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The purpose of this chapter is to review the literature on fertility stalls in Africa. The first section provides a descriptive approach of the demographic transition since the 1950s, while the second looks at the unusual pace of fertility decline from the 1990s from a comparative perspective. The third section summarizes the halts and reversals in fertility decline from the early 2000s. First, the methods used to define a fertility stall are described. Then, the stall periods and studies by country where the slowdowns occurred are identified and listed. The fourth section describes the analyses conducted on the fertility dynamics during stall periods, such as the changes in the proximate determinants of fertility, birth intervals, fertility desires, and fertility preferences. The fifth section summarizes the studies analyzing the potential causes of fertility stalls, such as education, wealth, HIV, and under-five mortality, among others. Finally, the sixth section draws conclusions from the reviewed studies, and the seventh proposes a research agenda from the gaps in literature.

Migrer, c’est entrer en incertitude. Incertitude sur la durée de la migration, sur les futurs lieux de vie, sur les étapes à franchir, sur la sécurité financière et matérielle, sur les perspectives d’avenir. Migrer, c’est aussi un parcours fait de changements, de bifurcations, de redéfinitions de projets. Un parcours par ailleurs jalonné de procédures administratives ou juridictionnelles, demandes de titres de séjour limité ou illimité, dont les règles sont de plus en plus complexes et évoluent au gré des politiques migratoires. Or, comme nous allons le démontrer, la complexité croissante du régime migratoire belge amplifie les incertitudes, immobilise les trajectoires et fabrique une proportion importante de situations irrégulières. Avec un impact lourd sur le vécu des personnes migrantes, qui peut parfois conduire à des situations de non-respect des droits humains.

Approximately 400,000 births to adolescent girls under age 15 occurred worldwide each year in the 2010s, representing a fertility rate of around 13 annual births per 10,000 girls aged 10–14. More than half of these occurred in sub-Saharan Africa, where we observe 40 annual births per 10,000 girls aged 10–14. Since the early 1970s, fertility among girls aged 10–14 has decreased sixfold worldwide. In countries of the Global South, a majority of these births occur within a union (marriage or non-marital cohabitation).

Fertility transition in sub-Saharan Africa has been different than in other low- and middle-income countries. Slowdowns, halts and reversals in fertility decline have been observed over the last 20 years. So far, studies have focused on fertility trends at the national level and the potential causes remain unclear. We use more than 130 Demographic and Health Surveys from 33 sub-Saharan African countries to examine fertility trends at the subnational level and to identify the potential causes that have led to fertility plateaus. We reconstruct fertility trends from the 1980s by pooling birth histories. Then, we smooth the trends using restricted cubic splines and use decomposition methods to analyze if changes in fertility trends are due to changes in fertility by place of residence or to changes in population composition. Stylized models of fertility transition predict that fertility decline occurs first in urban areas and then diffuses to rural areas. Likewise, theory shows that as the transition progresses, the demand for children decreases due to higher levels of education and welfare. However, on the one hand, our results show that fertility is stalled mainly in capital cities in sub-Saharan Africa at rates well above replacement level. On the other hand, our results show that stalled fertility among the most educated women and of wanted fertility, as the demand for children remains at high levels, explain fertility stalls at the national level. Finally, we found a clear correlation between the countries most affected by the HIV pandemic and fertility stalls.

Fertility decline in sub-Saharan Africa began in the early 1980s; however, fertility remains at rates well above replacement levels. Even more, since the early 2000s slowdowns, halts and reversals in fertility decline have been observed in many countries. Our goal is to analyze the extent to which wanted and unwanted fertility have contributed to fertility stalls, specifically in countries with strong evidence of stalled fertility, i.e., Cameroon, Congo, Kenya, Namibia, Rwanda, Zambia and Zimbabwe. We use the Demographic and Health Surveys to estimate fertility rates by fertility planning status. Then, we propose four scenarios in which we estimate what the fertility levels would be if no mistimed and unwanted births have occurred. In the first two scenarios we revisit the usual measure of Wanted TFR and propose a new measure that shifts mistimed births to the time in which the mother would have wanted to have the birth. In the last two scenarios, we use contraceptive failure to account for rationalization. Our findings suggest that fertility stalls are mainly driven by wanted fertility. Unwanted fertility account for the stalled period only in Kenya. Our findings suggest that preventing mistimed or unwanted births would lead to lower fertility rates, although fertility stalls would have remained. Accounting for rationalization from contraceptive failure results in lower estimates of wanted fertility compared to the usual measure of wanted fertility.

Increased access to and improved quality of education is identified as one of the factors leading to the reduction of fertility levels; however, declines in fertility in sub-Saharan Africa has not followed increases in education. Halts and reversals in fertility decline have been found in many sub-Saharan African countries. Evidence suggests that disruptions in the progress of education might account for recent fertility stalls in several SSA countries. Our objective is to unravel the relationship between education and stalled fertility by analyzing the contribution of changes in female fertility by educational level to positive or non-declining changes in total fertility rates. Using the Demographic and Health Surveys, we first estimate fertility rates by educational level and examine how they have varied over time, especially during periods of stagnation. Then, we use a decomposition method to analyze changes in fertility rates. We discern the extent to which fertility stalls are related to reversals and halts in the fertility decline of more educated women, or whether there is fertility plateauing at all educational levels, or whether it is due to an effect of changes in the composition of the population. Our results suggest that halts and reversals in fertility decline among women with secondary and higher education account for stagnant fertility in countries with strong evidence of fertility stalls. Although we also find fertility plateaus among women with lower levels of education, these higher and non-declining fertility rates would not explain much of the stagnation in fertility at the national level.

Evidence shows that capital cities lead fertility transitions. However, data confirm that fertility stalls are a common feature among sub-Saharan African capitals, which could affect the transition at the national level. We use 137 DHS from 33 sub-Saharan African countries to determine at what phase of the fertility transition their capitals are in. We look at differences between phases and identify what contributed most to fertility decline. We find that most capitals are at an intermediate phase of the transition. In early stages, sex life and cohabitation begin at earlier ages than later in the transition. Postpartum infecundability is similar in all phases. Contraceptive use is the main determinant of fertility decline. In the later stage of the transition, contraceptive prevalence is more than double that of the earliest phase. Non-increasing contraceptive prevalence in recent years suggests that fertility rates will not decline rapidly in the near future.

Although fertility in sub-Saharan Africa has decreased over the last 40 years, it remains at high levels. Moreover, halts and reversals in fertility decline have been observed in many countries. We use information from 27 DHS surveys of six countries where strong evidence of fertility stalls has been found. We compute TFR decomposing it by unintended birth outcomes (planned, mistimed, and unwanted fertility). Also, we compute TFR estimates from some scenarios to examine to what extent fertility stalls are explained by planned fertility and unintended fertility. Preliminary results show planned fertility explains 62% of births, meaning that two out of every five births are unintended. Reducing unmet need could lead to lower levels of fertility; however, fertility stalls persist even after meeting contraceptive needs. In most cases, fertility stalls are mainly explained by wanted fertility. Scenarios show that stall periods would have occurred even in the absence of unplanned births.

Pregnancy at an early age is risky. On the one hand, adolescent mothers are more likely to have miscarriages, stillbirths, preterm deliveries, and to seek induced abortion. Also, adolescent childbearing can also increase health risks of newborns, such as low birthweight and poor neonatal conditions. On the other hand, early pregnancy can lead to early marriage. Since out-of-wedlock pregnancies are often socially disapproved in less developed countries, pregnant adolescents may not have other choice than marriage. Early marriage reinforces gender inequality and exclusion from the decision on when and whom to marry. A rising age at marriage could be the most critical factor in postponing early adolescent childbearing and in meeting sexual and reproductive health rights. Most studies have focused on adolescents between 15 and 19 years of age mainly due to the paucity of data for adolescentes under 15 years of age. However, in recent years there is increasing information on young adolescents. Thus, we focus on births to adolescent mothers between 10 and 14 years of age. To our knowledge, there is no research that analyzes the effect becoming pregnant before the age of 15 to early marriage. We examine the characteristics of adolescents under 15 who become pregnant, and whether an early pregnancy precipitates early marriage or whether pregnancies occur within marriage. We compare our results with adolescents aged 15-19 to examine whether patterns are similar or different. We expect that births in early adolescence are more likely to occur within marriage among poorer adolescents and that births in early adolescence are more likely to precipitate a change in marital status among wealthier adolescents. Patterns are similar between adolescents under 15 and 15-19; however, the proportion of births within marriage is higher among older adolescents. We use all available DHS from 70 countries located in Latin America, North Africa & West Asia, South & Southeast Asia, and sub-Sah