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Using daily data over the period August 5, 2013 - September 27, 2019, this study investigates the dynamic spillovers between international monetary policies across four major economies (i.e. Eurozone, Japan, UK and US) and three key cryptocurrencies (i.e. Bitcoin, Litecoin and Ripple). In doing so, we apply a Time-Varying Parameter Vector Auto-Regression (TVP-VAR) model, a dynamic connectedness approach and network analysis. The empirical results indicate that cryptocurrency returns and monetary policy spillovers were particularly large when shadow policy rates became negative, moderated during the Fed's "tapering process", and sharpened again more recently as cryptocurrency buoyancy returned. Gross directional spillovers suggest that shadow policy rates have more "to give than to receive", while those from and to cryptocurrency returns are naturally volatile. There is also strong interconnectedness between monetary policy in either the US or the Eurozone and the UK, and between Bitcoin and Litecoin. However, the spillovers across monetary policy and cryptocurrencies tend to be muted. Finally, spillovers were only slightly larger during the Fed's "unconventional" policy compared to the "standard" era, but their composition qualitatively changed over time.

This paper investigates the impact of macro-prudential policy (proxied by the counter-cyclical capital buffer (CCyB)) on bank credit risk during uncertain times, as banking sector stability is crucial in promoting financial intermediation. Using a unique daily data set consisting of 4939 credit default swaps (CDS) of 70 banks from 25 countries over the period 2010–2019, we find that CCyB tightening decreases bank-level CDS spreads, while CCyB loosening increases CDS spreads. This heterogeneous effect of CCyB arises due to its asymmetric effect on the capital ratio (i.e., the equity-to-total assets ratio) of banks. Tightening CCyB significantly increases capital, whereas loosening CCyB does not impact capital. Thus, the risks that emanate from the banking sector during periods of heightened uncertainty and financial distress can be significantly dampened when CCyB regulation is enabled. Consequently, macro-prudential policies for banks to hold higher levels of capital during good times are justified to contain financial market risks during downturns.

Using quarterly data for 10 OECD countries and the Euro area and a Kalman filtering technique, we investigate the international co-movement among natural interest rates. We show that the US is the main source of global spillovers and global/common factors appear to be key drivers of such co-movement. Indeed, global liquidity is a net transmitter of shocks, while quantitative easing (QE) and the US Dollar are net recipients of shocks. We also find that total spillovers among natural interest rates have been rising since the late nineties, spiking at around economic re-cessions, periods of US monetary policy tightening, the global financial crisis and the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis. From a policy perspective, our findings suggest: (i) the need of more monetary policy coordination among countries to tackle common drivers of natural rates; (ii) the importance of complementing monetary policy with macro-financial stabilisation tools to ease the global constraints that it faces; (iii) a very gradual and uncertain monetary normalisation path, subject to spikes in financial markets' volatility; and (iv) a (lower) "new normal" level for real policy rates.

Using state-level data for the U.S. housing market over the period of 1975:Q1-2012:Q2, we show that the consumption-wealth ratios derived from aggregate wealth (cay) and disaggregate (i.e. financial and housing) wealth (cday) are strong predictors of real housing returns (and their volatility). Additionally, we find that, barring the extreme ends of their respective conditional distributions, such effect is stronger for housing return volatility than housing returns. All in all, our findings show that state-level regressions can recover a large degree of heterogeneity that country-level exercises typically ignore. Such heterogeneity is prominent not only in terms of consumption smoothing behavior, but also with regard to housing return predictability.

Fiscal rules are typically seen as government constraints. Yet, the extent to which they are substituted or complemented by market discipline (especially, during financial stress) remains unexplored. Using data for 71 countries over the period 1985–2015, we estimate an “augmented” fiscal reaction function to assess the impact of both fiscal and market discipline. We find that different market signals influence fiscal policy, but fiscal discipline depends on market incentives. In the EU and the OECD, market signals complement fiscal rules. These are less effective in the EMU and non-OECD countries that are “debt intolerant”. Yet, there are unintended consequences: (i) neither output and debt stabilisation, nor fiscal rules affect the fiscal stance in the absence of financial crises; and (ii) financial stress makes fiscal discipline a destabilising factor, while central bank actions almost dismiss it. Finally, market (fiscal) discipline effects are (not) persistent and stronger (more uncertain) for the EMU.

We study the behaviour of real interest rate gaps-i.e. periods of real interest rates above (below) the natural interest rate-and link their length with a set of key observable determinants. Using quarterly data for 13 OECD countries over (close to) the last 60 years, we find that global risk-taking, CPI inflation, (un)conventional monetary policy, and income redistribution crucially shape the duration of both events. However, while labour-related supply-side factors appear to affect the length of positive interest rate gaps, the adoption of an inflation targeting regime and the current account balance seem to explain the duration of negative interest rate gaps. Our results suggest that the "normalisation" of the conduct of monetary policy is likely to be very gradual, and subject to spikes in uncertainty and financial markets' volatility.

We use a novel U.S. state-level database to evaluate the role of housing wealth as a provider of collateral services. First, we estimate the cointegrating relationship between housing wealth and labour income for all 50 states, as well as the District of Columbia (D.C.), and overall U.S. Then, we assess the predictive ability of the housing wealth-to-income ratios (labelled by hwy) for state-level future real housing returns. We uncover: (i) positive estimates for the elasticity of housing wealth with respect to labour income, which are also largely heterogeneous across U.S. states; and (ii) a negative link between the housing wealth-to-income ratios and future housing returns, albeit the forecasting power of hwy also varies considerably across states. We conclude that country-level regressions typically "mask" this diversity of features surrounding the usefulness of housing in collateral provision and unfavourable labour income shock smoothing that state-level frameworks are able to recover.

Using long-term sovereign ratings data for a panel of 130 countries over the last three decades, we investigate the duration and determinants of sovereign rating phases through the lens of discrete-time Weibull models. We find that the likelihood of the end of the ‘speculative-grade’ phase increases as time goes by (i.e. there is positive duration dependence), but the ‘investment-grade’ phase is not duration dependent. Thus, for sovereigns rated as speculative, the build-up of reputation as good borrowers is a gradual process, whereas the reputation of investment-grade sovereigns solidifies and remains unchanged as time passes. However, the length of both phases significantly depends on the country's economic conditions. In particular, lower inflation, stronger growth and sounder fiscal policies shorten (prolong) the speculative- (investment-) grade phase. In addition, better governance quality helps to reduce the duration of speculative-grade phases.

We used a panel of 29 advanced and emerging market countries to investigate whether the IMF's World Economic Outlook (WEO) fiscal forecasts add value in terms of forecast accuracy and information content, relative to private sector forecasts (from Consensus Economics). We find that: (i) WEO forecasts are not significantly less accurate than Consensus forecasts; (ii) WEO and Consensus forecasts tend to mutually encompass one another; and (iii) each source of forecasts appears to contain some information that is not embedded in the other source.

We use a novel continuous-time Weibull model (without and) with a change-point in the duration dependence parameter to investigate the duration of the exit and re-entry of sovereigns to international capital markets. Relying on annual data for a large panel of countries over the period 1970-2011, we find that, as the reputation of debtor countries as good (bad) borrowers solidifies over time, those episodes are more likely to end - i.e. the "legacy of time". Debtor countries can take advantage of the "benefit of doubt" of creditors during short exit spells. However, when exits are long and the reputation as a bad borrower emerges, no more "complacency" makes it more difficult for them to borrow again in international capital markets - i.e. the "tyranny of time". We also find that: (i) government stability and multilateral financial assistance play a crucial role; (ii) the dynamics of the duration of exit (re-entry) spells is robust to the presence of default episodes, the default length and the haircut size; and (iii) exit and re-entry have shortened over time.

We investigate the interconnectedness and spillovers between oil price inflation and CPI inflation in the G7 countries and China over the available period 1987M6-2020M6. To this end, we employ the multivariate DECO-GARCH model and both time-domain and frequency-domain spillover methods to achieve the objectives. We find that there is a reasonably high degree of integration between the oil price inflation and the CPI inflation rates in those countries. This relationship is not only time-varying, but also has been rising over time and, remarkably so, during oil crises and financial stress episodes. We also show that the oil price inflation is a crucial transmitter of spillovers to the CPI inflation of the countries under consideration, particularly to the US inflation, which, in turn, has a weak to mild influence on the paths of inflation of other countries. Additionally, the largest gross directional spillovers to other CPI inflation rates accrue to the US, while the lowest accrue to China. Finally, the oil price inflation influences the CPI inflation over the short-end of the business cycle, but much less so over the medium- to long-ends.

In this paper, we provide a forensic perspective of the determinants of banks' CDS spreads. Using data for 118 banks of 30 countries over the period 2004-2011, we find that banks' default risk typically reflects: (i) the quality of the banks’ balance sheet; (ii) liquidity of banks’ assets; (iii) how profitable banks’ operations are; (iv) the banks’ leverage ratios; and (v) how stringent/lenient regulatory capital ratios are. Considering a series of indicators of the financial structure of the banking system, our results reveal that: (i) higher concentration of the banking sector, stronger presence of foreign banks and a deterioration of the health of the banking sector lead to higher banks' CDS spreads; and (ii) the availability of alternative means of finance does not significantly influence banks' default risk. We also show that periods of high inflation, low GDP growth and stock market crashes are prone to an intensification of tensions in the banking system, but financial reforms (especially, in the field of banking supervision and privatizations) can mitigate them. Moreover, the timing, the duration and the composition of fiscal consolidation programs have a significant impact on banks' CDS spreads, and, in particular, expenditure-driven consolidation episodes are associated with a rise in banks' default risk. Finally, we highlight that although the financial crisis of 2008-2009 was a global event, higher quality of economic and legal institutions (and, therefore, in the regulatory framework) could have dampened the rise in bank' CDS spreads.

We employ a discrete-time parametric duration model on a group of 121 countries over the period 1970–2011 and find that the probability of the end of financial markets' shutdown and reaccess falls as these events become longer. We also show that: (1) shutdown episodes are longer when economic prospects are poor and the degree of financial openness falls, the chief executive has been in office for long periods, and the country has a default history and (2) spells of reaccess tend to be longer when economic growth improves and financial openness increases, there are neither government crises nor government instability, and the country did not default in the past. (JEL C41, G15)

The goal of this paper is to assess time-variation in asset returns while considering the whole conditional distribution. We use a quantile regression framework and quarterly data for the U.S., and show that the probabilistic distribution of expectations about future stock returns changes in response to variation in commonly used explanatory variables. Moreover, our results support the idea that lower quantiles are less stable than upper quantiles, thus, suggesting that asset pricing models are particularly accurate in capturing the expectations that less risk-averse agents have about future returns.

We find that fiscal austerity is associated with a reduction of human development standards, with the negative effect being particularly severe in the case of spending-driven consolidation episodes. Fiscal adjustments are especially damaging for human development in developing countries (namely, African and Latin American countries). Additionally, the empirical evidence shows that (i) government stability is a crucial institutional determinant of human development, and (ii) while investment in physical capital can boost human development, government consumption and inflation are detrimental to it. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Using quarterly data for a group of 20 industrialized countries and both continuous- and discrete-time duration models, we show that financial crisis recessions are associated with a two- to three-fold increase in the likelihood of the end of a housing boom. Additionally, recessions preceded by booms in mortgage credit are especially damaging, as their occurrence coincides with an increase in the duration of housing market slumps of almost 90%.

We use a nonparametric causality-in-quantile test to analyze the predictive ability of the wealth-to-income ratio (wy) for excess stock returns and their volatility. Our results reveal that the wy is nonlinearly related with excess stock returns, and hence, results from linear Granger causality tests cannot be deemed robust. When we apply the nonparametric causality-in-quantile test, we find that the wy can predict excess stock returns over the majority of the conditional distribution, with the exception being the extreme ends, that is, when the market is in deep bear or bull phases. However, the wy has no predictability for the volatility of excess stock returns.

We analyze predictability of risk premium in the context of model uncertainty. Using data for the euro area, the US and the UK, we show that there is a large amount of model uncertainty and one can improve the forecasts of stock returns with a Bayesian Model Averaging (BMA) approach. The empirical evidence for the euro area suggests that several macroeconomic, financial and macro-financial variables are consistently among the most prominent determinants of risk premium. As for the US, only a few number of predictors play an important role. In the case of the UK, future stock returns are better forecasted by financial variables. These results are corroborated for both the M-open and the M-closed perspectives, different model priors and in the context of “in-sample” and “out-of-sample” forecasting. Finally, we highlight that the predictive ability of the BMA framework is stronger at longer periods, and clearly outperforms the constant expected returns and the autoregressive benchmark models.

The existing literature has typically focused on bank-level characteristics to uncover the main drivers of bank CDS spreads. In this paper, we use data for 58 banks from 15 countries over the period 2004–2011 to assess whether country-level factors also explain variations in bank CDS spreads. In particular, we focus on financial structure indicators (namely, financial stability, depth, access and efficiency) and country risks (i.e. economic, financial and political rating risks) to explain why some banks experience higher levels of credit risk relative to others across countries. We find that while country-level financial instability is associated with higher credit risk; bank-level profitability, liquidity and improved asset quality are linked with lower credit risk. In addition, although country-level financial depth (as an indicator of credit bubble) contributes to higher CDS spreads, house price appreciation tends to dampen credit risk.

We use a nonparametric causality-in-quantiles test to compare the predictive ability of the consumption-wealth ratio ( cay) and the Markov Switching version ( cay MS ) for excess and real stock and housing returns and their volatility. Our results reveal strong evidence of nonlinearity and regime changes in the relationship between asset returns and cay or cay MS , which corroborates the relevance of this econometric framework. Moreover, both cay or cay MS are found to predict only excess stock returns over its entire conditional distribution, with the latter being a strong predictor only at certain quantiles. As for the housing market, these two consumption-wealth ratios only predict the volatility of real housing returns, with cay MS outperforming cay over the majority of the conditional distribution.

Con datos de la NBER-CES Manufacturing Industry Database, los autores identifican una relacion positiva entre la tecnologia inferida a partir de la productividad total de los factores y las razones entre trabajadores calificados y no calificados y entre sus salarios, pero solo en sectores de base cientifica e intensivos en produccion, mientras que es negativa en los dominados por el proveedor. Confirman la prima salarial por calificacion y el aumento del sesgo tecnologico hacia el trabajo calificado desde 1980. Las diferencias de productividad entre trabajadores calificados y no calificados aumentan la demanda relativa de los primeros cuando ambos no son intercambiables. Concluyen que los gobiernos deberian promover la innovacion de base cientifica.

In this paper, an innovative camera synchronization technique is presented, enabling the combination of two 1 mm $\times 1$ mm sized cameras to produce a real-time 3-D image. The technique developed and implemented on an FPGA platform with an USB3 interface, allows minimal error synchronization of up to an eight individual self-timed cameras. Typically, a small self-timed camera modules do not allow external synchronization, but for stereo vision, 3-D reconstruction with multiple cameras, and applications requiring pulsed illumination, camera synchronization is required. The developed solution uses the power supply control to dynamically adapt their frame rate and frame phase. The control core overviews the operating frequency of each camera by measuring the line period in each frame based on a well-defined sampling signal. The frequency is then adjusted by varying the voltage level applied to the sensor using as a reference the error between the measured and desired line period. This allows for average synchronization errors below 0.02% at temperatures ranging from 0 °C to 60 °C. This paper will allow the implementation of smaller than 3-mm-diameter 3-D stereo vision equipment for medical endoscopy, such as disposable robotic or micro invasive surgery applications.

In this paper, we investigate the hedging versus the financialization nature of commodity futures vis-a-vis the equity market using a ARMA filter-based correlation approach. Our results suggest that while gold futures are typically seen as a hedge against unfavorable fluctuations in the stock market, the majority of commodity futures appears to be treated as a separate asset class in line with their increasing financialization. Our results are robust to the presence of inflation, highlight the hedging role played by fuel (energy) commodity futures in the nineties, and reveal that the commodity financialization boosted since the 2000s. We also show that gold futures are partially a safe haven for equity investments in the short-term, but not in the mid-term. Finally, we uncover some hedging (financialization) of crude oil futures associated to global demand (oil supply) shocks.

We investigate the response of the central bank to the change in size of non-bank financial intermediaries. Using quarterly data for the U.S. over the period 1946:Q1-2016Q4, we find that when faced with an increase in the asset growth of the securities' brokers and dealers and the shadow banking sector, the monetary authority reacts by raising the short-term nominal interest rate. This response is stronger in the case of sharp variation in the size of the balance sheet of nonbank financial intermediaries. From a policy perspective, our study suggests that an extended version of the original Taylor rule - embedding both price stability and financial stability concerns – provides a good characterisation of the monetary policy reaction function.

We use duration analysis to assess the impact of securitization, mortgage sector liberalization and government involvement in housing finance on the length of housing booms, busts and normal times in a panel of 20 OECD countries over the period 1970Q1-2015Q4. Our results reveal that a move towards a more liberalized mortgage sector is associated with longer housing booms, while an increase in securitization is linked with shorter housing busts. They also show that the length of housing booms and busts is particularly sensitive to housing finance characteristics, but that does not seem to be the case for normal times. Additionally, government support measures do not necessarily cushion against housing busts. A careful assessment of their distributional impact, as well as their effect on the trade-off between liquidity and guarantee/loan provision, is also required to prevent (longer) housing booms. All in all, housing finance regulation may prove especially relevant to shield against the damaging effects of housing busts and the financial stability risks associated with housing booms. Monetary policy can also be an important complement to macro-prudential policies. Finally, government participation in housing finance should be designed in a way that avoids an undesirable amplification of house price fluctuations.

We link transitory deviations of consumption from its equilibrium relationship with aggregate wealth and labor income to equity returns on the one hand, and to two characteristics of bond investors—the premium demanded to hold long‐term assets, and “flight to quality” behavior—on the other hand. Using a panel of 10 euro area countries over the period 1984Q1–2017Q4, we show that a rise in the consumption–wealth ratio predicts both higher equity returns and the future term spread, while a fall in the consumption–wealth ratio explains a large fraction of the rise in the spread between the “risky” and the “safe‐haven” bond.

We investigate the interconnectedness between CPI inflation in the G7 countries and China and oil price inflation over the period 1987M6-2020M6. To this end, we employ the multivariate DECO-GARCH model and both time-domain and frequency-domain spillover methods to achieve the objectives. We find that there is a reasonably high degree of integration between the CPI inflation rates and the oil price inflation. This relationship is not only time-varying, but also has been rising over time and, remarkably so, during the oil crises and financial stress episodes. We also show that the oil price inflation is a crucial transmitter of spillovers to CPI inflation. The largest gross directional spillovers to other CPI inflation rates accrue to the US, followed by France, while the lowest accrue to China. Additionally, the oil price inflation influences the CPI inflation over the short- and medium-terms and, to a lesser extent, in the long-term. Finally, different measures of the oil price inflation are net transmitters of inflation spillovers that are strongly interconnected among themselves. They transmit strong spillovers to the US inflation, which, in turn, has a mild influence on the path of inflation in several of the countries under consideration.

We assess the spillovers from the oil sector to the housing market cycle using quarterly data for 20 net oil-exporting and -importing industrial countries, and employing continuous- and discrete-time duration models. We do not uncover a statistically significant difference in the average duration of booms and normal times in the housing markets of those net oil-importers and net oil-exporters. Similarly, the degree of exposure to commodity price fluctuations does not seem to significantly affect the housing market cycle. However, we find that housing booms are shorter when oil prices increase than housing busts when oil prices decrease. We also show that the net oil-importers are more vulnerable to protracted housing slump episodes than the net-oil exporters., Compete 2020, Portugal 2020, Feder, FCT

Using quarterly data for a panel of advanced economies, we show that synchronized fiscal consolidation (stimulus) programmes in different countries make their business cycles more closely linked. We also find: (i) some evidence of decoupling when an inflation targeting regime is unilaterally adopted; (ii) an increase in business cycle synchronization when countries fix their exchange rates and become members of a monetary union; (iii) a positive effect of bilateral trade on the synchronization of business cycles. Global factors, such as a rise in global risk aversion and uncertainty and a reversal of nonstandard expansionary monetary policy, can also reduce the degree of co-movement of business cycles across countries. From a policy perspective, our work shows that an inflation targeting regime coupled with simultaneous fiscal consolidations can lead to more business cycle synchronization.

This paper focuses on the macroeconomic and wealth effects of unconventional monetary policy. To this end, we estimate a Bayesian Structural Vector Autoregression (B-SVAR) using U.S. monthly data for the post-Lehman Brotherscollapse period. We show that a positive shock to the growth rate of central bank reserves does not have a substantial impact on the industrial production or the consumer price. However, the shock gives a strong boost to asset prices, which is larger in magnitude for stock prices than for housing prices. Thus, unconventional monetary policy typically operates via portfolio rebalancing effects. A VAR counter-factual exercise confirms the role of the shocks to the growth rate of central bank reserves in explaining the dynamics of the variables included in the system, especially, in the case of asset prices. Finally, additional empirical assessments uncover an important change in the conduct of monetary policy from "standard" to "exceptional" times and the suitability of our model in capturing such structural transformation., We are grateful to participants to the Third International Symposium in Computational Economics and Finance (ISCEF), organized in Paris on April 10-12 2014 (http://www.iscef.com), and two anonymous referees for their constructive comments that considerably improved this paper. Sousa acknowledges that this work has been financed by Operational Programme for Competitiveness Factors-COMPETE and by National Funds through the FCT-Portuguese Foundation for Science and Technology within the remit of the project "FCOMP-01-0124-FEDER-037268 (PEst-C/EGE/UI3182/2013)." Traverso is also highly indebted to the suggestions made by Vitor Castro. Address correspondence to: Ricardo M. Sousa, University of Minho, Department of Economics and Economic Policies Research Unit (NIPE), Campus of Gualtar, 4710-057 Braga, Portugal; e-mail: rjsousa@eeg.uminho.pt,rjsousa@alumni.lse.ac.uk., info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion

©2016 American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association We use a representative consumer model to analyze the relation between the transitory deviations of consumption from its common trend with aggregate wealth and labor income, cay, and the housing risk premium. The evidence based on data for 15 OECD countries shows that, if financial and housing assets are seen as complements, investors will temporarily allow consumption to rise when they expect a rise in future housing returns. By contrast, if housing assets are treated as substitutes for financial assets, consumption will be reduced.

We investigate the role of global factors in explaining the length of commodity price cycle phases, using a continuous-time Weibull duration model and data for a panel of 33 countries over the period 1980Q1-2015Q4. We find evidence of increasing (constant) positive duration dependence for commodity price booms and busts (normal time spells). Global macroeconomic conditions - in particular, inflation, economic policy uncertainty and monetary policy actions - significantly affect the duration of all commodity price cycle phases. Global environmental conditions also impact the duration of commodity price booms, with a rise in average temperature (rainfall) increasing (reducing) their length. A rise in the number of military conflicts around the globe is associated with shorter booms and busts. Finally, we find that a rise in oil prices is linked with longer booms and shorter busts.

This paper analyses the transitions out of fiscal consolidations using annual data for 17 industrial countries over the period 1975-2013 and applying a discrete-time competing risks duration model. Our approach allows us to distinguish the factors behind a successful or an unsuccessful end of fiscal consolidation episodes. The results show that economic and political factors, the size and typology of fiscal adjustments and the occurrence of crises explain the differences in the length and the success/failure of fiscal consolidations. Moreover, while fiscal adjustment programmes that end successfully display positive duration dependence, those that end in an unsuccessful manner are not duration dependent.

Endoscopy and small surgery can be performed with the support of small cameras. These cameras need to be minimal to reduce intrusion, require fast response and automatic illumination. The current work describes the world's smallest camera for endoscopy, NanEye, and the dynamic control algorithm for ROI developed for the illumination LED source coupled to the camera head that allows adjusting light, gain and exposure time. The obtained results show that it is capable of achieving correction speeds under 1 s while maintaining a static error below 3% relative to the total number of pixels of the image. The result of this work will allow the integration of high brightness LED sources of millimeter size on a very small camera enabling its use in endoscopic surgical robotic operations or minimal invasive surgery and NanEye is expected to be supplied at low prices for single time use.

Using annual data for 13 European countries over the period 1980-2008, we assess the impact of national fiscal consolidations on the income inequality of European regions. Regional dispersion increases in the outcome of consolidation episodes, particularly, when packages are more severe and implemented through spending cuts rather than tax rises. From a policy perspective, these findings suggest that fiscal consolidations driven by reductions in government spending can exacerbate regional disparities and may ultimately counteract the European policy efforts to promote territorial cohesion. Our results are robust to alternative inequality measures, the occurrence of crisis episodes and the exclusion of fiscal outliers.

"Published online: 19 Oct 2015", Using a panel of 13 advanced economies for the period 1980–2012, we find that periods of impaired financial intermediation mainly accrue to maturity mismatches in sovereign debt. Thus, a higher (lower) share of short-term (medium and long-term) debt leads to an increase in the financial stress index. From a policy perspective, our work suggests that debt management policies translated into longer average maturities of sovereign debt not only reduce the expected debt servicing cost, but also mitigate strains in the financial sector., FCT Fundação para a Ciência e Tecnologia (COMPETE 2020, PORTUGAL 2020, FEDER)

Using a Structural VAR (SVAR) model, we examine the effects of the monetary policy of the United States on sectoral commodity prices (including the non-fuel commodity prices, food prices, beverage prices, prices of agricultural raw materials, prices of metals and prices of fuel (energy) commodities) and macroeconomic activity. The empirical evidence suggests that a U.S. monetary contraction leads to an immediate rise in the broad commodity price index, which possibly reflects an aggregation bias, greater expected inflation and speculation, high production costs or some overshooting due to overreactions. Then, the response erodes after six quarters as the positive interest rate shock vanishes and higher interest rates and liquidity drainage take traction. Despite this, the aggregate price response masks the existence of significant heterogeneity in the price responses of the different types of commodity sectors. More specifically, a positive interest rate shock leads to: (i) an initial pop in the price returns of the non-fuel commodities, which later reverses path and becomes negative (as in the case of the prices of agricultural raw materials); (ii) a positive and persistent rise in the volatile food prices; (iii) a fall in the beverage prices; and (iv) a persistent reduction in the prices of metals and the prices of energy prices. Our results also remain globally intact with respect to alternative specifications and identification schemes as well as to unconventional monetary policy effects. Similar results are also found when commodity futures prices are used. We conclude that policymakers should recognize the source of sector inflation before embarking on contractionary monetary policy. The design of core inflation targeting is also preferable to headline inflation targeting.