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United States law recognizes adult reproductive liberty and many states view surrogacy services through that lens. During the COVID-19 pandemic in March, 2020, New York State enacted the Child-Parent Surrogacy Act (CPSA) into law, after feminists and their allies had caused its defeat in 2019. Just before approval of the CPSA, a group of legislators introduced the Alternative Surrogacy Bill (ASB). This article is a case study that examines how the CPSA and not the ASB became law, examining surrogate rights, the best interests of the child, and the ethical issues related to adult donor-conceived and surrogacy born children's rights to information about their ancestry.

The disciplines of ethics, science, and the law often conflict when it comes to determining the limits and boundaries of embryo research. Under current Australian law and regulations, and in various other jurisdictions, research conducted on the embryo in vitro is permitted up until day fourteen, after which, the embryo must be destroyed. Reproductive technology and associated research is rapidly advancing at a rate that contests current societal and ethical limits surrounding the treatment of the embryo. This has brought about the question of the adequacy of the fourteen-day rule and whether it is necessary for it be reconsidered and reformed. This paper will highlight some of the tensions that exist in ethics, science, and the law in relation to the extension of the rule. It will be concluded that any move to extend the rule must be accompanied by close consultation with the public as the ultimate stakeholders in how the future of reproductive technology is created, constructed, and contested.

Questions concerning the beginning of human life have pervaded society since antiquity. In the post-modern world, scientific and technological advances have fueled discussions on the issue, such that debates previously concentrated on abortion now also focus on biotechnological interventions. The article addresses the latter, reflecting on the extent to which human dignity can be considered a (hermeneutic) reference in establishing ethical and legal parameters for biotechnological advances in the definition of the beginning of human life. The study's method was critical hermeneutic ethics, with ethics at the center of the process of understanding and interpretation, observing the contours of facticity. No consensus was found on the beginning of human life, so it is essential to engage in dialogue with the new reality resulting from biotechnological advances in the process of defining ethical and legal principles for protecting the embryo and human nature, with human dignity as the reference.

In his book Reasons and Persons, Derek Parfit suggests that people are not harmed by being conceived with a disease or disability if they could not have existed without suffering that particular condition. He nevertheless contends that entities can be harmed if the suffering they experience is sufficiently severe. By implication, there is a threshold which divides harmful from non-harmful conceptions. The assumption that such a threshold exists has come to play a part in UK policy making. I argue that Parfit's distinction between harmful and non-harmful conceptions is untenable. Drawing on Kant's refutation of the ontological argument for God's existence, I suggest that the act of creation cannot be identical with the act of harming-nor indeed of benefiting-however great the offspring's suffering may be. I suggest that Parfit is right that bringing children into existence does not usually harm them, but I argue that this must be applied to all conceptions, since Parfit cannot show how the harm threshold can be operationalised. If we think certain conceptions are unethical or should be illegal, this must be on other grounds than that the child is harmed by them. I show that a Millian approach in this context fails to exemplify the empirical and epistemological advantages which are commonly associated with it, and that harm-based legislation would need to be based on broader harm considerations than those relating to the child who is conceived.

Has the time come to put to bed the concept of a harm threshold when discussing the ethics of reproductive decision making and the legal limits that should be placed upon it? In this commentary, we defend the claim that there exist good moral reasons, despite the conclusions of the non-identity problem, based on the interests of those we might create, to refrain from bringing to birth individuals whose lives are often described in the philosophical literature as 'less than worth living'.

This document provides the latest recommendations for evaluation of potential sperm, oocyte, and embryo donors, incorporating recent information about optimal screening and testing for sexually transmitted infections, genetic diseases, and psychological assessments. This revised document incorporates recent information from the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, the US Food and Drug Administration, and the American Association of Tissue Banks, with which all programs offering gamete and embryo donation services must be thoroughly familiar, and replaces the document titled, "2008 Guidelines for Gamete and Embryo Donation: A Practice Committee Report," last published in Fertil Steril 2008;90:S30-44., (Copyright © 2013 American Society for Reproductive Medicine. Published by Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.)

The article examines the writings of one of the most influential political philosophers, Hannah Arendt, and specifically focuses on her views regarding the distinction between the private and the public and the transformation of the public to the social by modernity. Arendt's theory of human activity and critique of modernity are explored to critically evaluate the social contributions and implications of reproductive technologies especially where the use of such technologies is most dominant within Western societies. Focusing on empirical studies on new reproductive technologies in Israel, it is argued, powerfully demonstrates Arendt's theory, and broadens the perspectives through which society should evaluate these new technologies towards a more reflective understanding of its current laws and policies and their affect on women more generally.

Reproductive medicine becomes more and more important due to demographic changes and an increased demand. Since the German "Embryonenschutzgesetz" was set in 1991 many medical improvements could be achieved which are not covered by law. Health can be improved avoiding multiple pregnancy rates. In Germany we are facing an insufficient law concerning reproductive medicine. Therefore, it is very important to renew the law in order to create a better health supply clearing crucial medical questions.

This article examines to what extent nurses can at present opt out of clinical procedures on the basis of conscience in English law. It considers the current rights to opt out on the basis of conscience contained in section 4 of the Abortion Act 1967 and section 38 of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990. It examines how through codes of practice and guidance, there is recognition of the ability to opt out beyond theses statutes. It suggests that rather than let practice evolve to enable persons to opt out, the fundamental issues as to whether it should be a right or a privilege needs careful consideration across healthcare professions as a whole and a broader public debate.

Life law is a new conception brought by the development of modern life science and biotechnology. There are many different ideas on the conception of life law in academy. The definition of life law should be footed on the domain of bioethics. Based on bioethics, life law is a group of legislations which are enacted or acknowledged by the state and implemented by the state compulsively with the goal of regulating all types of relations revolving the survival as well as terminal of human beings and some other creatures which play important roles in the maintenance of human's life and health. There are many problems in China's study on science of life law, which need paying special attention to by China's scholars.

On 9 May 2005, the Israeli Ministry of Health issued guidelines spelling out the conditions under which sex selection by preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD) for social purposes is to be permitted in Israel. This article first reviews the available medical methods for sex selection, the preference for children of a specific gender in various societies and the ethical controversies surrounding PGD for medical and social purposes in different countries. It focuses then on the question of whether procreative liberty or parental responsibility should be the centre of attention in this context. Finally, the article critically examines the new Israeli guidelines and their implications for the women undergoing the necessary medical treatments, for the children born as a result, for other members of the family and for society in general.

This paper discusses the policy debate and ethical discussion surrounding pre-implantation genetic diagnosis (PGD) for sibling donor (SD) in Germany and Israel. Based on an analysis of the regulations and ethical discourse concerning a unique form of new reproductive technology (NRT)--PGD for SD--we complement the scholarly discussion of NRTs in these countries, by pointing to an explanatory factor that has been so far neglected, namely the hegemonic notions regarding the ideal relationship between the generations, and the mutual obligations between different family members in Germany and Israel. We argue the fact that PGD (in general) and PGD for SD (in particular) have been banned in Germany, but were endorsed without hesitation in Israel, has to do with different perceptions of family ethics within the two societies. Furthermore, we argue that this factor contributes significantly to the more general understanding of German and Israeli policies regarding NRTs.

Modern advances in human genetic and reproductive technologies are among the recent developments disturbing the balance between the spiritual and the material components of life. This paper gives an Islamic perspective on some of these advances, including abortion, in vitro fertilization, genetic engineering, cloning and stem cell research.

Scientific advances during the last decades regarding potential intervention on embryos arouse many questions in society to prepare the ground concerning the limits that should be set for these practices. For the first time in 1994, a parliamentary proceeding allowed the definition of a French model of bioethics through laws of the same name. These laws, among others, authorized in a well and strictly defined setting the practice of preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD). Because of technical progress concerning PGD, new questions arose, especially concerning the accomplishment of designer babies. The French Chamber of Representatives came in with a new law that banishes the concept of designer babies and replaces it with another concept: double hope babies, in French "bébé du double espoir". A first hope of a pregnancy giving birth to a healthy child and the second being that this child conceived with the aid of PGD could help treat an elder brother. Because of the issuing of two specific laws in a ten years interval, France occupies a privileged place in a Europe where bioethical issues continue to be debated, particularly PGD.

The President's Council on Bioethics, headed by Leon Kass, was created by President George W. Bush to advise the President on issues of ethical import raised by advances in biomedical science. Between 2002 and 2004, members of the Council from diverse disciplines addressed topics such as human cloning, stem cell research, assisted reproduction, and medical interventions intended to enhance human capability or appearance. This article provides background on the Council and reviews its published reports. It also considers key definitions and distinctions, specific recommendations of the Council, and positions articulated by members who contributed to the development of its reports.

The extent to which society utilises the law to enforce its moral judgments remains a dominant issue in this era of embryonic stem cell research, preimplantation genetic diagnosis, and human reproductive cloning. Balancing the potential health benefits and diverse moral values of society can be a tremendous challenge. In this context, governments often adopt legislative bans and prohibitions and rely on the inflexible and often inappropriate tool of criminal law. Legal prohibitions in the field of reproductive genetics are not likely to reflect adequately the depth and diversity of competing stakeholder positions. Rather, a comprehensive and readily responsive regulatory policy is required. Such a policy must attend to the evolving scientific developments and ethical considerations. We outline a proposal for effective, responsive, and coherent oversight of new reproductive genetic technologies.

This Article considers whether infertile taxpayers can deduct their fertility treatment costs as medical expenses under Internal Revenue Code section 213 and whether they should be able to deduct them. Internal Revenue Code section 213 defines medical expenses as "amounts paid-for the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease, or for the purpose of affecting any structure or function of the body." This definition is interpreted by reference to a baseline of normal biological functioning, which includes reproductive functioning. Most people conceive and bear children without having to incur expenses for fertility treatment. Expenses incurred to approximate the baseline of normal reproductive health are deductible, even if the taxpayer winds up better off, with a child, after the fertility treatment. The medical profession recognizes that infertility is a disease or condition. Infertility is a loss, just as a broken leg is a loss. Fertility treatment costs are thus medical expenses under section 213. In addition, given the existence of the medical expense deduction, taxpayers should be able to deduct the cost of fertility treatments, including IVF, egg donor, and surrogate procedures, under either an "ability-to-pay" or consequentialist normative approach. Reproduction is extremely important to most people. In addition, allowing taxpayers to deduct the costs of fertility treatment will encourage infertile taxpayers to elect the most effective treatment option and reduce the rate of risky multifetal pregnancies. This Article concludes that fertility treatment costs are deductible as medical expenses under current law and should be deductible as medical expenses.