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When offering constructions of political values, it is common to generally strive for unity, i.e., to aim at principled definitions and the reduction of normative conflict. In this article, by contrast, I argue that we should aim to construct broad and conflicting concepts of the central liberal democratic values of liberty and equality. Taking my cue from an under-appreciated debate between Ronald Dworkin and Bernard Williams, I suggest that the demand for unity derives its appeal from a juridical model of political value construction, which assumes the unified perspective of public decision-making. But while this model may be apt for constructing institutional rights, the construction of the political values liberty and equality had better operate according to a political model, which focuses on the perspective of citizens that live in a relationship of political opposition. Not only is there no demand for unity from that perspective, but there is a positive demand for political plurality: we need to draw on broad and conflicting concepts of liberty and equality if we are to respect the claims of fellow citizens with whom we have value-based political disagreements. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Journal for Religion in Education / Religionspädagogische Beiträge is the property of Arbeitsgemeinschaft Katholische Religionspadagogik & Katechetik (AKRK) and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This paper aims to analyze whether there is a dialogue between the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and the Supreme Federal Court in the judgment of ADPF 130. The task initially requires that what is freedom of expression from Ronald Dworkin be established, and then analyze the following precedents of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights: the case of Palamara vs. Chile and the Kimel vs. Argentina. The purpose is to assess whether the STF in the ADPF 130 decision applies and interprets the American Convention in an abstract way or whether it respects the interpretative logic built by the Court from its precedents around the matter of freedom of expression. Finally, it will be approached that there is a two-way resistance to establish the dialogue between the two Cortes. It is concluded that the protection system both internally and internationally should promote greater cooperation to improve the understanding of human rights protection. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Yıldırım Beyazıt Law Review (YBLR) is the property of Ankara Yildirim Beyazit University Law School and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

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This paper argues that although Dworkin’s aim of developing a more practical understanding of moral truth is plausible, his attempt to do that while keeping the concept of moral objectivity remains deeply problematic. Because of its opposition to everything subjective, moral objectivity stands in an inherent conflict with the practical reality that we experience as persons from a first-person perspective; therefore, Dworkin’s attempt to reconceptualize moral objectivity from within a first-person perspective is inherently contradictory. The paper suggests that we should go one step further than Dworkin and give up the concept of moral objectivity altogether. A notion of moral certainty instead of moral objectivity would satisfy Dworkin’s intention of finding a practical conception of moral truth more adequately. A brief preliminary conception of it is developed while invoking the German philosopher Robert Spaemann’s ontology of a person.

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In this article, I argue that Dworkin's one-system view of law and morality is not as easy to refute or dismiss as some would suggest. In a recent article, Dindjer criticizes a new kind of opposition to legal positivism characterized by both its opposition to a two-system view of law and morality and its promotion of a one-system alternative picture. By re-examining Dworkin's criticisms of the two-system view and by providing additional reasoning of my own, I show that Dworkin's one-system interpretative approach is not just sensible but also promising in refocusing contemporary debates in general jurisprudence on a moral and political reading of the structural features of law. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A presente pesquisa tem como objetivo discutir a construção da teoria de interpretação judicial de Jürgen Habermas, considerando a maneira que este filósofo se vale das ideias de Ronald Dworkin e de Klaus Günther. Utiliza do método indutivo baseado nas obras dos teóricos mencionados. Identifica que Habermas considera como insuficiente os métodos tradicionais da interpretação e que é necessário resolver a questão interna entre facticidade e validade que se dá no discurso jurídico. Visualiza que Habermas utiliza da teoria de Ronald Dworkin para resolver o primeiro estágio da referida tensão a partir do recurso aos princípios e do direito como integridade. Compreende que Habermas se vale da teoria de Klaus Günther para dividir os discursos de validade dos discursos de adequação, permitindo separar os discursos jurídicos dos discursos morais. Entende que Habermas constrói uma teoria que tem base procedimental e parte da aplicação do princípio do discurso a partir do direito processual. Ao final, conclui que Habermas traz uma proposta teórica generalista, baseada em releitura procedimental de Ronald Dworkin e que deixa uma lacuna para ser preenchida quanto à dinâmica dos discursos jurídicos.

O discurso de ódio é um problema importante para o debate jurídico brasileiro. A sua reverberação pode ser vista como reflexo do nosso passado, recheado de injustiças contra grupos minoritários. Ocorre que é um argumento famoso na teoria política estadunidense de cunho liberal a ideia de que o discurso de ódio estaria abarcado pela liberdade de expressão, cabendo a sua restrição prévia apenas em casos de incitação direta à violência. Este artigo busca problematizar essa tese. Propõe-se que a tolerância é um bem comum e difuso que gera direitos a todos, em função de ser condição para o exercício da autonomia que acompanha o status moral da dignidade humana. O discurso de ódio volta-se a dilapidar esse bem, gerando uma situação de limitação injusta da autonomia das pessoas à qual o discurso se volta. O trabalho parte dos argumentos de Jeremy Waldron no livro “The harm in the hate speech” (2012), apoiados na teoria da justiça de John Rawls, para fins de promover uma crítica fundada em princípios de justiça à corrente liberal, aqui resumida a partir dos argumentos de Ronald Dworkin. Após a exposição da tese de Waldron contra Dworkin, propõe-se uma releitura dos seus argumentos em consonância com uma teoria dos bens, para fins de elucidar a natureza da relação política que une pessoas de diferentes grupos e origens, obrigando-as a produzir e garantir a manutenção de um ambiente político de tolerância.

In this article, I present a two-pronged argument for the immorality of contemporary, asymmetric drone warfare, based on my new interpretations of the just war principles of "proportionality" and "moral equivalence of combatants" (MEC). The justification for these new interpretations is that drone warfare continues to this day, having survived despite arguments against it that are based on traditional interpretations of just war theory (including one from Michael Walzer). On the basis of my argument, I echo Harry Van der Linden's call for "an international treaty banning all weaponized UAV [uninhabited aerial vehicles]". [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Quaestio Iuris (QI) is the property of Editora da Universidade do Estado do Rio de Janeiro (EdUERJ) and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Since the publication of Shoshana Zuboff's The Age of Surveillance Capitalism, the strategies of Surveillance Capitalists and appropriate responses to them have become common points of discussion across several fields. However, there is relatively little literature addressing challenges that Surveillance Capitalism raises for the foundations of law. This article outlines Surveillance Capitalism and then compares the views of Thomas Aquinas and Ronald Dworkin in four areas: truth and reality, reality and law, interpretation and social custom, and virtue and law; finally, it closes by asking whether the law alone can provide a sufficient response to Surveillance Capitalism. The overarching argument of the article is that, while Aquinas's view of the foundations of law accounts for and responds to the challenges of Surveillance Capitalism more effectively than Dworkin's, law alone cannot provide a sufficient response to this emerging phenomenon. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

According to Dworkin, "truth" is an interpretative concept. Why? Moral judgements are often the subject of disagreement because they are often the result of divergent conceptual understandings. If, on the other hand, we want to interpret concepts correctly, we have to deal with the analysis of the underlying values we attach to these concepts. Dworkin understands the true as a matter of interpretation, which—and this is often misunderstood—is capable of producing a correct conception of the truth. The truth is thereby directly related to justice. Dworkin even ties his theory of interpretation to an objective truth that can only produce conclusive reasons for a specific advocacy of a particular position in an argument after responsible and intensive debate—in the sense of his two-stage theory. In fact, it turns out that Dworkin's search for and conception of an objective truth describes a (historical) process. We interpret what our ancestors have already interpreted and continue to understand (in a modified way). This reflexive responsibility is ours to bear; according to Dworkin, it is our responsibility to always stand up for truth through good arguments. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This contribution is based on the Chinese concept called Moulüe. A unique feature of Moulüe, without parallel in Western praxis-oriented schools of thinking, is its Yin-Yang dimension. The two hemispheres of the Yin-Yang symbol, a white one and a black one, are inseparably interconnected. According to the Moulüe concept, the white hemisphere is the place of transparent, conventional, legal ways to solve problems, whereas the black hemisphere harbors hidden agendas, and unconventional, cunning methods to solve problems, with the 36 stratagems as a central component. A person with Moulüe competence who is confronted with a problem can switch from options for action in one hemisphere to options for action in the other according to the circumstances. This contribution shows how the realization of justice, and the spreading of truth, can be achieved based on Moulüe skill which enables the application of the 36 stratagems. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Artykuł dotyczy przekrojowego zarysu rozwoju nurtu niepozytywistycznego w filozofii prawa, zaczynając od niemieckiej powojennej filozofii społecznej. W artykule o tej tematyce nie mogło zabraknąć obszerniejszego opracowania dotyczącego filozofii Gustawa Radbrucha i jego słynnej formuły, która sprowadza się do postulatu o koniecznym oparciu prawa stanowionego o prawo naturalne. Kolejna część artykułu dotyczy kilku autorów, których można uznać za prekursorów bądź kontynuatorów myśli niepozytywistycznej, wliczając w to Ronalda Dworkina z jego teorią zasad prawnych. W zakończeniu ujęta została ogólna refleksja na temat debat naukowych, które często bazują na niezrozumieniu stanowiska oponentów.

The doctrine of the sanctity of life has traditionally been characterised as a Judeo‐Christian doctrine that has it that bodily human life is an intrinsic good and that it is always impermissible to kill an innocent human. Abortion and euthanasia are often assumed to violate the doctrine. The doctrine is usually understood as being derived from religious dogma and, as such, not amenable to debate. I show that this characterisation of the doctrine is problematic in a number of ways, and I go on to rethink the doctrine. In doing so I follow in the footsteps of Ronald Dworkin, who offered a characterisation of the doctrine in his 1993 Life's Dominion, drawing on a conceptualisation of sacredness that is radically different from standard ones and not dependent on religious dogma. I'll argue that although Dworkin's efforts have much to recommend, his conceptualisation of sacredness is inadequate. Dworkin attempted to reconceptualise sacredness 'from the armchair'. Here I explain how sacred values are thought of in anthropology and psychology and argue that the sanctity of human life should be understood in the same way. I'll explain how doing so allows us to resolve a number of conceptual problems that bedevil standard characterisations of the doctrine of the sanctity of life. I'll also consider the possibility of a compromise over the sanctity of human life, and as a consequence, compromise over the permissibility of abortion and euthanasia. I'll argue that such compromise is possible, albeit difficult to achieve. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Quaestio Iuris (QI) is the property of Editora da Universidade do Estado do Rio de Janeiro (EdUERJ) and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

According to Ronald Dworkin's mature views on jurisprudence, legal normativity depends on judges' views about political morality. Plato's own mature views on this subject seem to take the contrary position as he claims that the law is expected to be authoritative in order to preserve a given state of affairs. Therefore, in Plato's view judges are not expected to interpret the law ubiquitously according to their own standards of political morality. In what follows, the discussion starts off by offering a brief account of Dworkin's interpretivism and some of its shortcomings. We shall then move on to Plato's account of legal normativity, especially his views on the authority of law, law as preservation, and finally the politics of law in the light of the debate between conservatism and progressivism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Explica seis pontos fundamentais do debate entre Hart e Dworkin e relaciona este debate com dois problemas relevantes para uma teoria social crítica. Os pontos do debate são distribuídos em três círculos. O círculo externo diz respeito à existência de um (regras) ou de dois (regras e princípios) padrões jurídicos, bem como à existência e abrangência de uma regra de reconhecimento. O círculo intermediário toca nos temas do sentido, amplitude e inevitabilidade da discricionariedade judicial e da relação entre Direito e moral. O círculo interno, por fim, envolve o problema dos desacordos teóricos e da diferenciação entre dois tipos (descritivo e interpretativo) de teoria do Direito. Já os problemas relevantes para uma teoria social crítica são, primeiro, suas relações com os estádios do capitalismo em geral e do liberalismo em especial; e, segundo, suas respectivas posições acerca das conquistas das lutas jurídicas subalternas do Séc. XX.

In this essay I will draw from moral philosopher Bernard Williams to criticise the claim made by Ronald Dworkin that legal obligations are a particular kind of moral obligations. In Section 2 I will explain Dworkin’s argument in favour of legal obligations as moral obligations. This starts with a picture of the “moral community” and relies heavily on Dworkins’ interpretive method. In Section 3 I will criticise Dworkin’s theory for its reliance on unwarranted claims about practical reasoning and the powers of morality. I will adopt a more constructive tone in 4, as I will outline an alternative view that recognises the richness of the point of view of concrete agents. The gist of the criticism developed in the essay is that Dworkin endorses an overly moralised view on obligations, a view that ignores that people can genuinely feel obligated by demands that are not moral.

This paper focuses on the study of Ronald Dworkin and Human dignity as the highest constitutional value. Ronald Myles Dworkin (1931-2013), a famous American philosopher, jurist, and scholar of the United States constitutional law believes that constitutional provisions are permeated with moral principles and that human dignity is an intrinsic constitutional value, and that it must be consideredin judicial decisions. Dworkin has his concept of rights, arguing that rights constitute claims against the state,and he espouses the idea that it is forbidden to sacrifice individual needs and preferences to achieve the public interest. That is, there are rights that the state cannot derogate from or violate, whatever the rationalizations and justifications. Dworkincategorically affirms that people have the right to be treated with dignity and that rights have an exceptional moral force that stems from the importance of human dignity, and that leads to preventing the formulation and implementation of specific policies even if they aim to enhance the general welfare of society. Consequently, his thoughts and reflections in this regard constitute a solid philosophical basis for the recognition of human dignity as the highest constitutional value.

Legal Pluralism and One Right Answer are two prominent theories within jurisprudence. The former proposition is a theoretical construct primarily posited by John Griffiths, while the latter is an outstanding thesis advanced by Ronald Dworkin. Nevertheless, a comparative analysis of these two theories has been limited to determine the optimal approach. This article compares two ideas in their efficacy in resolving challenging cases. The premise posits that Legal Pluralism is a suitable counterpoint to Ronald Dworkin's One Right Answer and is a superior method for addressing intricate matters. The article additionally illustrates the domains in which the two theories have undergone legal evaluation.

O artigo examina as bases hermenêuticas do que está no cerne do Código de Processo Civil brasileiro: os precedentes judiciais incorporados pela civil law oriundos do common law. Observa-se a necessidade de evidenciar a inadequação dos precedentes judiciais à teoria clássica do ordenamento, pois os precedentes resistem ao positivismo normativista e ao formalismo. O objetivo é trazer à luz a forçosa redução na estrutura precedentalista, de modo a harmonizá-la, a todo custo, à forma de um dispositivo legal. Sob a égide de que precedente não deve ser estudado e aplicado como norma geral e abstrata, é preciso evidenciar que existe um conjunto de elementos a serem balizados na estruturação da força hermenêutica a circundar o precedente judicial. Ainda, é importante a interligação da hermenêutica em que não existe separação entre interpretar e aplicar, na contramão do que propõe a doutrina contemporânea. Para complementar, optou-se pelo referencial teórico do Direito como integridade de Ronald Dworkin, firmando uma pesquisa com emprego de abordagem qualitativa e método hipotético-dedutivo e dialético. Conclui-se que a integridade exige que os juízes construam seus argumentos integrados ao conjunto do Direito, sedimentando uma garantia contra arbitrariedades e efetivando os freios.

Este trabalho tem por objetivo apresentar a peça shakespeariana Medida por Medida, em especial abordar o papel do juiz Ângelo que atua, em um primeiro momento, como juiz servo da lei, mas posteriormente, de modo a atender seus interesses pessoais, manifesta a sua vontade de decidir arbitrariamente. Ainda, o presente estudo busca compreender a abordagem positivista de tomada de decisão, para então levantar uma crítica ao positivismo jurídico consoante a teoria de Ronald Dworkin. O presente estudo se deu por meio de uma abordagem qualitativa e descritiva, com pesquisa bibliográfica em revistas jurídicas, artigos e livros.

This study aims to verify if the decisions given by the Supreme Labor Court, in the demands related to the protection of workers' personal data, are adequate to Ronald Dworkin's theory of decidability, answering the question: is it possible to state that the decisions of the TST in cases involving the informational self-determination of the worker are adequate to the notion of law as a whole and coherent system? The research uses a phenomenological hermeneutic approach, concluding that the jurisprudence of the TST was partially adequate to Dworkin's theory, sometimes failing to provide a consistent foundation in the face of conflicting fundamental rights.

O presente trabalho analisa, a partir do RE nº 657.718/MG, a existência de desacordos morais entre o Executivo e o Judiciário, e como esses Poderes têm se posicionado para solucionar essas questões. Busca-se compreender em que consistem os descordos de moralidade entre esses Poderes, elucidando que o Judiciário não tem sido o espaço mais adequado para a solução dessas controvérsias, haja vista a existência de uma cultura institucional em deliberar de forma pragmática e não integrativa, aplicando a teoria da decisão judicial desenvolvida por Ronald Dworkin de forma parcial. Com isso, concluiu-se que para aprimorar a solução de desacordos morais entre Executivo e Judiciário deve-se recorrer à utilização dos diálogos interinstitucionais. O diálogo possibilita a construção de decisões mais integradas ao ordenamento jurídico, bem como permite que se compreenda de forma mais adequada os contornos da divergência moral. No caso do RE nº 657.718/MG, identificou-se que os Ministros apresentaram uma compreensão errônea do desacordo. Para o desenvolvimento do presente trabalho, utilizou-se a metodologia indutiva, qualitativa, com análise bibliográfica e documental, mediante coleta de dados secundários, o que se deu com a degravação da sessão plenária de julgamento do RE nº 657.718/MG.

ABSTRACT: The paper is a dialogue with Dworkin’s posthumous book, Religion Without God. Firstly, I intend to reconstruct accurately Dworkin’s argument in the book and in other recent writings, then I try to scrutinize how the dworkinian idea of a general right to ethical independence, instead of a special right to religious freedom, would apply in a concrete situation. Secondly, I analyze two objections that religious conservatives might advance against Dworkin’s liberal project. The first objection claims that the author unsuitably imports to religion a distinction between fact and value that is typical of philosophy, but not of religiosity. The second objection affirms that religion is a basic good of reflexive character, and not something individualistic as Dworkin defends. My conclusion is that religious freedom is a problem that demands a political solution, and that perhaps the most respectful position towards religion would recognize that some parts of it might be sacrificed in the name of other values we believe important.

This paper explores how the Colombian Constitutional Court has used the legal and political philosophy of Ronald Dworkin to show that the use of the concepts of rights as trump cards, individual autonomy, and state neutrality, have configured the reception of egalitarian liberalism. This conclusion is reached by means of an analysis of the meaning and use of these concepts in certain judicial decisions and of personal interviews with certain head justices and law clerks of said Court, which also made it possible to frame this question within the larger issue of the relationship of philosophy to the decisions of the judges.

El presente artículo hace un estudio de la jurisprudencia de la Corte Constitucional de Colombia sobre el derecho al Sabbath de los miembros de la Iglesia Adventista del Séptimo Día. La metodología adoptada consiste en el análisis dinámico de precedentes propuesto por Diego López Medina en El derecho de los jueces (2009), en el que presenta algunas herramientas para trabajar con la jurisprudencia estructuradamente. Aquí se reconstruyen estas herramientas y, sobre esa base, se estudia el problema de los miembros de la Iglesia Adventista del Séptimo Día de disfrutar o no el Sabbath a partir del argumento de los principios de Dworkin. El artículo se divide en tres secciones: la primera, contiene la reconstrucción de la metodología enunciada. La segunda, contiene el estudio del precedente sobre el Sabbath, cuyo resultado es la línea jurisprudencial y la presentación de la gráfica que la contiene. En la última sección se entabla un diálogo entre el balance jurisprudencial fijado y la teoría de los principios de Dworkin contenida en Los derechos en serio (2012a).

Since the publication of Shoshana Zuboff’s The Age of Surveillance Capitalism, the strategies of Surveillance Capitalists and appropriate responses to them have become common points of discussion across several fields. However, there is relatively little literature addressing challenges that Surveillance Capitalism raises for the foundations of law. This article outlines Surveillance Capitalism and then compares the views of Thomas Aquinas and Ronald Dworkin in four areas: truth and reality, reality and law, interpretation and social custom, and virtue and law; finally, it closes by asking whether the law alone can provide a sufficient response to Surveillance Capitalism. The overarching argument of the article is that, while Aquinas’s view of the foundations of law accounts for and responds to the challenges of Surveillance Capitalism more effectively than Dworkin’s, law alone cannot provide a sufficient response to this emerging phenomenon.

O artigo busca apresentar o processo de ingresso diferenciado para as minorias raciais como proposta de implementação de uma igualdade com base na teoria dworkiniana, abordando especificamente o processo seletivo criado pela rede varejista Magazine Luiza para o seu programa de trainee, restrito a candidatos negros. Dados demonstram que os negros estão em piores condições que os brancos em relação a bens e recursos no Brasil, havendo um cenário de exclusão social que os leva à condição de vulneráveis. O combate às práticas discriminatórias deve abranger, além de estratégias repressivas, medidas compensatórias que possam acelerar o processo da busca pela igualdade. A pesquisa, de cunho eminentemente teórico, envolvendo o método dedutivo, abordagem qualitativa e técnica de pesquisa bibliográfica e documental, conclui que as ações afirmativas, tais como a implementada pela Magazine Luiza, funcionam como instrumentos para a promoção da igualdade de recursos, nos termos propostos por Ronald Dworkin.

Zusammenfassung: Das jüngste Urteil des Bundesverfassungsgerichts zur Beihilfe zur Selbsttötung ist bei Kirchen und Ärztevertretern auf deutliche Ablehnung gestoßen. Auch der ehemalige Vorsitzende des Deutschen Ethikrats hat das Urteil scharf kritisiert. Die Vehemenz dieser Kritik deutet darauf hin, dass sich der Gegensatz zwischen Verteidigern und Gegnern des Vorrangs der Selbstbestimmung einer Person im Hinblick auf ihr eigenes Lebensende verhärtet hat. Um einen Ausweg aus diesem Patt zu finden, muss die Streitfrage in anderen Begriffen formuliert werden als in denen des Rechts und der kategorischen Gebote. Wichtige Hinweise dazu liefern Ronald Dworkins Überlegungen zur Ursache moralischer Konflikte.

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Copyright of Revista de Direitos Fundamentais & Democracia is the property of Revista de Direitos Fundamentais & Democracia and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Este artigo tem por objetivo elucidar a semelhança do direito com a literatura e conhecer a proposta do Direito como integridade de Ronald Dworkin,dentro da qual ele compreende o Direito como um conceito interpretativo na defesa da tese da única resposta correta. Para isso, recorre-se a uma revisão bibliográfica sintetizada nas obras do referido autor, bem como artigos publicados em revistas científicas e produções acadêmicas. Nessa seara, o intuito foi apresentar a proposta de Dworkin segundo a qual ele sustenta que a prática jurídica é um exercício de interpretação de maneira geral, para isso faz-se um aporte à literatura de modo a propiciar um melhor entendimento da atividade interpretativa. Foi utilizada a metodologia dedutiva com revisão da literatura acerca do tema.

O presente trabalho objetiva analisar juridicamente políticas de ações afirmativas em meio à teoria da justiça de Ronald Dworkin, que se situa na doutrina denominada igualitarismo liberal. Primeiramente, apresenta-se a concepção dworkiniana de igualdade e como programas de cotas, se eficientes, podem servir a essa abordagem. Em um segundo momento, distinguem-se as questões de política e de princípio, demonstrando a importância de tal distinção do ponto de vista do direito e como ela pode conferir legitimidade jurídica às ações afirmativas. Adiante, são introduzidas possíveis interpretações que a Constituição dos Estados Unidos pode conferir ao direito à não discriminação racial. Por fim, as duas últimas seções são dedicadas à distinção entre dois tipos de igualdade e à análise de direitos potencialmente contrários às políticas de cotas. É concluído que programas de ações afirmativas são legítimos a partir da perspectiva do igualitarismo liberal, assim como da ótica do direito.