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This article explores the impact of the US foreign policy's predictability, or lack thereof, vis-à-vis the Middle Easter regional order. It lays out two main arguments. Firstly, since 2003, the US has undertaken some concrete actions which have undermined former expectations of its behaviour among regional actors. By that, Washington distanced itself from open and predictable foreign policy that played a key role in maintaining the regional order, most concretely as an external security provider. US actions fostered a double-level uncertainty: amid a broader process of strategic disengagement from the region, the US's level of intervention was not really predictable as in some occasions it adhered to its former responsibilities and opted either for direct intervention or offshore engagement, while in others it advanced in its disengagement by not intervening or doing less than expected by regional actors; additionally, in terms of the direction of its interventions, its policies fostered uncertainty as they fluctuated from some reinforcing the status to those disrupting it. Secondly, this uncertainty prompted regional actors to assume further security-oriented responsibilities, as shown by the renewed centrality of the Gulf Cooperation Council or the innovative Saudi foreign policy in Bahrain, Yemen or Qatar since 2011. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article looks at the starvation crisis in Yemen due to the internal armed conflict which started in 2014. Topics discussed include the provisions of the international humanitarian law Protocol II on the use of starvation as a warfare method, the Protocol II violation committed by Saudi Arabia for attacking the water resources in Yemen, and the need for the creation of a convention based on the principles on environmental protection in relation to armed conflict by the United Nations.

Over the last few decades, Turkey, Iran, and Saudi Arabia have become very active in Northeast Africa. In addition to developing bilateral relations with countries in the region, they regard the area as the gateway to connections with the rest of the continent, although they are guided by different motivations. Turkeys expansion of its interests in Africa is both a reaction to the European Union's rejection of its membership and an opportunity to expand its trade, which has been hindered by instability in the Middle East in recent years. Like Saudi Arabia, it views Northeast Africa as a place to extend its cultural influence with that region's indigenous Sunni population. Saudi Arabia has used its wealth to curtail Iran's attempts to expand its influence in the region, while Turkey has provided on-the-ground technical assistance to enhance its political and economic connections in the region. In recent years the two countries have been drawn together by Iran's involvement in Yemen, although Turkey has sought to avoid becoming involved in local political disputes. Rather, it has served in multinational peacekeeping efforts and actions to prevent piracy in the sea lanes off the coast of Africa and the Arabian Peninsula. However, since the dispute between Saudi Arabia and Qatar over the latter country's relations with Iran that began in June 2017, some tension has arisen between Turkey and Saudi Arabia. While Iran also wants those sea lanes to be freely open to traffic--as they were during the time of Shah Muhammad Reza Pahlavi--it also wants to counteract Israeli involvement in Northeast Africa. Turkey has made great inroads politically and economically in Northeast Africa in recent years, while Saudi Arabia has gained the upper hand in its rivalry with Iran., INTRODUCTION Historically there have been many political, economic, and cultural connections between the core area of the Middle East (Egypt and Southwest Asia) and Northeast Africa (Sudan, South Sudan, and [...]

This article examines Saudi Arabia's decision in recent years to use novel and hitherto unexplored informal alliance formats, which we term multinational security coalitions (MSCs). This development was initiated by the new Saudi political leadership under King Salman and Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman, who have a much greater inclination to pursue proactive foreign and security policies than their predecessors. However, it will be highlighted that beyond the priorities of individual personalities, this shift in Saudi Arabia's behaviour occurred against the backdrop of significant changes in the existing security environment, including the perceived withdrawal of the United States from the security affairs of the region during the presidency of Barack Obama, and crucially also Saudi Arabia's frustration over the failure of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) to develop into a viable security mechanism. The article begins with the introduction of the key ideas relating to institutional design, the conceptual framework for this study. Section two outlines the most important reasons for Saudi Arabia's choice of the MSC format. The third section examines the strengths of the MSC format—especially informality, the resulting low entry-thresholds and the low risk of entrapment—that provided Saudi Arabia with partial and temporary success in recruiting coalition partners and thus bolstering its leadership role. The final section demonstrates, however, that ultimately MSCs are not a panacea. The informality of MSCs that makes it easy for the pivotal state to assemble a coalition also makes it hard for it to forge, and enforce, a common vision. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper analyses the alliance between Syria and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia during the years 1970–1989. The relations between the two Arab powers were characterized by cooperation and support amid ideological and 'structural' differences. This was a stark contrast with the conflictual relations of the previous decade. The change was driven mainly by a reshaping in Syria's regional policy. The new 'realist' foreign policy imposed by Hafiz Al-Assad created an overlapping of interests between Syria and the KSA. Riyadh valued Syria's role in the region and used its support of Damascus vis-à-vis Israel as a tool to obtain domestic and regional legitimacy. On the other hand, Syria benefited from the KSA's generous economic and diplomatic help. This study will use an approach based on neoclassical realism to show how domestic and international factors led to these changes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since the 2003 regime change in Iraq and the 2011 Arab uprisings, the political map of the Middle East has been in flux. Regional actors have taken advantage of emerging windows of opportunity, which have affected the outcome of this process. Saudi Arabia's role as an aspiring regional hegemon in the region is salient: the country's assertive course in shaping its neighbourhood coincides with a more independent foreign policy that goes beyond the traditional US alliance and seeks to diversify its international partners. This diversification of Saudi foreign policy since the ascension to the throne of King Salman in 2015 is explained by using the IR concept of hedging. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article explores Iran and Saudi Arabia, long time adversaries socially, politically, militarily and religiously. The author traces this competition back to two events in 1979: the Iranian revolution and the siege of the Grand Mosque in Mecca, Saudi Arabia. Other topics discussed include how the Iranian revolution transformed the country into a theocracy, Islamic extremism and Shiite and Sunni Islam.

On March 26, 2015, Saudi Arabia launched airstrikes on Yemen with the aim of restoring the rule of President Abd Rabbo Mansour Hadi and destroying the Houthi movement. Scholars and policy analysts moved quickly to examine the Yemen war as a sectarian struggle and a byproduct of Saudi-Iranian rivalry in the region. However, these traditional explanations fall short of unravelling the Saudi motive behind launching a large-scale operation in Yemen, its severely weakened and politically divided neighbor. This paper offers an alternative explanation for the abrupt Saudi aggressiveness toward Yemen. It argues that this intervention is driven by a non-material need: Saudi leadership aims to assert the Kingdom's status as a regional power in the Middle East., Introduction On March 26, 2015, Saudi Arabia launched airstrikes on Yemen with the aim of restoring the rule of President Abd Rabbo Mansour Hadi and eliminating the Houthi movement. Located [...]

The article focuses on developments in Saudi Arabia foreign policy. Topics discussed include the liberal ideals such as regional integration and international institutionalization; the 2015 ascension of King Salman bin Abdulaziz and limited increase in U.S. support for Riyadh and the deployment of Saudi troops inside Jordan.

Saudi politics is commonly portrayed as reflecting a system of centralised personal rule in which decision-making power trickles down from the tightly knit power circles within the House of Saud. In contrast, this paper draws attention to the empowerment of quasi-autonomous state organisations in Saudi Arabia as a result of state transformation and regional integration. At its most extreme, state transformation in Saudi Arabia has created institutional and regulatory enclaves with vested interests and areas of competence that cross Saudi borders. This paper illustrates the foreign policy ramifications of transformed statehood in Saudi attempts to further Gulf regional integration in the context of the Gulf Monetary Union project. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A special relationship has developed between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, centered on a particular trade-off. Saudi Arabia depends on Pakistan for strategic depth and regards it as both an important asset in restraining Iranian influence and an answer to its need for a non-Arab ally. In exchange, Pakistan receives extensive economic aid, and benefits from Saudi Arabia's influence in the Gulf and its role as guardian of the Islamic holy sites. The two countries have been able to overcome several disputes between them by maneuvering between various pressures, strengthening their special relations, and ensuring that more is unknown than known about their strategic cooperation, both conventional and nuclear. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Saudi Arabia's massive air campaign against the Houthi rebels in Yemen initiated a major shift from the Kingdom's traditional policy of restraint, to a force-based foreign policy approach unofficially dubbed the "Salman Doctrine." The doctrine aimed at repositioning the Kingdom as the Middle East's preeminent power by rolling back its archrival Iran. This commentary argues that the Kingdom has made hardly any progress on the war and diplomatic fronts so far to achieve this objective, due mainly to a glaring mismatch between the doctrine's ends and the means to achieve these ends. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the competition for regional leadership between Egypt, under President President Abdel Fattah Sisi, and Saudi Arabia, under crown prince Muhammad bin Salman. An overview of their mutual opposition to Iran and to the alliance between the organization Muslim Brotherhood, Turkey and Qatar is provided.

As the dynamics in the Middle East continue to fluctuate, powerful regional actors like Saudi Arabia and Iran have looked to other powers in the international order to help counter the growing influence of regional rivals. This is most demonstrated by the developing economic and political partnership between China and Saudi Arabia. This article offers an exploration of how Saudi Arabia has sought to use its relationship with China as a means of counterbalancing and limiting Iranian power projection in the region. It explores the triangular relationship between China, Saudi Arabia and Iran, and shows the growth in economic and political relations at the expense of established Sino-Iranian energy relations. Furthermore, it will illustrate how this relationship will have regional and international implications in the Gulf. This article demonstrates Saudi Arabia's influence in the Sino-Saudi relationship with reference to its position on the Iranian nuclear issue and UN Resolution 1929. It concludes that despite a failure for Saudi Arabia to directly influence Chinese decision-making processes, this event sets a precedent that will continue to mature as Sino-Saudi relations further deepen into a strong strategic partnership and will have repercussions for the balance of power in the Gulf and Middle East. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Historically, based on shared values of culture and religion, Pakistan's relations with Saudi Arabia have become increasingly complex over time. This has occurred in the backdrop of important geopolitical and economic shifts in the region, leading to a new dynamic equilibrium in the Pak-Saudi bilateral ties. Strong relations with Riyadh have become a crucial element of Pakistan's overall foreign policy, given the latter's intermittent economic support by the former, which underscores the significance of the Kingdom; however, deepening Indo-Saudi ties can also not be overlooked or underestimated. This paper gives an overview of ever-evolving Pak-Saudi ties, while taking into consideration current dynamics of the Kingdom's role in the Middle East and Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries as well as in the South Asian region. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents speeches given by attendees of the meeting held at the Capitol Visitor Center in Washington D.C. on November 30, 2018, including Ryan Crocker, former U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan, Iraq, and Pakistan, scholar Hussein Ibish, and professor Bülent Aras on the rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Turkey in the Middle East. Topics discussed include the massacre at the Shatila refugee camp, the killing of author Jamal Khashoggi, and Turkey's increasing influence in North Africa.

The article discusses the relations between Iraq and Saudi Arabia for 2017-18 by referring to the rise of politicians Haider al-Abadi and Muqtada al-Sadr in Iraq and Muhammad bin Salman in Saudi Arabia. Topics discussed include the Iraqi revolution of 1958, the change in the Saudis' Iraq policy driven by Iran's increasing involvement in regional conflicts in Syria, Yemen, and Lebanon, and building of a barrier along the Saudi-Iraqi border.

Ever since the 1980s, the MENA subsystem has been weakening under the weight of persistent inter-state conflict, violent non-state and sub-state actor incursions, and intense competition for influence and geopolitical advantage amongst its core states. Furthermore, a domino-like collapse of autocratic regimes across the Arab region after 2010 heralded an unprecedented level of disorder, insecurity and chaos. Regional disorder and the general crisis of the state in the Arab region has aggravated regional fragmentation and has at the same time emboldened Saudi Arabia and a small group of its neighbours to adopt a more interventionist, and at times belligerent foreign policy posture. The region's changing dynamics provide the backdrop for closer analysis of Saudi responses to the regional crisis, which itself has been shaped by the changing of the guard in the Kingdom in 2015. The change is marked by an intensification of Saudi activism and a deepening of its role as a resurgent regional power. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Four Gulf states led by Saudi Arabia in mid-2017 launched a brazen attack on media freedom by demanding that Qatar shut down the Al Jazeera television network, as part of a list of demands prompted by a diplomatic crisis. The standoff has not ended although the immediate threat to Al Jazeera appears to have abated. The world's media responded to the threat to Al Jazeera by convening in Doha for a conference in July 2017 and by issuing a statement containing recommendations for the protection of freedom of expression. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The events of the 2016 summit of the Organization for Islamic Cooperation (OIC) in Turkey demonstrate how Saudi Arabia’s role within the organization has been transformed from leadership into a hegemonic one, a process that has been unfolding over five decades. As a strong voice in the Muslim world, Saudi Arabia has employed a range of diplomatic strategies, in accordance with its national interests, to influence the OIC and its member states. Based on the analysis, this paper argues that Saudi Arabia has been able to exert hegemonic control over the OIC due to the organization’s structural make-up, its reliance on Saudi funding, as well as dominance in bilateral affairs with majority of the OIC members. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Over the past decades, the member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council have emerged as the leaders of the Middle East and North Africa region. They have also proved to be the safest Arab allies for the EU due to their stability and prosperity, despite being the only regimes in the region whose leaders are not elected by universal direct suffrage. In recent months, Saudi Arabia, in particular, has been anxious to re-establish its leadership in the region through disruptive structural changes. Even though it remains difficult to make sense of these reforms, many analysts have speculated about their purported future relevance. This article argues that the changes undermine the social contract that has prevailed in the kingdom for decades, whereby citizens enjoy material comfort in exchange for their loyalty to the regime. Thus these changes threaten to destabilise the country, with potential lasting effects on the region and collateral consequences for Europe. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

If shared security perceptions were the foundation of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), 2011 might be analysed as the watershed year in which the GCC began to fragment from within. Both the 2014 and 2017 intra-GCC crises were manifestations of conflicting security perceptions, formed across the GCC countries in and since 2011. Through an in-depth analysis of the events and of the subsequent reaction of the GCC governments in terms of discourse and foreign policy, we distinguish three different categories of conceptualization. First, the governments of Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates perceived domestic protests as an 'intermestic' threat - triggered by the intersection of the international and domestic levels. Second, the leaders of Oman and Kuwait conceptualized protests in their countries as manageable domestic insecurity, rather than as fully-fledged externally orchestrated events - arguably because they did not perceive a direct danger to their stability and legitimacy. Finally, it can be argued that the government of Qatar did not see any real danger in the protests but instead viewed them as an opportunity to expand Doha's regional influence, arguably at Riyadh's expense. Unpacking the fundamental factors shaping such perceptions is the key to finding the appropriate framework for analysing GCC security in the future. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article examines foreign relations between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and discusses the impact the relationship has within the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). It covers the UAE's national security efforts since its creation in 1971 and how Saudi Arabia has viewed the UAE as a competitor within the GCC in both politics and economics.

In this article, we focus on the bilateral relationship between Saudi Arabia and Indonesia, placing the contemporary development of the mutual relationships and cooperation between these two Muslim-majority nations into historical context. Moreover, we describe not only formal political economic relationships but also informal cultural, educational, religious relations between the two states. We argue that although socioreligious and people-topeople interactions are vital in the relations, these are not the only factors in the inherently pragmatic contemporary relationship between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Republic of Indonesia, which is built increasingly on the basis of national interests. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]