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The right to religion is well protected in the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (the Constitution) as well as attendant legislation. Section 15(1) of the Constitution provides that all persons have the right to freedom of religion. Section 31(1) of the Constitution then goes on to state that persons who belong to a religious community, amongst others, may not be denied the right to practise their religion with other members of that community. Section 9(3) of the Constitution prohibits the state from unfairly discriminating against any person directly or indirectly on several grounds, which include the ground of religion. Section 9(4) of the Constitution on the other hand prohibits any person from unfairly discriminating against any other person on the ground of religion, amongst others. These constitutional protections resonate in both the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 and the Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998. Despite these protections, the right to freedom of religion is still a contested subject in the workplace, inter alia. The contestation intensifies when the right to freedom of religion results in an employee not being able to comply with one or more of the employer's workplace needs. Employers' who do not understand the balance that has to be struck between the employee's right to freedom of religion and its workplace needs will often find themselves on the wrong side of our labour laws if they dismiss an employee without having due regard to the employee's religion. This is what transpired in TDF Network Africa (Pty) Ltd v Faris 2019 40 ILJ 326 (LAC).

espanolLas manifestaciones religiosas de las personas, deportistas o no, forman parte del ejercicio de la libertad religiosa, que como raiz de las libertades implica a la conciencia y a la libertad de expresion. En el caso de los deportistas profesionales, nos encontramos con prohibiciones que defienden un lugar aseptico de ideologias y creencias para crear un espacio de identidad compuesto de valores comunes que contribuyan a la paz y al desarrollo. El conflicto es evidente, las libertades individuales de personas con una identidad propia frente a un mundo aseptico que intenta demostrar que existe una finalidad legitima. Este trabajo trata los supuestos de discriminacion directa e indirecta que sufren los deportistas y las vias de solucion posibles como la conciliacion, la acomodacion razonable y el arbitraje, partiendo de que la dignidad humana debe ser el fundamento de referencia para dar cohesion en una sociedad donde las libertades en materia de religion y de creencias entran en conflicto. DeutschDiereligiosen Auserungen von Menschen, ob Sportler oder nicht, sind Teil der Ausubung der Religionsfreiheit, die in der Freiheit wurzelt und die Gewissens- und Meinungsfreiheit beinhaltet. Im Fall der Profisportler finden wir Verbote, die einen Raum frei von Ideologien und Uberzeugungen verteidigen, um einen Iden-titatsraum zu schaffen, der aus gemeinsamen Werten besteht, die zu Frieden und Entwicklung beitragen. Der Konflikt ist offenkundig: die individuellen Freiheiten der Menschen mit ihrer eigenen Identitat kollidieren mit einer aseptischen Welt, die versucht zu beweisen, dass sie einen legitimen Zweck verfolgt. Diese Arbeit befasst sich mit den Fallen direkter und indirekter Diskriminierung, die Sportler erleiden, und mit moglichen Losungen wie Schlichtung, angemessene Vorkehrun-gen und Schiedsverfahren, auf der Grundlage, dass die Menschenwurde die Bezugs-grundlage sein muss, um den Zusammenhalt in einer Gesellschaft zu gewahrleis-ten, in der die Freiheiten in Bezug auf Religion und Glauben in Konflikt geraten. EnglishIndividual demonstrations of faith, whether of a sport nature or not, make part of the right to freedom of religion, which, as root to most freedoms, involves con-science and freedom of expression. Regarding competitive sportspeople we face prohibitions supporting a neutral ground of ideologies and beliefs so as to make identity out of common ground toward peace and development. Conflict is clear, individual freedoms of people with their own identity facing an aseptic world which tries proving there is such a thing as a legitimate purpose. The current piece of work deals with direct and indirect discrimination against sportspeople togeth-er with the likely ways of conciliation, reasonable accommodation and arbitration, based on the fact that human dignity must be the flagship in this society where free-dom based on faith and beliefs crash into one another.

Кожевников Олег Александрович – доктор юридических наук, профессор кафедры конституционного права, Уральский государственный юридический университет, профессор кафедры конституционного и международного права, Уральский государственный экономический университет, г. Екатеринбург. E-mail: jktu1976@yandex.ru. Oleg Aleksandrovich Kozhevnikov – Doctor of Law, Professor of the Department of Constitutional Law, Ural State Law University, Professor of the Department of Constitutional and International Law, Ural State University of Economics, Yekaterinburg, Russian Federation. E-mail: jktu1976@yandex.ru. В статье дается анализ отдельных решений Конституционного Суда РФ 2020 года в области законодательства об административных правонарушениях. Автор обосновывает позицию о необходимости законодательным и правоприменительным органам административной юрисдикции при осуществлении законотворческой деятельности, а также применении законодательства об административных правонарушениях неукоснительно соблюдать решения Конституционного Суда РФ и в обязательном порядке учитывать позиции федерального органа конституционного контроля для формирования эффективной и однообразной практики правоприменения, избежания присутствующего в РФ необоснованного динамизма в нормативном регулировании отношений в сфере законодательства об административных правонарушениях. This scientific study analyzes individual decisions of the Constitutional Court of the Rus-sian Federation in 2020 in the field of legislation on administrative offenses. The author sub-stantiates his position on the need for legislative and law enforcement bodies of administrative jurisdiction to strictly comply with the decisions of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation in the implementation of legislative activities, as well as the application of legisla-tion on administrative offenses, and to take into account the positions of the federal body of constitutional control in order to form an effective and uniform practice of law enforcement, as well as avoiding the unjustified dynamism present in the Russian Federation in the normative regulation of relations in the field of legislation on administrative offenses.

El derecho a la libertad religiosa ha sido abordado con diferente intensidad por el Tribunal Europeo de Derecho Humanos y por las instituciones protectoras del Sistema Interamericano, la Comisión y la Corte. Sin embargo, las diferencias entre ambos ámbitos de protección de los derechos humanos no son solo cuantitativas porque responden a realidades históricas, políticas y sociales distintas. Aun así, también se dan puntos de encuentro en los sujetos titulares y obligados, en la perfilación de su contenido y en sus límites. Lo más llamativo del Tribunal europeo es el recurso constante al margen de apreciación nacional ante la diversidad de posturas de los Estados miembros del Consejo de Europa; y, en el Sistema Interamericano, la vinculación del derecho a la protección de los más vulnerables, bien a través de la cosmovisión de los pueblos indígenas, bien por su relación con el trabajo de muchos activistas de la sociedad civil con los más pobres The right to religious freedom has been approached with different intensity by the European Court of Human Rights and by the protective institutions of the Inter-American System, the Commission and the Court. However, the differences between the two protective spheres of human rights are not only quantitative, because they respond to different historical, political and social realities. Even so, there are also meeting points in the titular and obligated subjects, in the outline of their content and in their limits. The most striking aspect of the European Court is the constant recourse to the margin of national appreciation in the face of the diversity of positions of the member states of the Council of Europe; and, in the Inter-American System, the linking of the right to protection of the most vulnerable, either through the worldview of indigenous peoples, or because of its relationship with the work of many civil society activists with the poorest

refers to the presence of crucifixes in the classrooms of the Italian public school. Therefore, in view of the spread of Islamism in Europe, and its possible repercussions, we will examine two judgments on the impact of the wearing of the Islamic veil on the school and university environment (Leyla Sahin v. Turkey and Dogru v. France). At the end, we will present the French experience regarding the application of the principle of secularity in public educational institutions, which guarantees the protection of non-proselytism in such institutions. O presente artigo objetiva analisar um acórdão recentemente julgado pelo TEDH (Osmanoglu e Kocabas v. Suíça), que trata, em linhas gerais, da recusa dos pais, praticantes fervorosos da religião muçulmana, em enviar suas duas filhas para as aulas de natação mistas obrigatórias em suas escolas. A seguir, busca-se a partir deste estudo de caso tecer comentários sobre o artigo 9º da CEDH, invocando outros acórdãos, também julgados pelo TEDH. Logo em seguida, estudaremos o acórdão Lautsi v. Itália, que se refere à presença de crucifixos nas salas de aula da escola pública italiana. Por conseguinte, tendo em vista a propagação do islamismo na Europa, e seus possíveis reflexos, examinaremos dois acórdãos que versam sobre o impacto do uso do véu islâmico no ambiente escolar e universitário (Leyla Sahin v. Turquia e Dogru v. França). Ao final, apresentaremos a experiência francesa no que se refere à aplicação do princípio da laicidade nas instituições públicas de ensino, que garante a proteção do não proselitismo em tais instituições.&nbsp

У статті проводиться порівняльний аналіз природи прав людини в державах ісламської правової сім’ї відповідно до встановлених західними державами норм. Висвітлюються особливості ставлення мусульманських, арабських держав до міжнародно правових актів, що регулюють питання захисту прав людини. Визначається основна проблема відсталості ісламських теократичних держав від демократичних та правових засад щодо питань захисту прав людини, які сформувались у Європі та світі. В 2020 році досі залишається актуальним питання захисту прав людини. Особливо цікавим воно є в контексті розгляду прав людини в державах ісламської правової сім’ї. Наприклад, в Об’єднаному Королівстві Саудівська Аравія лише в 2018 році жінки отримали право на керування авто. Проте, такі права не є базовими та основоположними, тож розглядати їх в контексті європейської моделі захисту прав є недоцільно. Але все ж, цікаво поглянути на це питання в розрізі базових прав людини, які звичні для жителів романо-германської правової сім’ї і захищаються міжнародними угодами. Досі за Основним законом Об’єднаного Королівства Саудівська Аравія не допускається поширення інших релігій, крім ісламу, а будь-які публічні прояви належності до не мусульманських релігій суворо заборонені. То чи можемо ми стверджувати, що право свободи віросповідання громадян цієї монархії порушується? Загалом, зрозуміло, що конфлікт між правами людини та релігією існує. І хоча держави, в яких сповідується іслам є зазвичай теоцентричними, можемо вважати, що іслам сумісний із правами людини. Наявність різного роду ісламських документів з прав людини, схожих за своєю суттю з міжнародними документами з прав людини, посилює думку про існування певної політики захисту прав людини. Тим не менш, існують погляди на користь та проти існування такої політики. Варто розуміти, що такі погляди можуть оцінюватись лише після визначення еквівалента існування етики прав людини в ісламі, і якщо так, то чи сумісна вона з принципами прав людини, що застосовуються в міжнародних відносинах. Окрім того, необхідно також визначити фактичну практичну позицію в різних мусульманських країнах. The article deals with the comparative analysis of the nature of human rights in the states of the Islamic legal family in accordance with the norms established by the western states. The peculiarities of the attitude of Muslim, Arab states to international legal acts regulating the protection of human rights are highlighted. The backwardness of Islamic theocratic states from the democratic and legal principles on human rights issues that have emerged in Europe and in the world is the main problem. The issue of human rights protection is still relevant in 2020. It is particularly interesting in the context of the consideration of human rights in the states of the Islamic legal family. For example, in the United Kingdom of Saudi Arabia only in 2018 did women have the right to drive a car. However, such rights are not basic and fundamental, so it is inappropriate to consider them in the context of the European model of protection of rights. However, it is interesting to look at this issue in the context of basic human rights that are common to residents of the Romano-German legal family and protected by international agreements. Until now, according to United Kingdom Basic Law, Saudi Arabia is not allowed to spread religions other than Islam, and any public display of membership of non-Muslim religions is strictly prohibited. So can we claim that the freedom of religion of the citizens of this monarchy is being violated? In general, it is clear that there is a conflict between human rights and religion. And although the states in which Islam is professed are usually theocentric, we can assume that Islam is compatible with human rights. The presence of all kinds of Islamic human rights instruments, similar in nature to international human rights instruments, reinforces the idea that there is a specific human rights policy. However, there are views about the benefits and against the existence of such policies. It should be understood that such views can only be evaluated after determining the equivalent of the existence of a human rights ethic in Islam and, if so, whether it is compatible with the human rights principles applicable in international relations. In addition, it is also necessary to determine the actual practical position in the various Muslim countries.

The thesis examines the litigious negotiation and contestation of the right to freedom of religion at the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) from the early 1990s until today. A twofold observation constitutes the starting point for this investigation. First, the trend of the judicialization of politics increasingly extends to the domain of the politics of religious regulation. Second, an increasing number of strategic religious and secular litigators has intervened in transnational judicial struggles. Against this backdrop, the thesis asks how religious and secular actors influence the construction of the judicial norm. It analyzes the judicial activism of a variety of religious actors, including Jehovah’s Witnesses, Muslims, Sikhs, Christians and secular actors. The main argument is that the unequal distribution of power and resources among religious minorities and majorities translates into diverging strategies of religious freedom litigation, and, thereby, into the interpretation of the right to freedom of religion. The power asymmetry leads to inequality regarding the degree of openness of the legal opportunity structure of the ECtHR and hence the participation in the judicial norm building. In particular, it shows that while some actors tend to adapt their religious claims in order to fit dominant interpretations of the law, other actors contest the interpretation of the foundations of the law itself. Furthermore, different means of litigation fuel an intensified ideological opposition and tension within liberal religious freedom interpretations., La thèse analyse la négociation du droit à la liberté religieuse dans les litiges à la Cour Européenne de Droits de l’Homme (CEDH) des années 1990 jusqu’à aujourd’hui. Une double observation constitue le point de départ de cette recherche : le constat d’une judiciarisation croissante de la régulation politique du religieux d’un côté, et celui d’une mobilisation stratégique croissante d’acteurs religieux et séculiers dans les arènes judiciaires transnationales de l’autre. La thèse pose la question de comment les acteurs religieux et séculiers influent sur le processus de construction de la norme juridique. Elle analyse l’activisme juridique déployé par des acteurs religieux, y compris les témoins de Jéhovah, des acteurs musulmans, sikhs, et chrétiens, et des activistes séculiers, dans des litiges concernant la liberté religieuse. Partant d’une approche par les champs, la thèse postule que l’inégalité en ressources et en pouvoir entre les acteurs structurent leurs approches et leurs interprétations du droit à la liberté religieuse. La Cour ne constitue une structure d’opportunité également accessible pour tous les acteurs. Tandis que certains des acteurs impliqués dans les litiges ont tendance à adapter leurs revendications religieuses de manière à correspondre aux paradigmes juridiques dominants, d’autres contestent et négocient les interprétations des fondements mêmes du droit. L’asymétrie entre les acteurs du droit se conjugue à des oppositions et tensions idéologiques qui sont inscrites dans la construction de la norme juridique.

International audience; Laıcité has assumed centre stage in much of the public debate in France over a little more than a decade. As it retraces the main legal developments that this heightened debate has triggered, the present article underlines the radical transformation the French constitutional principle has undergone. It insists that the principle has assumed a meaning that radically contrasts with its Republican articulation in the law of 1905: it now applies to private individuals (and no longer commands only public authorities), has come to being equated with a commandment of religious neutrality (whereas it did not for most of the twentieth century) and is mainly applied to (if not targeted at) Muslim women. For all these reasons, it is argued that French la\"ıcité can no longer be coined `liberal'.