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This paper investigates what drives countries to legislate presumed consent – making citizens organ donors by default unless they opt out – instead of explicit consent. Results reveal the following: First, civil law predicts presumed consent, which uncovers a mechanism by which an institution that long pre-dates transplantation medicine has an impact on current health outcomes. This is in line with previous research that has found that civil law regimes tend to be more comfortable with a centralized and activist government than common law ones. Second, Catholicism predicts presumed consent. This is consistent with previous research that shows Catholicism generally relies on more hierarchical structures and is less likely to encourage social responsibility among its members. Last, higher pro-social behavior decreases the likelihood of presumed consent. This could be explained by policy-makers trying not to discourage donations where pro-social behavior is high by making it look a requirement rather than an altruistic act. The implications of the findings are discussed, with a particular focus on policy-switches in organ donations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

List experiments are a widely used survey technique for estimating the prevalence of socially sensitive attitudes or behaviors. Their design, however, makes them vulnerable to bias: because treatment group respondents see a greater number of items (J + 1) than control group respondents (J), the treatment group mean may be mechanically inflated due simply to the greater number of items. The few previous studies that directly examine this do not arrive at definitive conclusions. We find clear evidence of inflation in an original dataset, though only among respondents with low educational attainment. Furthermore, we use available data from previous studies and find similar heterogeneous patterns. The evidence of heterogeneous effects has implications for the interpretation of previous research using list experiments, especially in developing world contexts. We recommend a simple solution: using a necessarily false placebo statement for the control group equalizes list lengths, thereby protecting against mechanical inflation without imposing costs or altering interpretations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article presents a unified framework that allows us to disentangle to what extent agents in proportional representation (PR) systems engage in the different strategies that the available voting models have separately suggested: ‘party’, ‘coalitional’, ‘bandwagon’ and ‘other’ voting (i.e. neither of the previous three). Results using data from multiple countries reveal that at least 75% of agents cast a sincere party vote. Around 10% of voters try to affect policymaking by casting a coalitional vote. Since most coalitional agents use their vote to ‘push’ coalitions away from the centre, extreme parties are the most benefited. Hence, strategic coalitional voting may increase rather than preclude fragmentation of a party system in PR contexts. Another 5% of voters support the expected winner regardless of their own party and coalition preferences. Finally, 5–10% of voters fall into the category of other types. The characteristics and motivations of each type are uncovered. Political sophistication increases the likelihood of sincere and coalitional voting. On the other hand, dissatisfaction with parties voted for in the past increases other voting. In particular, recent growth of European right-wing nationalist parties is shown to rely more on other voting and less on sincere and coalitional support. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]