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This research utilizes the 2010 Environmental Performance Index to examine how electoral rules affect environmental performance in 20 Latin American Democracies. Using Time-series analysis of habitat protection, PM-10, and CO2 emissions, our study finds that proportionality and party systems influence environmental performance in the region. Results show that representation impacts ecosystem vitality more so than public health. We account for this gap by arguing that levels of political representation influence the allocation of public and private goods which, in turn, help determine environmental outcomes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Much of the research that examines democratic institutions initially focused on political economic outcomes. More recently there has been increasing interest in how political institutions impact domestic and foreign policies beyond the scope of the fiscal and monetary domain. For instance, where once researchers mainly focused on governmental revenues and expenditures when examining the effects of democratic institutions, today there is a growing body of research that seeks to address the relationship between majoritarian and consensus democracy and social and foreign policy prescriptions. This research aims to expand our knowledge of political institutions on domestic policy-making by analyzing the relationship between electoral rules and education policy. I argue that democracies that produce greater representativeness will place greater importance upon educating their citizens. My research models whether democracies vary in how education policy is prescribed and educational standards achieved. The findings suggest that electoral rules effect how education policy is formulated. These results have far-reaching implications on how countries develop and provide opportunities to their citizens. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper develops a theoretical foundation to support the notion that within democratic rule there needs to be citizen accountability for the misdeeds of government. In the area of foreign policy, specifically, citizens must be held directly responsible for any and all atrocities committed by elected officials. If what differentiates democratic polities from autocratic tyrannies is the free will of citizens to elect representative government, then those that govern do so with the consent of the people. Such tacit consent should be explicit enough for citizens to be held accountable when egregious policies are bestowed upon the citizens of other nations. Thus, a democratic burden exists when citizens are permitted such a prevailing role in politics as to select those who choose to inflict harm onto others. The burden, simply stated, is that the right to vote is accompanied with an obligation to take responsibility for the policies and actions of those you elect. Therefore, citizens of democratic countries should be liable for atrocious behavior similarly to those within government that give the commands or carry out the orders. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Proponents of legislative professionalism argue that increases in the length of legislative sessions and staff resources improve legislative independence over the policy process. However, better pay and benefits also engenders enhanced careerism. These concomitant processes may have varied implications on the influence of organized interests over the legislative process. While careerism may increase legislator expertise, it may also divert their attention towards reelection and foster stronger relationships with lobbyists. Does careerism enhance or decrease interest group influence over the legislative process? Will enhancing legislative resources counteract the effects of careerism? Preliminary results suggest that interest group influence increases with the advent of careerism and decreases with professionalization. Further analysis, however, reveals that the effects of careerism actually taper off as professionalism increases. The practical implication of this research is that while careerism may facilitate interest group influence, modest increases in legislative resources go a long way in counterbalancing this effect. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the United States, elected representatives are given the primary responsibility of bureaucratic oversight. However, as state legislatures have become more professionalized it has not only given legislators greater capacity for oversight, but has also enhanced careerism. This raises an interesting question: Does careerism compete with the desire to engage in oversight and thus temper the positive effects of enhanced legislative resources? While the literature suggests an inverse relationship here, we argue that the level of professionalism itself plays an important role in shaping the effects of careerism. We hypothesize that moderately professional legislatures with sufficient (but not disproportionate) resources are most susceptible to the effects of careerism, and as a result less likely to engage in bureaucratic oversight because of those effects. Our preliminary findings suggest that the careerism effect is not evident in very amateur or highly professionalized legislatures, but occurs in moderately professional legislatures. This research gives us a better understanding of how the level of professionalism within legislatures impacts the choices, and responsibilities, of those who enter public service. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Why are some Democratic states inclined to pursue unilateral foreign policies, while others are more likely to rely on multilateral approaches? By focusing on electoral institutions, this proposed research will examine whether constitutional variations affect three foreign policy outcomesâ€"intergovernmental organization (IGO) membership, foreign aid donations, and trade openness. We have learned through the vast body of research that democracies are less likely to fight one another and more likely to engage in cooperative foreign policies. Unfortunately, many questions remain unanswered, or unasked, as to why democracies exhibit cooperative tendencies towards each other. Do all democracies possess an affinity towards making peaceful commitments? Or are some more prone towards peaceful interactions than others? This proposed research will explore if and why democracies vary in their propensity to foster cooperation. The underlying premise will be that democracies differ in institutional arrangement, and this variation may account for foreign policy differences. Why some democracies may develop a more multilateral foreign policy than others is an important question that will explore an important dimension of the theory of democratic peace. The proposed research will investigate whether variations in democratic structure relates to policy differences. I will utilize some of the comparative politics literature to help identify two distinct types of democracies, consensus and majoritarian, and proceed by illustrating institutional differences between the two. This will lay the groundwork for the argument that variation among democracies contributes to divergent foreign policy outcomes. I will investigate whether foreign policy differences exist between the two types of democracies, expecting to find that consensus democracies will rely more on multilateral approaches than majoritarian ones. Needless to say, democracies cooperate in a multitude of ways; however, this research will be limited to examining whether some democracies join more IGOs, donate more foreign aid, and are open to more trade. IGO membership, foreign aid, and trade openness are focal points of this proposed research because they have been identified in previous literature as behaviors applicable towards explaining the democratic peace. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We examine possible explanations for citizen preferences on e-government use and preferences on computer access and training. Our analysis shows that self-interest and ideological disposition account for the use of and support for such services. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]