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This study investigates the role of exclusive content provision in two-sided markets where both sides are allowed to join multiple platforms. We consider a model of duopolistic two-sided platform market with a monopolistic multi-product (content) firm on one side, and consumers on the other. The model demonstrates that the monopolistic content provider uses exclusivity as strategic commitment to balance the two opposite effects on its bargaining power: the positive effect caused by increase in multi-homing consumers and the negative effect caused by restriction of distribution channels.

This paper examines vertical relationships in which a monopolistic upstream producer supplies a product through downstream distributors to consumers who may access multiple distributors (i.e., multi-homing). Given that there are multi-homing consumers, exclusive supply of a product induces more consumers to multi-home than non-exclusive supply. Consequently, the upstream firm deals with only one of the distributors exclusively without any contractual arrangements. We also show that forcing non-exclusive supply on the producer may worsen welfare as a result of the reduction of multi-homing consumers.

This study considers the anti-competitive effect of fixed-fee pricing, such as the one seen in a recent antitrust case in Japan. We show that fixed-fee pricing has stronger exclusionary effect than the per-use pricing's exclusionary effect. However, the restriction on usage of fixed-fee pricing may have a welfare-decreasing effect, although the restriction promotes entry.

Purpose We report the clinical characteristics of a Japanese family with autosomal dominant oculocutaneous albinism and a SLC45A2 gene mutation. Methods A total of 16 members of a Japanese family with general hypopigmentation and foveal hypoplasia underwent detailed clinical examinations. We evaluated the severity of foveal hypoplasia using spectral-domain optical coherence tomography (SD-OCT) and graded it according to the criteria of Thomas et al. DNA was extracted from 17 family members and used for genome-wide single nucleotide polymorphism genotyping and linkage analysis. Mutational search was performed for the SLC45A2 gene responsible for oculocutaneous albinism type 4 (OCA4). Results All 16 patients exhibited hypopigmentation of their hair and/or iris. They showed foveal hypoplasia, including 3 patients with grade 1 foveal hypoplasia, 7 with grade 2, and 6 with grade 3. No patient had grade 4 foveal hypoplasia. Optical coherence tomography showed macular ganglion cell complex thinning in the temporal area, and a slight reduction of visual field sensitivity in the centrotemporal area. A maximum multipoint parametric logarithm of the odds (LOD) score of approximately 2.00 to 3.56 was obtained on chromosome 5, spanning approximately 7.2 Mb between rs13187570 and rs395967 that included the SLC45A2 gene. All affected members showed a novel heterozygous variant, c.208T>C (p.Y70H), in the SLC45A2 gene, which supported a diagnosis of OCA4. Conclusions The present study reports a very rare family with autosomal dominant OCA4 whose diagnosis was confirmed by a mutational analysis. Most family members exhibited mild general hypopigmentation and low-grade foveal hypoplasia.

This study investigates the role of exclusive content provision in two-sided markets where both sides are allowed to join multiple platforms. We consider a model of duopolistic two-sided platform market with a monopolistic multi-product (content) firm on one side, and consumers on the other. The model demonstrates that the monopolistic content provider uses exclusivity as strategic commitment to balance the two opposite effects on its bargaining power: the positive effect caused by increase in multi-homing consumers and the negative effect caused by restriction of distribution channels.

The purpose of this article is to investigate the properties of equilibrium in a market with a leader. In particular, we examine how the equilibrium values depend on existing competitors. When the number of competitors is exogenously given, most equilibrium values, including the leader’s strategies, depend on the structure of the competitors: the number of incumbent competitors, their technologies, and their objective functions. In contrast, when an entry is endogenous, the equilibrium values, including not only the leader’s strategies but the entrants’ as well, are independent of such properties of the incumbent competitors. We provide several applications of our main result in industrial organization issues.

This paper examines the strategic commitment behavior of heterogeneous leaders in an endogenous market structure. We demonstrate that each leader's investment level is independent of the other leaders' characters. Furthermore, we show that a leader over-invests (resp. under-invests) when an investment increases (resp. decreases) the leader's marginal profitability. Such an investment always makes leaders employ aggressive strategies in the competition relative to those in a no-commitment case. This result implies that aggressiveness of leaders is a robust observation in an endogenous market structure.

This paper examines the optimal licensing scheme when the number of licensees is determined endogenously. We demonstrate that a license holder obtains monopoly profit even if the license holder uses only a fixed fee as long as the marginal cost is constant. Furthermore, we show that under free entry of licensees, a license holder can obtain monopoly profit with any combination of a positive fixed fee and a unit royalty that satisfies a certain condition. Even if the fixed fee is regulated to be a certain level, a license holder can achieve monopoly profit by means of a unit royalty. This result is in contrast with that of a case where the number of licensees is exogenously determined.

This paper examines the effects of exclusive dealing contracts in a simple model with manufacturers-distributors relations. We consider entrants in both manufacturing and distribution sectors. It is well-known that a potential entry threat is welfare increasing under homogenous price competition, even though the potential entrant is less productive. This paper reexamines this intuition by employing the above model. We show that the entry threat of a less-productive manufacturer is welfare decreasing when there is an exclusive dealing contract between the incumbent manufacturer and distributor. This result is in contrast to the view of the contestable markets literature.

New molecular targeting agents against multiple myeloma (MM) have been developed and the prognosis of patients with MM has been improved. However, MM still remains an incurable disease. It is important to continue to investigate new therapeutic agents based on the biology of MM cells. Bromodomain (BRD4) inhibitors such as JQ-1 and I-BET151 have been shown as candidates for a molecular targeting agent against MM. In this study, we searched for chemical compounds inhibiting BRD4 binding ability and we investigated their effects on MM cell proliferation. We identified novel compounds CA1 and CA2 as a BRD4 inhibitor using an alpha screening assay. The IC50 values of the binding ability of recombinant human BRD4-BD1-BD2 of CA1 and CA2 are 0.44 and 1.1 mM, respectively (Figure 1). We next investigated the effects of CA1 and CA2 on MM cell lines (MM.1s, AMO-1, NCIH929, and OPM-2 cells). Analyses with MTT assay showed that these compounds inhibited the proliferation of MM cells in a dose-dependent manner. c-myc and cyclinD1 mRNA transcripts were decreased by the treatment of CA1 and CA2, while, p21 mRNA transcripts were increased (Figure 2). In flow cytometric analysis, cell cycle arrest occurred in a G1 phase and apoptosis was induced. Western blotting analysis showed the decrease of c-myc protein levels as well as the cleavage of caspase-3. In conclusion, novel BRD4 inhibitors CA1 and CA2 inhibited binding of BRD4 to its ligands, resulting in the suppression of MM cell proliferation and the induction of apoptosis via the caspase activation. Figure 1. Figure 1. Figure 2. Figure 2. Disclosures Yoshioka: ConverGene LLC: Employment. Strovel:ConverGene LLC: Employment.

The existing literature about exclusive dealing contracts has focused on cases where an incumbent manufacturer o¤ers exclusive contracts to deter an entry. In contrast, we consider the case where an incumbent distributor o¤ers exclusive dealing contracts to deter an entry. Exclusive dealing contracts by a distributor are less e¤ective. We will show that the outcome of such contracts is quite di¤erent from the outcomes in the traditional literature. If the number of manufacturers is su¢ ciently high, it is impossible to exclude an e¢ cient entry. Furthermore, if we allow two- part tari¤ contracts, the entrant distributor can enter the market for any number of manufacturers.

This paper examines the effects of exclusive dealing contracts offered by an incumbent distributor. The effectiveness of exclusive dealing contracts offered by distributors is quite differrent from those offered by incumbent manufacturers. The traditional literature has focused solely on exclusive dealing contracts made by incumbent manufacturers and has derived multiple equilibria within homogeneous price competition models. In contrast, this paper asserts that exclusive dealing contracts made by a distributor generate a unique equilibrium and that an efficient entrant must be excluded under the equilibrium as long as distributors have sufficient bargaining power.

A seminal work by Fumagalli and Motta (2006) explored that an incumbent manufacturer cannot deter an entry by exclusive dealing contract with distributors. This paper extends the flamework of Fumagalli and Motta and examines a situation in which an incumbent distributor tries to deter an entry of efficient distributor by exclusive dealing contracts with manufacturers. The result of this paper is quite opposite to that of Fumagalli and Motta. The exclusion can be successful. It is an unique equilibrium. In this sence, the effects of exclusive dealing depends on the mareket stiructure. Moreover, we extend our model with an entrant even in upstream. It may decrease the possibility of exclusion but may promote the inefficient vertical relation between the entrants.

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This paper explains the corporate revival process of Nitto Kougyou, a famous golf courses managing company in Japan. After the crash of bubbles in Japan, the profit condition of Nitto Kougyou dropped drastically. Goldman Sachs bought this company in 2001 and filed for court-mandated rehabilitation. This paper carefully examines the corporate revival process of this company and makes clear the important points for considering the restructuring process of Japanese firms and for solving the non-performing loans problems.

This paper explains the corporate revival process of Nitto Kougyou, a famous golf courses managing company in Japan. After the crash of bubbles in Japan, the profit condition of Nitto Kougyou dropped drastically. Goldman Sachs bought this company in 2001 and filed for court-mandated rehabilitation. This paper carefully examines the corporate revival process of this company and makes clear the important points for considering the restructuring process of Japanese firms and for solving the non-performing loans problems.

This paper explains the corporate revival process of Snow Brand Milk Products Co. Ltd. (Yuki-Jirushi), a famous dairy-products company in Japan. As a result of a string of scandals, Yuki-Jirushi experienced sudden drops of sales and profits. In order to improve the profit condition, Yuki-Jirushi implemented drastic corporate restructurings and M&A. This paper explains this process in detail and shows the general implications for corporate revival process of Japanese firms.

This paper explains the corporate revival process of Snow Brand Milk Products Co. Ltd. (Yuki-Jirushi), a famous dairy-products company in Japan. As a result of a string of scandals, Yuki-Jirushi experienced sudden drops of sales and profits. In order to improve the profit condition, Yuki-Jirushi implemented drastic corporate restructurings and M&A. This paper explains this process in detail and shows the general implications for corporate revival process of Japanese firms.