be approached, and (3) offers a solution to the ambiguity in how sexual orientation should be treated under the Equal Protection Clause. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article highlights the protest of Air Horn Orchestra against the House Bill 2. Topics discussed include approval of House Bill 2 from North Carolina legislative, which eliminates essential anti-discrimination protections and limited the sovereignty of municipalities but requires that transgender people use the bathroom that corresponds to their biological sex; views of Jesse Jarnow, music journalist on the protest; standing of artists for LGBTQ rights in North Carolina.

The article explores the almost lack of gender discrimination litigation in Brazil despite the existence of anti-discrimination laws in the country. It presents a summary of the relevant constitutional and statutory provisions which show that Brazil does not have laws against gender discrimination. It also discusses several factors that prevent most of the victims of discrimination from suing such as the lack of more aggressive truth-finding procedures.

The author argues that the U.S. Supreme Court should apply the sex discrimination standard under Title VII when reviewing claims based on sexual orientation because sexual minorities depart from stereotypical notions of gender and sexuality. Topics covered include the legislative history of sex discrimination under Title VII, the way courts holds queer plaintiffs to a different standard than heterosexual plaintiffs, and the Supreme Court's denial of certiorari in a sex discrimination case.

The article offers information on the issues relating to the gender, poverty and inequality. Topics discussed include links between gender, poverty and inequality as enunciated in the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs); role of black women in bringing about social change; and the government legislation on race and gender along with the access to education for girls and political representation.

The article focuses on removing gender bias from Louisiana Civil Code. It uses linguistic theory and empirical research for examining why masculine generics are detrimental to society; assessment of other states legislative drafting practices and their willingness to use gender-neutral language in state laws; and Louisiana Equal Pay for Women Act for eleminating gender pay gap.

Lord Steyn once stated that the victimization of those who complain of discrimination under the equality legislation should be treated as seriously as the discrimination itself. Empirical research, demonstrating the fear of reprisals, supports this. If, say, employees can be denied promotions, grievance processes, transfers, or references because of a complaint, their careers could be frozen for years or even destroyed. This would undermine the legislation's principal rubrics against discrimination and harassment. Hence, the equality legislation has provided an independent cause of action for victimization. Yet, from the earliest days of this legislation (beginning with the Sex Discrimination Act 1975), the courts have afforded the victimization provisions a particularly narrow construction. In 1993, it was suggested that the resulting 'weak' victimization provisions could be 'supplemented' with the law of (criminal) contempt of court, by filling the gaps left by the narrow interpretations and moreover, providing a stronger 'deterrent value' of criminal proceedings. This paper explores that suggestion by reviewing the subsequent case law. It begins by setting out the legislation and the problematic 'narrow' interpretations. This is followed by an outline of the relevant principles of contempt of court and then reviews some prominent victimization cases. This review shows that indeed principles of contempt have been imported into some of these cases, but not in the way anticipated. It reveals that first, contempt was used to restrict the victimization provisions, second, it was ignored to fill obvious gaps in these provisions, and third, that some victimization cases ought to have been referred for contempt but were not. It concludes by identifying that this 'on-off' relationship between victimization and contempt of court exposes the judiciary's reluctance to take the administration of justice as seriously for equality law as it does for other fields. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]