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The significance of Maurice's refusal to become count and duke in the United Provinces became clear with his death. Had he taken the crown when it was within his grasp, his brother Frederick Henry would have succeeded him as stadholder by established right. Now, however, Frederick Henry did not step at once into his brother's boots, but had to wait for the States to act. There was no question about his succession in command of the army. He had been named deputy commander on 12 April, when Maurice's incapacity and approaching death had become evident, and then, when his brother was no more, he was appointed captain-general of the Union by the States General, as they had promised Maurice they would do. His command was therefore more extensive than Maurice's had been, for it included all troops in the service of the States General, including those in the northern provinces, where, however, all significant military operations had ceased. There was discontent in some of the provinces that the States General had not waited for their customary prior approval, but Holland pressed for Frederick Henry's universal command over the troops of the Union. The haste with which Frederick Henry was given command came from two concerns. One was that no opportunity be given to the Spaniards to exploit a period of uncertainty. It was bad enough that they took Breda on 5 June; but Spinola was a bold general whose enterprising spirit there was every reason to fear. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In terms of territory and dependencies, the Spanish monarchy in early modern times was essentially a Mediterranean and trans-Atlantic empire. It extended across the southern flank of Europe and included an immense portion of the New World. Yet, paradoxically, during most of the age of Spanish greatness, the principal strategic pivot and main military base of the monarchy was located far from both the main territorial blocs of which the empire was composed – in northern Europe. In the opening decades of Spain's ascendancy down to the 1530s, its principal armies operated in Italy or the Iberian peninsula itself. But from the 1540s onwards, for well over a century, the Spanish crown chose to concentrate its military might, resources and expenditure, and thus its capacity to influence international affairs, in the Low Countries. This remarkable enduring strategic posture ceased only with the peace of the Pyrenees (1659) when Spain definitively lost its place at the head of the European powers, to France, and turned its efforts to attempting to recover Portugal. There were several reasons for this, at first sight, rather illogical choice of main strategic base but the most compelling, during much of this long period, was the need to combat French power and influence, France being Spain's chief rival for hegemony in Europe. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When on 1 July 1701 Marlborough left England with William his role was to act as the king's deputy. The dual appointments which he held also reflected a situation in which war against France was highly likely, but not yet inevitable. As ambassador extraordinary he received instructions to negotiate with French and Spanish diplomats at the Hague for a settlement on what by later standards were very generous terms – a French evacuation of the Spanish Netherlands and satisfaction to the Emperor for his claims. His instructions did not spell these out because it was for Marlborough to negotiate them in working out the terms of the Grand Alliance. Secondly, as commander-in-chief of the English and Scottish forces assembling in the Dutch Republic Marlborough was to assume the active role of general which William's failing health made it impossible for him to sustain. However William would still have been in the background, and had he lived longer would certainly have intervened, a serious complication which Marlborough was spared. William's choice of Marlborough, despite their mutual dislike and past antagonisms, was dictated by the king's life-long commitment to subordinate all personal considerations to the mission of containing and reducing the excessive and aggressive power of France. William knew that the recent parliamentary and journalistic onslaughts against the employment of foreign soldiers made it impossible to nominate a Dutch general, such as the experienced Athlone (Ginkel) or the royal favourite Albemarle to whom he had recently given the Garter, still withheld from Marlborough. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]