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The start of the cholera epidemic in Haiti quickly highlighted the necessity of the implementation of an Alert and Response (A&R) System to complement the existing national surveillance system. The national system had been able to detect and confirm the outbreak etiology but required external support to monitor the spread of cholera and coordinate response, because much of the information produced was insufficiently timely for real-time monitoring and directing of a rapid, targeted response. The A&R System was designed by the Pan American Health Organization/World Health Organization in collaboration with the Haiti Ministry of Health, and it was based on a network of partners, including any institution, structure, or individual that could identify, verify, and respond to alerts. The defined objectives were to (1) save lives through early detection and treatment of cases and (2) control the spread through early intervention at the community level. The operational structure could be broken down into three principle categories: (1) alert (early warning), (2) verification and assessment of the information, and (3) efficient and timely response in coordination with partners to avoid duplication. Information generated by the A&R System was analyzed and interpreted, and the qualitative information was critical in qualifying the epidemic and defining vulnerable areas, particularly because the national surveillance system reported incomplete data for more than one department. The A&R System detected a number of alerts unrelated to cholera and facilitated rapid access to that information. The sensitivity of the system and its ability to react quickly was shown in May of 2011, when an abnormal increase in alerts coming from several communes in the Sud-Est Department in epidemiological weeks (EWs) 17 and 18 were noted and disseminated network-wide and response activities were implemented. The national cholera surveillance system did not register the increase until EWs 21 and 22, and the information did not become available until EWs 23 and 24, when the peak of cases had already been reached. Although many of the partners reporting alerts during the peak of the cholera epidemic have since left Haiti, the A&R System has continued to function as an Early Warning (EWARN) System, and it continues to be developed with recent activities, such as the distribution of cell phones to enhance alert communication.

The World Health Organization's revised International Health Regulations (IHR (2005)) call for member state compliance by mid-2012. Variation in disease surveillance and core public health capacities will affect each member state's ability to meet this deadline. We report on topics presented at the preconference workshop, “The Interaction of Disease Surveillance and the International Health Regulations,” held at the 2010 International Society for Disease Surveillance conference in Park City, Utah. Presenters were from the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO), the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), the Armed Forces Health Surveillance Center, U.S. Naval Research Unit Six, the Philippines' National Epidemiologic Center, and the French armed forces. The topics addressed were: an overview of the revised IHRs; disease surveillance systems implemented in Peru, the Philippines, and by the French armed forces; the capacity building efforts ...

From August 2000 through January 2001, a large epidemic of Ebola hemorrhagic fever occurred in Uganda, with 425 cases and 224 deaths. Starting from three laboratoryconfirmed cases, we traced the chains of transmission for three generations, until we reached the primary casepatients (i.e., persons with an unidentified source of infection). We then prospectively identified the other contacts in whom the disease had developed. To identify the risk factors associated with transmission, we interviewed both healthy and ill contacts (or their proxies) who had been reported by the case-patients (or their proxies) and who met the criteria set for contact tracing during surveillance. The patterns of exposure of 24 case-patients and 65 healthy contacts were defined, and crude and adjusted prevalence proportion ratios (PPR) were estimated for different types of exposure. Contact with the patient’s body fluids (PPR = 4.61%, 95% confidence interval 1.73 to 12.29) was the strongest risk factor, although transmission through fomites also seems possible.

The within-outbreak diversity of hepatitis E virus (HEV) was studied during the outbreak of hepatitis E that occurred in Sudan in 2004. Specimens were collected from internally displaced persons living in a Sudanese refugee camp and two camps implanted in Chad. A comparison of the sequences in the ORF2 region of 23 Sudanese isolates and five HEV samples from the two Chadian camps displayed a high similarity (>99.7%) to strains belonging to Genotype 1. But four isolates collected in one of the Chadian camps were close to Genotype 2. Circulation of divergent strains argues for possible multiple sources of infection., Epicentre

EDITOR—In their editorial describing the interim smallpox guidelines for the United Kingdom Harling et al ask how countries lacking the public health infrastructure to respond to outbreaks and without vaccine supplies would be able to control an outbreak of smallpox.1 Confronted with the threat of intentional release of biological agents, the World Health Organization advocates dual use investment in public health infrastructure to strengthen outbreak intelligence and verification, support the response to an …