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This article examines current Russian expert and official narratives on the Arctic, situating them in the broader context of the debate on Russia’s role in the international system. Combining a critical geopolitics approach to the study of international relations with content analysis tools, we map how structural geopolitical changes in the wider region have shaped narratives on the Arctic in Russia today. Two types of Russian narratives on the Arctic are explored—the one put forward by members of the Russian expert community, and the one that emerges from official documents and statements by members of the Russian policymaking community. With the expert narratives, we pay particular attention to the Arctic topics featured and how they are informed by various mainstream approaches to the study of international relations (IR). In examining policy practitioners’ narrative approaches, we trace the overlaps and differences between these and the expert narratives. Current expert and official Russian narratives on the Arctic appear to be influenced mostly by neorealist and neoliberal ideas in IR, without substantial modifications after the 2014 conflict, thus showing relatively high ideational continuity.

Basert på en gjennomgang av et omfattende kildemateriale beskriver Geir Flikke hvordan Aleksej Navalnyj gradvis har bygget seg opp til å bli en av den russiske opposisjonens fremste profiler, en prosess som kulminerer med Navalnyjs (mislykkede) kampanje for å bli registrert som kandidat i presidentvalget 2018. Flikke gir en inngående og detaljrik gjennomgang av strategier, slagord og protestrepertoar. Både «rebeller» og regime bruker stadig vekk mer kreative metoder – opposisjonen for å nå frem, myndighetene for å kvele alle tilløp til det man gjerne refererer til som en mulig «fargerevolusjon».

Evolving official Russian identifications of Georgia amount to a dangerous securitisation of this small neighbour – achieved through a focus not on Georgia itself but on Western engagement in the region. With the long absence of face-to-face diplomatic encounters and contact, the Russian idea of Georgia as a ‘Western proxy’ has become entrenched. This article advances a social explanation of Russian foreign policy that speaks to geopolitical explanations in foregrounding great power interaction and security by drawing on insights from a discourse-theoretical reading of securitisation theory. It adds value to social explanations by showing how the identification of another political entity can be changed into that of a ‘proxy’ through its integration into a larger ‘radically different other’, and how this expansion occurs in interplay with interpretations of physical manifestations of the larger ‘radically different other’ in the ‘proxy’. Finally, it draws attention to the impact of physical encounters on foreign policy in these times of COVID-19, war, and growing isolationism in world affairs. Identification and physical disconnect in Russian foreign policy: Georgia as a Western proxy once again?

How does a security dilemma dynamic between parties deemed not to hold hostile intentions toward each other emerge and escalate? This article investigates Russian official discourse on NATO engagement in Europe post-Crimea (2014), and its impact on security interaction in the Arctic. We also examine how Russia represents NATO intentions and actions in a context seen by Russia as a relation of war. We identify the effect of these changing representations of self and other for the emerging securitization dilemma in relations between Russia and NATO, arguing that they have replaced uncertainty about NATO’s hostile intentions with certainty. Although Russia still articulates the Arctic as a unique cooperative region, there may be little space left for non-conflictual Russian action when encountering NATO in the Arctic. We highlight the agency and importance of evolving political rhetoric in creating a dangerous situation where lethal conflict can occur between parties who do not seek it, and also suggest that adjustments to patterns of official speech could be a tool of mitigation.

This chapter addresses a set of strategically important questions about the relationship between Russian strategy and the country’s energy resources. It is divided into three sections. The first presents a brief discussion of the concept of a ‘grand strategy’ and its application in the Russian context. The second examines the role of energy resources in a grand strategy in general, and in the current Russian context in particular. The final section considers the importance of Asia in the realisation of Russian energy and grand strategy. The chapter seeks to answer the following questions: • What is a grand strategy? • Does Russia have a grand strategy? • What is the connection between grand strategy and energy? • What is the role of energy resources in Russia’s grand strategy? • What is the role of Asia in Russia’s grand and energy strategy designs?

This article examines the role of the far right in political polarisation in Georgia. Polarisation has been a constant feature of Georgian politics, reaching new levels after the 2020 parliamentary elections. On the one hand, polarisation leaves little (if any) room in the political space for newcomers and small actors, including the far right. Carving out a niche in an extremely polarised political space requires a strong, consolidated, alternative force. To date, the fragmented nature of the Georgian far-right movement has hindered its mobilisation as a viable alternative to either the ruling party, Georgian Dream, or the opposition. On the other hand, the far right has also played a role in polarisation: Critics have argued that far-right groups have been used as an instrument to fuel polarisation further. Even though the activities of the far right seem to play into the interests of one end of the polarised political space more than the other, this article asserts that the far-right movement should not be reduced to a mere instrument in the hands of political powers.

Georgia`s foreign policy, especially the implementation of international agreements, is best understood in the context of domestic contestation among alternative foreign policy views. • Nativist views exert increasing influence on the Georgian public. Georgia’s European partners should engage the Georgian public through civil society support and people-to-people contacts, to build trust and facilitate open debate. • The exclusive character of differing foreign policy positions further fuels the extreme political polarization. The government and opposition should be encouraged to come together over shared democratic values, instead of playing up the differences. • Pluralism and tolerance should be encouraged in the public and media debate.

This resource is an application for the Wadsworth International Fellowship from the Wenner-Gren Foundation. This Wadsworth International Fellowship is to aid training in Anthropology at the University of Sussex, Brighton, United Kingdom.

Russlands potensielle etablering av Bastionforsvaret er forankret i inneværende langtidsplan (LTP) som Forsvarets dimensjonerende scenario for en eventuell stormaktskonflikt. Kombinasjonen av våpenteknologisk utvikling og den russiske militærmaktens vesentlige reduksjon siden konseptet ble utviklet har imidlertid medført en manglende evne, og tilsynelatende vilje, til å implementere og opprettholde dets omfattende forsvarssoner. En diskusjon om Bastionforsvarets fortsatte relevans for norsk forsvars- og strukturplanlegging er dermed på overtid.

De facto states – unrecognized secessionist entities that eke out a living on the margins of the international system – are often heavily dependent on external patron states for economic aid and investment. When the parent state – the state that the de facto state seeks to break away from – responds to the secessionist attempt by imposing sanctions or economic blockades, this further exacerbates such dependency. Moreover, due to their lack of international recognition, de facto states often have limited opportunities to engage with the outside world beyond the patron and the parent state. However, closer examination of one such de facto state, Abkhazia, reveals that de facto states can enjoy some bounded independent economic agency. Abkhazia’s maneuvering between Russia as “patron,” Georgia as “parent state,” and the wider international community (here exemplified by the EU) in the sphere of trade and economic interaction has important implications for de-facto state conflict transformation.

This research paper examines the critical external and internal challenges that faced NATO at its 70th anniversary, and how the policies of two members – Norway and Poland – can influence the internal cohesion of the Alliance and thus its ability to provide security to all its members. The survival of NATO as a viable security actor will depend on its capacity to maintain internal cohesion, a crucial factor influencing its ability to address external risks, challenges and threats in the increasingly turbulent international environment. This study places the debate in the broader context of discussion on alliance survivability in general, maps the external and internal challenges facing the Alliance after seven decades of its existence, and examines possible risks that the policies of Norway and Poland may pose to NATO’s internal cohesion and thus its ability to react to external challenges.

This policy paper provides a structured comparative analysis of the nationalist populist actors, discourses and strategies in three Associated [1] Eastern Partnership (EaP) countries – Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia. It assesses the challenges of the radical right, nationalist populist groups on democratic developments in the Associated EaP countries: - the role of external actors, the tactics and policies used and how to deal with and manage this threat. The study was prepared by a group of Ukrainian, Moldovan and Georgian authors with specializations in national populism and its impact on political processes in these three countries. Research methodology includes desk research, as well as qualitative interviews, organized in each country with the involvement of local experts, journalists and civil society activists. The policy paper provides recommendations on how to mitigate the negative effects of anti-democratic, national populist groups and how to strengthen resilience against national populism in these EaP countries. This policy paper provides a number of significant findings which may be relevant for various state and nonstate stakeholders and beneficiaries who work on democratization and Europeanization issues in and around these three countries. Firstly, the paper highlights significant regional differences and similarities among them and explores their complex socio-political context, which is in many ways different from that of EU countries. Understanding the regional context is important to key national and international stakeholders in order to prioritize proper policy responses to populist challenges and select the most suitable programs and practices to neutralize populist nationalist challenges. As one of its key conclusions, the policy paper highlights a very diverse picture of nationalist populism challenges in these countries which is a relevant finding for the EU: to switch from its traditional one-size-fits-all approach to one that uses a country-by country-based differentiation when supporting these countries in their fight against national populism.

Moscow increasingly views the ‘Collective West’ as an offensive actor and the High North as terrain for NATO ‘expansion’. Norway figures as an active partner in this endeavour. For Norway, this situation is precarious: to the degree that Norway is seen as an inimical ‘NATO in the North’, Norwegian policies across a range of issue-areas increasingly risk being perceived as actions in an existential Russia–West struggle. This is worrisome because a key pillar of official Norwegian policy towards Russia involves balancing NATO deterrence with reassurance. As the military/non-military distinction becomes blurred in the eyes of Russia this crucial balancing becomes very difficult – the intended ‘reassuring’ signal might not come across.

The quick rise of commercially viable renewable energy worldwide presents encouraging opportunities for sustainable growth, but it also portends new risks. Hydrocarbon-producing nations of Eurasia have typically strongly relied on geographic proximity to their most lucrative export market: Europe. Yet the revolutionary nature of Europe's ‘Green Deal’ means that their position is under threat. While the demand-side ramifications of the global low-carbon transition are widely discussed, little consideration has been given to the inevitable implications for hydrocarbons producers, particularly in the less-studied central Asian region. This article draws attention to the interconnections between hydrocarbon rents, regime stability and new foreign policy strategies in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan in the wake of the global shift away from oil to renewable energy. By so doing, it systematically examines what implications the energy transition has on crucial petrostates in central Asia, and what this, in turn, means for international stability.

Building on a discourse-theoretical reading of securitization theory, this article theorizes and examines how two political entities can become locked in a negative spiral of identification that may lead to a violent confrontation. Through mutual and multifaceted securitization, each party increasingly construes the other as a threat to itself. When this representation spreads beyond the military domain to other dimensions (trade, culture, diplomacy), the other party is projected as “different” and “dangerous” at every encounter: positive mutual recognition is gradually blocked out. Military means then become the logical, legitimate way of relating: contact and collaboration in other issue-areas are precluded. Drawing on official statements 2014–2018, this article investigates how Norwegian–Russian relations shifted from being a collaborative partnership to one of enmity in the High North. The emerging and mutual pattern of representing the other as a threat across issue-areas since 2014 has become an “autonomous” driver of conflict—regardless of whether either party might originally have had offensive designs on the other. Spiraling toward a New Cold War in the North? The Effect of Mutual and Multifaceted Securitization

Based on a mapping of mentions of country names in more than 30,000 Russian official speeches, press conferences, meeting transcripts, and official statements, this brief provides insights into changes to Russia’s engagement with the world during the 21st century. Without disentangling the subtleties of relations – such as their security, economic, or cultural dimensions and their benign or adversarial features – this approach allows the brief to sketch answers to questions that would otherwise be left to guesswork.

This Policy Brief presents the most recent data on the performance of the Russian energy sector and discusses its strategic importance in the current setting.

The recent wave of far-right mobilization across the globe, including Georgia, naturally attracts wide media attention. Although the interrelation of the media and the far right, especially in the Georgian context, remains under-researched, evidence from other countries shows the potential impact of media coverage on both public opinion, i.e. the demand for the far right, and the consolidation of far-right actors, i.e. the supply of the far right. This policy paper examines the possible role the Georgian media can play in far-right mobilization and provides recommendations for both media and civil society organizations.

After the crises in Ukraine, and despite the Georgian government’s allegedly more pragmatic attitude towards Russia, official statements from Moscow increasingly project Georgia as hostile. This may be the result of the Kremlin stepping up a propaganda campaign to put pressure on Georgia, but it is also linked to growing perceptions of Georgia as becoming an agent of NATO. Moreover, Russia’s increasingly insistent rhetorical and practical support for the independent status of the two Georgian breakaway republics, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, is still framed with reference to Kosovo as a tit-for-tat in a conflict with the West. In parallel with this hardening in Russian views, there is hardly any diplomatic contact between Russia and Georgia. The regional multilateral frameworks have become dysfunctional, obstructed by polarization. Further Georgian NATO integration could entail an increasing risk of war, unless frank discussions and engagement with Russia can be promoted.

This article reviews the literature on the geopolitics of renewable energy. It finds that while the roots of this literature can be traced back to the 1970s and 1980s, most of it has been published from 2010 onwards. The following aggregate conclusions are extracted from the literature: renewable energy has many advantages over fossil fuels for international security and peace; however, renewable energy is thought to exacerbate security risks and geopolitical tensions related to critical materials and cybersecurity; former hydrocarbon exporters will likely be the greatest losers from the energy transition. Many of the reviewed publications share some weaknesses: a failure to define “geopolitics”; an unwarranted assumption that very little has been published in the field previously; limited use of established forecasting, scenario-building or foresight methodologies; a lack of recognition of the complexity of the field; a lack of theorisation. Most authors do not distinguish between the geopolitical risks associated with different types of renewable energy, and only a few distinguish clearly between the geopolitics of the transitional phase and the geopolitics of a post-energy transition world. A disproportionately large part of the literature is dedicated to critical materials and cybersecurity, while only a small part concerns the decline of former fossil fuel powers. Among those publications that do discuss the decline of fossil fuels, there is also an over-focus on oil producers and a lack of attention to the countries that rely heavily on coal, for example Australia, China, Germany, Indonesia, Poland and the United States.

Denne artikkelen som er publisert som bidrag til Den norske Atlanterhavskomite serie Ukens analyse ser på det nylig avholdte presidentvalget i Hviterussland, og diskuterer om vi er i ferd med å se begynnelsen på slutten for «Europas siste diktator», Aljaksandr Lukasjenka.

In 2019, Russia’s Chief of the General Staff, Valery Gerasimov, presented a ‘strategy of active defence’, a possible prelude to the forthcoming Russian military doctrine. This article examines this strategy with particular emphasis on the role of precision-guided missiles, tactical nuclear weapons and the role of the navy. It provides insights on the shape of new Russian military doctrine and the military threat Russia might represent to the West. Maren Garberg Bredesen and Karsten Friis conclude that the active defence concept may imply a lowering of the use-of-force threshold. Russia’s continued build-up of tactical nuclear weapons integrated into the conventional forces reinforces this concern. Missiles, Vessels and Active Defence What Potential Threat Do the Russian Armed Forces Represent?

Ever since NATO’s enlargement process began, Russia has voiced concerns for the impact of a greater NATO military presence near the Russian border for its national security. While the signing of the 1997 NATO–Russia Founding Act eased some tensions, Russia–NATO relations have had their ups and downs. Russia’s military intervention in Ukraine and annexation of Crimea in 2014 led NATO to adopt countermeasures aimed at improving the security of its members – such as the deployment of NATO troops to areas deemed for geographical reasons most exposed to potential Russian interventions. This Policy Brief examines Russian reactions to these new NATO deployments, placing them in the broader context of the Russian debate on NATO as a source of strategic concern. It starts with a discussion of the general strategic context, follows with examining the main lines in the Russian debate on NATO as a general security challenge, and continues with an examination of official views on a greater NATO military presence in areas close to Russian borders. It ends with some policy-relevant conclusions on striking a balance between NATO concerns for the security of its members and Russian views on what Moscow defines as national security concerns.

Despite numerous declarations, the Russian authorities have done very little about domestic reforms, such as economic modernization. By contrast, Russia’s external policy has been extremely active, and is extensively debated within Russia itself. On the surface, it may seem that the domestic agenda is fully suppressed by the external one. In reality, however, foreign policy plays an important instrumental role, as the main tool for achieving domestic consensus and mobilization. It is public approval of the country’s foreign policy, together with ‘Russia-friendly’ interpretations of international processes, that create openings for the political elite to postpone domestic reforms. Various strategies for domestic reforms have recently been elaborated on the order of the President – but there are no indications that they will be realized anytime soon.

In the aftermath of the March 2018 presidential elections, the Russian political system is preparing for – indeed, already entering – the next phase of its development: the transition of power. This inevitable, but still unmentionable, transition is the topic of topics in the minds of Russia’s political elites, and is made all the more pertinent by the fact that the acting members of the decision-making class cannot discuss it openly. What is the constitutional framework around this political situation? Is there indeed a problem of succession, or, more broadly, of stability in the transition of power? What lessons could be drawn from other political regimes that resemble the Russian system? What are the possible scenarios for the transition of power? What are the positive and negative sides, feasibility and possible consequences of these scenarios? These are the questions this working paper seeks to address. The Russian political system in transition: Scenarios for power transfer

The non-Gazprom gas producers (NGPs) doubled their share of the Russian domestic gas market between 2000 and 2010 and have continued growing since then. For several years especially Novatek expanded. More recently, Rosneft has emerged as a key player, not least through its purchase of TNK-BP. This article begins with an overview of the companies in the Russian gas sector, their resource bases and capacities, and subsequently examines whether differences in field development costs and export market access may make it rational for Gazprom to continue ceding market share to the NGPs. With rising costs of Gazprom's queue of greenfield developments, any delays in Gazprom's investment program may be compensated through increased NGP production. The article argues that the NGPs are ready to fill the gap, may be allowed to do so and are already increasing their market share in an increasingly competitive market. The stage may now be set for a continued gradual transformation of the Russian gas market, in which the interests of Gazprom and the NGPs may be complementary or may be pitted against each other, but those of the Russian Federation are in any case likely to be better fulfilled than in the past.

Russian public opinion polls regularly report approval ratings of 84% to 86% for President Vladimir Putin – but can we trust those figures? This question has come to the fore after the events of 2014. Although Putin’s decision to annex Crimea, with the subsequent broad confrontation with the West, was seen by many as extremely damaging for the country’s long-term development, Putin’s approval ratings have shown almost unquestioning support for his policies. Does this support reveal deep-rooted anti-Westernism in Russian society, or an imperialistic mood? Or is it the result of intense propaganda campaigns and polling fabrications?

The purpose of this thesis is to assess Pakistan’s relationship with Afghanistan before and after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. I argue that the nature of the relationship was transformed by the region becoming the centre of Cold War conflict, and show how Pakistan’s role affected the development of the mujahidin insurgency against Soviet occupation. My inquiry begins by assessing the historical determinants of the relationship, arising from the colonial legacy and local interpretations of the contested spheres of legitimacy proffered by state, tribe and Islam. I then map the trajectory of the relationship from Pakistan’s independence in 1947, showing how the retreat of great power rivalry following British withdrawal from the subcontinent allowed for the framing of the relationship in primarily bilateral terms. The ascendance of bilateral factors opened greater possibilities for accommodation than had previously existed, though the relationship struggled to free itself of inherited colonial disputes, represented by the Pashtunistan issue. The most promising attempt to resolve the dispute came to an end with the communist coup and subsequent Soviet invasion, which subsumed bilateral concerns under the framework of Cold War confrontation. Viewing the invasion as a major threat, Pakistan pursued negotiations for Soviet withdrawal, aligned itself with the US and gave clandestine support to the mujahidin insurgency. External support enhanced mujahidin military viability while exacerbating weaknesses in political organization and ideology. Soviet withdrawal in 1989 left an unresolved conflict. Faced with state collapse and turmoil across the border, heightened security concerns following loss of US support, and intensified links among non-state actors on both sides of the frontier, the Pakistan government drew on its recently gained experience of working through non-state actors to attempt to maintain its influence in Afghanistan. There would be no return to the relatively stable state-state ties prevailing before 1979.

This thesis demonstrates the multi-faceted nature of Soviet Jewish emigration and the policy that governed it in the 1970s. The research shows that although the factors contributing to Soviet policy on emigration varied throughout the decade, it was domestic rather than foreign affairs that determined Soviet policy on Jewish emigration. In particular, economic and demographic trends had much to do with Soviet emigration decisions as the 1970s progressed. Soviet Jewish emigration was noteworthy for its rapid growth, sustained for a period of nearly ten years, as well as for its sudden decline and virtual cessation during the 1980s. With few exceptions, most studies ignore the domestic considerations affecting emigration decisions. The classic explanation for Soviet policy portrays emigration as a barometer of US-Soviet relations, with the Soviet Jews used as 'pawns' in, or 'hostages' to, the superpower rivalry. While an element of that interpretation is true, particularly with respect to the early period of emigration, it ultimately fails because it cannot account for the entire course of emigration. By neglecting the domestic situation, such analysis does not view emigration in a sufficiently broad context. Included in the dissertation is an examination of Soviet German emigration, instructive for illustrating that neither specific bilateral nor general East-West relations were exclusive determinants of emigration policy. Likewise, the effect of the United States policy of linking trade and emigration as outlined in the Jackson-Vanik amendment to the Trade Act of 1974 is explored, as are the 1975 Helsinki Final Act and other international instruments addressing freedom of movement. Extensive historical background, with special emphasis on Soviet nationality policy, is provided in the thesis.

This article examines the extent to which ethnic and religious identity explains alliance/alignment decisions by states in Central Asia and the Caucasus. It finds that identity variables have little direct explanatory role in accounting for these decisions in this region. Instead, alignment choices appear to be driven largely by the strategic context. However, identity factors do have an impact on how policy-makers interpret their strategic context through the influence of these factors on threat perception.

Theories of transboundary water politics have failed to explain the status quo in many river basins: fragile political relations between riparian states and nationalist domestic politics, as well as weak regional institutions and huge economic inefficiencies – but also an absence of wars over water. This is due to an uncritical approach to scale, power, and geopolitics. It is the purpose of this thesis to address these conceptual gaps by critically evaluating the multiple relationships between the logic of large dams and the politics of international rivers. The meaning of dams, the politics of their operation and construction, and their impact on international relations are much more ambiguous, opaque and complex than existing explanations have suggested so far. In turn, their logic influences, competes with, and contradicts the logic of river basin governance. Dams produce alternative spaces of development, energy, and state power that complement or are superimposed on existing spaces of riparian cooperation. This thesis argues that the contradictions between these spaces explains the geopolitical limbo of many international rivers in the developing world. Drawing from Foucault’s governmentality theory, the literature of critical geopolitics, and post-structural approaches to spatial scale the case-oriented research design of this thesis evaluates two geopolitical processes in contentious transboundary river basins: the construction of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam on the Nile and the operation of the Toktogul Dam in the Kyrgyz stretch of the Syr Darya River. By unpacking these processes, this thesis makes three substantial contributions to existing scholarship. Firstly, it is argued that regional river basin management is essentially a geopolitical project that contradicts the geo-economic imperatives of the dam. Secondly, power and agency in water politics is diffused far beyond the nation-state and can be understood in terms of “network effects”. Thirdly, to marry the concerns of the geopolitical and the geo-economic, I propose that the contrasting logics give rise to “geopolitical entrepreneurs” – actors who use geopolitics for wealth accumulation, legitimacy, nation-building, and other ends. While dams may provide power, wealth, and authority an allegorical Sword of Damocles is let down on the riparians.

Ethnic relations are an important feature of contemporary Russia. This is especially true in the North Caucasus where ongoing insecurity combined with a depressed economy has led to growing Russian nationalism, xenophobia, and fears over immigration. In Stavropol’skii krai, the only ethnic Russian dominated territory in the North Caucasus Federal District, the situation is especially acute. In this thesis I investigate how the geopolitics of ethnic relations in Stavropol’skii krai, as part of the wider North Caucasus situation, impact on the everyday life of citizens in Stavropol’. I do this through employing an eclectic methodology, including both qualitative and quantitative techniques. Through four research papers, I explore how the built urban environment, through the politics of naming place (for example, street names and monuments), has become a space through which ethnic identity can be (re)produced and contested. I show how ethnic relations are (re)presented and performed in Stavropol’ through the Den’ kraya celebration, a performance that is based on a Soviet-era idealised framing of ethnic relations, and one which is open to challenge. I explore how in summer 2007 ethnic relations turned violent as ethnic Russian and non-ethnic Russian citizens rioted, and I attempt to explain the geopolitics surrounding this. Finally, I show how everyday ethnic relations have turned increasingly violent in Stavropol’ since 1991, drawing on reports from non-governmental organisations and independent researchers. I situate this research within the context of the changing ethnic geography of the krai since 1991. Together, this research represents a geopolitics of ethnic relations in Stavropol’skii krai.

This thesis explores professional visions for the planning of everyday life during the period of developed socialism. Considering a wide range of disciplinary literature, including architecture, urban planning, design and sociology, this thesis analyses how professionals imagined residential and domestic life in an urbanised and technologically advanced socialist society. Continuing the narrative of Khrushchev’s modernising programme to reform everyday life (byt) into the post-Khrushchev period, the thesis follows professionals of the last two Soviet decades who criticised the rationalising and collectivising planning paradigm inaugurated during the preceding decades. Professionals argued that this paradigm had produced a dehumanised and alienating everyday environment in the city and the home. After setting out the theoretical framework and the historical context of developed socialism, the first empirical section addresses urban residential life. It focuses on the microdistrict planning unit to illustrate how professionals, disillusioned with functionalist planning, searched for ways to humanise the city and adapt it to the behaviours and needs of urban residents. Part two investigates shifting professional views on the home and the everyday processes associated with it, such as cooking and cleaning. No longer seen as a utilitarian space in which everyday processes transpire, the home came to be understood as a personal and emotionally resonant place. Part three focuses on material culture, investigating evolving views on consumption and aesthetics. It illustrates how professionals endeavoured to rehabilitate the object world and align it with populist preferences while nonetheless maintaining a commitment to technological and forward-looking principles. In contributing to the scholarly understanding of developed socialism, this thesis contends that the 1970s-1980s saw experts embrace individual agency and popular sentiments. This turn did not, however, signify a turn towards individualism or de-politicised malaise: professionals maintained their utopian aspirations to engineer and control everyday life.

'Thieves-in-law' (vory-v-zakone in Russian or kanonieri qurdebi in Georgian) are career criminals belonging to a criminal fraternity that has existed at least since the 1930s in the Soviet Gulag. These actors still exist in one form or another in post-Soviet countries and have integrated into transnational organised criminal networks. For reasons yet to be explicated, thieves-in-law became exceptionally prevalent in the Soviet republic of Georgia. Here, by the 1990s, they formed a mafia network where this means criminal associations that attempt to monopolize protection in legal and illegal sectors of the economy.In 2005, Mikhail Saakashvili, the current president of Georgia claimed that 'in the past 15 years...Georgia was not ruled by [former President] Shevardnadze, but by thieves-in-law.' Directly transferring anti-organised crime policy from Italy and America, Saakashvili's government made reform of the criminal justice system generally and an attack on the thieves-in-law specifically a cornerstone of the Rose Revolution. New legislation criminalises the possession of the status of ‘thief-in-law’ and of membership of criminal associations that constitute what is known as the ‘thieves’ world’ (qurduli samkaro). Along with a sweeping reform of the police and prisons and a ‘culture of lawfulness’ campaign, Georgian criminal justice reforms since 2003 may be seen as the first sustained anti-mafia policy to be implemented in a post-Soviet country. It also appears to have been very successful.The longevity and sudden decline of the thieves-in-law in Georgia provides the main questions that the following study addresses: How do we account for changes in the levels of resilience to state attack of actors carrying the elite criminal status of ‘thief-in-law’? How has this resilience been so effectively compromised since 2005? Utilising unique access to primary sources of data such as police files, court cases, archives and expert interviews this thesis studies the dynamics of changing mafia activities, recruitment practices, and structural forms of a criminal group as it relates to changes in the environment and, in particular, the recent anti-organised crime policy.

The Arctic region has become the site of renewed great power interest. Not only are the US and Russia actively engaged in the Arctic Council, but China has also become an observer. In addition to that, a number of policy commentators have claimed that great power interest in the Arctic region is more than cooperation over natural resources and climate change, and that this “scramble for the Arctic” may, in fact, herald a renewed geopolitical engagement in the region. In the case of Iceland, commentators have pointed to the increased activity of both Russia and China as evidence of this. To the extent that there may be such an interest underlying the Arctic policies of Russia and China, in effect linking economic and public goods to security, we set out to probe this link here. Rather than being able to conclude that there was a clear great power competition going on over influence in Iceland, we suggest that much of the great power presence and interest in Iceland is the result of Iceland’s willingness to play great powers off against one another. We encountered little evidence of a strong Chinese presence in Iceland, although the few avenues China had pursued had resulted in a fair amount of distrust. As for Russia, there seems to have been Russian willingness to provide a loan to bail out Iceland in 2008, but it remains unclear what, if any, the ulterior motives were. For Iceland, the motive seems to have been the ability to use Russia as international leverage. On the balance, the case of Iceland gives little evidence of a strong competition between China, Russia and the US for influence on the island. On the other hand, Iceland’s ability to play different public goods providers up against each other suggests that the model of public goods substitution may have given to little emphasis on the agency of ‘client’ states.

Over the last decade, the Arctic region has become the site of new forms of great power interest. While the US has changed its hegemonic presence, other powers, in particular China and Russia, have been perceived to actively pursue Arctic strategies, perhaps seeking to undermine the western hegemony in the area. One of the most talkedabout features of this new interest, has been the alleged Chinese desire to get engaged in Greenlandic mining. While there is certainly a desire among some in Greenland for alternative sources of revenue, direct Chinese involvement runs into a number of political and logistical challenges. To close observers, the narrative of heavy Chinese interest and involvement in Greenland probably says less about China and Chinese interests, than about dynamics in the relationship between Greenland and Denmark. Even with Greenlandic independence a possibility in the intermediate future, there seems to be no obvious hegemon to take the place of the already existing ones.

This resource is an application for the Conference Grant from the Wenner-Gren Foundation. The World Archaeological Congress (WAC) is a non-governmental, not-for-profit organization whose members seek to promote interest in the past in all countries, to encourage the development of regionally-based histories and to foster international academic interaction. Its aims are based on the need to recognize the historical and social roles as well as the political context of archaeology, and the need to make archaeological studies relevant to the wider community. WAC conferences are international forums for discussion for anyone who is concerned with the study of the past. The Eighth World Archaeological Congress (WAC-8) will be held in Kyoto, Japan at Doshisha University. The aims of WAC-8 are to promote: discussion of new archaeological research as well as archaeological policy, theory, and practice; professional training for emerging scholars, especially those from disadvantaged nations, groups and communities; the empowerment and support of Indigenous groups and First Nations peoples; and the conservation of archaeological sites. With the help of support from Wenner-Gren, WAC-8 will include participants from around the world, helping to foster an international community of research scholars in anthropology.

Contrary to expectations that the election results would necessitate a new coalition government, the recent parliamentary elections in Georgia have secured a constitutional majority for the Georgian Dream. This is evidence that Georgia remains steadfast in its Euro-Atlantic course, as well as signalling growing political stability and a sustained commitment to reforms. However, concerns are rising over the new government’s super-majority and the recent introduction of constitutional amendments that could threaten the system of checks and balances. Upholding its democratic credentials will also depend on the government’s ability to preserve political pluralism, ensure the development of media freedoms, continue work towards a depoliticized judiciary, and move beyond its retributive style of governance. Moreover, enduring economic problems and the unresolved issue of the breakaway territories Abkhazia and South Ossetia, where local governments have been deepening their relations with Moscow, remain key challenges. These will all need to be addressed, at home and among Georgia’s Western partners, as the country continues to aspire to EU and NATO membership.

Russia defines itself as a Great Power in relation to Europe and the West. The first part of the article traces how, since 1991, a story about greatness centred on being part of contemporary European civilization has given way to a story of how Russia is great by being superior to a Europe that is now seen as rotten and decadent. The former story spelled cooperation with Europe and the West, where the latter spells confrontation. The second part argues that Russia's superiority complex is unsustainable. It is hard to see how, in the face of the formative structural pressure of the state system, Russia will be able to sustain its superiority complex. A state that does not order itself in such a way that it may either gain recognition as a Great Power by forcing its way and/or by being emulated by others, is unlikely to maintain that status. The costs of maintaining Great-Power status without radical political and economic change seem to be increasing rapidly. If Russia wants to maintain its status, an about-turn is needed. Such a turn may in itself be no solution, though, for if Russia does not do anything about the root causes of its perceived inferiority to Europe, then the Russian cyclical shifting from a Westernizing to a xenophobic stance will not be broken. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]