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Extant research in comparative politics has examined the role of institutional frameworks such as constitutional design, the nature of the electoral systems, parliamentarism and federalism on the quality of governance. Understanding variations on effective democratic governance has assumed a state-centric approach that has largely neglected how strong legislatures can drastically affect political outcomes. This study finds empirical evidence that the strength of national legislatures (in terms of its influence over the executive, institutional autonomy, its specified powers and institutional capacity) is correlated to effective democratic governance as measured by voice and accountability, governmental effectiveness, regulatory quality, control of corruption and rule of law entrenchment based on a cross-national analysis of 150 countries with available data from the period 1996–2016. The results hold even when the sample is restricted to developing countries, where party systems are more likely to be under-institutionalized. A sensitivity analysis also confirms that the relationship between strong legislatures and effective democratic governance is not attenuated or conditioned by its interactive effect with other institutional arrangements. Implications suggest that the substantive strength of national legislatures promotes higher levels of democratic accountability, and that the international community must focus on frameworks that strengthen global legislatures to avert political instability and creeping authoritarianism.

Critics of Philippine democracy have pointed out that the unitary system employed since the country became a sovereign state in 1946 led to the prolonged underdevelopment of sub-national regions (provinces). Hence, policy makers have put forward the argument that a shift to a Federal system is necessary because of the imperial Manila syndrome. This is the notion that political, economic, and social underdevelopment is more prevalent the farther away a province is from the capital, Metro-Manila, which has been a longstanding theory of ‘core-periphery’ dynamics in political geography. Using sub-national data derived from Philippine provinces, the study finds that provinces farther away from Manila in terms of geodesic distance are indeed disadvantaged not only in terms of economic, poverty, and human development indicators, but also in terms of dependence on internal revenue allotments which inhibits local growth. Physical distance from the capital also decreases rural funds for provincial development. The implications suggest that a Federal arrangement can promote peripheral growth and development, but it certainly is not a panacea.

Since the election of Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte in 2016, extra-judicial killings (EJKs, hereafter) have become commonplace as a result of his administration’s declaration of war on drugs. Empirical cross-national work on examining determinants behind state repression remains scant especially in understanding the phenomenon at the sub-national level. This study investigates what accounts for variations on EJKs at the level of Philippine provinces. Using monthly panel-data for 62 provinces and employing various count-model regressions, the findings indicate that Philippine provinces which have large populations, stronger state capacity, and are more affluent in terms of the human development index are more likely to exhibit higher rates of EJKs. Furthermore, the vote share of the President in the 2016 elections and presidential visits to specific provinces are correlated with higher incidences of EJKs—corroborating theories on delegative democracies and penal populism. Lastly, it is found that drug-prone provinces are more likely to experience a higher share of human rights violations in terms of EJKs, compared to provinces that have lower affectation rates. The implications suggest that the Philippine war on drugs seem to promote vertical accountability as international criticism and domestic opposition mounts.

Migrant remittances have been linked to improving the quality of government and political accountability in the developing world. The argument is that migrants have the capacity to withhold remittances to their families when they deem that their local governments are blighted with corruption and bureaucratic inefficiency. Relatedly, migrants also empower citizens in sub-national regions by providing funds to family members who become less beholden to clientistic ties with political parties which concomitantly foster state-level corruption. Thus, relatives of migrants also become social agents who will increasingly expect better governmental performance and demand higher levels of political accountability at the sub-national level. Using data provided by the Philippine National Statistics Office and the National Statistical Coordinating Board of the Philippines (NSCB hereafter), the study provides empirical evidence that the number of migrants (by province) and the amount of remittances sent by migrants are positively associated with governmental effectiveness and higher levels of human development at the provincial level. It is also found that opportunistic shirking on the part of the sub-national governments is also not occurring, as remittances also induce provincial governments to spend more on their citizens, which will likely lead to better public goods provision. The overall findings imply that just like their counterparts from other developing countries, Filipino migrants are agents of democratic accountability.

The presence of failed states in the international system has increased, especially after the end of the cold war. Recent research demonstrates that state fragility and failure are strongly influenced by regime type, political instability, and economic growth. But these studies do not highlight the possibility that state fragility/failure is a function of historical path dependency. To address its prevalence and persistence in the modern world, we must focus on the unique histories of nation-states and examine how the colonial past may have led to substandard institutions and problematic state-society relations. Using an extensive dataset of nation-states in the developing world in order to conduct panel regression analyses, I find that state failure is largely a function of variations in the type of colonial rule and the duration of colonial control. British or Spanish rule, as well as the relative absence of European intervention into the polity, is associated with a lower risk of state failure, while French or Portuguese rule is associated with a higher risk. The findings imply that we need to reconsider our understanding of state failure; its very existence and persistence in the modern world are influenced by the historical process of colonialism and its institutional legacies.