Search

We report the 1st example of a true complementarity effect in memory development--a situation in which memory for the "same event" simultaneously becomes more and less accurate between early childhood and adulthood. We investigated this paradoxical effect because fuzzy-trace theory predicts that it can occur in paradigms that produce developmental reversals in false memory, which are circumstances in which adults are more likely than children to remember new events as old. The complementarity prediction is this: If subjects separately judge whether those same events are new but similar to old ones, adults will be more accurate than children, even though adults are less accurate when they judge whether the items are old. We report 4 experiments in which children (6- and 10-year-olds), adolescents (14-year-olds), and adults encoded the modal developmental reversal materials: Deese-Roediger-McDermott lists. Then, they responded to memory tests on which half the subjects judged whether test items were old and half judged whether the same items were new-similar. The paradoxical complementarity effect was detected in all experiments: The tendency to falsely remember "new-similar" items as being old increased with development, but so did the tendency to correctly remember them as being new-similar.

Advances in dual-retrieval models of recall make it possible to use clinical data to test theoretical hypotheses about mild cognitive impairment (MCI) and Alzheimer's dementia (AD), the most common forms of neurocognitive impairment. Hypotheses about the nature of the episodic memory declines in these diseases, about decline versus sparing of specific processes, and about which individuals will become impaired over time can all be rigorously tested. Basic theoretical principles, such as whether recollection and reconstruction are distinct retrieval processes, can also be evaluated. In 3 studies, measurements of recollective retrieval, reconstructive retrieval, and familiarity judgment were extracted from standard clinical instruments, for healthy subjects and for subjects with MCI and AD diagnoses. Differences in reconstructive retrieval consistently distinguished MCI and AD, in nationally representative subject samples as well as in highly educated samples, and recollective retrieval also distinguished them in highly educated samples. Dual-retrieval processes were accurate predictors of future conversion to MCI and AD over periods of 1.5-6 years and were better predictors than the best genetic marker of these conditions (the e4 allele of the "APOE" genotype). The standard recollection-deficit account of memory declines in MCI and AD was not supported, but the data were consistent with an alternative account that stresses the increasing importance of reconstruction deficits as older adults convert to these diseases.

A hoary assumption of the law is that children are more prone to false-memory reports than adults, and hence, their testimony is less reliable than adults'. Since the 1980s, that assumption has been buttressed by numerous studies that detected declines in false memory between early childhood and young adulthood under controlled conditions. Fuzzy-trace theory predicted reversals of this standard developmental pattern in circumstances that are directly relevant to testimony because they involve using the gist of experience to remember events. That prediction has been investigated during the past decade, and a large number of experiments have been published in which false memories have indeed been found to increase between early childhood and young adulthood. Further, experimentation has tied age increases in false memory to improvements in children's memory for semantic gist. According to current scientific evidence, the principle that children's testimony is necessarily more infected with false memories than adults' and that, other things being equal, juries should regard adults' testimony as necessarily more faithful to actual events is untenable. (Contains 2 tables and 5 figures.)

We investigated the development of dual-retrieval processes with a low-burden paradigm that is suitable for research with children and neurocognitively impaired populations (e.g., older adults with mild cognitive impairment or dementia). Rich quantitative information can be obtained about recollection, reconstruction, and familiarity judgment by defining a Markov model over simple recall tasks like those that are used in clinical neuropsychology batteries. The model measures these processes separately for learning, forgetting, and reminiscence. We implemented this procedure in some developmental experiments, whose aims were (a) to measure age changes in recollective and nonrecollective retrieval during learning, forgetting, and reminiscence and (b) to measure age changes in content dimensions (e.g., taxonomic relatedness) that affect the two forms of retrieval. The model provided excellent fits in all three domains. Concerning (a), recollection, reconstruction, and familiarity judgment all improved during the child-to-adolescent age range in the learning domain, whereas only recollection improved in the forgetting domain, and the processes were age-invariant in the reminiscence domain. Concerning (b), although some elements of the adult pattern of taxonomic relatedness effects were detected by early adolescence, the adult pattern differs qualitatively from corresponding patterns in children and adolescents. (Contains 6 tables and 3 figures.)

Do the emotional valence and arousal of events distort children's memories? Do valence and arousal modulate counterintuitive age increases in false memory? We investigated those questions in children, adolescents, and adults using the Cornell/Cortland Emotion Lists, a word list pool that induces false memories and in which valence and arousal can be manipulated factorially. False memories increased with age for unpresented semantic associates of word lists, and net accuracy (the ratio of true memory to total memory) decreased with age. These surprising developmental trends were more pronounced for negatively valenced materials than for positively valenced materials, they were more pronounced for high-arousal materials than for low-arousal materials, and developmental increases in the effects of arousal were small in comparison with developmental increases in the effects of valence. These findings have ramifications for legal applications of false memory research; materials that share the emotional hallmark of crimes (events that are negatively valenced and arousing) produced the largest age increases in false memory and the largest age declines in net accuracy. (Contains 2 figures and 3 tables.)

Disjunction fallacies have been extensively studied in probability judgment. They should also occur in episodic memory, if remembering a cue's episodic state depends on how its state is described on a memory test (e.g., being described as a target vs. as a distractor). If memory is description-dependent, cues will be remembered as occupying logically impossible combinations of episodic states (e.g., as being a target "and" a distractor). Consistent with this idea, memory disjunction fallacies were repeatedly detected in a series of experiments, at the level of individuals as well as at the level of groups. Disjunction fallacies varied as a function of manipulations that should affect description-dependency, such as type of test cue, immediate versus delayed testing, word frequency, and emotional valence. Response bias, as well as description-dependency, contributed to disjunction fallacies, as predicted by fuzzy-trace theory's retrieval model. The significance of these findings for memory is that a new form of episodic distortion, description-dependent memory, has been added to the 2 traditional forms (forgetting and false memory). The significance for probability judgment is that disjunction fallacies, which have customarily been explained as by-products of memory retrieval, may be wholly or partly due to the uncontrolled influence of response bias. (Contains 1 figure, 4 tables and 3 footnotes.)

One of the most extensively investigated topics in the adult memory literature, dual memory processes, has had virtually no impact on the study of early memory development. The authors remove the key obstacles to such research by formulating a trichotomous theory of recall that combines the traditional dual processes of recollection and familiarity with a reconstruction process. The theory is then embedded in a hidden Markov model that measures all 3 processes with low-burden tasks that are appropriate for even young children. These techniques are applied to a large corpus of developmental studies of recall, yielding stable findings about the emergence of dual memory processes between childhood and young adulthood and generating tests of many theoretical predictions. The techniques are extended to the study of healthy aging and to the memory sequelae of common forms of neurocognitive impairment, resulting in a theoretical framework that is unified over 4 major domains of memory research: early development, mainstream adult research, aging, and neurocognitive impairment. The techniques are also extended to recognition, creating a unified dual process framework for recall and recognition. (Contains 5 footnotes, 8 tables, and 12 figures.)

S. Ghetti (2008) and M. L. Howe (2008) presented probative ideas for future research that will deepen scientific understanding of developmental reversals on false memory and establish boundary conditions for these counterintuitive patterns. Ghetti extended the purview of current theoretical principles by formulating hypotheses about how developmental reversals are controlled by the growth of phantom recollection and by the growth of false-memory editing. Some data are available on her hypotheses about phantom recollection, which distinguish phenomenology (vague or vivid) from memory representation (verbatim or gist). Howe introduced alternative theoretical principles that can be traced to the early work of Deese and Underwood. He argued that fuzzy-trace theory is subject to 3 limitations and that his alternative conception makes 3 predictions that contrast with fuzzy-trace theory's predictions. In the current reply, it is shown that the stated limitations do not apply to fuzzy-trace theory, that previously published research runs counter to the 3 predictions, and that the core difference between the 2 approaches is that fuzzy-trace theory is an opponent-processes model whereas the alternative conception is a 1-process model. (Contains 1 figure.)

When recognition probes seem familiar but their presentation cannot be recollected, dual-process models predict that they will be attributed to too many presentation contexts--most dramatically, to multiple contexts that are mutually contradictory. This is the phenomenon of episodic over-distribution. In the conjoint-recognition and process-dissociation paradigms, attributions to two contradictory contexts can be measured: (a) presented and not presented (conjoint recognition) and (b) presented on List 1 only and presented on List 2 only. Consistent with dual-process models but inconsistent with one-process models, analyses of over 100 sets of conjoint-recognition data revealed that attribution of probes to the first contradictory combination was virtually universal. Across the data corpus, 18% of true-memory probes (studied targets) and 13% of false-memory probes (related distractors) were judged to have been both presented and not presented. Likewise, episodic over-distribution was detected in follow-up analyses of process-dissociation data sets, where an average of 39% of target probes were judged to have been presented on List 1 only and to have been presented on List 2 only.

We review recent applications of fuzzy-trace theory to memory development, organizing the presentation around two themes: the theory's explanatory principles and experimental findings about memory development that follow as predictions from those principles. The featured explanatory principles are: parallel storage of verbatim and gist traces, dissociated retrieval of verbatim and gist traces, differential survival rates for verbatim and gist traces, retrieval phenomenology, and developmental trends in verbatim and gist memory. The experimental findings come from four different areas of research: the development of retrieval phenomenologies, ''reversed'' developmental trends in false memory, the development of mere testing effects, and the development of false persistence in memory.

Presents new measure of children's use of an editing operation that suppresses false memories by accessing verbatim traces of true events. Application of the methodology showed that false-memory editing increased dramatically between early and middle childhood. Measure reacted appropriately to experimental manipulations. Developmental reductions in incidence of false-memory reports were primarily due to developmental improvements in verbatim memory. (Author/KB)

Reviews some limiting properties of the process-dissociation model as it applies to the study of dual-process conceptions of memory. A second-generation model (conjoint recognition) is proposed to address these limitations and supply additional capabilities. Worked applications to data are provided. (Author/GCP)

Presents a unified theoretical approach to children's false-memory reports that deals with both spontaneous and implanted reports. Details false recognition and misinformation models that allow researchers to determine the impact of identity judgment, nonidentity judgment, and similarity judgment in false memory reports. (LBT)

Presents a conjoint recognition paradigm and a model that quantifies conscious and unconscious memory for learned materials and for the types of unlearned materials found to induce false memories in children. Validation study showed that model accounted for 7- and 10-year-olds' performance on recognition memory task. Conscious and unconscious memory parameters reacted appropriately to manipulations. (Author)

Two experiments involving students from grades 1-2 and 5-6 found strong connections between development and forgetting rates when the influences of learning ability were eliminated. Findings eliminated a hypothesis based on age variability in overlearning. (RH)

Data were generally consistent with the view that preschoolers and elementary schoolers can respond to memory probes by applying arithmetical processing to running gist from recently solved problems. Discussed are two competing interpretations of the development of working memory: fuzzy-trace theory and the generic-resources hypothesis. (Author/RH)

Reyna and Brainerd supplement arguments they made previously in this issue by advancing five additional reasons for preferring output-interference explanations over the resources hypothesis. (RH)

Proposes an interference explanation of data from dual-task studies of memory development. Dual-task data support the resources hypothesis that memory processes tax a common pool of cognitive energy, which has been variously called attentional, mental effort, and working-memory capacities. Suggests that dual-task deficits are instances of output interference between otherwise independent systems. (RH)