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In 1945, the British and American chiefs of staff ordered that information about the Allied solution of German cryptosystems be excluded from their official histories of World War II in order to preserve an intelligence advantage. This left the world with an incomplete but not an erroneous account of that struggle. Despite a few leaks, not until Group Captain F. W. Winterbotham revealed those solutions in 1974 did that story begin to emerge fully. An unexpected consequence was to bolster British pride. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Historians generally consider resistance in Europe as a national phenomenon. This vision is certainly accurate, but forgets one important datum: the Allies have played a decisive part in European resistance, by recognizing (or not) governments in exile, by authorizing (or not) the free access to the BBC, and by using their secret services (mainly the Special Operations Executive, SOE, and the Office of Strategic Services, OSS). This article tries to show how this action has shaped resistance in Western Europe, and given to the Anglo-Americans a leading part in clandestine action--even if national powers, in one way or another, have resisted this hegemony. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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Copyright of Danubius is the property of Danubius and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Following Japan's successful attacks against Allied targets throughout the Far East and the Pacific in December 1941, Canada focused on protecting its own Pacific coastline in British Columbia, participating in joint US–Canadian defence measures as required. Canadian authorities removed all Japanese Canadians from the Pacific Coast, placed conscript troops in British Columbia, and searched for other enemies in the province. They investigated subversion and sought to avert coastal attacks, whilst Japan conducted nuisance raids and maintained a presence in the Aleutians. Recently declassified intelligence files show that several factors influenced the way in which Canadian authorities viewed ‘the enemy within’ and ‘the Pacific threat’. During the Pacific War, the Canadian conscription policy, public complacency, wartime allegiances and enemy activity along the coast all impacted the way in which security intelligence was collected and interpreted in British Columbia. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

For many years, the former general Count Gerhard von Schwerin was celebrated in Aachen as a man who sought to save the city from destruction in September 1944. Recently, however, his reputation has come under attack through a report produced by three historians at the University of Aachen. According to the report, his anti-Nazi credentials are also questionable since they are based purely upon Schwerin's own post-war testimony. This article argues that any final verdict on Schwerin must take into account British and American source material relating to his post-war career in intelligence. Not only was Schwerin involved in the foundation of two intelligence organisations while serving as Konrad Adenauer's adviser on rearmament (May October 1950), he also worked as an agent for the Central Intelligence Agency (1951–1953) and advised Kurt Schumacher and Franz Josef Strauß on intelligence questions. A determined critic of Reinhard Gehlen, Schwerin's behind-the-scenes campaign for strong democratic control of the intelligence services, and the trust he was accorded by Allied intelligence officials, suggests that current views on his career require revision. Über Jahrzehnte galt General Gerhard Graf von Schwerin als der »Retter von Aachen«, ein Mann, der im September 1944 versucht hatte, die Stadt vor der Zerstörung zu retten. Allerdings ist seine Version der Ereignisse anhand eines Berichts von drei Historikern der Rheinisch-Westfälischen Technischen Hochschule in Aachen infrage gestellt worden. Demnach sei Schwerins mutmaßliche Widerstandshaltung auch deshalb fraglich, weil sie nur auf seinen eigenen Darstellungen aus der Zeit nach 1945 basiert. Dieser Aufsatz argumentiert, dass ein abschließendes Urteil über Schwerin britische und amerikanische Akten einbeziehen muss. Dazu gehören besonders die Quellen, die seine nachrichtendienstlichen Aktivitäten in der Nachkriegszeit betreffen. Schwerin war nicht nur an der Gründung zweier Geheimdienste beteiligt, sondern er arbeitete auch als Agent der CIA (1951–1953) sowie als Nachrichtendienst-Berater für Kurt Schumacher und Franz Josef Strauß. Seine exponierte Kritik an Reinhard Gehlen, seine Kampagne für eine starke parlamentarische Kontrolle der Geheimdienste der Bundesrepublik sowie die Tatsache, dass er das Vertrauen von alliierten Geheimdienstlern genoss, suggeriert, dass das derzeitige Urteil über seine Karriere revidiert werden sollte. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents an intelligence case gone bad during the Second World War, when the United States decided to drop a three-man OSS group into Hungary. Hungary, a close ally of Germany, after seeing that the war was not going to end with an Axis victory, wished to seek contact with the Western Allies in order to try to find a way out of its precarious situation. The study, based mainly on archival research, shows the evolution of the Sparrow Mission, whose goals are still unclear today. Both the preparations and the timing of the mission seem to indicate that the plan had some influence on the German decision of occupying Hungary in March 1944, and such a German move helped the Normandy landing of the Allies a few months later. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The article presents an overview of the military intelligence operations conducted by Nazi Germany in Sweden during World War II. Introductory details are given noting that despite the neutrality of Sweden during the conflict, multiple intelligence operations were conducted by Germany through the diplomatic offices in the nation. Individual agents such as Rudolf Fleck, Eberhard von Schoeler, and Erika Wendt are profiled. Systematic campaigns undertaken by Germany are also mentioned in connection to the invasion of Scandinavia.

The article presents an exploration into the intelligence activities of Nazi Germany and the Allied powers within Iran during World War II. Contextual details are given describing the Iranian theater during the war, noting strong Iranian ties to Axis Germany even after the Allies successfully invaded the country in 1941. Accounts are then given describing intelligence and counter-intelligence activities which vied against each other by Germany, the Soviet Union and Great Britain through the remainder of the conflict.

The author responds to scholarly criticisms by James Longenbach appearing in the periodical "The Nation" of his article "A Poetry of Action: George Oppen and Communism," which was published in the Volume 6, #1 issue of "American Communist History." He discusses the possibility that either American poet George Oppen or his wife Mary Oppen were working for the Soviet Union as spies during the 1940s. Also presented are facsimiles of Soviet espionage communications dating from August 1943 which were intercepted and translated by American military intelligence.

This article explores the development of the Kriegsmarine's signals intelligence service, the B-Dienst, and its role in operational planning prior to 1939. It challenges the prevalent view that the Kriegsmarine had little interest in intelligence gathering and contends that the naval leadership understood the implications and possibilities of this new intelligence source. By employing hitherto unused source material the article demonstrates how the B-Dienst was systematically protected and nurtured by the naval staff. Consequently the Kriegsmarine entered the Second World War with a well-prepared signals intelligence machinery from which it reaped the rewards in the first half of the conflict. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article analyses the content and nature of American intelligence with regard to Finland in 1941-1944. The significance of intelligence was that it supported connections between the United States and Finland at a time when both external and internal circumstances inhibited the functioning of normal state to state relations between the two nations. The evolution of wartime conditions guided the interests of American intelligence. The main conclusion is that American intelligence in Finland can be interpreted as communication on multiple levels between two states. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the Soviet Union's intelligence operations during World War II, focusing particularly on the impact of the June 22, 1941 creation of the NKVD (People's Commissariat for Interior Affairs) from the former NKVD and NKGB (People Commissariat for National Security). The author asserts that the wartime foreign intelligence operations were successful as a result of the leadership of Russian Lieutenant General Pavel Fitin who ran the NKVD from 1943 to 1946. Some of the wartime goals of Soviet intelligence included ascertaining the military operations of, and uncovering military technologies developed by, the U.S. and Great Britain; work in neutral countries to gather human intelligence; and aid to underground movements organized against Germany.

The article presents an account of Carl Krepper, a World War II Lutheran pastor in New Jersey who was also a Nazi German spy with a mission to sabotage U.S. infrastructure. Details are given outlining the larger context of the German Operation Pastorius and the activities of Krepper as a member of the campaign. A profile of Krepper's theological training and history is given. Accounts are also provided relating Krepper's covert actions on behalf of the Third Reich, his apprehension by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and his military trial.

Two newly available sources for World War II intelligence history consist of French pre-war mainly intelligence documents held for years in the Soviet Union and recently returned to France and of German pre-war documents, primarily cryptologic, held for years in the United Kingdom and recently restituted to the Federal Republic. In addition, a memorandum of 1930 reveals that the future spy Hans-Thilo Schmidt frequently visited the factory making the Enigma machine and coolly asked the manufacturer for basic details, which they gave him and which he later sold to the French, leading eventually to the Allied reading of Engima-enciphered messages during World War II. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents an account of the career of the German Schutzstaffel double-agent Hildegard Beetz. Details are given regarding her activities during World War II, highlighting her defection from the Third Reich and her cooperation with various intelligence agencies of the U.S. and Allied Forces. Accounts are also given of her post-war operations such as operation "Sitting Duck" in Berlin, Germany under the code name of "Gambit" in 1946 and 1947. Comments are included highlighting how effective an agent Beetz was.

The article presents the summary of a conference that focused on the history of the Waffen-Schutz Staffel (Waffen-SS), a Nazi national military force of the Third Reich in Germany. It was held from May 6-7, 2011 in Würzburg, Germany. Topics under discussion at the conference included the recruitment tactics of the Waffen-SS, the interactions between the Waffen-SS and the Wehrmacht defense forces during the battle in Ardenno, Italy, and the contributions of the SS to the Jewish Holocaust.