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The falling costs of collecting, storing, and processing data have allowed firms and governments to improve their products and services, but have also created databases with detailed individual-level data that [...]

A theory of resource management where the enforcement of property rights is endogenously determined is developed. The model explains heterogeneity in the effectiveness of resource management and that a change in management regime can be caused by changes in prices, population, or technology.

A study was conducted to develop a model of how property rights can emerge in the absence of political institutions of enforcement. An alternative security mechanism in the community is analyzed. Findings indicate that trust is a crucial factor for producing high economic outcomes, and that the establishment of trust depends on shared mental models.

Archaeology provides a compelling perspective on the evolution of property rights and macroeconomy in precapitalist societies that lacked systems of writing. Most interpretations of macroeconomy in the Prehispanic Southwest have focused on interaction networks that emanated from 'heartlands' where intensive agriculturalists were aggregated in towns along major streams. Although archaeologists are aware of communities in 'hinterland' territories, they rarely consider their political economies. As a remedy, we apply common-pool-resource (CPR) theory to investigate hypothesized linkages between property rights and social identity in two hinterlands in Arizona: the Papagueria and the Grand Canyon. Our analyses indicate, first, that from circa C.E. 850 to C.F. 1350, local communities negotiated their social identities in a macroeconomy of fluctuating resource values and, second, that incentives for privatizing peripheral territories intensified in some areas during periods of economic competition. These findings underscore the critical role of archaeology in modeling property rights in precapitalist societies. [Keywords: common-pool resources, archaeology, Native America, political economy, regional analysis]

The landmark titling program of the Peruvian government between 1996 and 2003 is examined to learn the labor market effects of higher tenure security. Estimates of the impact suggest that the program results in a substantial increase in labor hours and a substitution of adult for child labor.

The location and control decision of the multinational firm is examined through the insights gained from property-rights approach and the apparatus of international trade theory. Models are presented which generate predictions on how firms organize production across borders.

Mexico's initial industrialization was based on firms that were grouped: that is linked to other firms through close affiliations with a common bank. Most explanations for the prevalence of groups are based on increasing returns or missing formal capital markets. We propose a simpler explanation that better fits the facts of Mexican history. In the absence of secure property rights, tangible collateral could not credibly be offered to creditors; but there remained the possibility of using reputation as a form of intangible collateral. In such circumstances, firms had incentives to group together for purposes of mutual monitoring and insurance.

This model shows that individuals, countries, tribes or some other unit will put effort and investment into protecting their rights to property but few invest in taking other's property. The model follows the process from an initial claim of property through putting systems in place to protect the property.

How the property rights and transactional-cost theories relate to the economics of a business firm is discussed and modeled.

Conservative argument against big government is not necessarily synonymous with favoring lower taxes, since tax revenues can promote distributive justice without distribution through public programs. Tax policy should be discussed in the context of the broad concerns of social justice, although this need not include respect for natural property rights.

The neoliberal Washington Consensus dominated global policy making over the 1980s. Fundamental to this consensus were three theoretical and ideological tenets: that privatization and markets are a natural order and that this order is best achieved if the state economic role is limited. I argue that private property and markets simply cannot be established as neoliberals propose, nor can the state be so easily curtailed. To support this argument, I will draw briefly on examples from the 'transition economies.' I argue that a more historical understanding of the nature of markets, property, and diverse forms of social organization will allow policy makers to more accurately use these institutions to achieve desired ends. This does not resolve the question of how to define those ends.

The author discusses models for equity financing. Topics include property rights, corporate cash flows, and costs related to collection.

Several case studies are presented illustrating the negative implications of property rights assignment and public welfare. While property owners benefit directly from rights assignment, consumers fail to benefit as a result of the lower output from reallocation strategies, and the higher price owners are able to charge.

Coase argued that voluntary bargaining can help solve the problem of externalities, under certain conditions. There are limitations to the bargaining approach in practice, and Coase noted the impediment represented by transaction costs. Pre-bargaining manipulation can lead to resources being used in an inefficient way. This problem relates to externalities rather than to exchanges of private goods. There is a need for government intervention to supplement rules relating to liability.