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Forty years after it was delivered, New York Times Co. v. Sullivan remains one of the Supreme Court's most important opinions. This essay explores three questions about the opinion: How novel was it? How significant was it? How beneficial was it? The answers to these questions focus on the expanded protection for the criticism of public officials, recognizing that robust public debate is highly important, even in the face of possible abuse by critics. Part of the import of the opinion, however, lies not in what was decided, but in what was not decided.

Current case law on free speech is a mixed bag. In a case recently dismissed, a professor challenged the President of the University of Oklahoma's decision to bar access to sex news groups from computers on campus. The end result was a two-tier lab system, one permitting access to faculty and those with valid research needs and a second that denied access. On the other hand, a superior court judge ruled that a Cal-State Northridge student could use a Web page to attack an incumbent state senator. Clearer answers will depend on more cases.

This essay focuses on the prospects of protecting academic freedom in American higher education. It addresses three specific areas of potential conflict and tension--pressures to divorce the protection of academic freedom from formal tenure systems, the increasing regulation of harassment and other forms of incivility in the collegiate community, and a host of new and difficult dimensions of academic freedom in cyberspace--for which the academic world is surprisingly ill prepared.

This unique volume discusses the management of transformational change in higher education as a key element of success. With input from researchers, presidents, provosts, and other senior leaders of the higher education community, this edited volume explores transformational change in a range of institutions from small teaching and community colleges to large comprehensive research universities.

Ring-fused 1,2-dithiolylium or isothiazolium salts were obtained by substitution of a sulphur atom for the grouping (R2NCS2Pd) in various cyclopalladated complexes [Pd(R2NCS2)L] derived from ligands (LH) containing Ar–CS or Ar–CN– substructures. This process was accomplished by reaction of the complexes with: (a), thiocyanogen (yielding an intermediate metal-free thiocyanato-compound) followed by perchloric acid, or (b), morpholine-N-sulphenyl chloride.

Conventional wisdom would have caused the academic community to expect the very worst in the perilous days after the September 11 terrorist attacks. Indeed, many of us feared that outspoken professors would suffer even harsher reprisals than had their predecessors during the McCarthy era. After all, a direct attack on U.S. continental soil, resulting in three thousand deaths (or five thousand as it seemed initially), had no counterpart during the Cold War period. For myriad reasons, both real and imagined, even a sanguine observer might well have feared a perilous prospect for the academic community in the aftermath of the 9/11 trauma.

Dinesh D’Souza’s Illiberal Education has predictably stirred the academic community with debates that are likely to sharpen. Meanwhile, the assumptions shared by its proponents and critics deserve to be examined more closely than the initial flurry of controversy allowed. The book and its thesis also need to be placed in the larger context of issues, facts, and trends that American scholars and administrators have debated for some time. This review takes such a second look at D’Souza’s challenging work.

(1991). An Inquiry into the Legal and Ethical Problems of Campus Hate Speech. Free Speech Yearbook: Vol. 29, No. 1, pp. 26-30.

I INTRODUCTION Over the past four decades of teaching and studying First Amendment law, I have witnessed the resolution, or at least the clarification, of many free speech and press issues. There are, however, persistent issues--those elusive or intractable tensions between free expression and other basic human liberties--that deserve particularly close scrutiny. Three such issues occasion this article: tensions between free expression and privacy, civility, and equality. Examples of each tension abound: Can an aggressive reporter or photographer be barred from using high-tech tools such as infrared cameras and parabolic microphones to gather images and conversations through the walls of a house or office? Can a person be jailed for cursing and using vulgar four-letter words in public? Can "hate speech" be curbed on a college campus to protect vulnerable groups in society? It should be simple to answer such questions, but instead is exceedingly difficult because of a deep national ambivalence toward the proper balance betwe en free expression and other values. As a nation, we are equally committed to freedom of speech and to those basic values of privacy, civility and equality. We expect the courts to strike the proper balance, to resolve these tensions in ways that will permit us to preserve (and our laws to serve) both sets of values equally well. When the courts fail or falter in this effort, we are deeply disappointed. We expect judges to discover or devise paths of reconciliation, even though they have eluded the rest of us. In the three areas of tension on which this article focuses, the courts have been notably unsuccessful and a breakthrough appears unlikely. Perhaps we should simply acknowledge that resolution of these issues is not possible and that we must accept certain intractable tensions within our First Amendment jurisprudence. Maybe, indeed, we should even be grateful that so few truly irreconcilable conflicts exist. II PRIVACY: WILL THE TRUTH "SET YOU FREE"? In an ideal system, the legal import of truth would be unmistakably clear. Factual correctness would either provide a complete defense to any claim for invasion of privacy or be legally irrelevant. The courts of this country have, however, been curiously ambivalent about the relationship between privacy and truth. Even individual Supreme Court Justices may fairly be accused of vacillation. One might easily forget that Justice Louis D. Brandeis, who late in his career framed the case for maximum freedom of expression most eloquently, (1) had as a young lawyer written the seminal article first advancing the rationale for imposing legal liability on those whose publication of unwelcome truth invaded the privacy of others. (2) Such inconsistency has persisted in ways that underscore the inherent difficulty of the issue. The Supreme Court has consistently declined to recognize truth as an absolute defense when reviewing criminal or civil judgments against those who have published truthful but private information, although the Justices have never sustained such a claim when the accuracy of the material was undisputed. What the Court has said on this issue is helpful but not dispositive: "[S]tate action to punish the publication of truthful information seldom can justify constitutional standards." (3) The crucial word, of course, is "seldom"; Chief Justice Burger chose not to say "never." Such a formula poses this intriguing question: Why has the high Court never flatly foreclosed such claims against publishers of truthful information? Instead of setting that standard, the Court has imposed three conditions: (1) The information must be accurate; (2) it must have obvious "public interest"; and (3) it must not have been "unlawfully obta ined." (4) The first criterion is obvious enough; spreading false information would not only subject the publisher to civil liability for defamation, but also would elicit little sympathy even from a court generally committed to protecting free expression and communication. …

I N the first Supreme Court case that dealt with the clause of the First Amendment that declares that Congress shall pass "no law respecting an establishment of religion," the justices recognized the central importance of the framers' views in defining the proper relationship between church and state. Those views merge from several sources-Thomas Jefferson's I786 Statute of Virginia for Religious Freedom, James Madison's Memorial and Remonstrance, and Jefferson's letter in i802 to the Danbury Baptists.1 This letter first suggested the euphonious and oftenquoted phrase "a wall of separation" as a guide to the constitutional proximity of government and religion. In the half-century since that first decision, the Supreme Court has steadily refined and adapted the initial concepts and principles, creating different formulations of a constitutional test of nonestablishment. In the early years, long before the issue had reached the courts, the Establishment Clause could have been construed to mean no more than that the several surviving state-established churches were free of federal interference-giving some meaning to the curious language "no law respecting an Establishment of Religion." After the last state church was disestablished in the I830s, such an interpretation was no longer viable, if, indeed, it had ever been more than a theoretical possibility.

Scholars and subpoenas coexist uneasily. For at least a half century, formal demands for discovery of research results, or research in process, have posed an acute dilemma for the scholarly community. A scholar's unique academic research can, through judicial action, be wrested from the scholar and involved in often-lengthy litigation. Courts have struggled to balance the contending interests, particularly during the last quarter century. Sometimes the demands are granted, and sensitive material is required to be turned over to litigants. Other times, scholars have prevailed-usually on rather narrow, fact-based principles. The research topics that have triggered such demands by the judicial system have varied with the issues of the times. Perhaps the first such dispute involved FBI threats to subpoena highly sensitive material on sex research held by the Kinsey Institute at Indiana University. Since the Institute had pledged confidentiality to many of its research subjects, its officers insisted it could not comply with the FBI demand and would, if necessary, "accept the consequences of such defiance." In the end, the FBI backed down and a legal resolution was not required.1 In the 1960s and 1970s, several research issues that reached the courts grew directly out of the Vietnam War.2 The years since then have brought cases involving demands for disclosure of research on subjects as varied as unsafe automobiles,3 medical devices,4 and employee morale in large public utilities.5 The 1990s have seen the focus of such litigation shift to research on cigarettes and their effects. Mounting pressures on the tobacco industry, chiefly through damage claims by former smokers or their families, or by states seeking to recover the costs of treating smokers, have intensified the potential importance of

The Cincinnati, Ohio, jury surely did the right thing by rejecting obscenity charges against Contemporary Arts Center Director Dennis Barrie following the exhibition of Robert Mapplethorpe's photographs.' Yet a different outcome at that trial might have forced higher courts to consider to what degree the fine arts enjoy protection under the first amendment, an issue that has been curiously neglected in the evolution of freedom of expression. First amendment protection of artistic expression and several related questions affecting both free expression generally and academic freedom in particular deserve more attention than they have received. These questions are the focus of this article.

Ring-fused 1,2-dithiolylium or isothiazolium salts were obtained by substitution of a sulphur atom for the grouping (R2NCS2Pd) in various cyclopalladated complexes [Pd(R2NCS2)L] derived from ligands (LH) containing Ar–CS or Ar–CN– substructures. This process was accomplished by reaction of the complexes with: (a), thiocyanogen (yielding an intermediate metal-free thiocyanato-compound) followed by perchloric acid, or (b), morpholine-N-sulphenyl chloride.

The academic library presents a complex challenge facing both general university administrators and library directors in this period of rapid change.

Isothiazolium and 1,2-dithiolylium salts containing fused rings have been synthesised from cyclometalated palladium complexes.

nyone who is not a professional librarian should, I think, come to this occasion with respectable alternative credentials. I am happy to submit mine for your review and appraisal. Being an administrator in a large state university surely gives one a varied perspective on the university library-its problems, its needs, and its hopes. At another level, I have served for several years on the Committee on Research Libraries of the Association of American Universities. Before that time I was a member of the board of the Center for Research Libraries, and since leaving the board I have continued to work with the center as chairman of a small Committee on Financial Resources Development. (The role of that committee, as its title will readily suggest, is to seek additional resources for the work of the center. This prospect is now greatly enhanced, I might say, by the recent appointment of a fulltime development officer.) In several capacities I have been privileged to work with Jim Haas and the Council on Library Resources; two years ago, for example, I was involved in a small group advising on a future course for the council as it faced its second quarter-century. While I suspect Jim and his board could have designed the future without any guidance from our group, we were grateful for the chance to review and assess prospects for this remarkable organization. What may be the most significant role, however, is one I have left until last in this enumeration. Any university professor with a legitimate claim to scholarship is, of course, a user of the research library. While the pressures of university administration leave regrettably little time for research, an occasional foray to the collections in one's own discipline is a vital source of sanity. Moreover, anyone who uses a specialized or branch library, as I do in my role as law professor, quickly realizes the interdependence of collections across a complex campus. A law library by itself meets only a fraction of the research needs of an active scholar. Increasingly, in fact, my younger law faculty colleagues have interests, and therefore research needs, which transcend the traditional law library collections. They are not only historians and economists with extensive needs in the social sciences; they are also biologists, philosophers, linguists, and anthropologists for whom the core collection of legal materials within the law school building offers but the starting point for their research. So it is as library patron and user that I would offer the most cogent credential of all, and urge that my comments today be taken as much in that perspective as from the administrative vantage point, which presumably occasioned Carla Stoffle' s gracious invitation. Let us suppose we might redesign-or design from scratch-the standards, and the process, by which libraries are judged. Surely if we could do so, we would frame a set of criteria that might differ rather substantially from the often implicit desiderata we now apply. Let me suggest in

The addition of aliphatic acids to a wide Variety of alkenes to form esters is heterogeneously catalysed by ion-exchanged sheet silicates. Cation exchange of the silicate is a prerequisite since natural montmorillonite is a poor catalyst for these reactions. Exchange with almost any multivalent ion induces some degree of catalytic activity but Al 3+ , Cr 3+ and H + ion-exchanged clays proved the most efficient catalysts in the present context. The reactions were carried out in pressure vessels, the reaction temperature range depending on the nature of the alkene employed. Esterification is in competition with alkene oligomerisation, and the synthesis of t-alkyi esters failed at temperatures much above room temperature due to the rapidity of the competing process. All other ester types, however, could be synthesised at temperatures up to 200 °C, and only above this temperature does the competitive process become significant. Initial reaction rates of esterification increase rapidly with temperature although, as would be expected, final equilibrium yields diminish. The number of ester products which may be obtained in a given reaction is determined by the number of stable carbocation intermediates which each alkene can produce. In those reactions where single carbocation intermediates are to be expected, excellent yields of a single ester are often obtained. For example ethyl ethanoate was prepared in 92% yield (based on ethanoic acid) with 96% selectivity, from ethanoic acid and excess ethene using Al 3+ ion-exchanged montmorillonite as the catalyst in a 40 h reaction at 200°C.

Justice Powell's leading opinion in the Bakke case stressed educational diversity over state responsibility. However, even when “diversification” fails as a goal, the desire to overcome the effects of past discrimination may nonetheless avail.

(1970). THE FIRST AMENDMENT IN THE LAST YEAR: A REVIEW OF CASES AND TRENDS. Free Speech Yearbook: Vol. 9, No. 1, pp. 95-103.