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To innovate, organizations need to enhance variance, see old things in new ways, and break from the past. They need to do things that make money later rather than now and to be open to creative failure. Robert Sutton refers to this as “organizing for exploration,” and in this excerpt from a recent book, he posits 11½ “weird” ideas that nurture an innovative spirit—managerial toys that expand the frontiers and fuel the long-term success of corporate activities.

The quest for information and research-based insight is an obsession in the capital markets. There is a veritable industry of analysts, investment bankers, portfolio managers, and investors who seek any informational advantage, which is one reason that academics who study finance have been recruited to work on Wall Street and with money managers. Yet the potential payoff for using valid evidence is even greater when it comes to managing organizations. At the same time, however, imitation is much slower and less effective in the world of management practices, in part because such practices depend on tacit knowledge and implementation skill, on knowing not just what to do but how to do it. In addition, management practices and logic resist copying because of the power of precedent and ideology. Most managers actually try to act on the best evidence. They follow the business press, buy business books, hire consultants, and attend seminars featuring business experts. While companies sometimes benefit from these efforts, there is surprisingly little rigorous use or serious appreciation of evidence-based management. This article explores these obstacles and offers guidelines to enable managers to better practice evidence-based management.

PurposeThis article advocates for evidenced‐based management and aims to demonstrate how it works.Design/methodology/approachThe article identifies seven implementation principles to help people and companies that are committed to doing what it takes to profit from evidence‐based management.FindingsThe seven principles are: treat your organization as an unfinished prototype; no brag, just facts; see yourself and your organization as outsiders do; evidence‐based management is not just for senior executives; like everything else, you still need to sell evidenced‐based management; if all else fails, slow the spread of bad practices; and the best diagnostic question: what happens when people fail?Research limitations/implicationsA follow‐up article needs to show results when firms institute evidence‐based management.Practical implicationsA key underpinning of evidence‐based management are three truths: that most so‐called breakthrough ideas are either old, wrong, or both; that effective companies and leaders are more interested in what is true than what is new; and that those that do simple, obvious, and even seemingly trivial things well will dominate competitors who search for silver bullets and instant magic.Originality/valueThe article explains why the implementation of evidenced‐based management promotes competitive advantage.

According to Bazerman, economics has achieved its position of dominance simply because it provides prescriptions whereas other social sciences do not. We challenge his argument by showing that other social sciences do offer prescriptive advice but are nonetheless rarely influential. We argue that the mechanisms through which economics and other social sciences gain influence and affect practice should be investigated more carefully by management scholars seeking to understand how to have greater impact on both public policy and management practice.

States the top reason why managers should take notice of scholarly research is because actions based on sound evidence beat those based on suspect intuition every time. Posits that even academic research at its best is perhaps not that much of a better alternative to guru’s fads and fantasies.

The article discusses various papers published within the issue, including one by William McKinley and colleagues on determinants and development of schools in organization theory and another by Marianne Lewis and Andrew Grimes on metatriangulation.

Why, in light of all the substantial resources firms devote to improving their performance, do so few management practices actually change? In fact, knowledge management at many companies often makes the "knowing-doing" gap worse. This article explains why firms find it so difficult to translate knowledge into practice and offers a set of guidelines that address the sources of this problem. Knowing what to do is not enough; the challenge for managers is to figure out how to do what they know needs to be done.

The article relates a response from the authors of “Hard Facts, Dangerous Half-Truths, and Total Nonsense: Profiting From Evidence-Based Management” to a discussion within the March 2007 issue of “...

Existing theory and research on organizational impression management focuses on how spokespersons use remedial tactics, following image-threatening events, to put their organization in the best possible light. By contrast, little theory or research has considered how organizations use impression management tactics to avert undesirable responses to upcoming events. This paper uses a qualitative and inductive study of billing procedures at three large hospitals to develop theory about how organization members use impression management tactics to fend off specific, expected challenges to organizational practices that are ambiguously negative. We found that hospitals use anticipatory impression management tactics to: (1) distract, diminish, or overwhelm patients' attention to hospital charges; and (2) to induce emotions that lead patients to simplify their information processing of those charges. Hospitals appear to use such anticipatory obfuscations both to fend off patients' initial challenges and to prevent their existing challenges from escalating. We discuss these findings in terms of their contributions to theories of symbolic management, social influence, and routine service encounters.

Most studies of organizational performance define performance as a dependent variable and seek to identify variables that produce variations in performance. Researchers who study organizational performance in this way typically devote little attention to the complications of using such a formulation to characterize the causal structure of performance phenomena. These complications include the ways in which performance advantage is competitively unstable, the causal complexity surrounding performance, and the limitations of using data based on retrospective recall of informants. Since these complications are well-known and routinely taught, a pattern of acknowledging the difficulties but continuing the practice cannot be attributed exclusively to poor training, lack of intelligence, or low standards. Most researchers understand the difficulties of inferring causal order from the correlations generated by organizational histories, particularly when those correlations may be implicit in the measurement procedures used. We suggest that the persistence of this pattern is due, in part, to the context of organizational research. Organizational researchers live in two worlds. The first demands and rewards speculations about how to improve performance. The second demands and rewards adherence to rigorous standards of scholarship. In its efforts to satisfy these often conflicting demands, the organizational research community sometimes responds by saying that inferences about the causes of performance cannot be made from the data available, and simultaneously goes ahead to make such inferences. We conclude by considering a few virtues and hazards of such a solution to dilemmas involving compelling contradictory imperatives and the generality of the issues involved.

Most existing writings imply that creative work is best done in physical and social isolation from outsiders, including case studies of successful product development teams that worked in isolation and psychological research showing that novel responses are inhibited when observers are present. In contrast, this article describes how one organization, IDEO Product Development, innovates routinely even though it has a constant and diverse stream of backstage visitors. IDEO uses visitors9 knowledge to enhance its creative work. Other benefits of such visits include enhancing the organization9s reputation and improving the innovation process in client organizations. This case implies that creative work does not always require isolation and that visitors can be brought backstage in ways that help rather than hamper creative work.

This essay asserts that, although qualitative methods now enjoy wide legitimacy among organizational researchers, there are still times when it is best to conceal or downplay the role that qualitative data played in developing an author's ideas. I identify four circumstances where treating qualitative research as a closet rather than an open activity may help authors write papers that flow better, are more convincing, and are more readily accepted for publication. These circumstances are when weak qualitative data lead to good insights, when describing the qualitative research reduces the quality of the writing, when an outlet does not publish “empirical” papers, and when writing for an audience that remains biased against qualitative research. I illustrate these points primarily with my own closet qualitative research, but also draw on Cialdini's writings on the qualitative inspiration for his experimental research and discussions with colleagues about how they have used closet qualitative research.

We combine network and organizational memory perspectives in a process model of innovation through technology brokering. We show how a product design firm uses internal routines to exploit links to...

This paper draws on writings in psychology, sociology and organizational behavior to develop a conceptual framework that specifies how positive emotion helps employees obtain favorable outcomes at work. We propose that feeling and expressing positive emotions on the job have favorable consequences on: (1) employees independent of their relationships with others (e.g., greater persistence), (2) reactions of others to employees (e.g., “halo,” or overgeneralization to other desirable traits), and (3) reactions of employees to others (e.g., helping others). These three sets of intervening processes are proposed, in turn, to lead to work achievement, job enrichment and a higher quality social context. A partial test of this framework is made in an 18-month study of 272 employees. Results indicate that positive emotion on the job at time 1 is associated with evidence of work achievement (more favorable supervisor evaluations and higher pay) and a supportive social context (more support from supervisors and coworkers) at time 2. But positive emotion at time 1 is not significantly associated with job enrichment at time 2.

As employees strive to do their jobs, they face threats to productivity from all quarters-disruptive technology, meddlesome superiors, senseless organizational practices, and abusive clients and customers. Sutton, of Stanford University, reminds us that the best bosses identify and slay those dragons, thereby protecting the time and the dignity of their people and enabling them to focus on real work. Self-awareness is the key to defending employees effectively. Good leaders resist their own tendency to exercise power: They keep meetings short, listen to their followers, and make it safe to disagree with the boss. They also work to reduce outside distractions by, for example, championing mornings free of e-mail or streamlining performance-review processes. When their own bosses are the problem, they occasionally defy orders. Once in a while, they encourage their people to overtly comply with misguided demands from on high without actually buying in to them. Good bosses fight enemies. They take the heat for their teams. They have their employees' backs. Stepping on to this battlefield requires humility, intelligence, and bravery. In leading the charge to make the workplace safe and productive, however, you may risk martyrdom. Don't lose sight of the need to retain your own political power as you defend against the institutional forces that threaten your employees. And remember that preserving your own well-being will ensure that you have the energy to fight the good fight.

This article links institutional and impression management perspectives in a process model of how controversial and possibly unlawful actions of members of organizations can lead to endorsement and support from key constituencies. This model is grounded in interview, archival, and observational data concerning eight illegitimate actions attributed to members of two social movement organizations. We found that institutional conformity and decoupling illegitimate activities from legitimate structures facilitated spokespersons’ efforts to use impression management tactics that shifted attention away from the controversial actions and toward the socially desirable goals endorsed by broader constituencies. As a result, these organizations used publicity generated by illegitimate actions to obtain endorsement and support from those constituencies. We discuss the implications of the model for other kinds of organizations and derive testable propositions. We also consider implications for institutional and impres...

This article derives hypotheses from the threat-rigidity model about organizational responses tofinancial adversity. These hypotheses are tested in a national sample of 72 randomly selected drug abuse treatment organizations. We propose that decreasing funding levels and numbers of funding sources will be associated with four classes of rigidities in organizations: (a) restriction in information processing (rigid use of existing organizational procedures), (b) constriction of control (less participative decision making), (c) conservation of resources (work force reduction), and (d) competition among members. The threat-rigidity thesis is supported by findings that decreases in total budgets are associated with rigid use of existing procedures, work force reduction, and competition among organization members. Further; decreases in number offunding sources are associated with less participative decision making, work force reduction, and more competition among members.

A pair of qualitative and inductive studies are used to generate a model of how social influence strategies that entail displays of contrasting positive and negative emotions bring about compliance...

Using institutional theory, we developed predictions about organizational units that moved from an environment making consistent demands to one making conflicting demands. Many community mental hea...

The phrase "switching cognitive gears" is used to call attention to the fact that cognitive functioning involves the capacity to shift between cognitive modes, from automatic processing to conscious engagement and back again. Effectiveness may be as much a function of an actor's capacity to sense when a switch is appropriate, as to process in one or another mode. In this paper the authors develop a perspective on the switch from automatic to active thinking and the conditions that provoke it. They apply the perspective to work settings and identify types of situations in which actors are expected to switch from habits of mind to active thinking. They propose further work to develop a framework for understanding the switch from active thinking to automatic.

THE ORGANIZATIONAL CONTEXT AS AN INFLUENCE ON GROUPS AND INDIVIDUALS .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . . . . . .. .. . ........ . .. . . . . . . . . ... ... ......... .. . . . . . ... ..... ..... . . . . . 198 Context as Opportunity and Constraint 198 Context as a Distal or Proximate Influence ...... .. ......... ........ 201 Context as Similar and Dissimilar 205 WHEN CONTEXTS HAVE MINIMAL INFLUENCE .... ......... 208 INDIVIDUALS AND GROUPS AS INFLUENCES ON ORGANIZATIONAL CONTEXTS 209 Powerful Individuals as an Influence on Organizations 210 Powerful Groups as an Influence on Organizations 215 A'dra;���ti!�;.��������: .. ���.�����:.���.�.���.�����.��.���.������.�� 215 THE INTERACTIONS OF INDIVIDUALS AND GROUPS WITH THEIR ORGANIZATIONAL CONTEXTS .. . . . . ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . . . ........ 217 The Homeless 218 Air Disaster 218 Nuclear Power Plant 219 HOW CAN WE PUT ORGANIZATIONS BACK INTO ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR? 220 Methodological Implications 220 Substantive Implications 222

This study replicates and extends our prior research on expressed emotions. We propose that the levels of a store's busyness and customer demand influence the emotions service employees express dur...

The human tendency toward homogeneity is a cornerstone of social psychology. Classic studies going back to at least Asch (1955, 1956) and Sherif (1936) suggest that, when interacting with others, variance in human thought and action disappears as people conform to other group members and group norms. Convergence is considered to be a primary consequence of social interaction and group life. In fact, group life often becomes synonymous with uniformity and conformity among members. So, it is not surprising that research on emotion as a group-level construct focuses on homogeneity and on the mechanisms that propel group members to share emotional reactions (see Anderson & Keltner, this volume; Barsade & Gibson, 1998; Bartel & Saavedra, 2000; Hatfield, Cacioppo, & Rapson, 1994; Hatfield & Rapson, this volume). Although group dynamics researchers have documented powerful pressures that drive out variance, variance within groups has also been a persistent, if less frequent, theme as well (Cartwright & Zander, 1960; Schein, 1965). Groups do not transform members into clones: Variance persists in even the most homogenous groups, and such variation can have important consequences. Some modern research on group cognition does imply the value of examining variation in groups. The widely studied notion of transactive memory, for example, is predicated on the heterogeneity of information held by group members – that group members know and remember different things (e.g., Liang, Moreland, & Argote, 1995; Moreland, 1999; Wegner, 1986).

This chapter considers the social structuring processes that occur in groups using computer medicated communications (CMC). Building on a model of status dynamics in face-to-face groups, we develop a series of propositions that indicate how characteristic differences between face-to-face and computer-mediated communications media are likely to affect the behaviors used by individuals to manage their status in a group setting. We propose several types of behaviors or moves that appear to be used to create, negotiate, and manage status in electronically communicating groups. We use qualitative field data from on-going teams to illustrate this perspective of how communication technology can shape the informal social structures of groups.

Social science theories can become self-fulfilling because they shape institutional designs and management practices as well as social norms and expectations about behavior, thereby creating the behavior they predict. Social theories also perpetuate themselves to the extent that they promulgate language and assumptions that become widely used and accepted. Language and assumptions affect what people see and think about and what alternative organizational arrangements they consider implementing. We illustrate these ideas by considering how the language and assumptions of economics shape management practices. We argue that theories can "win" in the marketplace for ideas independently of their empirical validity to the extent that their assumptions and language become taken for granted, normatively valued, and therefore, create conditions that make the theories come "true."

La reussite et l’influence d’un chef dependent de la perception qu’il a de ses collaborateurs. Conseils pour aider les dirigeants a projeter leur pouvoir.

Outre qu’ils rendent la vie difficile aux autres salaries, les « salopards » sont une nuisance economique pour l’entreprise.

For at least the past decade, the holy grail for companies has been innovation. Managers have gone after it with all the zeal their training has instilled in them, using a full complement of tried and true management techniques. The problem is that none of these practices, well suited for cashing in on old, proven products and business models, works very well when it comes to innovation. Instead, managers should take most of what they know about management and stand it on its head. In this article, Robert Sutton outlines several ideas for managing creativity that are clearly odd but clearly effective: Place bets on ideas without much heed to their projected returns. Ignore what has worked before. Goad perfectly happy people into fights among themselves. Good creativity management means hiring the candidate you have a gut feeling against. And as for the people who stick their fingers in their ears and chant, "I'm not listening, I'm not listening," when customers make suggestions? Praise and promote them. Using vivid examples from more than a decade of academic research to illustrate his points, the author discusses new approaches to hiring, managing creative people, and dealing with risk and randomness in innovation. His conclusions? The practices in this article succeed because they increase the range of a company's knowledge, allow people to see old problems in new ways, and help companies break from the past.

We are grateful to Steve Barley, Max Bazerman, Daniel Brass, Gary Alan Fine, Linda Pike, Robert Kahn, James March, Marshall Meyer, Keith Murnighan, Christine Oliver, and David Owens for their contributions to this essay. This essay was prepared while the first author was a Fellow at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences. We appreciate the financial assistance provided by the Hewlett-Packard Corporation and the National Science Foundation (SBR-9022192). This essay describes differences between papers that contain some theory rather than no theory. The~re is little agreement about what constitutes strong versus weak theory in the social sciences, but there is more consensus that references, data, variables, diagrams, and hypotheses are not theory. Despite this consensus, however, authors routinely use these five elements in lieu of theory. We explain how each of these five elements can be confused with theory and how to avoid such confusion. By making this consensus explicit, we hope to help authors avoid some of the most common and easily averted problems that lead readers to view papers as having inadequate theory. We then discuss how journals might facilitate the publication of stronger theory. We suggest that if the field is serious about producing stronger theory, journals need to reconsider their empirical requirements. We argue that journals ought to be more receptive to papers that test part rather than all of a theory and use illustrative rather than definitive data.