Search

The COVID-19 pandemic has demonstrated the devastating impact of infectious disease outbreaks and the threat of emerging and re-emerging dangerous pathogens, independent of their origin. Natural, accidental, and deliberate disease outbreaks all need systems in place for an effective public health response. The best known international instrument in the field of public health is the WHO International Health Regulations (2005). Although the International Health Regulations are mainly focused on natural disease outbreaks, the actions to take to comply with them also contribute to biosecurity and non-proliferation. This paper examines in case of full implementation of the International Health Regulations, what other actions states should take to comply with international biosecurity instruments, including the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540, to effectively prevent and defend against intentional biological threats. An overview of international instruments from different disciplines regarding biosecurity is presented. Furthermore, this paper clarifies the similarities between the international biosecurity instruments and addresses the additional requirements that instruments stipulate. From a detailed comparison between the instruments it can be concluded that, to adhere to all legally-binding international biosecurity instruments, specific non-proliferation and export control measures are necessary in addition to full implementation of the International Health Regulations. Additionally, an overview of non-legally binding instruments in the field of biosecurity is presented and practical implementation examples are highlighted. Compliance with legally binding instruments can be improved by precise guidance provided by non-legally binding instruments that are clear and attuned to the situation on the ground. To improve understanding of the existing international instruments, this paper aims to provide an overview of the international legal biosecurity framework to biosecurity experts, policymakers, civil servants, and practitioners. It offers possible practical applications for the politico-legal context and accommodates the enhancement of full employment of biosecurity resources for an improved multidisciplinary capacity to prevent, detect, and respond to infectious disease outbreaks.

Swimming in fecally contaminated recreational water may lead to gastrointestinal illness. A recreational water-associated outbreak of norovirus (NoV) infections affecting at least 100 people in The Netherlands occurred in August 2012. Questionnaire responses from patients indicated swimming in recreational lake Zeumeren as the most likely cause of illness. Most patients visited the lake during the weekend of 18⁻19 August, during which the weather was exceptionally warm (maximum temperatures 32⁻33 °C), and visitor numbers elevated. Patients, mostly children, became ill with gastroenteritis 1⁻6 days (median 2 days) after exposure. Four stool samples from patients were NoV GI positive. Subsurface sandy soil from one of the beaches where most patients swam was NoV GI positive; the water sample was negative. The epidemiological curve and the timeline of investigation based on reported symptoms demonstrate the difficulty in discovering the source in recreational water outbreaks. A NoV outbreak in a recreational lake that is not subjected to external fecal contamination sources shows the need for active communication about human shedding of viruses during and after diarrheal episodes and the advice to refrain from swimming, even a few weeks after the symptoms have resolved.

Fresh produce that is contaminated with viruses may lead to infection and viral gastroenteritis or hepatitis when consumed raw. It is thus important to reduce virus numbers on these foods. Prevention of virus contamination in fresh produce production and processing may be more effective than treatment, as sufficient virus removal or inactivation by post-harvest treatment requires high doses that may adversely affect food quality. To date knowledge of the contribution of various potential contamination routes is lacking. A risk assessment model was developed for human norovirus, hepatitis A virus and human adenovirus in raspberry and salad vegetable supply chains to quantify contributions of potential contamination sources to the contamination of produce at retail. These models were used to estimate public health risks. Model parameterization was based on monitoring data from European supply chains and literature data. No human pathogenic viruses were found in the soft fruit supply chains; human adenovirus (hAdV) was detected, which was additionally monitored as an indicator of fecal pollution to assess the contribution of potential contamination points. Estimated risks per serving of lettuce based on the models were 3×10(-4) (6×10(-6)-5×10(-3)) for NoV infection and 3×10(-8) (7×10(-10)-3×10(-6)) for hepatitis A jaundice. The contribution to virus contamination of hand-contact was larger as compared with the contribution of irrigation, the conveyor belt or the water used for produce rinsing. In conclusion, viral contamination in the lettuce and soft fruit supply chains occurred and estimated health risks were generally low. Nevertheless, the 97.5% upper limit for the estimated NoV contamination of lettuce suggested that infection risks up to 50% per serving might occur. Our study suggests that attention to full compliance for hand hygiene will improve fresh produce safety related to virus risks most as compared to the other examined sources, given the monitoring results. This effect will be further aided by compliance with other hygiene and water quality regulations in production and processing facilities.

Hepatitis E virus (HEV) is an important infection in humans in EU/EEA countries, and over the last 10 years more than 21,000 acute clinical cases with 28 fatalities have been notified with an overall 10‐fold increase in reported HEV cases; the majority (80%) of cases were reported from France, Germany and the UK. However, as infection in humans is not notifiable in all Member States, and surveillance differs between countries, the number of reported cases is not comparable and the true number of cases would probably be higher. Food‐borne transmission of HEV appears to be a major route in Europe; pigs and wild boars are the main source of HEV. Outbreaks and sporadic cases have been identified in immune‐competent persons as well as in recognised risk groups such as those with pre‐existing liver damage, immunosuppressive illness or receiving immunosuppressive treatments. The opinion reviews current methods for the detection, identification, characterisation and tracing of HEV in food‐producing animals and foods, reviews literature on HEV reservoirs and food‐borne pathways, examines information on the epidemiology of HEV and its occurrence and persistence in foods, and investigates possible control measures along the food chain. Presently, the only efficient control option for HEV infection from consumption of meat, liver and products derived from animal reservoirs is sufficient heat treatment. The development of validated quantitative and qualitative detection methods, including infectivity assays and consensus molecular typing protocols, is required for the development of quantitative microbial risk assessments and efficient control measures. More research on the epidemiology and control of HEV in pig herds is required in order to minimise the proportion of pigs that remain viraemic or carry high levels of virus in intestinal contents at the time of slaughter. Consumption of raw pig, wild boar and deer meat products should be avoided.

On 6 September 2014, the accidental release of 1013 infectious wild poliovirus type 3 (WPV3) particles by a vaccine production plant in Belgium was reported. WPV3 was released into the sewage system and discharged directly to a wastewater treatment plant (WWTP) and subsequently into rivers that flowed to the Western Scheldt and the North Sea. No poliovirus was detected in samples from the WWTP, surface waters, mussels or sewage from the Netherlands. Quantitative microbial risk assessment (QMRA) showed that the infection risks resulting from swimming in Belgium waters were above 50% for several days and that the infection risk by consuming shellfish harvested in the eastern part of the Western Scheldt warranted a shellfish cooking advice. We conclude that the reported release of WPV3 has neither resulted in detectable levels of poliovirus in any of the samples nor in poliovirus circulation in the Netherlands. This QMRA showed that relevant data on water flows were not readily available and that prior assumptions on dilution factors were overestimated. A QMRA should have been performed by all vaccine production facilities before starting up large-scale culture of WPV to be able to implement effective interventions when an accident happens.

Transmission of enteric and respiratory viruses, including human norovirus (hNoV) and human influenza virus, may involve surfaces. In food preparation and health care settings, surfaces are cleaned with wipes; however, wiping may not efficiently reduce contamination or may even spread viruses, increasing a potential public health risk. The virucidal properties of wipes with a singlet-oxygen-generating immobilized photosensitizer (IPS) coating were compared to those of similar but uncoated wipes (non-IPS) and of commonly used viscose wipes. Wipes were spiked with hNoV GI.4 and GII.4, murine norovirus 1 (MNV-1), human adenovirus type 5 (hAdV-5), and influenza virus H1N1 to study viral persistence. We also determined residual and transferred virus proportions on steel carriers after successively wiping a contaminated and an uncontaminated steel carrier. On IPS wipes only, influenza viruses were promptly inactivated with a 5-log 10 reduction. D values of infectious MNV-1 and hAdV-5 were 8.7 and 7.0 h on IPS wipes, 11.6 and 9.3 h on non-IPS wipes, and 10.2 and 8.2 h on viscose wipes, respectively. Independently of the type of wipe, dry cleaning removed, or drastically reduced, initial spot contamination of hNoV on surfaces. All wipes transferred hNoV to an uncontaminated carrier; however, the risk of continued transmission by reuse of wipes after 6 and 24 h was limited for all viruses. We conclude that cleaning wet spots with dry wipes efficiently reduced spot contamination on surfaces but that cross-contamination with noroviruses by wiping may result in an increased public health risk at high initial virus loads. For influenza virus, IPS wipes present an efficient one-step procedure for cleaning and disinfecting contaminated surfaces.

Noroviruses are the most common agents causing outbreaks of viral gastroenteritis. Outbreaks originating from contaminated drinking water and from recreational waters have been described. Due to a lack of cell culture systems, noroviruses are detected mostly by molecular methods. Molecular detection assays for viruses in water are often repressed by inhibitory factors present in the environment, like humic acids and heavy metals. To study the effect of environmental inhibitors on the performance of nucleic acid sequence-based amplification (NASBA), we developed a real-time norovirus NASBA targeting part of the RNA-dependent RNA polymerase (RdRp) gene. Specificity of the assay was studied with 33 divergent clones that contained part of the targeted RdRp gene of noroviruses from 15 different genogroups. Viral RNA originated from commercial oysters, surface waters, and sewage treatment plants in The Netherlands. Ninety-seven percent of the clones derived from human noroviruses were detected by real-time NASBA. Two clones containing animal noroviruses were not detected by NASBA. We compared the norovirus detection by real-time NASBA with that by conventional reverse transcriptase PCR (RT-PCR) with large-volume river water samples and found that inhibitory factors of RT-PCR had little or no effect on the performance of the norovirus NASBA. This consequently resulted in a higher sensitivity of the NASBA assay than of the RT-PCR. We show that by combining an efficient RNA extraction method with real-time NASBA the sensitivity of norovirus detection in water samples increased at least 100 times, which consequently has implications for the outcome of the infectious risk assessment.