1. Consciousness, subjective facts and physicalism – 50 years since Nagel’s bat.
- Author
-
Robert Van Gulick
- Subjects
consciousness ,self-understanding.consciousness ,subjective facts ,physicalism ,self-understanding ,Philosophy of religion. Psychology of religion. Religion in relation to other subjects ,BL51-65 - Abstract
The existence of subjective facts in the epistemic sense defined by Thomas Nagel’s famous article, “What is like to be a bat?”, might be taken to support an anti-physicalist conclusion. I argue that it does not. The combination of nonreductive physicalism and teleo-pragmatic functionalism is not only consistent with such subjective facts but predicts their existence. The notion that conscious minds are self-understanding autopoietic systems plays a key role in the argument. Global Neuronal Workspace theory is assessed in terms of its potential to answer David Chalmers’ Hard Problem of consciousness. A suggestion is made for augmenting the theory that involves another sense in which facts about conscious experience are subjective. The idea of conscious minds as self-understanding systems again plays an important role.
- Published
- 2024
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