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Scholars have found consistent evidence that directors who served on boards of firms accused of misconduct face reputational penalties in the director labor market. While commonly interpreted in terms of an "ex post settling-up" process that penalizes directors for failing in their role as monitors of management, the fundamentally social basis of the director labor market suggests that the ex post settling-up process may also incorporate a resource-provisioning role for directors as conferrers of legitimacy. We analyze how growing socioeconomic pressures that aim to redress the longstanding underrepresentation of female and ethnic minority directors may lessen, for these sought-after directors, the penalties typically imposed by the labor market in the aftermath of corporate misconduct. Using a rich proprietary data set on financial misconduct and directors' demographic characteristics, we find strong support for our hypotheses regarding a possible "reputational immunity" effect. We also provide supplementary analyses demonstrating the specific mechanisms underlying our predictions, and establishing the robustness of the results to a variety of alternative explanations. We discuss the implications of our theoretical perspective and empirical findings for future research on corporate governance, corporate misconduct, and the duality of minority status as it relates to discriminatory outcomes in modern labor markets. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How do individuals and collectives construct and sustain identities that run counter to dominant institutions? We develop the notion of counter-institutional identity as involving individual and collective constructions of "who we are" that are in strong opposition to dominant values and principles in the field, diverge from roles that are established through socialization and training, and involve practices that are proudly construed in direct contrast to field norms. We draw on findings from a comparative case study of Assertive Community Treatment teams to theorize about the identity work of groups and individuals that enables and constrains counter-institutional identity constructions. We develop a cross-level process model of encapsulation in which authoritative texts (or prescriptive documents) play a role in sanctioning and enhancing counter-institutional identities. The model shows how rigorous positioning against "who we are not" (an "identity foil") through practices of oppositional identity work are combined with practices of relational identity work that reinforce counter-institutional identities by positively valuing "who we are" as superior to the foil. These practices are crucial to understanding how and why counter-institutional identities are created and sustained. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Punishing the innocent is considered an "error" that the legal system must minimize. In reality, it is a choice. When evidence points to one of a few suspects as the victim's assailant, society must decide whether to punish all, some, or none. Despite the stated distaste, in many cases lawmakers, regulators, and enforcers elect to sanction a large group of innocent actors. Mass arrests, sobriety checkpoints, profiling, even increasing the number of searches and seizures, and using excessive police force--are all forms of collective punishments. They allow the targeting and sanctioning of an entire population in the name of finding the culprit. The decision is often masked by confusing terms but its effect is the same. The freedoms of many are sacrificed to punish the one. These methods have been widely criticized, but what can economics say on the subject? Are these methods even effective? Under what conditions? The standard economic model of crime has not offered a clear answer to these questions because it typically focuses on the apprehension and punishment of a single actor--the offender. It therefore does not consider the possibility of punishing a group of innocent actors as a policy tool. This Article seeks to fill this gap. First, in deviation from previous models, it develops a realistic framework in which the enforcer can choose not only the probability of detection and the nature and severity of the punishment but also the size of the "punishment group." Our model then analyzes the welfare implications of collective punishment and the menu of choices available to enforcers and regulators. To be clear, our intention is not to argue for group punishment as an enforcement strategy. Rather, our goal is to explain the logic of collective liability regimes and unravel the way detection of offenders is currently carried out. Our analysis also shows that in many cases enforcers applying collective sanctions are motivated by self-interest and bigotry. Concerningly, even when the enforcer's goal is to enhance deterrence, the cost on members of the punishment group is discounted or ignored, resulting in a substantial loss of freedoms and welfare. The silver lining is that many of these concerns can be addressed by appropriate reforms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the Global South, states are increasingly using regularization programs as a means of managing migrant populations. These regularization programs are often described as progressive, in that they seek to bring migrants into state systems of rights and protections. Yet they tend to occur alongside processes of securitization aimed at expanding greater state control over temporary migrant populations. This article draws on multi-sited ethnographic data from Thailand to highlight the sharp end of legal status: the costs, debts, risks, and unfreedoms it can produce for migrant workers. To do so, I draw on fieldwork undertaken during Thailand's 2017–2018 regularization campaign, where unauthorised Cambodian migrants were given the opportunity to regularize their status by obtaining passports and two-year work visas/permits. Through interviews with Cambodians seeking to regularize their status, I explore how regularization produces documents of precarity: documents that both are insecure and may produce risk and insecurity for migrants. While regularization offers migrants legal status, it also puts them into new, asymmetrical relationships with states, brokers, employers, and financial institutions. These findings illustrate how contexts of reception shape the meaning of legal status, and highlight how regularization campaigns can be entangled with efforts to control and restrict migrants. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Through an analysis of three wooden things found in As I Lay Dying —Darl's cedar bucket, Cash's casket, and a river-log—this essay explores how Faulkner refuses to represent wooden objects as simply objects of human use or exchange. Rather, Faulkner invests objects with what new materialists have called "thing-power." This thing-power complicates faith in human powers of quantification and control—faith that is exhibited by Cash and that was exhibited by Progressive-Era proponents of scientific forestry. Ultimately, the investigation suggests that Faulkner's environmentalism is more akin to recent new materialisms than to conventional nature appreciation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Organizations adopt formal sanctioning systems to deter ethical violations, but the formal systems' effectiveness may be undermined by informal sanctioning systems which promote violations. I conducted an ethnographic study of six trading crowds on two financial exchanges to understand how informal and formal sanctioning systems, which are grounded in different interpretations of equity, interact to affect trader deviance from rules established by the financial exchange (exchange deviance). To deter informal trader norms that conflict with exchange rules, the exchanges formally prohibit traders' informal sanctions. The exchanges, however, underestimate traders' informal sanctions related to ostracism and social rejection, which are not only difficult for the exchanges to detect, but also interpersonally hurtful and harmful to trader performance. Consequently, the traders' informal social sanctions lead to secondary sanctions from trading firms. Ultimately, the informal sanctioning system evades the formal sanctioning system by exploiting what the exchanges deem to be minor rule violations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Questions related to the EU's ability to foster change in the behaviour of third countries through sanctions have gained salience over the past three decades. This article explores how the nature and type of EU restrictive measures, initially conceived as targeted, preventive and temporary measures, have evolved considerably since then. The EU sanctions against Belarus are used as an illustrative case study in order to shed light on the evolutions within the EU's sanctions practice. This article first examines the erosion of the targeted character of EU sanctions against Belarus through the broadening of listing criteria and the increasing recourse to sectoral sanctions. It then questions the temporary character of EU sanctions against Belarus by highlighting their indefinite duration and cyclicity. Last but not least, it is argued that EU sanctions against Belarus have an increasingly punitive character. The article concludes with an analysis of the implications that the EU's evolving sanctions practice can have for the current EU's sanctions policy toward Belarus as well as for its other sanctions regimes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Sanctioning welfare clients has become a fundamental practice for social policy based on behavioural conditionality. Although sanctioning practices have received attention in research focused on street‐level work, the way in which sanctioning practices are structured in an institutional context and used by caseworkers should be explored further. This study examines the implementation of the "wastage of resources" sanctioning directive in Polish social welfare offices, based on interviews with social workers and case studies conducted between 2019 and 2021. A research framework based on the street‐level work concept was used to indicate that sanctions were rarely used by social workers because of the administrative justification process, which overwhelmed them with the responsibility of proving sanction‐worthy circumstances. Catalogues of sanction‐worthy situations are developed by local‐level policy agents, social workers, welfare office managers, municipal courts and clients. However, generally, social workers adapt to the given context by disciplining clients informally and avoiding formal sanctions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Perception determines the way we behave towards an object or problem, how everything that affects a person's perception will later affect the chosen behavior. Accounting students by understanding the negative consequences of tax evasion actions and penalties in the form of sanctions can know signs in decision-making and behavioral patterns of academic compliance in higher education. This study seeks to examine the effect of student perceptions of tax evasion and tax sanctions on the ethical behavior of accounting students' compliance. Results show that student perception as variable X1 on tax evasion does not have a significant effect to Ethical Behavior academic compliance of accounting students at the State University of Malang. Next on variable X2 result testing perception on sanction positive and significant effect on behavior ethical obedience academic accounting students at the State University of Malang. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this study, we examine whether welfare deservingness judgements in the United Kingdom are affected by a bias against claimants from stigmatised social class backgrounds. In the United Kingdom, as in other countries, stereotypes of a perceived social 'underclass' are widespread. Political and media discourse frequently portrays members of this 'underclass' as lazy, feckless and not genuinely in need of support. Yet despite strong academic interest in perceived welfare deservingness, existing research has largely neglected the role of social class bias in deservingness judgements. To address this gap, we use a novel vignette experiment administered to a representative sample of British respondents to provide the first direct evidence of discrimination against welfare claimants with 'underclass' signifiers. We find that the British public are more likely to endorse a sanction against a claimant from an 'underclass' background than against an otherwise identical claimant from a less stigmatised class background. We also asked respondents to justify their decisions and, applying computational methods to analyse these free‐text responses, we find that 'underclass' claimants are more likely to be blamed for violating the conditions of their benefit, while claimants from other class backgrounds are more often given the 'benefit of the doubt.' Our findings have important implications for our understanding of the relationship between social class background and public deservingness perceptions, and potentially for the differential treatment of claimants by the benefits system. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The recent inclusion of behavioural conditionality in health‐related benefit programmes raises questions about frontline workers' (FWs') discretionary use of sanctioning. Using an experimental vignette design in a survey of 824 FWs in the Norwegian Labour and Welfare Administration (NAV), we investigated whether FWs' perceptions of diagnosis and sick recipients' obligations affect their propensity to sanction for non‐compliance. We find that the recipients' diagnoses did not influence FWs' propensity to sanction for non‐compliance. Recipients with a symptom diagnosis (ME/CFS) were sanctioned to the same degree as those with a diagnosis based on objective medical evidence (Bekhterev's disease). However, FWs who generally found it difficult to impose activity requirements on recipients with health‐related problems were also less prone to enact sanctions. Our results support the notion of competing approaches to activating and sanctioning the sick. FWs who agree that it is difficult to activate the sick also tend to avoid sanctioning, whereas the propensity to sanction is more widespread among those who disagree that activating the sick is difficult. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There is scarce information about the institutional mechanisms creating the demographic portrait of sanctioned doctors published in the U.S. Office of Inspector General's (OIG) List of Excluded Individuals and Entities (LEIE). The current study examines the demographic characteristics of 1,289 physicians who appeared in the LEIE during a five-year period from 2008 to 2013. The results of a multivariate logistic regression found that sex, country of medical school training, and medical specialty were associated with being excluded by the OIG for a quality of care matter. Findings suggest the demographic portrait of doctors in the LEIE reflects the interplay between the doctors' behaviors and the actions of various agencies. A demographic portrait of physician violators, if one considers the mechanisms generating the list, can be useful for public policy recommendations and action. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines disciplinary proceedings about sexual misconduct by lawyers. Sexual misconduct in a professional relationship is harmful and unacceptable and should result in immediate disciplinary action to protect victims, future victims and the public. However, there is no explicit offence of sexual misconduct in Australian disciplinary legislation regarding lawyers. Rather, sexual misconduct must be linked to the statutory offences. While the Australian Solicitors' Conduct Rules guide the interpretation of the offences, there is only express reference to sexual harassment. We examined tribunal and court legal disciplinary cases from 2000 to 2020 across all Australian jurisdictions in which sexual misconduct had occurred. Decision makers typically only considered sexual misconduct sufficiently egregious to meet the required standard of a disciplinary offence when accompanied by a criminal conviction. The conduct was often portrayed as a result of character flaws, rather than harmful to victims and the public. Thus, decision makers failed to locate the behaviour in the wider incidence of violence against women. The profession's failure to acknowledge sexual misconduct reflects narrow professional norms which do not robustly protect victims. Explicit acknowledgement of sexual misconduct in disciplinary proceedings is essential. These amendments would signify the importance, frequency and impact of sexual misconduct. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Introduction to The Problem: The use of criminal law to limit the freedom of citizens' civil rights must be done with caution since it intimately links to the infringement of such rights. Purpose/Objective Study: The present study aims to explore the criteria of criminalization based on the principle of limitations of human rights. Design/Methodology/Approach: This study employed doctrinal legal research using both conceptual and statutory approaches Findings: In the policy formation of illegal acts, the legislator frequently formulates rights constraints. The criminalization criteria specified in the human rights limitation can be used to apply this restriction. Restriction-containing offenses determined by the legislature must be by law, legitimate aim, and necessity in a democratic society. A consistent model of criteria for democratic society demands does not exist. This last criterion is linked to both the proportionality principle in human rights and the concept of criminal law as a last resort. Paper Type: Research Article [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An introduction is presented in which the editor discusses various reports within the issue on topics including the competitive use of information, biases in information-processing and decision-making, and the role of rational calculus and retributive justice in sanctioning of norm violations.

Why do we sanction norm violations? Despite near universal agreement on the role of sanctions for maintaining norms of cooperation, scholars hotly dispute whether individuals sanction based on a rational calculus or because of strong retributive instincts. In this paper we report on a mixed-method field study examining sanctioning behavior. Our goal is to extend theories of sanctioning by evaluating the conditions under which individuals are more likely to administer a sanction in response to a norm violation. To guide the development of our hypotheses, we engage in a qualitative examination of sanctioning decisions in the context of gourmet cuisine. We then test our predictions in a field experiment involving more than 500 gourmet chefs in Italy. Our results suggest that individuals follow retributive instincts, but they also engage in cost--benefit calculations. Indeed, we find that the two logics of sanctioning jointly influence participation in social exchange. Recognizing their own tendency to sanction at a cost, individuals avoid circumstances that could trigger the need for costly sanctions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While many have observed the importance of state regulators to the implementation of law, multiple decentralized regulators are crucial for achieving deterrence and compliance. Informed by the deterrence literature, this study conducts in-depth interviews with 150 Chinese farmers and experts and studies how regulated actors perceive detection possibility and sanction impact and how such perceptions shape compliance. The study finds that farmers perceive considerable deterrence risks from multiple actors, helping to explain their pesticide compliance. The study further finds that such perceived threats are linked to social relations or guanxi between farmers and multiple regulators, which are built on frequency of contact, mutual trust and personalized networks among the actors involved. Social relations or guanxi could help to predict sources of deterrent threats and the degree of tolerance for potentially violent actions. Deterrence and regulatory compliance are frequently enhanced when there are close relations between the regulated and regulators. Policymakers and practitioners might want to create a risk environment by first deliberating the relations between polycentric regulation and the generally authoritarian nature of the Chinese state, understanding the regulatory logic of social relations, and then by determining the relevant third parties and formulating policy incentives for utilizing such threats. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While the United States generally operates on a pay-yourown- way system that avoids punitive awards, current patent law standards seem to fly in the face of this general scheme. Following the ground-shaking cases of Octane Fitness and Halo, patent law now allows awards of both treble damages and attorney's fees after a mere showing of conduct akin to negligence. Defendants can be threatened with both of these crippling enhanced awards based on a totality of the circumstances showing of objective evidence. Moreover, awards of up to treble damages and attorney's fees are left entirely to the discretion of the trial judge--meaning that a successful appeal of a crippling double sanction is unlikely. Given patent law's departure from the traditional enhanced damages scheme and willingness to sanction conduct approaching mere negligence, a differentiation must be made between situations calling for treble damages and those calling for attorney's fees in order to avoid the draconian remedy of sanctioning the same conduct twice. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article informs that relationship between science and cultural administration is unproblematic under a democratic framework, and science wants to be financed without ideological guidelines and to make progress in knowledge. Topics include case of democratic societies and a cultural administration stands in of fundamental conflicts; and sanction methods regulates science with assignment or deduction of human and financial resources.

When morality is important and central to individuals' identities (moral identity), it may heighten their sense of responsibility to behave in moral ways. Although research has linked moral identity to various moral actions, research has yet to demonstrate the association between moral identity and individuals' consistent moral choices, despite situational sanctions (i.e., peer group approval) to behave immorally. The purpose of this study was to examine if prioritizing morality in the self is associated with individuals' consistent moral responses in four situations encouraging the expression of immoral behavior. After reading about situations in which peers approved of and encouraged immoral behavior (i.e., stealing a laptop, drunk driving, cheating on an exam, keeping someone else's money), 185 participants reported the degree to which they disagreed or agreed that: (1) each situation was immoral; (2) they would resist the 'temptation' to behave immorally; and (3) they would attempt to convince their peers of the 'right thing' to do. Results revealed that, despite being encouraged to behave immorally, heightened moral identity predicted individuals' moral responses in three (of the four) situations. When morality is important and central to individuals' identities, moral choices tend to emerge despite opportunities to behave immorally. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recent rejections of epistemic consequentialism, like those from Firth, Jenkins, Berker, and Greaves, have argued that consequentialism is committed to objectionable trade-offs and suggest that consequentialism's propensity for trade-offs hints at a larger problem. Here I argue that sanctioning trade-offs isn't a fault of a theory of epistemic normativity, because there are permissible epistemic trade-offs. I give examples of permissible epistemic trade-offs in pedagogy, in changes of worldview, and in indirect epistemic decisions. I also show that views that sanction trade-offs have an easier time than their rivals in explaining both why we ought to be open-minded and how arguments with suppositions get their argumentative force. These considerations don't eliminate the consequentialist's burden to respond to the objectionable cases, but they do undermine the idea that no correct theory of epistemic normativity properly sanctions trade-offs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article critically analyses the causes of poverty in Iran with reference to several studies. The author discusses several reasons of poverty including prostitution, high unemployment, and international sanctions against the Islamic regime. The study also questions whether the international sanctions against the Islamic regime could possibly be a cause of poverty. According to the Mehr News Agency, 11 million people equal to 14 percent of the population were living below the poverty line.

Highlights • Analyze the effect of the endogenous choice of sanctioning institutions on individuals' location decisions. • Possibility of voting on implementing sanctions varies across treatments. • The possibility of voting leads to a more efficient partition of subjects, lower inequality, and lower migration rates. Abstract We experimentally analyze the effect of the endogenous choice of sanctioning institutions on cooperation and migration patterns. Subjects are assigned to one of two groups, are endowed with group-specific preferences, and play a public goods game. We compare an environment in which subjects can move between groups and vote on whether to implement sanctions, to one in which only one group is exogenously endowed with sanctions. We find that the possibility of voting leads to a more efficient partition of subjects across groups, higher payoffs, lower inequality, and lower migration rates. Over time, subjects tend to vote for institutions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the relationships between advanced urban marginality and new forms of state craft to regulate marginalised populations, specifically Wacquant's concept of the centaur state and the use of conditionality mechanisms in the British welfare state. The article empirically explores the experiences and perspectives of welfare practitioners and subjects. It finds some evidence of an inculcation of elite narratives and understandings of urban marginality and incidences of antagonism. However, the orientations and ethical frameworks of those deploying or subject to processes of sanctioning within reconfigured welfare regimes are more differentiated and ambiguous than both governmental discourse and critical urban studies often suggest. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract According to seminal utility-based theories of norm-violating and unethical behavior, the decision to lie involves trading-off the potential benefits of dishonesty against the potential costs if caught. However, even in paradigms with zero risk of sanctions, individuals do not consistently cheat. Still more strikingly, most of the few findings available from studies implementing a sanctioning system run contrary to what would be expected based on utility-based accounts of dishonesty, showing increased cheating when there is a small risk of sanctions as compared to when the risk is zero. Given the striking nature of these findings and the general scarcity of corresponding evidence, we devised a targeted empirical test of the role of sanctions for dishonest behavior. Specifically, in two experiments, we manipulated the probability (i.e., 16.7% vs. 50%) that the factual truth of one's response in a cheating paradigm is checked. In Experiment 2, we further varied the severity of sanctions for being caught cheating. Results showed that the willingness to lie strongly decreased with increasing probability of being caught as well as with increasing severity of sanctions. As such, the results clearly support the theoretical notion that external costs influence unethical behavior, in the direction implied by utility-based models. Highlights • Utility-based models of unethical behavior emphasize consideration of potential costs. • Extant findings on the influence of external costs are scarce and counterintuitive. • We test the influence of the probability and severity of sanctions on dishonesty. • In two studies, participants may get caught for cheating and face monetary costs. • Lying substantially decreases with increasing probability and severity of costs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, I argue that citizens have an entitlement to sanction representatives, but representatives have tools to anticipate this sanction and reconstruct their views in order to anticipate the views of the people they are supposed to represent. I also argue that represented and representatives have an entitlement to sanction democratic representative institutions and practices, but, unless citizens across the spectrum of all representative relationships agree on many fronts, sanctions are likely to violate the democratic requirement that all subjected to a collective decision should not be mere objects of coercion. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We report a sequential bribery game to disentangle the effect of descriptive social norms among public officials on bribe offers by firms. Participants who knew that they were interacting with a partner from a group with a majority of corrupt (as opposed to honest) partners offered twice as many bribes. This effect of norms occurred independently of strategic considerations and the possibility of being sanctioned. Indeed, the effect of sanctions was not significant. These findings highlight a causal connection from perceptions of bribery to actual behavior. (JEL C91, D73, K42) [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Catch-and-release (C&R) angling is a powerful tool for reducing impacts on recreationally targeted fishes. Although C&R can be mandated in fisheries through regulation, voluntary adoption and informal management are often critical due to minimal enforcement opportunities. Anglers themselves may play a role in increasing C&R adoption through interpersonal sanctioning (i.e., self-policing). To date, little research has examined factors that predict the willingness of anglers to sanction others’ behavior. We present results from surveys (n = 49) with anglers in Argentina to explore their motivations to sanction other anglers within their stakeholder community. Anglers with the strongest intentions to sanction were younger and more open to adopting best practices, identified fishing as important to their lifestyle, and expressed high environmental concern relative to other anglers. Our findings highlight the role that recreational anglers can play in promoting best practices via interpersonal sanctioning and identify barriers that inhibit this type of action. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, I propose a new self-defense theory of punishment, the rights-protection theory. By appealing to the interest theory of right, I show that what we call “the right of self-defense” is actually composed of the right(s) to protect our basic rights. The right of self-defense is not a single, self-standing right but a group of derivative rights justified by their contribution to the protection of the core, basic rights. Thus, these rights of self-defense are both justified and constrained by the basic rights they are supposed to protect. I then explain how this theory responds to a common objection. Opponents argue that, to exercise the right of self-defense, some threat must be present. However, in the context of punishment, the threat has already taken effect or is already gone. Thus, the right of self-defense becomes irrelevant when we punish an offender. I show that this objection is based on an implausibly narrow conception of self-defense. A reasonable conception would allow us to exercise our right of self-defense when there is a present definite threat, a future definite threat, or a potential threat. Thus, we may still exercise our right of self-defense in the context of punishment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article analyzes American sociologist James Coleman's theory of structural or methodological individualism and its influence on the emergence of social norms, and discusses the importance of general norms for externalities and sanctions and the role of social networks in the emergence of norms. The demand for a norm calls for the existence of an externality or consequences of actions for others, while the realization of a norm applies the theory of collective action which provides public good and may impose sanction in a multistage process. Several conditions for norm emergence captured by Coleman's theory are externalities, sanctioning, normative demand, and private interests.

Sanctions are widely used to enhance compliance in principal agent relationships. Although there is ample evidence confirming the predicted positive incentive effect of sanctions, it has also been shown that imposing sanctions may reduce compliance by crowding out intrinsic motivation. We add to the literature on the hidden costs of control by showing that these costs are restricted to situations where the principal actively chooses to sanction low performance and where this choice is known to the agent. In such a situation, the principal's commitment to sanction low performance might indicate that she or he is a distrustful “type” and hence conveys a negative signal. To the contrary, if (a) an agent is not informed about whether low performance will be sanctioned or if (b) the computer determines whether low performance will be sanctioned, the principal's “type” is not revealed, and we find no evidence of crowding out. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The evolution of cooperation is an unsolved research topic and has been investigated from the viewpoint of not only biology and other natural sciences but also social sciences. Much extant research has focused on the evolution of cooperation among peers. While, different players belonging to different organizations play different social roles, and players playing different social roles cooperate together to achieve their goals. We focus on the evolution of cooperation in linear division of labor that is defined as follows: a player in the i -th role interacts with a player in the i + 1-th role, and a player in the n -th role achieves their goal (1 ≤ i < n ) if there are n roles in the division of labor. We take the industrial waste treatment process as an example for illustration. We consider three organizational roles and B i is the i -th role. The player of B i can choose two strategies: legal treatment or illegal dumping, which can be interpreted as cooperation or defection ( i = 1−3). With legally required treatment, the player of B j pays a cost to ask the player of B j +1 to treat the waste ( j  = 1, 2). Then, the cooperator of B j +1 pays a cost to treat the waste properly. With illegal dumping, the player of B i dumps the waste and does not pay any cost ( i  = 1−3). However, the waste dumped by the defector has negative environmental consequences, which all players in all roles suffer from. This situation is equivalent to a social dilemma encountered in common-pool resource management contexts. The administrative organ in Japan introduces two sanction systems to address the illegal dumping problem: the actor responsibility system and the producer responsibility system. In the actor responsibility system, if players in any role who choose defection are monitored and discovered, they are penalized via a fine. However, it is difficult to monitor and detect the violators, and this system does not work well. While, in the producer responsibility system, the player in B 1 is fined if the player cannot hand the manifest to the local administrative organ because the players of B i ( i  = 1−3) who choose defection do not hand the manifest to the player of B 1 . We analyze this situation using the replicator equation. We reveal that (1) the three-role model has more empirical credibility than the two-role model including B 1 and B 3 , and (2) the producer responsibility system promotes the evolution of cooperation more than the system without sanctioning. (3) the actor responsibility system does not promote the evolution of cooperation if monitoring and detecting defectors is unsuccessful. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We build and estimate a nonstationary structural job search model that incorporates the main stylized features of a typical job search monitoring scheme in unemployment insurance (UI) and acknowledges that search effort and requirements are measured imperfectly. On the basis of Belgian data, monitoring is found to affect search behavior only weakly because assessments were scheduled late and infrequently, the monitoring technology was not sufficiently precise, and lenient Belgian UI results in caseloads that are less responsive to incentives than elsewhere. Simulations show how changing the aforementioned design features can enhance effectiveness and that precise monitoring is key in this. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

ABSTRACT This article examines one informant's approach to the relationship between ideological concepts and political power. I argue that ideological representation must be understood on its own terms, rather than within a larger theory of discourse. I point toward three key qualities of every encounter with ideological representation: subjectivity, discontinuity, and commitment. The fieldwork on which this article is based occurred in Berlin, Germany, during the fall 2014. During this period, my research focused on activists committed to overturning the sanctioning policy ( Sanktionspolitik), which allows case managers to dock the unemployment benefits of their clients. [ ideology, subjectivity, welfare state, Germany] [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In 1993, the World Bank created its Inspection Panel, unprecedently opening itself up to being held to account by people negatively affected by its development projects. Within a decade, the other Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs) – the Asian, African, Inter-American Development Banks, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the rest of the World Bank Group would too. The creation of these accountability mechanisms embodies a norm of ‘accountability as justice’ that provides recourse for damaging behaviour through a formal sanctioning process. This article makes two arguments: first, the United States built on its history of using ‘accountability as control’ to advocate using accountability for justice for the MDBs during debates over maintaining their efficiency and effectiveness. As the predominant MDB shareholder, the United States used its power (of the purse) and influence (through its voice and vote) to garner support for the norm despite opposition from borrowers and the Banks. Second, the United States had to resort to these same levers to demand the MDBs reformulate the mechanisms when borrower resistance and Bank avoidance hindered their effectiveness. The United States successfully created the norm but Bank recalcitrance meant the United States had to use the same levers to ensure its effectiveness. The article concludes that change within the Banks is evident but incremental: the spread of the norm amongst the MDBs has changed their governance to include recourse for project affected people with structures in place to strengthen them over time. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Driving under the influence (DUI) is one of the major causes of traffic accidents in Taiwan. About 5% of injuries involve DUI, and nearly 20% of deaths are due to alcohol-related crashes. During early 2006 to the end of 2014, the authorities in Taiwan increased the severity of fine and jail penalties for DUI offenders three times. At the same time, the monthly drunk-driving injures decreased nearly 40% and the monthly alcohol-related traffic death dropped more than 80%. In this paper, we examine the effects of sanction changes on the reduction of drunk-driving casualties during this period. We find that drunk-driving injuries and deaths significantly dropped after the statutory changes. The reduction was immediate following all sanction changes that raised the maximum fines or jail terms of DUI offenders. Policies that increased the maximum jail terms of DUI offenders seem to have a better gradual effect on the reduction of alcohol-related traffic casualties. Although increased sanctions are found to be effective in reducing drunk-driving casualties, we need more future research to examine the policy-to-perception and the policy-to-behavior links. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Teachers respond differently to bullying and victimization. Socio-cognitive and moral domain theory suggest that students process teachers' behavior cognitively and that teachers' responses to incidents of bullying and victimization could affect students' level of moral disengagement. We examined the mediating effect of students' moral disengagement between types of teachers' responses to situations of bullying and victimization and individual bullying using multilevel mediation modelling. Participants were 609 students (50% boys, age M = 11.47, SD = 1.14) of central Italy, nested in 34 classes. Students rated the frequency of self-reported bullying and of teachers' responses to incidents of bullying and victimization on a 5-point Likert scale. Teachers' responses to bullying included non-intervention, mediation, group discussion, and sanctions. Teachers' responses to victimization included non-intervention, mediation, group discussion, and victim support. Results indicated that in the teachers' responses to incidents of bullying model, a significant indirect effect of non-intervention (β = .03; 95%CI [.01, .05]) and of sanctions (β = -.02; 95%CI [-.04, -.01]) on bullying through moral disengagement was found at the individual level. Similarly, in the model on teachers' responses toward victims there was a significant indirect effect through moral disengagement of non-intervention (β = .03; 95%CI [.02, .04]) and victim support (β = -.01; 95%CI [-.02, -.001]). At the class level there were no significant indirect effects. In sum, results indicated that moral disengagement is an important mediator at the individual level and suggest including teachers in anti-bullying interventions with a specific focus on their role for moral development. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The construction industry is experiencing more serious ethical problems than ever before. The objectives of this study are to (1) identify the inducers of individuals' unethical behavior in contractors' organizations in the Chinese construction industry; and (2) investigate the interrelationships among these inducers. Based on a literature review and interviews, 18 factors inducing unethical behavior were identified, and a questionnaire survey was performed, which garnered 129 responses. The results showed that 13 inducers were significantly important, and that "cost pressures," "inadequate sanctions," and "absence of ethics systems" were the top three inducers of unethical behavior. Additionally, the 18 inducers were categorized into 5 underlying groupings: culture-related inducers; policy environment; project pressures; individual traits; and organizational climate. Further analysis results indicated that culture-related inducers indirectly influence organizational climate through their direct impact on policy environment, project pressures, and individual traits. The proposed framework describing the inducers and the intergrouping relationships provides an understanding of the formation mechanism of contractors' unethical behavior. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article we address the long-debated question of when and why states comply with sanctions. While the literature remains indeterminate as to whether the key mechanisms driving sanction compliance are tied to interstate relations, intrastate constraints, or a dynamic combination of the two, our theoretical framework and methodological approach provide a novel perspective that incorporates insights drawn from network theory to explain the time until countries comply. Specifically, we argue that reciprocity, a concept with deep roots in both network theory and international relations, has largely been overlooked in the study of sanction compliance. Though often ignored, this concept captures an essential aspect of how cooperation is fostered in the international system and allows us to better analyze the strategic environment underlying sanctioning behavior. Given the theoretical importance of reciprocity in understanding interstate relations, we provide an approach that integrates estimations of this type of network interdependency into extant frameworks for modeling the time until countries comply with sanctions. Our results highlight that reciprocity not only has a substantive effect in explaining the duration of sanctions but that models excluding this concept from their specifications do notably worse in terms of their predictive performance. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

After describing key interpretive categories of sanctioned and structural violence, the article identifies some forms of sanctioned structural violence evident in Matthew’s Gospel. It concludes with a brief consideration of contemporary strategies for identifying and resisting scriptural inscribing and sanctioning of violence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The issue of terrorism has been a significant source of influence on the relationship between Iran and the U.S. since the Islamic Revolution. Iran's friendship with extremist groups that are designated as terrorist groups by the U.S. State Department is seriously challenging America's foreign policy. This article attempts to explore the prospect of confrontations on the issue of terrorism between Iran and the U.S. through a detailed analysis of their different interpretations and mutual recognitions of terrorism and through an in-depth analysis of the measures each party has taken regarding this confrontation. This article argues that the confrontation between Iran and the U.S. regarding the issue of terrorism is not strictly about terrorism. Rather, it is also about the conflicts of policies that result from different security interests and political values. Resolving the issue of terrorism depends on the reconciliation of the relationship between Iran and the U.S. Without mutual trust between the two nations, Iran will continue to support extremist groups in order to increase its influence against the external and internal pressures it is currently under, and the U.S. will continue to contain Iran's regional ambitions and seek changes in its behavior. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Legal instruments traditionally used for regulating beach management during the last decades have not been very effective in protecting beach socio-ecological systems in many countries. In the last 5 years, two new laws, which impact the Spanish Mediterranean coast, the Mediterranean ICZM Protocol and the amendment to the Ley de Costas 22/88 have been passed. This study analyzes the conflicts existing in various beaches on the Catalan coast and the potential of these new instruments to improve their management. The Protocol has better integrative potential and is more focused on governance than the LC. However, both show a limited capacity to influence beach management in the study sites due to various shortcomings: lack of specificity, lack of capacity to sanction, narrowness of the approach, lack of coordination with lower administrative levels, rigid institutional set up and an inability to restore coastal ecosystems. In order to improve management of some of the conflicts, we suggest scaling down and enforcing specific articles of the Protocol. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although the possibility that a firm's stakeholders may take damaging measures against it in response to its activities has been an underlying assumption of stakeholder theory from inception, the conditions that predispose stakeholders to act against firms remain largely unexplored in the literature. Based on work in equity theory, expectancy theory, and resource dependence theory, we present and test hypotheses concerning stakeholders' propensities to impose sanctions upon-or to support-firms. Using a vignette-based experiment, we found strong confirmation of the criticality of fairness in the firm-stakeholder relationship: stakeholder equity perceptions were unequivocally associated with the proclivity to sanction the firm, or to engage in prosocial behaviours of benefit to it. Stakeholder expectancy perceptions and resource dependence were related to only certain forms of stakeholder action, indicating that researchers should take care to differentiate between types of stakeholder response when investigating questions surrounding stakeholder mobilization. Our results also suggest specific avenues for stakeholder dialogue that could help firms mitigate the likelihood of stakeholders taking damaging action against them. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to examine the criteria of the provision on the corporation as the subject of crimes regulated in criminal legislation outside Indonesian Penal Code (KUHP) in the past five years. The criteria will be used to explore the construction of corporate criminal responsibility.Design/methodology/approach The method of the research is normative-legal study using the library research. The method of the examination is a qualitative-description. The data used are secondary data, including legislations, books, journals and other materials.Findings It is found that in the past five years, there are 25 criminal legislations outside KUHP which have the provision on corporation as the subject of crimes. In those 25 legislations, only four legislations which have the criteria of corporate criminal responsibility. In those legislation, it can be concluded that the construction of corporate criminal responsibility is based on identification and aggregation theory.Originality/value This research is novel in Indonesia. This research examines the specific articles of several legislations to deeply describe the corporate criminal responsibility. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Large-scale human cooperation among unrelated individuals requires the enforcement of social norms. However, such enforcement poses a problem because non-enforcers can free ride on others' costly and risky enforcement. One solution is that enforcers receive benefits relative to non-enforcers. Here we show that this solution becomes functional during the preschool years: 5-year-old (but not 4-year-old) children judged enforcers of norms more positively, preferred enforcers, and distributed more resources to enforcers than to non-enforcers. The ability to sustain not only first-order but also second-order cooperation thus emerges quite early in human ontogeny, providing a viable solution to the problem of higher-order cooperation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Sports organizations face various ethical challenges. To tackle these, ethical codes are becoming increasingly popular instruments. However, a lot of questions remain concerning their effectiveness. There is a particular lack of knowledge when it comes to their form and content, and on the influence of these features on the effectiveness of these codes of ethics. Therefore, we developed a framework to analyze ethical codes and used this to assess codes of ethics in sports clubs from six disciplines (soccer, gymnastics, badminton, equestrian sports, tennis, and judo). The form and content characteristics of the codes were tested for their impact on the ethical climate of sports clubs. Our results show that most codes focus on the themes of integrity, and on solidarity among the members of sports clubs. Deontological phrasing is dominant in ethical codes in sports clubs. The occurrence of comprehension aids, such as examples, and procedural content, such as the mentioning of sanctions, is low. When it comes to code effectiveness, i.e., the influence on the ethical climate, we see a positive significant effect of the use of consequentialist oriented statements, and of the combination of regulatory and inspirational phrasing. Also the presence of explicit guidelines for the members of the board had a positive significant affect. This shows that codes should be a source of inspiration and stimulate moral awareness, rather than merely guide behavior by simple rules. Other content elements do not influence code effectiveness, suggesting that ethical codes merely have a function of raising ethical awareness in sports clubs. These results help to shed light on what it takes for a code of ethics to become a useful and effective instrument to tackle unethical behavior in sports clubs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]