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ARTICLE CONTENTS INTRODUCTION 2542 I. DESCRIBING SUITS AGAINST CITIES 2548 A. Taxpayer Standing 2550 B. Neighbor Standing (2555) C. Preemption Standing 2564 II. ANALYZING SUITS AGAINST CITIES 2571 A. Economics [...], Our biggest social problems tend to manifest themselves in small ways--on the streets where they affect people's daily lives. Local governments, who govern the streets and thereby are closest to the people, often find themselves on the front lines of combatting those problems. Accordingly, local governments are now promoting reforms to address climate change and homelessness, to reinvent education and transportation, and to remedy ingrained inequities. Any government instituting change can and will face headwinds, which, in America perhaps inevitably, will at some point assume the form of lawsuits. But for various legal and functional reasons, city action is even more susceptible to litigation than federal or state action. Moreover, cities are particularly vulnerable to litigation instigated by the economically and politically powerful, who choose litigation when they fail to get their way from the political process. Consequently, suing cities has become a tool to stop local progress in its tracks. This Article is the first to call attention to these trends. It shows how, with little scholarly analysis or legal pushback, American law has come to accord special standing rights to private plaintiffs suing local governments. It also demonstrates how this regime systemically exacerbates existing inequalities and unjustifiably interferes with local democratic governance. But all is not lost. This Article identifies potential changes to the law that could rebalance the relationship between private plaintiffs and local governments. These changes will channel anticity litigation toward more socially beneficial uses, while discouraging the kinds of litigation that are, almost by nature, obstacles to progress. Current law famously makes it hard to sue federal and state governments. Much less famously, it makes it easy to sue local governments. By recognizing the problems each of the extremes portends, we can hopefully move closer to a democratically sound regime for suing governments.

INTRODUCTION 418 I. THE SCIENCE AND LEGISLATION OF BIOMETRICS 421 A. BIOMETRICS IN THE MODERN WORLD 422 B. MODERN RISKS IN THE BIOMETRICS FIELD 424 C. STATE BIOMETRIC REGULATION 427 [...]

I. Introduction and a Brief History of Crypto Regulation In May 2022, the total market value of the TerraLuna crypto asset (1) ecosystem fell from an estimated fifty billion dollars [...]

Political campaigns have always attracted significant attention, and politicians have often been the subjects of controversial--even outlandish--discourse. In the last several years, however, the risk of deception has drastically increased due to the rise of 'deepfakes.' Now, practically anyone can make audiovisual media that are both highly believable and highly damaging to a candidate. The threat deepfakes pose to our elections has prompted several states and Congress to seek legislative remedies that ensure recourse for victims and hold bad actors liable. These recent attempts at deepfake laws are open to attack from two different loci. First, there is a question as to whether these laws unconstitutionally infringe on deepfake creators'First Amendment rights. Second, some worry that these laws do not adequately protect against the most harmful deepfakes. This Note proposes a new approach to regulating deepfakes. By delineating a 'foreseeable harm' standard, with a totality-of-the-circumstances test rather than a patchwork system of discrete elements, this Note addresses both major concerns. Not only is a foreseeable harm standard effective, workable, and constitutionally sound; it is also grounded in existing tort law. Moreover, a recent Supreme Court decision pertaining to false statements and the First Amendment, United States v. Alvarez, lends support to such a standard. Adopting this standard will combat the looming threat of politically oriented deepfakes while preserving the constitutional right to free speech., Table of Contents Introduction I. The Problem with Political Deepfakes and Current Regulation Attempts A. Recent Examples of Politically Oriented Deepfakes B. Existing and Proposed Deepfake Laws II. Constitutional and [...]

INTRODUCTION 866 I. REMEDYING STATUTORY SURVEILLANCE HARMS 868 A. The Problem of Private Digital Surveillance 870 B. The RegulatoryApproach 873 C. The Litigation Approach 875 II. PROCEDURAL PROBLEMS WITH SURVEILLANCE [...], Class actions against online platforms alleging improper data collection and sharing practices have increased dramatically in recent years. In 2022, the Federal Trade Commission solicited public comment on governing these practices, which it termed "commercial surveillance," through rulemaking. This Comment highlights the rise of private commercial surveillance and how both regulation and litigation have been employed to address ensuing harms. This Comment then discusses procedural barriers to these class actions, particularly Rule 23(b)(3)'s predominance requirement and Article III standing, and how some courts have relied on the U.S. Supreme Court's decisions in Comcast v. Behrend and TransUnion v. Ramirez to heighten those barriers. Finally, this Comment makes several substantive recommendations for a federal privacy law that might overcome these procedural barriers, give effect to a private right of action, and complement regulatoryauthority.

INTRODUCTION 171 I. PUBLIC NUISANCE BACKGROUND 174 A. Historical Definition of Public Nuisance 174 B. Public Nuisance Today 176 C. Elements of Public-Nuisance Claims 177 D. Development of Public Nuisance [...], Always-listening devices have sparked new concerns about privacy while evading regulation, but a potential solution has existed for hundreds of years: public nuisance. Public nuisance has been stretched to serve as a basis of liability for some of the most prominent cases of modern mass-tort litigation, such as suits against opioid and tobacco manufacturers for creating products that endanger public health. While targeting conduct that arguably interferes with a right common to the public, this use of public nuisance extends far beyond the original understanding of the doctrine. Public nuisance has not been applied, however, to another prominent contemporary issue: privacy violations by always-listening devices. Plaintiffs have sued Google, Amazon, and Apple for their smart devices that listen and record snippets of conversations. But not one of these cases cites public-nuisance law as a basis for liability, even though the underlying wrong--eavesdropping--was one of the categories of conduct that fell within the earliest definitions of public nuisance. This Article explores the history of eavesdropping as a public nuisance at common law and throughout U.S. history. It explains the public nature of the wrong underlying eavesdropping and why actions that invade individuals' privacy should be understood as wrongs against the public at large. It then applies public-nuisance law to always-listening devices, arguing that public nuisance could serve as a basis for addressing privacy issues arising from modern technology or as a common-law analogue to make intangible privacy harms justiciable in federal court.

I. INTRODUCTION 390 II. OVERVIEW OF TITLE IX 391 A. RECENT HISTORY OF TITLE IX 391 B. NON-ATHLETIC APPLICATIONS OF TITLE IX 393 1. Sexual Harassment 394 2. Employment Practices [...]

CONTENTS ABSTRACT 116 INTRODUCTION 117 I. INTRODUCTION TO ACTOR-NETWORK THEORY 119 II. ASSEMBLAGE THEORY 120 III. WHY ACTOR-NETWORK THEORY 123 A. Solids Dissolve, Power Reconstitutes 124 B. North-South Exodus 127 [...], In 1971, Sarah Weddington argued Roe v. Wade as a class action on behalf of pregnant women living in Texas, many of whom, including herself, had to flee the State to obtain an abortion in Mexico. In 2021, Texas enacted S. B. 8, otherwise known as the Texas Heartbeat Act, which created a private cause of action for injunctive relief and statutory damages awards against any person assisting in and any physician accused of performing an abortion, thus reigniting the cross-border flows that historically have made Mexico a haven for runaway enslaved people and pregnant persons heading south to freedom. The Supreme Court of the United States discussed S. B. 8 and its effects in the context of a preenforcement challenge invoked in Whole Woman's Health v. Jackson. Using social science and philosophy understandings of Assemblage Theory and Actor-Network Theory, Professor Madeleine Plasencia offers a novel socio-legal theory for understanding how law and legal interpretation configure complex actor-network and assemblages connecting multiple contiguous political territories, creating a meta version of networks bridging Texas, Mexico, and parts between and beyond. Moreover, since S. B. 8 does away with traditional requirements of nexus and standing to sue, it outsources enforcement of its attack on reproductive rights to the world, raising vigilantes to officially sanctioned status, displacing virtuous actor-networks aimed at assisting pregnant persons with vicious networks of surveillance, thus reconstituting preexisting actor-networks to produce autopoietic systems of domination powered by pitting neighbor contra neighbor. To understand the full impact of Whole Woman 's Health v. Jackson and state laws such as S. B. 8, Plasencia theorizes the operation of the law from the perspective of the actor-networks it constitutes and reconstitutes, how these reconstituted assemblages activate new actors from fetalheartbeat actants to doctor-nurse-reporters, donors, neighbor-snitches, and recalcitrant acompanantes, and how these actor-networks, generate new social relations of power and vulnerability that are virulent and vicious rather than supportive and compassionate.

I. INTRODUCTION Sometimes lawyers get pushed around--both literally and figuratively. However, it is not every day that a Netflix camera crew might capture such an altercation on camera. While filming [...]

INTRODUCTION 142 I. ORIGINS AND IMPACT OF "DON'T SAY GAY" 143 II. PARENTS AND PRIVATE RIGHTS OF ACTION 146 A. S.B. 8 LEGISLATION: A FLAWED MODEL 147 B. How TO [...], The Supreme Court has historically overlooked the right to receive information in its free speech jurisprudence. But children have clear First Amendment rights in school, including the right to hear. By grounding its argument in the liberty model of free speech, this Note makes a case for how laws like Florida's "Don't Say Gay" bill can be challenged in court. Finally, it illustrates why an outright ban on discussing sexual and gender identity in elementary school classrooms is a violation of kids' right to receive information.

TABLE OF CONTENTS ABSTRACT 811 TABLE OF CONTENTS 812 I. INTRODUCTION 813 II. NEW YORK TIMES CO. V. SULLIVAN 816 III. TODAY'S ASSAULTS ON SULLIVAN 821 IV. A DUTY TO [...], The conservative legal establishment is waging war on modern liberalism with Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Organization marking its most recent victory. Against this backdrop, this Article contends that attacks from the right on New York Times Co. v. Sullivan--the Court's defining First Amendment decision that places political speech at the center of free speech doctrine--are motivated not by bona fide doctrinal disagreements but rather the cynical belief that the specter of defamation liability unrestrained by Sullivan will silence political opponents and, in turn, hasten the end of modern liberalism. So while the battle over Sullivan may not have the same partisan salience as attacks on Roe v. Wade, the political implications of overruling Sullivan are nevertheless vast. This Article confronts this troubling development. First, it tracks the politicization of defamation law in recent years, contextualizing it within the right's broader war on modern liberalism and cataloging the likely consequences of overruling Sullivan. Second, it asserts that claims from the right that Sullivan is un-American and ahistorical are nothing more than self-serving projection meant to detract from the undemocratic and historically unsupported principles that underlie the right's assault on Sullivan. In fact, this Article contends that Sullivan is quintessentially American--both ideologically and historically. Specifically, it asserts that Sullivan is the result of a long-recognized duty of a citizen in this country to impeach public officials through critical political speech and, when necessary, even defamatory speech. In all of this, the fight over Sullivan is not about defamation law, but the basic right to govern ourselves at all.

INTRODUCTION While nuisance law is seen by many as an obscure area taught in first-year property, public nuisance has emerged as a useful tool in litigating issues involving climate change. [...]

INTRODUCTION The "thorny thicket" of standing is a "tortuous track"--a track that the Supreme Court of North Carolina has tried to avoid. (1) At a constitutional minimum, federal standing requires [...]

I. INTRODUCTION 382 II. OVERVIEW OF TITLE IX. 383 A. RECENT HISTORY OF TITLE IX 383 B. NON-ATHLETIC APPLICATIONS OF TITLE IX. 385 1. Sexual Harassment 385 2. Employment Practices. [...]

INTRODUCTION As the Supreme Court stated in the 2020 case Barr v. American Association of Political Consultants, "Americans passionately disagree about many things. But they are largely united in their [...]

Most American lawyers, I suspect, know far too little about equity. We know that once upon a time, back in Merry Olde England, there were separate law and equity courts, [...], This contribution to the Notre Dame Law Review's annual Federal Courts Symposium on "The Nature of the Federal Equity Power" asks what the traditions of equity can tell us about Article III standing. I take as my point of departure the observation by Professors Sam Bray and Paul Miller, in their contribution to the Symposium, that equity does not have causes of action as such--or at least not in the same way as actions at law. This is potentially important for standing, as many academic critiques of the Supreme Court's standing jurisprudence have argued that standing should turn on whether the plaintiff has a cause of action. If Article III standing is to reflect traditional notions of which disputes are appropriate for judicial resolution, however, then that inquiry should include traditional practice on the equity side of the house, not just on the law side. I conclude that an equitable "grievance"--which Bray and Miller suggest plays a parallel role in equity to causes of action at law--typically involves a more particularized set of circumstances involving concrete harm or unfairness to the plaintiff. Equitable grievance, in other words, looks a lot like injury in fact. Attention to traditional equity practice thus may help put the Court's much-maligned injury-in-fact jurisprudence on a firmer footing.

Table of Contents Introduction 1641 I. Comparing Private, Public, and Hybrid Enforcement of Privacy Law 1646 A. Public Enforcement Regimes 1648 B. Private Enforcement Regimes 1651 C. Hybrid Enforcement Regimes [...], Many privacy advocates assume that the key to providing individuals with more privacy protection is strengthening the government's power to directly sanction actors that hurt the privacy interests of citizens. This Article contests the conventional wisdom, arguing that private rights of action are essential for privacy regulation. First, I show how private rights of action make privacy law regimes more effective in general. Private rights of action are the most direct regulatory access point to the private sphere. They leverage private expertise and knowledge, create accountability through discovery, and have expressive value in creating privacy-protective norms. Then to illustrate the general principle, I provide examples of how private rights of action can improve privacy regulation in a suite of key modern privacy problems. We cannot afford to leave private rights of action out of privacy reform.

INTRODUCTION 242 I. BACKGROUND ON MERGER LAW AND PRIVATE CHALLENGES 243 A. The Clayton Act and the DOJ-FTC Merger Guidelines 244 B. Private Right of Action Generally 248 II. PRIVATE [...]

ARTICLE CONTENTS INTRODUCTION 374 I. THE PUZZLE OF DISPARATE LIMBO 384 A. "Differential Impact" Claims Under the APA 384 B. Race-Related Disparate-Impact Claims Under the APA 391 C. Administrative Law's [...], Administrative law has a blind spot. It is blackletter doctrine that an agency's failure to consider the impacts of its conduct can lead to court invalidation of its decision as arbitrary and capricious. Judges have set aside agency action for failures to consider differentia] impacts on subgroups of business owners, park visitors, and animals. Yet when it comes to differential impact based on race or ethnicity, courts have, by and large, refused to entertain claims. If you are a Black farmer denied a federal loan, a Latinx schoolchild exposed to dangerous pesticides, a Latinx U.S. citizen denied a passport, or a Black renter suffering from housing discrimination, modern administrative law offers precious little recourse. Our Article uncovers how modern administrative law erased antidiscrimination principles. This story begins with the Civil Rights Act of 1964, when Congress punted on questions about disparate impact and the relationship between Title VI and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). But the plot thickened when the D.C. Circuit, in an opinion by then-Judge Ginsburg, held that [section] 704 of the APA barred civil rights plaintiffs from bringing an APA challenge because Title VI provided an alternative "adequate remedy."' Subsequent courts seized on the D.C. Circuit's [section] 704 dodge, using it to channel antidiscrimination claims away from the APA. Worse, courts have reflexively applied [section] 704 to oust civil rights claims, even after the Supreme Court's decision in Alexander v. Sandoval rendered Title VI demonstrably inadequate. Antidiscrimination's erasure from the APA, built on a mistaken relic of statutory interpretation, has consigned civil rights plaintiffs to a paralyzing limbo. Plaintiffs, unable to make out the stringent intent showings required under increasingly inhospitable civil rights laws, are also barred from mounting APA claims against agency discrimination for violations of administrative law's baseline guarantee of nonarbitrariness. Remedying disparate limbo is urgently needed, particularly as the nation enters a new round of soul-searching on the government's role in racial stratification, and as agencies at all levels take up new digital-governance tools that raise vexing bias concerns. Yet understanding the current state of disparate limbo also holds vitally important lessons about the broader sweep of modern administrative law and its relationship to the American civil rights struggle. Indeed, doctrinal developments that are core to the field--most notably the emergence throughout the 1970s and 1980s of muscular "hard look" review and a more intrusive judicial role in administrative governance--may only have been feasible because courts simultaneously excised divisive issues of race from administrative law's purview. Our account isolates a critical contingent moment when civil rights and administrative law diverged. In so doing, we place race and the scrubbing of antidiscrimination from the APA at the center of the construction of modern administrative law's empire.

Introduction 150 I. The Relationship Between Productivity Quotas and Employee Injuries 153 II. Enabling Factors of the High Employee Injury Rates at Amazon Warehouses 157 A. Unrestricted Employee Surveillance 157 [...]