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Informal, 'notice-and-comment', rulemaking is the prototypical mechanism employed by US regulators. However, agencies frequently claim their actions exempt from the process, and courts typically agree. Agencies thus face an important strategic choice between informal rulemaking and avoidance. To study this choice, we analyze a model of rulemaking with exemption and empirically analyze agency avoidance. Our model implies that more biased agencies engage in less avoidance, as they face more skepticism from the courts and, thus, require support from group comments to have their rules upheld. Empirically, we find support for this prediction. As for policy implications, we show it is more beneficial to allow exemptions when the agency is more biased. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Schedule C and noncareer Senior Executive Service positions hold significant influence over policy outcomes, yet they have received limited scrutiny compared to advise and consent (PAS) appointments. Such appointments offer understudied avenues for presidential control over the bureaucracy. Through a comprehensive analysis of more detailed data than has been employed to date, we reveal that these appointments are responsive to broader political dynamics, particularly those relevant to PAS appointments, including inter- and intrabranch conflicts, agency ideology, Senate workload, and the political calendar. However, statutory constraints and agency characteristics – such as the managerial expertise of appointed agency leadership – also shape their utilization. While unilateral appointments provide an advantage to Presidents, executives are constrained when using them to overcome legislative opposition or reshape resistant agencies. These lower-level appointments reflect the wider political landscape, granting the President significant – but not unrestrained – opportunities to exert influence on both the bureaucracy and policy outcomes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Chiou and Rothenberg (2003) utilized models of legislative productivity, synthesizing parties and preferences by deriving and measuring different equilibrium gridlock intervals, finding that such models outperformed alternatives depending on preferences alone. However, their temporal scope is limited to post-World War II. Generalizing theoretical models--notably recognizing the 1917 enactment of Rule 22 creating the Senate filibuster rule-and expanding historical scope empirically will produce results, inspiring greater confidence and better ability to distinguish whether partisan features matter. Hence, the authors generalize and test models using data extending to the late 19th century. Results indicate that a model combining preferences with party unity better explains outcomes than does a preference-based model, a model where parties control the agenda but cannot discipline members, or a model where the president rules his legislative party. In addition, findings are consistent with the inference that Rule 22 did not change the filibuster rule guiding the Senate substantially. Keywords: legislative majorities; U.S. Congress; filibusters; legislative gridlock; political party unity

Although scholars have put enormous effort into developing models of legislative choice behavior, they may not have sufficiently considered the underlying choice process and its relationship to the institutional environment. Our analysis does so by jointly integrating more realistic models of legislator decision making with a historical perspective on institutional evolution. We apply a unified model, incorporating participation and vote choice in a theoretically and econometrically sensible manner, to roll call voting and participation choices in the 73rd (1933-1934), 89th (1965-1966), and 104th (1995-1996) United States Congresses. We consider whether the same factors affect behavior over time, whether abstention choices affect outcomes, and whether integrating voting and participation is advantageous. Our models fit the data well and reveal significant, intuitive, differences in decision making over time that are related to Congress's development and that are relevant for policy. Realistic models and an appreciation for institutional evolution are related and important for considering legislative choice behavior.

Given its importance and level of conflict in recent decades, scholars have expended great effort analyzing appointment politics. However, despite descriptions that might lead to conclusions that the structure of how nominees are dealt with has changed over time, quantitative analyses have not investigated possible structural changes. We remedy this by conducting a changepoint analysis using data on executive nominations from 1885–2016. Two breaks involving Senate‐initiated institutional changes are uncovered: one associated with postwar congressional reorganization, the other with post‐Watergate era alterations to the relationship between Senate and President. By contrast, neither executive‐initiated changes nor disruptions in norms produced breaks. Thus, our analysis defines three different historical eras of the appointment process, suggests what causes one period to be replaced by another, and details what factors drove appointment politics in different eras. It also urges caution in generalizing from analyses of appointments incorporating features only measurable for more recent years. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While the importance of political appointments is a matter of consensus, theorists and empiricists generally focus on different considerations, such as ideology and confirmation duration, respectively. More recently, there have been efforts to integrate empirical and theoretical scholarship but, to date, no empirical analysis assesses theoretical expectations about the relationship between temporal concerns and nominee ideologies. We fill this gap by examining theoretical predictions and related expectations about how the passage of time affects the President's choices of nominees. We find that executives are disadvantaged as days pass and Presidents propose nominees with whom they are less ideologically compatible over time. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Scholars interested in bargaining over political appointments typically analyze the duration between the candidate’s nomination and eventual disposition, ignoring the prior period between vacancy and nomination. Using a dataset of vacancies reported to the Government Accountability Office, we instead examine the nomination stage. We uncover both commonalities and differences between the dynamics of nomination and those of confirmation. Ideological divergence between the President and the Senate filibuster pivot tends to delay nominations but only under divided government. Presidents not only move more quickly on more important positions, but are also influenced by the ideological leanings of the agencies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]