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This research note introduces the Subnational Electoral Coercion in India (SECI) Data Set, which provides comprehensive data on electoral coercion in 186 Indian Vidhan Sabha elections between 1985 and 2015. SECI draws on news reports to capture instances of electoral coercion, including coercive fraud, election boycotts by non-state armed groups, and deaths resulting from electoral violence at the assembly constituency level. SECI differs from existing data in its focus on subnational elections, its temporal coverage and its broad definition of electoral coercion, thus opening up new directions for research on electoral politics across Indian states.

Electoral violence is perpetrated by anti-systemic actors opposed to the democratic system, as well as by those vying for power through the electoral process. Even though the motivations for violent tactics are distinct, we do not know whether intra- and anti-systemic violence differ in their effects. Focusing on state-level elections in India - a country that combines nationwide elections with persistent political violence - we demonstrate that the distinction is crucial for understanding spatial patterns of electoral violence and effects on election outcomes. Based on an original dataset of violence in legislative assembly elections between 1985 and 2008, we show that both tactics depress turnout overall but that the effect is larger for anti-systemic violence. Intra-systemic violence not only appears to be more selectively targeted, as it is more likely to occur in constituencies where the incumbent belongs to the state-level opposition, but also generates electoral benefits for the party in control of state government.