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We study an implication of the Ricardian theory of differential extensive rent in a free trade regime. To this effect we develop a Ricardian two country two commodity open economy model. We assume that, unlike labour, land is heterogeneous both within and across countries and that the ratio of high to low quality land is different among the trading countries. By means of a numerical example we show that as the process of worldwide capital accumulation (and population growth) proceeds an industrial country may find it convenient to increase its domestic corn production and even reverse completely the pattern of its imports and exports.

In the Treatise, Keynes claimed that the price levels of consumption and investment goods would not necessarily move in opposite directions. He further argued that the first claim had nothing to do with monetary circulation. If these two claims could be established, they would have constituted a direct attack on Ricardian economics and the economics of Marx, both of which are identified as self-adjustment mechanisms as in Say's law by Keynes. This paper seeks to evaluate these claims through the lenses of sector balance, the two-price theory, and monetary circulation.

Volume II contains entries on the major schools of economic thought and analysis. These schools differ with regard to their 'vision' of the working of the economic system, the major forces and interactions that shape its path, and the policy recommendations proposed. At any moment of time, several such schools typically compete with one another, striving for dominance within the economic and political discourse. Each Handbook can be read individually and acts as a self-contained volume in its own right. It can be purchased separately or as part of a three-volume set.

John Maynard Keynes focused famously on a perceived sharp methodological divide between Malthus ‘the inductive and intuitive investigator’ and Ricardo ‘the abstract and a priori theorist.’ This sharp contrast is unjustified. I establish Malthus’s bona fides as a leading theorist by reference to his land-based growth model; his perception of an aggregate-demand problem, independent of the scarce land constraint; and his Physiocratic perspective (ultimately abandoned) on the source of surplus in agriculture. Malthus is also shown to proceed with supreme caution when addressing policy issues where factual circumstance relating to time and place are of the essence. But here too a sharp contrast with Ricardo is unjustified.

The purpose of this survey is to summarize known results about tropical hypersurfaces and the Cayley Trick from polyhedral geometry. This allows for a systematic study of arrangements of tropical hypersurfaces and, in particular, arrangements of tropical hyperplanes. A recent application to the Ricardian theory of trade from mathematical economics is explored.

It has recently been suggested that heterodox economics can benefit from an engagement with classical surplus theory. However, caution is often recommended due to the ideological concepts that are embedded in classical political economy. This article argues that many of the ideological concepts that are often attributed to classical political economy are actually not part of classical political economy, but rather of a “vulgar” form of political economy, a project that emerged after Ricardo. This vulgar project, often termed as “Ricardian economics,” is often mistakenly taken to be a development of classical political economy, but it is actually a rupture with the classical political economy of Petty, Smith, and Ricardo, as Marx, and later Sraffa, argued. Once this is acknowledged, the relationship between classical political economy and heterodox economics becomes clearer.

(from the 1988 French edition): Saving is the scourge of any economy that is not the mythological barter society of Ricardian economics. The author infers that saving is the major cause of unemployment in monetary economies.

Introduction Smith did not simply adumbrate the social existence of the modern capitalist society, which explains the well-known logical incoherence of his labor theory of value. Marx, advancing Ricardos critique of Smiths theory of value as flawed because it lacked a coherent clarification of the relation between labor values and income distribution, had already pieced together a comprehensive number of conceptual misgivings. For Marx, Ricardo had a better understanding of the capitalist economy, because, in general terms, Ricardo admonished Smith for severing the link between the production of labor-embodied commodities and the exchange value of these commodities in circulation: [Ricardo's categories] are confronted with their principle--the determination of value--and examined in order to determine the degree to which they directly correspond to this principle and the position regarding the apparent discrepancies which they introduce into the value relations of commodities ... the determined break with the contradiction that pervades Adam Smith's work. (Marx 1969b [1863]: 169) Marx succeeded in discerning the dissimilarities between Smith and Ricardo by employing his overall historical-critical approach. First, Smith's contributions have to be understood as a material result of the society in which he lived. Science as a theoretical practice cannot be separated from its historical conditions. Smith's texts are both material artefacts and an agency of the ensemble of social relations of the eighteenth-century British social formation. The temporality of that society was not thoroughly capitalist. Rather, as with other West European societies, the bourgeoisie had yet to develop its role as a hegemonic force and the incipient capitalist relations of production still had to be grasped within state-feudal social relations and their political state-form. The economic logic of capital accumulation was thoroughly subsumed under, and limited by, a dominant premodern logic of political accumulation of power. The economic position of the commercial bourgeoisie was organically interwoven with its ability to get hold of city and state offices, exclusive rights to set up economic activities, royal patronage, and symbols of political power such as ranks and titles. In other words, the centralization of political power under state-feudalism gave the commercial bourgeoisie new opportunities to syphon off part of the social surplus. Between the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries, the commercial bourgeoisie succeeded in accumulating political power in order to rise as one of the dominant social classes. Smith's Wealth of Nations profoundly expressed this partial and incomplete transition from feudal times to modern capitalism (e.g. Dobb 1973: 54-55). Contemporary economic and social historians such as EA Wrigley, MC Howell, and DC Coleman all emphasize the predominantly premodern features of early-modern Western European societies, therefore cautioning their colleagues not to automatically reduce the emergence of the commercial bourgeoisie to a fully developed capitalist society (Coleman 1992: 107-122; Howell 2010: 299-300; Wrigley 1988: 34-49). This reinvigoration of Marx's historical-critical methodology explains why Smith did not conceptually articulate all the necessary elements of material processes for grasping the inner logic of the capitalist mode of production. Second, Marx's historical-critical approach makes a clear distinction between the historical context of a text and its ideological appropriation by a new dominant class seeking to legitimize the current state of affairs. The historical materialist inference of textual meaning has been impeded by replacing the context of historical social relations with historicity--hegemonic ideological thought imposing its affirmation of the present upon the past. Marx vehemently vindicated Smith's and Ricardos scientific progress against later Vulgar economists,' who, under the disintegration of Ricardian economics, relapsed into a mere superficial description of the present: . …

It is not surprising that in ages of ignorance the principal instrument of a magician's arts was supposed to be his books. Books are a real magic, or rather necromancy--a person speaks from the dead, and speaking his most earnest feelings and gravest and most recondite thoughts. (Mill [1854] 1988: 666) Larry Moss, as editor-in-chief of the American Journal of Economics and Sociology, organized a commemorative panel for Martin Bronfenbrenner in 1998 and publication of the proceedings in the Journal He asked me to contribute, and suggested my topic: "Martin Bronfenbrenner as a Comrade-in-Arms in Establishing the 'New Classical Economics'" (Hollander 1999). In that paper I drew on Martin's correspondence with me to show that he had been poorly treated by colleagues for adopting my reading of Ricardianism. It is now Larry's turn to be the subject of a commemorative panel and publication of the proceedings. I cannot speak from firsthand knowledge, but it appears that Larry too was treated poorly by colleagues, though on an unrelated issue: "He was a neo-Austrian, though not 'pure' enough for some of the ultra-Rothbardians" (Diamond 2009). Were this indeed so, it would scarcely surprise me. Larry had a too well-developed sense of humor, and he was too fair minded and too catholic in his interests to put up with extremism of any sort. In any event, Larry, like Martin, came to accept my reading of Ricardo, as I shall show. The parallel I am drawing breaks down insofar as I am unable to join the panel and express my sentiments directly to Widdy Ho and family. I shall focus to begin with on Larry's contribution to the volume based on the conference held at the University of Toronto upon my retirement, "Ricardian Economics: Reasoning About Counter-Intuitive Tendencies When System Constraints Are Present" (Moss 2001). I was doubtless initially biased in its favor because of its location and because Larry there accepted the inverse wage-profit relation as the index of classical "Ricardianism" as I had sought for years to establish: "I agree with Hollander that the inverse wage-profit theorem might well be the central organizing principle of the Ricardian school of economics" (2001: 296). But high expectations may also remain unfulfilled. Far from it. I am confident that even wholly objective readers must find this chapter a veritable tour de force in its broad coverage of the primary literature from Hume to J. S. Mill; its fair treatment of the secondary commentaries; its demonstration of the longevity of "Ricardianism" entailing linkage of the inverse wage-profit relation as a central thread to the shared-incidence principle, comparative costs, the Hume monetary mechanism, and tax incidence; and its appreciation of the broad range of applications of the fundamental theorem on distribution, extending to the question of the responsibility of trade unions for inflation. In all this, Larry made an important contribution to our understanding of the evolution of 19th-century economics, while the clarity of the exposition, which is sprinkled with refreshing vignettes of familiar pieces of analysis, suggests that Larry must have been an inspiring teacher. Equally impressive are his extensions beyond the technicalities to broader intellectual considerations, in an attempt to explain why the inverse relation did not capture the public mind, which relies on the intuitive notion that general wage increases are passed on to consumers in generally higher prices. This perspective, runs his argument (here Larry followed Paul Krugman), was encouraged by a sort of fallacy of composition involving the illegitimate extension to the economy of thought processes derived from the business concern. Implied by Ricardo's analysis of the inverse wage-profit relation, Larry maintained, was recognition of the economy as a closed system subject to negative feedback mechanisms, and in this lay the revolutionary significance of Ricardian theory. …

Introduction I do not think that science is "refined common sense." I especially do not think economic science is so organized because many of its patterns of thought are counterintuitive. David Ricardo's formulation of several organizing principles in our discipline appears to be especially counterintuitive. Indeed, the purpose of this chapter is to highlight one of these organizing principles, namely, the inverse wage-profit theorem. This idea, in one form or another, dominated British economic thought after Adam Smith. (1) Despite its presence in the writings of David Ricardo, James Mill, Thomas Malthus, Mountifort Longfield, John E. Cairnes, and John Stuart Mill, the theorem never seeped out of the halls of academia to penetrate the popular mind. Down to this day, public opinion has it that anything that raises the cost of labor in a region ratchets up prices: "cost-plus-pricing" is what people believe, because it is apparently consistent with everyday experience in the marketplace. (2) After reviewing, in the second section, the evidence about the persistence of the inverse wage-profit theorem, especially in the writings of David Ricardo and John Stuart Mill, in the third and fourth sections, I document that this theoretical approach was not well known outside of the Ricardian literature during most of the nineteenth century. As to why the idea did not stick in the public's mind, I agree with Paul Krugman's suggestion: most non-economists find it difficult, if not virtually impossible, to imagine how a huge prosperous currency area such as the USA can be hemmed in by system constraints and governed by potent negative feedback mechanisms. Trained economists, especially those trained in what I shall call "the orthodox tradition," have an easier time conceptualizing the economy in these terms, and do so especially when passing on the principles of the discipline from one generation of university students to the next. (3) Intelligent observers, such as business leaders and heads of state, find orthodox patterns of thought arcane, obscure, and terribly difficult to understand. The development of economics as a scientific discipline is marked by the recognition that the social world is characterized by tendencies constrained by negative feedback effects. Large parts of neoclassical economics consist of ideas and analyses most properly rooted in the inverse wage--profit theorem of Ricardian economics. The inverse wage-profit theorem holds that an economy-wide increase in wages tends to lower overall profits and not raise the price level. This inverse wage--profit theorem is so important to the structure of the Ricardian framework of analysis that it is a more than likely candidate for the status of what Samuel Hollander has declared "the central doctrine" of Ricardian political economy (Hollander 1977: 221-257). Neither Adam Smith nor ordinary citizens would ever think to invoke such a peculiar theorem. It is simpler to generalize from the microeconomic idea that long-run selling prices tend to gravitate toward money costs of production. Therefore, inflation must be caused by a generalized rise in the money costs of production. What could be easier to understand? What could make better sense? But prices are not one-dimensional magnitudes. Prices are "ratios," and a set of ratios can not rise without the money commodity itself increasing or circulating more rapidly. Ricardo was certainly not the first economist to realize this basic fact about the structure of prices in the macroeconomy. (4) These insights informed all of Ricardo's subsequent scientific work. Ricardo's basic claim was that increases in the general level of wages create a tendency throughout the economy for profits to fall. Unless the quantity of money, or specie, in the economy just happened to expand to validate the required higher level of income (or the "velocity" of money rose by exactly the right amount), there would be no obvious way a higher wage level could coexist with a higher price level. …

This article discusses the contribution made by Francesco Fuoco (1774–1841) to the methodological debate in the early nineteenth century. In opposition to Say’s view, Fuoco defended the validity of the deductive method in economic analysis, upholding the mathématique sociale tradition. This perspective characterizes his main work, Saggi economici (1825–27), in which he expounded a systematic view of economic theory and synthesized, within the framework of deductive methodology, a typical subjectivist theory of value, drawn from Condillac, with the new Ricardian theory of distribution. As he engaged in defense of the deductive nature of economic analysis, Fuoco found confirmation of the validity of the mathématique sociale tradition in the Ricardian “new theory” of rent. In this analytical context, Fuoco’s original contribution lay in the importance that he assigned to the money function in the capitalist economy.

I owe the decision to study economics to the influence of the writings of Henry George and Karl Marx. In 1944 I was 17 years old and attending Peter Stuyvesant High School in New York City. I enrolled for a course in Commerce, and in the last week of the term the teacher took some of the better students, which included me, to a special lecture at a nearby Henry George School. The lecture was an explanation of why the unrestrained growth of land rentals had produced poverty, wars, and all the other ills of modern civilization. Henry George had long ago provided both the diagnosis of the evil and the treatment that would cure it: a single con fiscatory tax on ground rent! At the end of the lecture, we were all presented with free copies of Henry George's Progress and Poverty, which I duly read without understanding much of it. But years later when I finally studied the Ricardian theory of differential rent, I did have a moment of excitement at discovering the true source of George's theory. (1) Thus begins the intellectual autobiography of noted economic historian Mark Blaug. Over the years, Blaug has retained what he calls a "soft spot" for George. In the November 1980 issue of Economica, he reviewed the first edition of Critics of Henry George, not unfavorably. (2) In 1992, he edited a collection of 26 articles on Henry George. (3) In May 1996 he reviewed--rather less favorably--the three Georgist Paradigm books published by Shepheard-Walwyn. (4) In June 1999, he gave an invited lecture on Henry George at Macquarie University, Sydney, Australia, part of a series funded by the F. J. Walsh bequest. He published this lecture in 2000 as "Henry George: Rebel with a Cause." (5) On June 29, 2002, I interviewed Blaug at his home in the Dutch university town of Leiden. Blaug was born into an Orthodox Jewish family in the Netherlands, where his father was a successful raincoat manufacturer, "the Raincoat King of the Netherlands." In 1940, when the Nazis invaded Holland, the family fled to New York City. "I was brought up as an orthodox Jew, achieved pantheism by the age of 12, agnosticism by the age of 15, and militant atheism by the age of 17, from which I have never wavered." (6) Following high school, Blaug attended New York University, where he quickly became an avowed Marxist. "I was always a bit of a smart alec when I was young and Marxism was made to order for me: it allowed me to pontificate on every subject with a cocksureness that suited me perfectly." (7) He also joined the Communist Party, and was quickly expelled for signing a petition in support of the Party president, who had himself been expelled for disagreeing with an item of doctrine. "To those who have never been a member of a conspiratorial or quasi-conspiratorial group, the speed with which party members will ostracize a heretic is hard to believe." (8) The Marxist theory that "economic interests and economic forces are the foundations of all social and political conflicts" led Blaug to the study of economics, and to a rapid abandonment of his Marxist view. He graduated from Queens College of the City University of New York in 1950 and began Ph.D. work at Columbia. In 1952, while he was an instructor at Queens, three senior professors at Queens refused to cooperate with U.S. Senator Joseph McCarthy's communist-hunting committee--and were summarily fired. Blaug signed a petition in their support, and was immediately forced to resign, leaving him broke and depressed. But from out of nowhere a grant materialized to send him abroad to write his Ph.D. thesis. He spent the "best two years" of his life in London, where he discovered that "scholarly research was my true metier." (9) His dissertation on the rise and fall of the school of David Ricardo, supervised by George Stigler, was published in 1958 as Ricardian Economics. (10) In 1954, Blaug became an assistant professor at Yale. Assigned to teach history of economic thought--a required subject in those days! …

O artigo revisa a evolução da teoria ricardiana do valor em sua conexão com o elemento tempo. Inicialmente, procede-se breve inspeção da primeira proposta de Ricardo para a lei geral das trocas. Contempla-se, a seguir, uma ilustração numérica da fórmula original dos preços competitivos, esclarecendo-se como o fator tempo surgiu nas discussões sobre a teoria desenvolvida nos Principles. Examina-se ainda a versão simplificada da regra do valor introduzida na terceira edição do livro, assim como a proposição ricardiana fundamental de que as variações nos lucros teriam impacto mínimo nos preços. Mostra-se, na última seção, que a generalização do exemplo concebido por Ricardo, incluindo processos produtivos com múltiplos períodos, não sustenta tal asserção. This paper reviews the evolution of the Ricardian theory of value in its connection with the element time. Initially, Ricardo's first version of the general law of exchange is briefly inspected. After that, a numerical illustration of the formula for competitive prices is detailed, while some light is shed on how the factor time arose in the discussions about the theory advanced in the Principles. Next, the simplified version of the norm of value introduced in the book's third edition is examined, as well as the central Ricardian proposition that changes in the profit rate would have minimum impact on prices. The last section shows that a generalization of the same example concocted by Ricardo, incorporating multiple production periods, does not lend support to such assertion.

Bagehot wrote on the methodology of Ricardian political economy some years after the appearance of marginalism. The purpose of this paper is to examine and evaluate his methodological positions. Bagehot made some significant contributions concerning the nature of economic explanation, the relevance of economic assumptions and the limits of the validity of economic theories. His positions were strongly influenced by social anthropology and Darwinian evolutionism. Bagehot's originality lies in his evolutionist view of the Ricardian political economy, a view that led him to limit its validity and to reinforce its realisticness, at a time when economics was about to take an opposite direction.

The Ricardian economists’ famous model of economic growth employed the Malthusian population doctrine, the law of diminishing returns, and the classical or iron law of wages. This analysis was based on utilitarian moral philosophy. The gloomy Stationary State conclusions of the Ricardian growth model — maldistribution of income and widespread poverty — were challenged by both economists and moral philosophers. A particularly important challenge was that offered by William Whewell (1794–1866), Professor of Moral Philosophy and the dominant figure at the University of Cambridge. Whewell is remembered today for his early contributions to mathematical economics. This article begins with a review of the Ricardian growth model. Next, Whewell’s system of moral philosophy is examined and the scientific and religious basis of Whewell’s antagonism to Ricardian economics is considered. After considering Whewell’s treatment of agricultural progress, economic classes, and rent doctrine, his own model of economic growth is analyzed. Finally, Whewell’s appraisal of the duty of government to those harmed by development is explored.

It would be much too strong calling Mark Blaug’s overall approach a ‘research program’, nevertheless there is quite some coherence and continuity with respect to a few themes with which one could characterize his work throughout his professional life. One of these themes, ‘rigor versus relevance’, was most dominant in the last ten years of his life. So, though this theme was most prominent in the last period of his professional life, you can see – by hindsight – that it has always been one of his major concerns. Already his very first publication (1956), dealing with the empirical content of Ricardian economics, contains the key elements of the later ‘rigor versus relevance’ debate: My purpose here is to show, first of all, that the body of doctrine which Ricardo bequeathed to his followers rested on a series of definite predictions about the course of economic events which were subject to empirical verification, in the strictest sense of the term. Second, I shall try to show that the statistical data and methods of the time, crude as they may have been, were adequate to test the validity of Ricardian theory, in terms of its predictive accuracy for the class of phenomena which it was intended to explain, and, moreover, that such evidence was within the purview of all the economists of the day.

In this paper I accept that just as mainstream economics can be characterized by its insistence upon a deductivist method, so the least contentious, most widely accepted aspects of Post-Keynesianism can be accounted for by its anti-deductivist stance and more specifically by its tacit commitment to something like critical realism. I argue that neo- Ricardian economics, to the extent that it takes closure for granted as a natural and useful starting point for analysis, retains an underlying commitment to deductivism and so is difficult to reconcile with Post- Keynesianism. By providing a criterion for assessing whether neo- Ricardianism belongs within a coherent Post-Keynesianism I also clarify why the nature of this rclationship has for so long remained unresolved. Not until it was recognized that coherence within Post-Keynesianism turns upon methodological issues, and essentially involves the abandon- ment of the deductivist framework, could progress in understanding its relationship with neo-Ri...

David Ricardo’s criticisms of Adam Smith on value and wealth have been rather ignored in the recent revival of Ricardian economics. This essay intends to fill the gap by revisiting Smith’s link between value and wealth in the light of Ricardo’s criticisms. This is done in two steps. The first step is provided in section 1. This deals with Ricardo’s criticisms both of Say’s and Lauderdale’s criticisms of Smith and of Smith’s and Malthus’s arguments on the related issues of rent and the “annual produce of the land and labour of a country.” The second step is provided in section 2. The aim of this section is to dissolve Smith’s terminological inaccuracies or contradictions on the issue of value and wealth. This is done by highlighting the distinctions between the two points of view (of an individual and of society) and between the two aspects of labor (as work done and work to be done) that underlie Smith’s own system of thought. The article closes with a reappraisal of the principle of value as command of labor as work to be done in the economy as a whole and of Smith’s vision of a permanent increase in the natural price of labor (in Smith’s rather than in Ricardo’s sense) resulting from a continuous process of accumulation.

Professor George J. Stigler began teaching me long before I actually saw him, and most of what I learned from him was not learned in the two courses I took from him as a graduate student at the University of Chicago. A few years earlier, as an undergraduate at Harvard, I encountered among my assignments an article on the economic theories of David Ricardo by George Stigler. Its clarity, logic, and incisiveness immediately struck me as something well above and beyond the ordinary. (Many years later, the Nobel Prize committee would reach similar conclusions about his work.) To fully appreciate what a clear and incisive account of Ricardian economics means, one would first have to read David Ricardo himself. Though a great economist and an admirable human being, Ricardo did not think of himself as a great writer, or even a good writer-nor was there any reason why he should have. Add to this the inherent complexities of his ideas and you have a formula for a book that is heavy going, and which has provoked a large literature of commentaries, most of it no clearer than Ricardo and a lot less insightful. Among the few clear accounts of Ricardian economics, most are clearly wrong. However, Stigler's article cut through the murk like a powerful searchlight. In choosing Stigler's article on Ricardo as a class assignment, my mentor at Harvard, the late Professor Arthur Smithies, performed one of the most important and least appreciated functions of a teacher-recognizing and assigning work of the highest caliber that the students can handle. To say that Smithies was unimpressive as a classroom performer would be to put it charitably. But if substance is relevant to teaching (and why else do it?), Smithies was an outstanding teacher-many student grimaces and sighs to the contrary notwith

After showing different criteria for assessing economic theories and in general terms the growth of (economic) knowledge, the essentials of classical British economic theory (Political Economy) are outlined. Next the scientific career and the genesis of the works of Ricardo are dealt with. The building blocks of his theory are Malthus’ law of population and his own theory of land rent. They serve as a basis for developing his original theory of income distribution among the three classes of society (landowners, tenants, agricultural workers). His vision is - like that of Adam Smith - a self-adjusting model of the economy. Getting at first rid of rent, his intention was to show that - in contrast to Smith - a decrease of profits is the result of an increase in wages. Rent is a price determined, but not a price determining factor. The decline of profits reduces capital accumulation and economic growth and ends up in a stationary state of the economy. The precondition of his analysis of income distribution was a theory of value. Ricardo selected the quantity of embodied labour as an invariable measure of value. From a political point of view Ricardo opposed state interventions, such as the corn laws and the poor laws. He had trust in a self-regulating economy, unlike his friend and critic Thomas Malthus.

This paper is primarily concerned with inter-firm heterogeneity. By revisiting Ricardian economics and, in particular, introducing and applying the principles of comparative advantage to strategy inquiry, it advances current theoretical understanding of the phenomenon. Moreover, by introducing the notion of willingness-based isolating mechanisms, in contrast to ability-based ones, and integrating these with comparative and competitive advantage, the paper both complements the RBV as well as provides a more comprehensive understanding of heterogeneity and sustainable competitive advantage.

As Kenneth Arrow has pointed out in a recent paper, “David Ricardo was a peaceful man” (Arrow 1991, p. 70). Indeed he was—during his lifetime. I am not so sure he is resting peacefully given the further assertion that his system was “a bold attempt to determine values independent of demand considerations” (ibid., p. 75). Arrow adds, byway of qualification, that he does “not think, as some neo-Ricardians seem to, that there was in any sense an intended repudiation of the demand schedule”; rather Ricardo did not conceive of such a schedule even though “some of [his] analysis can only be made sensible on the basis of such a concept.”

Introduction Evelyn L. Forget and Sandra Peart 1. 'Classical Economics:' a reification wrapped in an anachronism? Samuel Hollander 2. Notes towards an un-canonical, pre-classical model of political economy A.M.C. Waterman 3. Bentham and the classical canon Nathalie Sigot 4. A new institutional perspective on the canonical model: the case of capital markets in the wealth of nations A.M. Endres 5. Beyond the canonical growth model: knowledge and learning in classical economics, 1815-1834 Masazumi Wakatabe 6. Reading The Wealth of Nations in context: rethinking the canon of mid-eighteenth century British Political Economy Richard A. Kleer 7. Justice versus expediency: The Wealth of Nations as an anti-political economy Jeffrey T. Young 8. The canon in the history of the Adam Smith problem Ingrid Peters-Fransen 9. The French foundations of the classical canon Walter Eltis 10. J.-B. Say and the French liberal school of the nineteenth century: outside the canon? Richard Arena 11. Priceless value (or almost so): misunderstood concerns of Marx and Ricardo William J. Baumol 12. Sraffa's Ricardo after fifty years: a preliminary estimate Pier Luigi Porta 13. David Ricardo's contribution to the constitution of Ricardian Economics: a reconsideration of 1970's interpretations of the 1815 debate Andre Lapidus and Nathalie Sigot 14. Ricardian economics: reasoning about counterintuitive tendencies when system constraints are present Laurence S. Moss 15. Ricardo's use of Say's law: the case of the Post-Napoleonic War depression Timothy Davis 16. Does Ricardo's theory of money belong to the classical canon? Ghislain Deleplace 17. On Holllander's and Keynes's 'canonical' interpretations of Malthus T.K. Rymes 18. Theory, application and the canon: the case of Mills and Jevons Sandra Peart 19. Canons in the history of economic thought Alessandro Roncaglia 20. Claiming and reclaiming the past: the legitimizing role of the precursor concept John K. Whitaker 21. Economic texts as apocrypha David M. Levy 22. Women in the canon of economics Robert W. Dimand 23. The canon in economics Warren J. Samuels

One important piece of the modern neo-classical theory of international trade is the celebrated Factor Price Equalization Theorem, developed independently by Lerner (1952, though written in 1932) and Samuelson (1948, 1949, 1953). This Theorem states that under certain conditions free trade leads to complete equalization of production factor rewards independently of factor mobility. A similar result - a tendency towards equalization of the profit rate - was obtained by Mainwaring (1978) in a Ricardian-Sraffian framework, but under the assumption that all trading countries share the same technology. The objective of this article is to discuss this result assuming technological differences among trading countries.

The first part of this chapter attempts to account for Cairnes’s attraction to the Ricardian economics of John Stuart Mill. In Part 2 I will examine some of the ways in which Cairnes modified his mentor’s doctrines.

Professor Luigi Pasinetti’s ‘A Mathematical Formulation of the Ricardian System’ has justly earned him a lasting reputation among scholars of Ricardian economics, and remains one of the contributions for which he is best known to the profession at large (Pasinetti, 1960). It inspired many of the subsequent attempts to capture the essential features of the system of thought of Ricardo and other classical economists in mathematical form. Pasinetti’s model is couched in explicitly dynamic form and establishes the existence, uniqueness and stability of the stationary-state equilibrium solution obtained. As Professor Pasinetti acknowledges in his paper, his two-sector model can be reduced to the one-sector one in terms of corn developed by Nicholas Kaldor a few years before (Kaldor, 1955–6). However, in contrast to Kaldor’s primarily graphical exposition, Pasinetti’s model is not only presented with full mathematical rigour, but has the advantage of being cast in terms of two sectors, with a further generalization to many nonwage goods.