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Drawing on the philosophy of language and anthroponymy, we aim to outline a theory of proper names, deliberately sidestepping conventional perspectives, which we have systematically addressed in previous instances. Articulating a distinctive viewpoint, grounded in the established connotations of the anthroponym (most notably its characterization as a rigid designator), we aim to demonstrate that names function as any linguistic sign, not deprived of any of its dimensions. We will also consider situations involving name changes, whether undertaken with the consent of the bearer or independently of their will. To the best of our current knowledge, the examination of proper names as speech acts has not received substantial attention in past or contemporary studies; hence, we will allocate appropriate attention to it. Furthermore, our investigation will encompass discussions on unconventional anthroponyms, addressing them as a key facet of our current research agenda. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article I issue a challenge to philosophers engaged in constructing logical languages. Formal languages that have had a great influence on various areas of philosophy have ineffable statements that arise from metaphysical assumptions, thus limiting what we can do with them. I deal with two cases. The case of Frege known as “The paradox of the concept horse”, and that of Kripke that is not as famous as the Fregean problem, which I call “The necessary bearing of the name.” I briefly develop each case and show that together they give us sufficient evidence of the limits of what we can do with logic when the formal systems employ unexamined metaphysical assumptions.

The author explores the meaning of proper names and other types of singular terms in the context of propositional attitudes, combining the problems of empty names, rigid designators and non-specific reading. An object in the attitudes can be given to the agent as such (de re), in the description (de dicto), as well as in several intermediate ways. From the analysis of the phe­nomenon of rigid designation, I move on to the theory of the object, where I consider two alterna­tives — strict, or Leibnizian, and weak. The first explains the actual non-existence by impossi­bility, the second — by occasionality. Here there are two ways of defining non-existent (fiction­al) objects — kinship and the counterpart relation, which are realized in frames that are different in their features. Nonspecific character is inherent in the kinship and counterpart relation in different ways. A special case is formed by hybrid worlds in which the real and the fictitious meet. The result of my analysis is five variants of a weakened de re reading of proper names and other singular terms in the context of attitudes. I describe their features, touching on the cogni­tive effect of narration, which operates with the appropriate attitudes.

The problem of reference, which is discussed in the framework of how singular terms refer and the conditions under which a successful reference is achieved in the philosophy of language, differs from the problem of the meaning of religious and metaphysical expressions in religious language. The issue of reference in religious language is discussed within the framework of which theory will explain the reference of religious and metaphysical expressions in general, especially which approach provides the reference of the term “God”, and whether the theory is consistent in terms of theism. The contribution of the theory to theological problems and practical religious life is an essential criterion in terms of which theory will be taken as the basis in the reference of the term “God”. In addition, some requirements have been developed for successful reference in religious language. According to accessibility, users of the term “God” should be easily able to efficiently apply the rules of successful reference required by theory. According to the scope, which is the second criterion, religious language users should be able to co-refer to the term “God”. Therefore, it can be said that the theory that provides wider co-reference in terms of religious language is successful. Regarding the literature, two theories come to the fore in religious language: the descriptive theory and the causal theory of reference. Applying the theories above to religious language, especially to the term “God”, is a highly controversial issue. It is possible to talk about these theories' philosophically consistent and inconsistent aspects, the possibilities they provide for the problem of reference, or the problems they cause. According to the descriptive theory, which claims that name refers to object with which compatible with the description, the term “God” is synonymous with the description of "the one and perfect creator of all that exists" and refers to through this description. It is possible to say that in the history of philosophy, philosophers have descriptively considered the term “God”. According to the causal theory of reference which claims that the referent is determined by the initial baptism and reaches subsequent users through the causal-historical chain, God is a rigid designator. If the causal theory of reference is taken as a basis in the reference of the term “God”, the name-referent relationship and how the connection between the causal-historical chain and the referent will be provided are the main points need to be explained. In this study, the causal theory of reference will be examined about the problem of reference in religious language. For this reason, the claims of Richard B. Miller who was the first to apply a causal reference to religious language, William P. Alston who developed the theory in religious language, Jerome I. Gellman who added new dimensions to the theory and made it more coherent for theism, and Meghan Sullivan who associates the theory with semantic hiddenness and adds a theological dimension will be discussed in our study. In addition, the consequences of the problem of reference to God on religious pluralism will be discussed. It is noteworthy that Miller, who applied the theory to the religious language for the first time, did not address the problem that the term's referent cannot be empirically determined. In addition, it is possible to say that Gellman, one of the philosophers who applied causal reference to the religious language, developed the theory, made it more suitable for religious language, and met the criticisms against it. Gellman's understanding of multiple causal references, which includes direct, indirect, and deferred aspects for successful reference, is important because it contains the possibility that God may be called eschatological in the future. While the inability to determine the term’s referent until Gellman guided the discussions on the problem of reference, the problematic aspects of the causal chain in terms of theism came to the fore with the concept of semantic vulnerability that Sullivan added to the literature. In addition, Sullivan differs from other thinkers who advocate causal reference with the problem of semantic hiddenness and the solution she proposes. With this solution, it’s possible to say that Sullivan added a theological link to her theory of causal reference. In addition, the most striking result of the causal reference theory is that it forms the basis for religious pluralism. While Miller and Alston support Hickian pluralism, Sullivan has a more complete understanding of pluralism compared to Hick. While the emergence of different religions in Hick's pluralism stems from the limitation of human perception, Sullivan explains different religions by revealing God himself in different ways. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The semantics of complex demonstratives is one of the most important and controversial topics in philosophy of language which has never been ceased to attract philosophers’ interest and attention. In this article, we will examine the most fundamental problems regarding complex demonstratives including the question of whether complex demonstratives are rigid designators and directly referential or rather, are quantified expressions. We will also examine the question that in a demonstrative like “That F”, does F play any role in a successful designation of the demonstrative. The last question is whether F has any share in the proposition of the content of the sentence in which the complex demonstrative has been used. Our answer to the first question is that complex demonstratives are directly referential and rigid designators. In response to the second question we will defend the idea that having the property F is a necessary condition for the referent if the complex demonstrative is to successfully refer to it, otherwise it won’t refer to anything. Lastly, our answer to the third question is that F has no share in the proposition or the content of the sentence.

In this paper, I present, generalize and develop the extensionalist theory of rigidity for general terms in light of criteria commonly applied to theories of general term rigidity. According to the theory, a general term is rigid if its extension is constant across all possible worlds. This position has been widely dismissed because it conflicts with the seemingly straightforward idea that natural kind terms have varying extensions from world to world. This criticism holds only to the extent that natural kind terms are indeed rigid. If it turns out that we need not view them as rigid, then the extensionalist theory fares well when compared with other theoretical requirements. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

En "Identidad y hacedores de verdad", Castro Albano sostiene que las teorías fuertes de los hacedores de verdad tienen problemas para asignar hacedores de verdad apropiados a las proposiciones expresadas por oraciones de identidad que contienen nombres. En mi trabajo, defiendo dos ideas principales. En primer lugar, considero que si el problema señalado por Castro Albano fuera genuino, sería un problema no sólo para las teorías fuertes sino para toda teoría de los hacedores de verdad. En segundo lugar, sostengo que el problema puede ser resuelto -o disuelto- si se defiende una adecuada concepción de los portadores de verdad, es decir, aquellas entidades de las cuales se predica la verdad; más específicamente, considero que debería sostenerse que los portadores de verdad son, en lugar de las proposiciones, las oraciones del lenguaje natural, es decir, entidades lingüísticas que pueden concebirse en última instancia en términos de actos de habla particulares y concretos.In "Identidad y hacedores de verdad", Castro Albano argues that strong theories of truthmakers have difficulties in assigning appropriate truthmakers to the propositions expressed by identity sentences containing names. In my paper, I defend two main ideas. In the first place, I think that if what is pointed out by Castro Albano were a genuine problem, it would be a problem not just for strong theories of truthmakers but for any of them. In the second place, I claim that the problem can be solved -or rather dissolved- by maintaining an adequate conception of truth-bearers, namely, those entities of which truth is predicated; more specifically, I defend the view that truth-bearers should be taken to be not propositions but sentences of a natural language, that is, linguistic entities that can be understood in terms of particular and concrete speech acts.