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Hank Rotter, NASA Technical Fellow for Environmental Control and Life Support System, will provide the causes and lessons learned for the two Space Shuttle Orbiter water dump icicles that formed on the side of the Orbiter. He will present the root causes and the criticality of these icicles, along with the redesign of the water dump nozzles and lessons learned during the redesign phase.

Life support is vital to human spaceflight, and most current life support systems employ single-use hardware or regenerable technologies that throw away the waste products, relying on resupply to make up the consumables lost in the process. Because the long-term goal of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration is to expand human presence beyond low-earth orbit, life support systems must become self-sustaining for missions where resupply is not practical. From May through October 2011, the life support team at the Johnson Space Center was challenged to define requirements, develop a system concept, and create a preliminary life support system design for a non-planetary Deep Space Habitat that could sustain a crew of four in near earth orbit for a duration of 388 days. Some of the preferred technology choices to support this architecture were passed over as the mission definition also has an unmanned portion lasting 825 days. The main portion of the architecture was derived from technologies currently integrated on the International Space Station as well as upcoming technologies with moderate Technology Readiness Levels. The final architecture concept contains only partially-closed air and water systems, as the breakeven point for some of the closure technologies was not achieved with the mission duration.

NASA is working to develop a new lunar lander to support lunar exploration. The development process that the Altair project is using for this vehicle is unlike most others. In Lander Design Analysis Cycle 1 (LDAC-1), a single-string, minimum functionality design concept was developed, including life support systems for different vehicle configuration concepts, first for a combination of an ascent vehicle and a habitat with integral airlocks, and then for a combined ascent vehicle-habitat with a detachable airlock. In LDAC-2, the Altair team took the ascent vehicle-habitat with detachable airlock and analyzed the design for the components that were the largest contributors to the risk of loss of crew (LOC). For life support, the largest drivers were related to oxygen supply and carbon dioxide control. Integrated abort options were developed at the vehicle level. Many life support failures were not considered to result in LOC because they had a long enough time to effect that abort was considered a feasible option to safely end the mission before the situation became life threatening. These failures were then classified as loss of mission (LOM) failures. Many options to reduce LOC risk were considered, and mass efficient solutions to the LOC problems were added to the vehicle design at the end of LDAC-2. In LDAC-3, the new design was analyzed for large contributors to the risk of LOM. To avoid ending the mission early or being unable to accomplish goals like performing all planned extravehicular activities (EVAs), various options were assessed for their combination of risk reduction and mass cost. This paper outlines the major assumptions, design features, and decisions related to the development of the life support system for the Altair project through LDAC-3.

In Spring of 2005, the NASA Engineering Safety Center (NESC) was engaged by the Space Shuttle Program (SSP) to peer review the suite of analytical tools being developed to support the determination of impact and damage tolerance of the Orbiter Thermal Protection Systems (TPS). The NESC formed an independent review team with the core disciplines of materials, flight sciences, structures, mechanical analysis and thermal analysis. The Math Model Tools reviewed included damage prediction and stress analysis, aeroheating analysis, and thermal analysis tools. Some tools are physics-based and other tools are empirically-derived. Each tool was created for a specific use and timeframe, including certification, real-time pre-launch assessments. In addition, the tools are used together in an integrated strategy for assessing the ramifications of impact damage to tile and RCC. The NESC teams conducted a peer review of the engineering data package for each Math Model Tool. This report contains the summary of the team observations and recommendations from these reviews.

The Internal Active Thermal Control System (IATCS) coolant exhibited unexpected chemical changes during the first year of on-orbit operation following the launch and activation in February 2001. The coolant pH dropped from 9.3 to below the minimum specification limit of 9.0, and re-equilibrated between 8.3 and 8.5. This drop in coolant pH was shown to be the result of permeation of CO2 from the cabin into the coolant via Teflon flexible hoses which created carbonic acid in the fluid. This unexpected diffusion was the result of having a cabin CO2 partial pressure higher than the ground partial pressure (average 4.0 mmHg vs. less than 0.2 mmHg). This drop in pH was followed by a concurrent increasing coolant nickel concentration. No other metal ions were observed in the coolant and based on previous tests, the source of nickel ion was thought to be the boron nickel (BNi) braze intermetallics used in the construction of HXs and cold plates. Specifically, BNi2 braze alloy was used for the IATCS IFHX and BNi3 braze alloy was used for the IATCS Airlock Servicing and Performance Checkout Unit (SPCU) HX and cold plates. Given the failure criticality of the HXs, a Corrosion Team was established by the IATCS CWG to determine the impact of the nickel corrosion on hardware performance life.

In Spring of 2005, the NASA Engineering Safety Center (NESC) was engaged by the Space Shuttle Program (SSP) to peer review the suite of analytical tools being developed to support the determination of impact and damage tolerance of the Orbiter Thermal Protection Systems (TPS). The NESC formed an independent review team with the core disciplines of materials, flight sciences, structures, mechanical analysis and thermal analysis. The Math Model Tools reviewed included damage prediction and stress analysis, aeroheating analysis, and thermal analysis tools. Some tools are physics-based and other tools are empirically-derived. Each tool was created for a specific use and timeframe, including certification, real-time pre-launch assessments, and real-time on-orbit assessments. The tools are used together in an integrated strategy for assessing the ramifications of impact damage to tile and RCC. The NESC teams conducted a peer review of the engineering data package for each Math Model Tool. This report contains the summary of the team observations and recommendations from these reviews.

Since the loss of Columbia on February 1, 2003, the Space Shuttle Program (SSP) has significantly improved the understanding of launch and ascent debris, implemented hardware modifications to reduce debris, and conducted tests and analyses to understand the risks associated with expected debris. The STS-114 flight rationale for expected debris relies on a combination of all three of these factors. A number of design improvements have been implemented to reduce debris at the source. The External Tank (ET) thermal protection system (TPS) foam has been redesigned and/or process improvements have been implemented in the following locations: the bipod closeout, the first ten feet of the liquid hydrogen (LH2) tank protuberance air load (PAL) ramp, and the LH2 tank-to-intertank flange closeout. In addition, the forward bipod ramp has been eliminated and heaters have been installed on the bipod fittings and the liquid oxygen (LO2) feedline forward bellows to prevent ice formation. The Solid Rocket Booster (SRB) bolt catcher has been redesigned. The Orbiter reaction control system (RCS) thruster cover "butcher paper" has been replaced with a material that sheds at a low velocity. Finally, the pad area has been cleaned to reduce debris during lift-off.