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By personal freedom I mean the "Kantian" capacity of bringing about spontaneously a new series of events. It is characterized by three conditions: there is an alternative, the explanation of the process needs to use action-words, deterministic laws cannot contain such expressions. The will is not a particular cause, but only a dependent moment in the process. Causality of freedom should be defined by the logical structure of the involved laws. Actions can be explained, but only ex post. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The author expresses broad agreement with Geert Keil's concept of free will as outlined in the opening article of this journal. Rather than accept Keil's notion of a "capacity-based" idea of decision-making within bounds of natural law, the author claims no such closed system exists. Further, all decisions are directed toward "becoming" in an uncertain but open future, and that a "now" is only something physically indeterminate between a past and a future.