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A published study reported by Munné using uterine lavage to retrieve in vivo blastocysts for preimplantation genetic testing has been the subject of several technical and ethical critiques. None of these critiques has been based on a review of the study's IRB-approved informed consent. This commentary seeks to do that, examining the Munné (and related Nadal) consent forms for their conformity to existing requirements for a full and informed consent.

The editors of the JRE solicited short essays on the COVID‐19 pandemic from a group of scholars of religious ethics that reflected on how the field might help them make sense of the complex religious, cultural, ethical, and political implications of the pandemic, and on how the pandemic might shape the future of religious ethics.

Following a theoretical prologue that seeks to define and critically understand the moral logics that support head, proportionate and progressive taxation, I examine the presence of each of these taxing options in Jewish and Christian thinking. Beginning with the Hebrew Bible this examination proceeds to the texts and practices of classical (Talmudic) Judaism, the Christian New Testament, and the later Jewish, Roman Catholic, and Protestant teachings that derive from these key textual resources. I conclude that while there are significant differences within and between these traditions, and while each type of taxation has a presence, the advocacy of progressive taxation as a means of serving the least-off members of society and promoting social equality and opportunity is a leitmotif of the biblically informed religious traditions.

Advances in genomic science and reproductive medicine are hastening the day when parents will be able to select or design desired traits for their children. This possibility raises a series of challenging questions: will our ability to choose our children’s biological inheritance deform parenting? Will it diminish children’s freedom by making them creatures of their parents’ whims? Will it widen social divisions, creating a ‘genobility’? Will it recreate the horrors of early twentieth century eugenics? In this perspective article I reply that while these are all important questions, the answers do not necessarily rule out the judicious use of human genetic engineering.

This chapter suggests the attitudes, values, and norms driven by international business are shaping and transforming religiously based local traditions. The global business ethic has the effect of precipitating or accelerating change in the local religious cultural system. The chapter outlines the global business ethic and indicates some of the forces that have led to its emergence. It reviews the ways in which developments in the Japanese context illustrate complex processes of continuity and change in religious ethical systems as they come to terms, through business life, with a larger community of moral relationships. The first component of the global business ethic requires firms doing business on an international level to avoid complicity in bribery and corruption. The second value of this global business ethic is a commitment to nondiscrimination on the basis of race, religion, ethnicity, and gender in the conduct of business.

In an era when lies and misrepresentations about historical events easily become firmly rooted, Michael Sells's discussion illustrates the importance of careful historical research as a moral enterprise. In addition to the skills of the historian, however, there is also room in this enterprise for those of the ethicist. In particular, I warn against confusing the truth or falsity of claims about one narrow historical period with larger questions about the moral meaning and significance of those claims. Illustrating this, I argue one cannot assess the legitimacy of competing nationhood claims solely on the basis of the deeds of specific actors. Nor should the actions of a single individual like the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem be converted into a totalizing claim about the rights of the Palestinian people.

We stand on the brink of unprecedented growth in our ability to understand and change the human genome. New reproductive technologies now enable parents to select some genetic traits for their children, and soon it will be possible to begin to shape ourselves as a species. Despite the loud cries of alarm that such a prospect inspires, Ronald Green argues that we will--and we should--undertake the direction of our own evolution. A leader in the bioethics community, Green offers a scientifically and ethically informed view of human genetic self-modification and the possibilities it opens up for a better future. Fears of a terrible Brave New World or a new eugenics movement are overblown, he maintains, and in the more likely future, genetic modifications may improve parents' ability to enhance children's lives and may even promote social justice. The author outlines the new capabilities of genomic science, addresses urgent questions of safety that genetic interventions pose, and explores questions of parenting and justice. He also examines the religious implications of gene modification. Babies by design are assuredly in the future, Green concludes, and by making responsible choices as we enter that future, we can incorporate gene technology in a new age of human adventure.

A reader picking up Katrien Devolder’s study for guidance in thinking about the ethics of human embryonic stem cell research will be surprised. Devolder actually presents no arguments either for or against such research. Unlike many studies that focus on the moral status of the early embryo, Devolder takes no position on this issue. While an opening chapter details the many medical and scientific benefits of this research, Devolder does not argue that these benefits justify human embryonic stem cell research. Instead, Devolder has a focused ‘‘epistemic’’ objective of critically examining various ‘‘middle-ground’’ positions that have been offered as ways of easing (or escaping) the extreme polarization that has marked the stem cell debate. That polarization is expressed in what Devolder calls ‘‘the Problem’’

Although we need the good witness of others to form our best selves, an argument can be made that we need to study the dark side of the equation as well. The understanding and analysis of bad leaders/misleaders is an important component of leadership studies. However, we argue that bad leaders should never be defined as leaders. Leadership aims at the good of its communities, while misleaders do not. Ethics, therefore, is not only essential to the practice of leadership but to the very meaning of the term.

In mid-June 2009, the Obama administration dissolved the President's Council on Bioethics (PCBE), a group established by President George W. Bush in August 2001 and whose nearly eight-year life was marked from beginning to end by controversy. While some will regret the PCBE's passing, others will regard the Council as a failed experiment in doing public bioethics.

Although the first human embryonic stem cells (hESCs) were produced in 1998, the direction of U.S. policy on stem cell research was set nearly 20 years earlier when the recommendations of a congressionally established Ethics Advisory Board were ignored by the Reagan administration. Thus began an unprecedented and unparalleled 30-year-long history of political intrusions in an area of scientific and biomedical research that has measurable impacts on the health of Americans. Driving these intrusions were religiously informed public policy positions that have usually escaped critical ethical analysis. Here I record my own encounters with this history of intrusions and the thinking behind them.My most abrupt encounter with the politics of stem cell research occurred on September 6, 2006, at a hearing of the Senate Subcommittee on Labor, Health and Human Services and Related Agencies, chaired by Senator Arlen Specter. Just a week before, scientists at Advanced Cell Technology (ACT), a small Massachusetts biotech company, had published a paper in the journal Nature in which they described a method for extracting stem cells from early human embryos while leaving the embryos intact and viable. As head of ACT’s Ethics Advisory Board, I had supported this research.

Science fiction is fast becoming reality as scientists and engineers seek to develop new ways of directly accessing and controlling our brains through brain-computer and even brain-to-brain interfaces. If such research is to receive continuing public approval and support—and not invite opposition—it must anticipate the special ethical challenges it creates. By pointing to some of the acute concerns raised by neural engineering technologies—around issues of identity, normality, authority, responsibility, privacy, and justice—Eran Klein and colleagues model and stimulate the kind of reflection that will be needed as new brain technologies are developed. And yet, as I read their informative discussion, I find myself asking even more questions. One concerns the ethical novelty of these technologies. For example, in terms of questions of identity, normality, responsibility, and authority, how different is deep brain stimulation from the potent psychiatric drugs that have been administered for decades? How different in terms of issues of liability associated with malfunction or misuse are brain-computer interfaces from other complex devices now routinely in use? Neither ethics nor law will have to rethink things from scratch as new neural devices and capabilities are introduced: the groundwork for answering some of these questions has already been laid in a variety of fields from bioethics, to health and product liability law. Nevertheless, I conclude that there are new questions here. It is not simply the fact that neural technologies pose questions of identity, privacy, and the like but that they do so with a degree of intensity that creates qualitatively new challenges.

The core issues explored by transhumanism raise profound questions about the goods and evils that define human existence and about the nature and meaning of human life. Christian faith, too, has long provided answers to questions about the directionality and meaning of human life. In a world brought into being by a loving God, what were we meant to be in our original created nature? Which features of our current experience are the result of the distortions of human sinfulness, and which remain part of our created goodness? What will life be like if our self-created distortions are removed and our eschatological hopes of salvation are realized? In Transhumanism and Transcendence: Christian Hope in an Age of Technological Enhancement, thirteen essays by Christian theologians and ethicists indicate that there are points of convergence and divergence for Christianity and the more ambitious transhumanist visions.

When does benefiting from others' wrongdoing effectively make one a moral accomplice in their evil deeds? If stem cell research lives up to its therapeutic promise, this question (which has previously cropped up in debates over fetal tissue research or the use of Nazi research data) is likely to become a central one for opponents of embryo destruction. I argue that benefiting from wrongdoing is prima facie morally wrong under any of three conditions: (1) when the wrongdoing is one's agent; (2) when acceptance of benefit directly encourages the repetition of the wrongful deed (even though no agency relationship is involved); and (3) when acceptance of a benefit legitimates a wrongful practice. I conclude by showing that, because of the ways in which most embryonic stem cell lines come into being, people who oppose embryo destruction may use human embryonic stem cells without incurring moral blame.

Foreword - Daniel Callahan Suffering and Bioethics: an introduction to the volume - Ronald M. Green and Nathan J. Palpant Part 1: The Nature, Meaning, and Experience of Suffering 1. Suffering and Human Dignity - Eric Cassell 2. Understanding Suffering - Barry Hoffmaster, 3. Paying Homage to the Silence of Suffering - Susan and Gordon Marino 4. Suffering, and the Promise of a World without Pain - Joseph Amato Part 2: Suffering in Biology 5. Social Neuroscience Meets Philosophy: Suffering, Empathy, and Moral Cognition -Jean Decety 6. The Biology of Suffering - Daniel Krashin, Natalia Murinova, Catherine Q. Howe, and Jane Ballantyne 7. What is Suffering and What Sorts of Beings Can Suffer? - David Degrazia Part 3: Suffering in Policy and Law 8. Individual and Social Callousness Toward Human Suffering - Daniel B. Hinshaw, Peter D. Jacobson, and Marisa P. Weisel 9. Human Rights and the Moral Obligation to Alleviate Suffering - Roberto Andorno and Cristiana Baffone 10. Exploring Interactions Between Suffering and the Law - Margaret Somerville Part 4: Worldview Perspectives on Suffering and Medicine 11. Suffering: A Catholic Theological-Ethical View -Lisa Cahill 12. The Orthodox Christian View of Suffering - H. Tristram Engelhardt Jr. 13. Redemptive Suffering Redeemed: A Protestant View of Suffering - Karen Lebacqz 14. Suffering: Reflections from the Jewish Tradition - Laurie Zoloth 15. Human Suffering through Illness in the Context of Islamic Bioethics - Abdulaziz Sachedina 16. Endure, Adapt, or Overcome? The Concept of 'Suffering' in Buddhist Bioethics - Jens Schlieter 17. Human Suffering and the Limits of Secular Bioethics - Mark Cherry Part 5: Suffering in the Ethics of Contemporary Medicine and Biotechnology 18. Reproductive Technology in Suffering's Shadow - Paul Lauritzen 19. Genomic Information and Suffering in the Genomic Era - Roberta Berry 20. Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis and the Prevention of Suffering - Mary Anderlik Majumder Part 6: Concluding Thoughts 21. Suffering and Ethics in an Age of Empowerment - Nathan J. Palpant 22. The Evil of Suffering - Ronald M. Green

Human embryonic stem cell research offers great promise for the treatment of many serious disease conditions in a variety of medical areas, including wound healing. Before this promise can be realized, society and individual researchers, clinicians, and patients will have to answer four ethical questions: 1) Can we ever intentionally destroy a human embryo? 2) Can we benefit from others' destruction of embryos? 3) Can we create an embryo to destroy it? 4) Can we clone human embryos? After outlining the issues raised by each question, the author concludes by indicating his own affirmative answer to each of these questions.

Debates about commodification in bioethics frequently appeal to Kant's famous second formulation of the categorical imperative, the formula requiring us to treat the rational (human) being as "an end in itself" and "never as a means only." In the course of her own treatment of commodification, Margaret Jane Radin observes that Kant's application of this formula "does not generate noncontroversial particular consequences." This is so, I argue, because Kant offers three different--and largely incompatible--interpretations of the formula. One focuses on the obligation to preserve rational willing; the second stresses respect for human (physical) dignity and integrity; the third views respect for others as "ends in themselves" as primarily involving a willingness to govern one's conduct by a procedure of impartial co-legislation. Only the third of these interpretations, I conclude, offers a reasonable and coherent approach to moral judgment about the limits of commodification.

As a “case” in business ethics, the conduct of the firearms industry is hardly dilemmatic. The responsible choices before firearm manufacturers have long been clear, if largely neglected. The great interest here for business ethicists lies in understanding how civil law and ethics can work together to bring a rogue industry under control. Business ethicists have a role to play in shaping the formation of legal standards in this area. In turn, emerging concepts of manufacturers’ liability can make a contribution to the teaching of business ethics.

Early last year, the GenEthics Consortium (GEC) of the Washington Metropolitan Area convened at George Washington University to consider a complex case about genetic testing for Alzheimer disease (AD). The GEC consists of scientists, bioethicists, lawyers, genetic counselors, and consumers from a variety of institutions and affiliations. Four of the 8 co-authors of this paper delivered presentations on the case. Supplemented by additional ethical and legal observations, these presentations form the basis for the following discussion.

A metadisciplinary course prepares students to use the tools of more than one discipline without overwhelming them with the factual material resulting from the use of these tools. In addition, it gives the student the opportunity to view the strengths and weaknesses of disciplinary methodologies in relationship to those of other systems and thus places the information derived through the use of these methodologies in context

The science of reproductive and therapeutic cloning has stirred heated ethical debates. Some of the fears and apprehensions are based on misconceptions of the science, but others are real and substantial. It may be ethically possible to undertake reproductive cloning once the direct physiological risks of cloning are reduced to the level of current assisted reproductive technologies, but this should be done only in a research context with careful monitoring and follow-up of children and families.

This case is another in a series intended to highlight the new questions emerging from advances in mapping the human genome and the application of genetic findings to clinical practice. The National Human Genome Research Institute, a component of the National Institutes of Health, by law is directed to designate a portion of its annual budget to furthering understanding of the ethical, legal, and social questions emerging from research on the human genome. As part of the effort, the Institute supports research by scientists and scholars around the nation with the aim of clarifying and resolving the tough ethical and research choices facing this endeavor. But recently it has launched an intramural program, which is expected to take a catalytic role in grappling with the array of issues the researchers face in carrying out investigations in human genetics.

Religious traditions of medical ethics tend to differ from more secular approaches by stressing limitations on autonomous decision-making, by more positively valuing the experience of suffering, and by drawing on beliefs and values that go beyond empiric verification. I trace the impact of these differences for some of the world's great religious traditions with respect to four issues: (1) religious conscientious objection to medical treatments; (2) end-of life decision-making, including euthanasia, physician-assisted suicide, and the withholding or withdrawing of life-sustaining treatments; (3) definitions of moral personhood (defining life's beginning and end); and (4) human sexuality.