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This article examines current Russian expert and official narratives on the Arctic, situating them in the broader context of the debate on Russia’s role in the international system. Combining a critical geopolitics approach to the study of international relations with content analysis tools, we map how structural geopolitical changes in the wider region have shaped narratives on the Arctic in Russia today. Two types of Russian narratives on the Arctic are explored—the one put forward by members of the Russian expert community, and the one that emerges from official documents and statements by members of the Russian policymaking community. With the expert narratives, we pay particular attention to the Arctic topics featured and how they are informed by various mainstream approaches to the study of international relations (IR). In examining policy practitioners’ narrative approaches, we trace the overlaps and differences between these and the expert narratives. Current expert and official Russian narratives on the Arctic appear to be influenced mostly by neorealist and neoliberal ideas in IR, without substantial modifications after the 2014 conflict, thus showing relatively high ideational continuity.

Basert på en gjennomgang av et omfattende kildemateriale beskriver Geir Flikke hvordan Aleksej Navalnyj gradvis har bygget seg opp til å bli en av den russiske opposisjonens fremste profiler, en prosess som kulminerer med Navalnyjs (mislykkede) kampanje for å bli registrert som kandidat i presidentvalget 2018. Flikke gir en inngående og detaljrik gjennomgang av strategier, slagord og protestrepertoar. Både «rebeller» og regime bruker stadig vekk mer kreative metoder – opposisjonen for å nå frem, myndighetene for å kvele alle tilløp til det man gjerne refererer til som en mulig «fargerevolusjon».

Evolving official Russian identifications of Georgia amount to a dangerous securitisation of this small neighbour – achieved through a focus not on Georgia itself but on Western engagement in the region. With the long absence of face-to-face diplomatic encounters and contact, the Russian idea of Georgia as a ‘Western proxy’ has become entrenched. This article advances a social explanation of Russian foreign policy that speaks to geopolitical explanations in foregrounding great power interaction and security by drawing on insights from a discourse-theoretical reading of securitisation theory. It adds value to social explanations by showing how the identification of another political entity can be changed into that of a ‘proxy’ through its integration into a larger ‘radically different other’, and how this expansion occurs in interplay with interpretations of physical manifestations of the larger ‘radically different other’ in the ‘proxy’. Finally, it draws attention to the impact of physical encounters on foreign policy in these times of COVID-19, war, and growing isolationism in world affairs. Identification and physical disconnect in Russian foreign policy: Georgia as a Western proxy once again?

How does a security dilemma dynamic between parties deemed not to hold hostile intentions toward each other emerge and escalate? This article investigates Russian official discourse on NATO engagement in Europe post-Crimea (2014), and its impact on security interaction in the Arctic. We also examine how Russia represents NATO intentions and actions in a context seen by Russia as a relation of war. We identify the effect of these changing representations of self and other for the emerging securitization dilemma in relations between Russia and NATO, arguing that they have replaced uncertainty about NATO’s hostile intentions with certainty. Although Russia still articulates the Arctic as a unique cooperative region, there may be little space left for non-conflictual Russian action when encountering NATO in the Arctic. We highlight the agency and importance of evolving political rhetoric in creating a dangerous situation where lethal conflict can occur between parties who do not seek it, and also suggest that adjustments to patterns of official speech could be a tool of mitigation.

This chapter addresses a set of strategically important questions about the relationship between Russian strategy and the country’s energy resources. It is divided into three sections. The first presents a brief discussion of the concept of a ‘grand strategy’ and its application in the Russian context. The second examines the role of energy resources in a grand strategy in general, and in the current Russian context in particular. The final section considers the importance of Asia in the realisation of Russian energy and grand strategy. The chapter seeks to answer the following questions: • What is a grand strategy? • Does Russia have a grand strategy? • What is the connection between grand strategy and energy? • What is the role of energy resources in Russia’s grand strategy? • What is the role of Asia in Russia’s grand and energy strategy designs?

This article examines the role of the far right in political polarisation in Georgia. Polarisation has been a constant feature of Georgian politics, reaching new levels after the 2020 parliamentary elections. On the one hand, polarisation leaves little (if any) room in the political space for newcomers and small actors, including the far right. Carving out a niche in an extremely polarised political space requires a strong, consolidated, alternative force. To date, the fragmented nature of the Georgian far-right movement has hindered its mobilisation as a viable alternative to either the ruling party, Georgian Dream, or the opposition. On the other hand, the far right has also played a role in polarisation: Critics have argued that far-right groups have been used as an instrument to fuel polarisation further. Even though the activities of the far right seem to play into the interests of one end of the polarised political space more than the other, this article asserts that the far-right movement should not be reduced to a mere instrument in the hands of political powers.

Georgia`s foreign policy, especially the implementation of international agreements, is best understood in the context of domestic contestation among alternative foreign policy views. • Nativist views exert increasing influence on the Georgian public. Georgia’s European partners should engage the Georgian public through civil society support and people-to-people contacts, to build trust and facilitate open debate. • The exclusive character of differing foreign policy positions further fuels the extreme political polarization. The government and opposition should be encouraged to come together over shared democratic values, instead of playing up the differences. • Pluralism and tolerance should be encouraged in the public and media debate.

Russlands potensielle etablering av Bastionforsvaret er forankret i inneværende langtidsplan (LTP) som Forsvarets dimensjonerende scenario for en eventuell stormaktskonflikt. Kombinasjonen av våpenteknologisk utvikling og den russiske militærmaktens vesentlige reduksjon siden konseptet ble utviklet har imidlertid medført en manglende evne, og tilsynelatende vilje, til å implementere og opprettholde dets omfattende forsvarssoner. En diskusjon om Bastionforsvarets fortsatte relevans for norsk forsvars- og strukturplanlegging er dermed på overtid.

De facto states – unrecognized secessionist entities that eke out a living on the margins of the international system – are often heavily dependent on external patron states for economic aid and investment. When the parent state – the state that the de facto state seeks to break away from – responds to the secessionist attempt by imposing sanctions or economic blockades, this further exacerbates such dependency. Moreover, due to their lack of international recognition, de facto states often have limited opportunities to engage with the outside world beyond the patron and the parent state. However, closer examination of one such de facto state, Abkhazia, reveals that de facto states can enjoy some bounded independent economic agency. Abkhazia’s maneuvering between Russia as “patron,” Georgia as “parent state,” and the wider international community (here exemplified by the EU) in the sphere of trade and economic interaction has important implications for de-facto state conflict transformation.

This research paper examines the critical external and internal challenges that faced NATO at its 70th anniversary, and how the policies of two members – Norway and Poland – can influence the internal cohesion of the Alliance and thus its ability to provide security to all its members. The survival of NATO as a viable security actor will depend on its capacity to maintain internal cohesion, a crucial factor influencing its ability to address external risks, challenges and threats in the increasingly turbulent international environment. This study places the debate in the broader context of discussion on alliance survivability in general, maps the external and internal challenges facing the Alliance after seven decades of its existence, and examines possible risks that the policies of Norway and Poland may pose to NATO’s internal cohesion and thus its ability to react to external challenges.

This policy paper provides a structured comparative analysis of the nationalist populist actors, discourses and strategies in three Associated [1] Eastern Partnership (EaP) countries – Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia. It assesses the challenges of the radical right, nationalist populist groups on democratic developments in the Associated EaP countries: - the role of external actors, the tactics and policies used and how to deal with and manage this threat. The study was prepared by a group of Ukrainian, Moldovan and Georgian authors with specializations in national populism and its impact on political processes in these three countries. Research methodology includes desk research, as well as qualitative interviews, organized in each country with the involvement of local experts, journalists and civil society activists. The policy paper provides recommendations on how to mitigate the negative effects of anti-democratic, national populist groups and how to strengthen resilience against national populism in these EaP countries. This policy paper provides a number of significant findings which may be relevant for various state and nonstate stakeholders and beneficiaries who work on democratization and Europeanization issues in and around these three countries. Firstly, the paper highlights significant regional differences and similarities among them and explores their complex socio-political context, which is in many ways different from that of EU countries. Understanding the regional context is important to key national and international stakeholders in order to prioritize proper policy responses to populist challenges and select the most suitable programs and practices to neutralize populist nationalist challenges. As one of its key conclusions, the policy paper highlights a very diverse picture of nationalist populism challenges in these countries which is a relevant finding for the EU: to switch from its traditional one-size-fits-all approach to one that uses a country-by country-based differentiation when supporting these countries in their fight against national populism.

Moscow increasingly views the ‘Collective West’ as an offensive actor and the High North as terrain for NATO ‘expansion’. Norway figures as an active partner in this endeavour. For Norway, this situation is precarious: to the degree that Norway is seen as an inimical ‘NATO in the North’, Norwegian policies across a range of issue-areas increasingly risk being perceived as actions in an existential Russia–West struggle. This is worrisome because a key pillar of official Norwegian policy towards Russia involves balancing NATO deterrence with reassurance. As the military/non-military distinction becomes blurred in the eyes of Russia this crucial balancing becomes very difficult – the intended ‘reassuring’ signal might not come across.

Building on a discourse-theoretical reading of securitization theory, this article theorizes and examines how two political entities can become locked in a negative spiral of identification that may lead to a violent confrontation. Through mutual and multifaceted securitization, each party increasingly construes the other as a threat to itself. When this representation spreads beyond the military domain to other dimensions (trade, culture, diplomacy), the other party is projected as “different” and “dangerous” at every encounter: positive mutual recognition is gradually blocked out. Military means then become the logical, legitimate way of relating: contact and collaboration in other issue-areas are precluded. Drawing on official statements 2014–2018, this article investigates how Norwegian–Russian relations shifted from being a collaborative partnership to one of enmity in the High North. The emerging and mutual pattern of representing the other as a threat across issue-areas since 2014 has become an “autonomous” driver of conflict—regardless of whether either party might originally have had offensive designs on the other. Spiraling toward a New Cold War in the North? The Effect of Mutual and Multifaceted Securitization

Based on a mapping of mentions of country names in more than 30,000 Russian official speeches, press conferences, meeting transcripts, and official statements, this brief provides insights into changes to Russia’s engagement with the world during the 21st century. Without disentangling the subtleties of relations – such as their security, economic, or cultural dimensions and their benign or adversarial features – this approach allows the brief to sketch answers to questions that would otherwise be left to guesswork.

This Policy Brief presents the most recent data on the performance of the Russian energy sector and discusses its strategic importance in the current setting.

The recent wave of far-right mobilization across the globe, including Georgia, naturally attracts wide media attention. Although the interrelation of the media and the far right, especially in the Georgian context, remains under-researched, evidence from other countries shows the potential impact of media coverage on both public opinion, i.e. the demand for the far right, and the consolidation of far-right actors, i.e. the supply of the far right. This policy paper examines the possible role the Georgian media can play in far-right mobilization and provides recommendations for both media and civil society organizations.

After the crises in Ukraine, and despite the Georgian government’s allegedly more pragmatic attitude towards Russia, official statements from Moscow increasingly project Georgia as hostile. This may be the result of the Kremlin stepping up a propaganda campaign to put pressure on Georgia, but it is also linked to growing perceptions of Georgia as becoming an agent of NATO. Moreover, Russia’s increasingly insistent rhetorical and practical support for the independent status of the two Georgian breakaway republics, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, is still framed with reference to Kosovo as a tit-for-tat in a conflict with the West. In parallel with this hardening in Russian views, there is hardly any diplomatic contact between Russia and Georgia. The regional multilateral frameworks have become dysfunctional, obstructed by polarization. Further Georgian NATO integration could entail an increasing risk of war, unless frank discussions and engagement with Russia can be promoted.

This article reviews the literature on the geopolitics of renewable energy. It finds that while the roots of this literature can be traced back to the 1970s and 1980s, most of it has been published from 2010 onwards. The following aggregate conclusions are extracted from the literature: renewable energy has many advantages over fossil fuels for international security and peace; however, renewable energy is thought to exacerbate security risks and geopolitical tensions related to critical materials and cybersecurity; former hydrocarbon exporters will likely be the greatest losers from the energy transition. Many of the reviewed publications share some weaknesses: a failure to define “geopolitics”; an unwarranted assumption that very little has been published in the field previously; limited use of established forecasting, scenario-building or foresight methodologies; a lack of recognition of the complexity of the field; a lack of theorisation. Most authors do not distinguish between the geopolitical risks associated with different types of renewable energy, and only a few distinguish clearly between the geopolitics of the transitional phase and the geopolitics of a post-energy transition world. A disproportionately large part of the literature is dedicated to critical materials and cybersecurity, while only a small part concerns the decline of former fossil fuel powers. Among those publications that do discuss the decline of fossil fuels, there is also an over-focus on oil producers and a lack of attention to the countries that rely heavily on coal, for example Australia, China, Germany, Indonesia, Poland and the United States.

Denne artikkelen som er publisert som bidrag til Den norske Atlanterhavskomite serie Ukens analyse ser på det nylig avholdte presidentvalget i Hviterussland, og diskuterer om vi er i ferd med å se begynnelsen på slutten for «Europas siste diktator», Aljaksandr Lukasjenka.

In 2019, Russia’s Chief of the General Staff, Valery Gerasimov, presented a ‘strategy of active defence’, a possible prelude to the forthcoming Russian military doctrine. This article examines this strategy with particular emphasis on the role of precision-guided missiles, tactical nuclear weapons and the role of the navy. It provides insights on the shape of new Russian military doctrine and the military threat Russia might represent to the West. Maren Garberg Bredesen and Karsten Friis conclude that the active defence concept may imply a lowering of the use-of-force threshold. Russia’s continued build-up of tactical nuclear weapons integrated into the conventional forces reinforces this concern. Missiles, Vessels and Active Defence What Potential Threat Do the Russian Armed Forces Represent?

Ever since NATO’s enlargement process began, Russia has voiced concerns for the impact of a greater NATO military presence near the Russian border for its national security. While the signing of the 1997 NATO–Russia Founding Act eased some tensions, Russia–NATO relations have had their ups and downs. Russia’s military intervention in Ukraine and annexation of Crimea in 2014 led NATO to adopt countermeasures aimed at improving the security of its members – such as the deployment of NATO troops to areas deemed for geographical reasons most exposed to potential Russian interventions. This Policy Brief examines Russian reactions to these new NATO deployments, placing them in the broader context of the Russian debate on NATO as a source of strategic concern. It starts with a discussion of the general strategic context, follows with examining the main lines in the Russian debate on NATO as a general security challenge, and continues with an examination of official views on a greater NATO military presence in areas close to Russian borders. It ends with some policy-relevant conclusions on striking a balance between NATO concerns for the security of its members and Russian views on what Moscow defines as national security concerns.

Despite numerous declarations, the Russian authorities have done very little about domestic reforms, such as economic modernization. By contrast, Russia’s external policy has been extremely active, and is extensively debated within Russia itself. On the surface, it may seem that the domestic agenda is fully suppressed by the external one. In reality, however, foreign policy plays an important instrumental role, as the main tool for achieving domestic consensus and mobilization. It is public approval of the country’s foreign policy, together with ‘Russia-friendly’ interpretations of international processes, that create openings for the political elite to postpone domestic reforms. Various strategies for domestic reforms have recently been elaborated on the order of the President – but there are no indications that they will be realized anytime soon.

In the aftermath of the March 2018 presidential elections, the Russian political system is preparing for – indeed, already entering – the next phase of its development: the transition of power. This inevitable, but still unmentionable, transition is the topic of topics in the minds of Russia’s political elites, and is made all the more pertinent by the fact that the acting members of the decision-making class cannot discuss it openly. What is the constitutional framework around this political situation? Is there indeed a problem of succession, or, more broadly, of stability in the transition of power? What lessons could be drawn from other political regimes that resemble the Russian system? What are the possible scenarios for the transition of power? What are the positive and negative sides, feasibility and possible consequences of these scenarios? These are the questions this working paper seeks to address. The Russian political system in transition: Scenarios for power transfer

The non-Gazprom gas producers (NGPs) doubled their share of the Russian domestic gas market between 2000 and 2010 and have continued growing since then. For several years especially Novatek expanded. More recently, Rosneft has emerged as a key player, not least through its purchase of TNK-BP. This article begins with an overview of the companies in the Russian gas sector, their resource bases and capacities, and subsequently examines whether differences in field development costs and export market access may make it rational for Gazprom to continue ceding market share to the NGPs. With rising costs of Gazprom's queue of greenfield developments, any delays in Gazprom's investment program may be compensated through increased NGP production. The article argues that the NGPs are ready to fill the gap, may be allowed to do so and are already increasing their market share in an increasingly competitive market. The stage may now be set for a continued gradual transformation of the Russian gas market, in which the interests of Gazprom and the NGPs may be complementary or may be pitted against each other, but those of the Russian Federation are in any case likely to be better fulfilled than in the past.

Russian public opinion polls regularly report approval ratings of 84% to 86% for President Vladimir Putin – but can we trust those figures? This question has come to the fore after the events of 2014. Although Putin’s decision to annex Crimea, with the subsequent broad confrontation with the West, was seen by many as extremely damaging for the country’s long-term development, Putin’s approval ratings have shown almost unquestioning support for his policies. Does this support reveal deep-rooted anti-Westernism in Russian society, or an imperialistic mood? Or is it the result of intense propaganda campaigns and polling fabrications?

The Arctic region has become the site of renewed great power interest. Not only are the US and Russia actively engaged in the Arctic Council, but China has also become an observer. In addition to that, a number of policy commentators have claimed that great power interest in the Arctic region is more than cooperation over natural resources and climate change, and that this “scramble for the Arctic” may, in fact, herald a renewed geopolitical engagement in the region. In the case of Iceland, commentators have pointed to the increased activity of both Russia and China as evidence of this. To the extent that there may be such an interest underlying the Arctic policies of Russia and China, in effect linking economic and public goods to security, we set out to probe this link here. Rather than being able to conclude that there was a clear great power competition going on over influence in Iceland, we suggest that much of the great power presence and interest in Iceland is the result of Iceland’s willingness to play great powers off against one another. We encountered little evidence of a strong Chinese presence in Iceland, although the few avenues China had pursued had resulted in a fair amount of distrust. As for Russia, there seems to have been Russian willingness to provide a loan to bail out Iceland in 2008, but it remains unclear what, if any, the ulterior motives were. For Iceland, the motive seems to have been the ability to use Russia as international leverage. On the balance, the case of Iceland gives little evidence of a strong competition between China, Russia and the US for influence on the island. On the other hand, Iceland’s ability to play different public goods providers up against each other suggests that the model of public goods substitution may have given to little emphasis on the agency of ‘client’ states.

Over the last decade, the Arctic region has become the site of new forms of great power interest. While the US has changed its hegemonic presence, other powers, in particular China and Russia, have been perceived to actively pursue Arctic strategies, perhaps seeking to undermine the western hegemony in the area. One of the most talkedabout features of this new interest, has been the alleged Chinese desire to get engaged in Greenlandic mining. While there is certainly a desire among some in Greenland for alternative sources of revenue, direct Chinese involvement runs into a number of political and logistical challenges. To close observers, the narrative of heavy Chinese interest and involvement in Greenland probably says less about China and Chinese interests, than about dynamics in the relationship between Greenland and Denmark. Even with Greenlandic independence a possibility in the intermediate future, there seems to be no obvious hegemon to take the place of the already existing ones.

Contrary to expectations that the election results would necessitate a new coalition government, the recent parliamentary elections in Georgia have secured a constitutional majority for the Georgian Dream. This is evidence that Georgia remains steadfast in its Euro-Atlantic course, as well as signalling growing political stability and a sustained commitment to reforms. However, concerns are rising over the new government’s super-majority and the recent introduction of constitutional amendments that could threaten the system of checks and balances. Upholding its democratic credentials will also depend on the government’s ability to preserve political pluralism, ensure the development of media freedoms, continue work towards a depoliticized judiciary, and move beyond its retributive style of governance. Moreover, enduring economic problems and the unresolved issue of the breakaway territories Abkhazia and South Ossetia, where local governments have been deepening their relations with Moscow, remain key challenges. These will all need to be addressed, at home and among Georgia’s Western partners, as the country continues to aspire to EU and NATO membership.

Russia defines itself as a Great Power in relation to Europe and the West. The first part of the article traces how, since 1991, a story about greatness centred on being part of contemporary European civilization has given way to a story of how Russia is great by being superior to a Europe that is now seen as rotten and decadent. The former story spelled cooperation with Europe and the West, where the latter spells confrontation. The second part argues that Russia's superiority complex is unsustainable. It is hard to see how, in the face of the formative structural pressure of the state system, Russia will be able to sustain its superiority complex. A state that does not order itself in such a way that it may either gain recognition as a Great Power by forcing its way and/or by being emulated by others, is unlikely to maintain that status. The costs of maintaining Great-Power status without radical political and economic change seem to be increasing rapidly. If Russia wants to maintain its status, an about-turn is needed. Such a turn may in itself be no solution, though, for if Russia does not do anything about the root causes of its perceived inferiority to Europe, then the Russian cyclical shifting from a Westernizing to a xenophobic stance will not be broken. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This project examines the prospects for Russia-Western practical cooperation against the Islamic State (IS) in Syria and, more broadly, for a rapprochement between Russia, NATO and key NATO member states post-Crimea. The analytical point of departure is two-fold: Firstly, the project will examine how Russia’s longstanding rejection of a ‘Western’ world-order, along with various Western leaders’ increasing depiction of Russia as an ‘adversary’, shape the two parties’ room for manoeuvre with respect to practical collaboration on the ground in Syria. Secondly, and operationalizing ‘the West’ as two key ‘Atlanticist’ member states in NATO, the United States and Britain, it will examine how Russian and Western domestic debates constrain governments and political leaders’ scope for action, and their ability to adjust their commenced policy paths in Syria. When adversarial statements about ‘the other’ are voiced by state leaders in an international setting, they are often portrayed in the media as being reflective of that particular leader or government’s position alone. In this project, we suggest that the dynamics of Russia-Western relations cannot be properly understood without alsoconsidering how states’ security policies are empowered and limited by domestic security policy debates. The project will provide an up-to-date, in-depth analysis of how contemporary Russian, American and British security policies are being constituted and constrained by domestic debates. Furthermore, it will trace how domestically negotiated security policies materialize in actions on the ground in Syria. Against the backdrop of the empirical analysis, publications from this project will discuss the likelihood of these states finding common ground against IS in Syria, and the prospects for Russia-Western rapprochement more generally.

Over the last three years, Russia and China have increased their engagement in Central Asia in response to NATO’s withdrawal from Afghanistan. Moscow has deepened its security cooperation with the Central Asian states with a new strategic purpose– guarding against instability spilling over from northern Afghanistan– and has promoted the expansion of the Eurasian Economic Union. China also has dramatically accelerated its economic activities in the region by announcing the One Belt One Route (OBOR) initiative, an ambitious project to upgrade regional infrastructure and connect China to Europe and the Middle East. Although both Beijing and Moscow claim to be regional partners and not rivals, since the Ukraine crisis Russia has been forced to accept China’s terms of cooperation in order to signal that it has non-Western partners and opportunities.

In March 2014, Russia took over the Crimean Peninsula by stealth. Having annexed it on 18 March, Russia made further forays in the eastern part of Ukraine, principally in Donetsk and Luhansk, where it provided secessionists with manpower and know-how, weapons (including heavy weapons), information technology and propaganda, as well as political support. Discarding the idea that territory or history alone can explain Russia’s grab, we assume that, besides increases in gas prices and demands for changes in the constitution while stoking unrest and violating borders, the Kremlin has resorted to war in eastern Ukraine as a means to exert pressure on the Kyiv government. What matters for Moscow is probably to prevent democracy from taking root in Ukraine, or in Western Ukraine for that matter. To the Kremlin, a failed state would be preferable to a democratic state, divided or not. If this interpretation is correct, to what extent can the conflict be resolved? Must the interests claimed by the Kremlin be taken into account in order to bring peace in Ukraine and reset EU– Russia relations? What can the EU – and the West otherwise, i.e. the United States – do? This Policy Brief argues that a solution to the conflict is beyond reach, because the conflict concerns two opposing worlds. If the war is eventually a means for Vladimir Putin to stifle democracy in Ukraine and to strengthen his hold over Russia, there is no room for compromise. The history of EU–Russia relations and the structure that has characterized them since the demise of the USSR underline the how difficult it is for the EU to maintain, or indeed establish, a balanced relationship with an increasingly authoritarian and predatory regime based on one-man rule. The EU may have inadvertently played into the hand of the Kremlin – through lack of imagination and strategy, rather than contempt for a wounded power, as Putin has contended. Since the outbreak of the crisis in 2014, however, the EU has mustered the capacity to target sanctions at Russian individuals that bear responsibility for the war in Ukraine, and at specific sectors crucial to the Russian economy, all the while attempting to pursue political dialogue with the authorities – a ‘double-track approach’. But we must ask: What is the purpose of sanctions that do not bring about changes in the opponent’s political behaviour? or of a dialogue that does not lead to a solution? And is there anything that the EU and its member states can do?

During an intense period of only 14 months, from June 2010 to August 2011, six major cooperation agreements between oil companies were announced in Russia. Almost all of these partnerships involved offshore projects, with an international oil company as one of the partners and Rosneft as the other. The agreements were concentrated along Russia's Arctic petroleum frontier, and the three that survived the longest involved oil or gas extraction in the Arctic. This article analyses and compares the contents and contexts of the agreements, to ascertain what they have to tell about access for international companies to Russia's offshore petroleum resources and the influence of competing Russian political actors over the country's petroleum sector. The article argues that the new partnerships did represent an intention to open up the Russian continental shelf, and that the agreements were driven and shaped by a series of needs: to secure foreign capital and competence, to reduce exploration risk, to lobby for a better tax framework, to show the government that necessary action was being taken to launch exploration activities, to improve Rosneft's image abroad, and either to avert or prepare for future privatisation of state companies such as Rosneft.

The rise of a national Right in both Europe and the US is disrupting the security agendas of Western foreign– and defense ministries. Long accustomed to directing the gaze and measures of Western security only outwards – towards Africa, the Middle East, China – these centers of policy formulation now find themselves forced to confront a more introspective line of questioning: Is the identity of ‘the liberal West’ and its agenda of a rule-based, institutionalized world order under threat from within? In this brief we unpack the visions of world order espoused by the new Western Right, its ideological overlap with conservative ideas in Putin’s Russia, as well as the built-in tensions and uncertainties of that emerging alliance. Our focus is on potential implications of these political developments for i) international institutionalism, and ii) interventionism. In short, we argue that anti-globalism must not be mistaken for anti-internationalism. The most basic political agenda of the national Right – from the Trumpian US to Putin’s Russia – is one of battling globalism and its liberal vision of a trans-national or cosmopolitan world order, by defending older Western concepts of sovereignty-centred, inter-national co-existence. In contrast to the extreme Right, the current European-US-Russian alliance of national Right politicians largely want to fight this battle from the inside and through, not outside, established institutions such as the UN and the EU. Visions of an Illiberal World Order? The National Right in Europe, Russia and the US