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In this paper, we compare the value of zero-sum stochastic games under optimal strategies (that are, for single-controller stochastic games, stationary) to the commonly used time-independent strategies ("static strategies"). Our findings are summarized in a series of theorems which provide the lower bound on the optimality of the static strategy under different assumptions. These bounds can be used to assess whether the additional computational complexity is worth the extra payoff gain or, symmetrically, assess the price of playing sub-optimal but simple strategies when stationary ones are forbidden. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In a dyadic game, strategic asymmetric dominance occurs when a player's preference for one strategy A relative to another B is systematically increased by the addition of a third strategy Z, strictly dominated by A but not by B. There are theoretical and empirical grounds for believing that this effect should decline over repetitions, and other grounds for believing, on the contrary, that it should persist. To investigate this question experimentally, 30 participant pairs played 50 rounds of one symmetric and two asymmetric 3 × 3 games each having one strategy strictly dominated by one other, and a control group played 2 × 2 versions of the same games with dominated strategies removed. The strategic asymmetric dominance effect was observed in the repeated-choice data: dominant strategies in the 3 × 3 versions were chosen more frequently than the corresponding strategies in the 2 × 2 versions. Time series analysis revealed a significant decline in the effect over repetitions in the symmetric game only. Supplementary verbal protocol analysis helped to clarify the players' reasoning and to explain the results. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We study how switching costs affect the subgame perfect equilibria in repeated games. We show that (i) the Folk Theorem holds whenever the players are patient enough; (ii) the set of equilibrium payoffs is obtained by considering the payoffs of a simple one-shot auxiliary game; and (iii) the switching costs have a negative impact on a player in the infinitely undiscounted repeated game but can be beneficial for him in a finitely repeated game or in a discounted game. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper studies two-player games in continuous time with imperfect public monitoring, in which information may arrive both gradually and continuously, governed by a Brownian motion, and abruptly and discontinuously, according to Poisson processes. For this general class of two-player games, we characterize the equilibrium payoff set via a convergent sequence of differential equations. The differential equations characterize the optimal trade-off between value burnt through incentives related to Poisson information and the noisiness of incentives related to Brownian information. In the presence of abrupt information, the boundary of the equilibrium payoff set may not be smooth outside the set of static Nash payoffs. Equilibrium strategies that attain extremal payoff pairs as well as their intertemporal incentives are elicitable from the limiting solution. The characterization is new even when information arrives through Poisson events only. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We study a repeated principal–agent model with transferable utility, where the principal's evaluation of the agent's performance is subjective. Our focus is on equilibria that are robust to the addition of small privately observed shocks to the payoffs. Existing constructions of positive‐effort equilibria are not robust to such payoff shocks. Allowing for simultaneous cheap‐talk announcements makes some effort sustainable in a robust equilibrium, and payoffs can be arbitrarily close to fully efficient ones if players are sufficiently patient. In contrast to the existing literature, our near‐efficient equilibria exhibit realistic features: the bonus size is reasonable, the threshold for being paid a bonus is nontrivial, and the base wage need not be negative. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Strategies for sustaining cooperation and preventing exploitation by selfish agents in repeated games have mostly been restricted to Markovian strategies where the response of an agent depends on the actions in the previous round. Such strategies are characterized by lack of learning. However, learning from accumulated evidence over time and using the evidence to dynamically update our response is a key feature of living organisms. Bayesian inference provides a framework for such evidence-based learning mechanisms. It is therefore imperative to understand how strategies based on Bayesian learning fare in repeated games with Markovian strategies. Here, we consider a scenario where the Bayesian player uses the accumulated evidence of the opponent's actions over several rounds to continuously update her belief about the reactive opponent's strategy. The Bayesian player can then act on her inferred belief in different ways. By studying repeated Prisoner's dilemma games with such Bayesian inferential strategies, both in infinite and finite populations, we identify the conditions under which such strategies can be evolutionarily stable. We find that a Bayesian strategy that is less altruistic than the inferred belief about the opponent's strategy can outperform a larger set of reactive strategies, whereas one that is more generous than the inferred belief is more successful when the benefit-to-cost ratio of mutual cooperation is high. Our analysis reveals how learning the opponent's strategy through Bayesian inference, as opposed to utility maximization, can be beneficial in the long run, in preventing exploitation and eventual invasion by reactive strategies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We conduct an experimental study of cartel behaviour in the presence of an active competition authority. Treatments differ with respect to how responsive the authority is to collusion and suspicious pricing behaviour by firms. Subjects are successful in coordinating strategies to avoid antitrust detection as we observe gradual price increases and staggered pricing conforming with theory. We find that the presence of a more active antitrust regime substantially improves the internal stability of cartels. We attribute this result to the common-enemy (or esprit de corps) effect induced by the threat of cartel prosecution. A more responsive antitrust policy in this experiment provides higher cartel deterrence which lowers both prices for consumers and the cost of antitrust enforcement. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Two key issues are confronted by the Port Group when entering an inland-river market; namely, port acquisition selection at the strategic level and port service pricing at the operational level. This article identifies the multi-type game relationships among the Port Group and multiple ports and customers in the planning time-horizon, and proposes a three-level programming model based on repeated games for the inland-river port acquisition selection and service pricing collaborative optimization problem. According to the model characteristics, a three-level nested heuristic algorithm is developed by combining a genetic algorithm, game simulation algorithm and equilibrium allocation algorithm. A series of numerical experiments with partial real data in Jining City, Shandong Province, China, is conducted to validate the superiority and efficiency of the proposed model and method. This article also provides some valuable management suggestions for the inland-river Port Group in terms of investment scale, investment expectation, pricing mode and customer relationship. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article proposes a dynamic model to examine the structure of "simple" relational contracts, obeying realistic properties that can be easily understood and audited by both parties. In such relationships, the need to offer each supplier a large enough share of future business to deter cheating limits the number of relationships a buyer can sustain. Trade is thus restricted to durable relationships, a form of social capital. Nevertheless, exogenous stochastic shocks sometimes prevent suppliers from fulfilling their promises and relationships are constantly dissolving and later renewed. Moreover, the coming of a crisis, where stochastic shocks are more probable, can lead to the quick rupture of some relationships as there is less expected future business to incentivize all suppliers. New relationships can later be formed, but this takes time due to search frictions. This suggests new connections between the theory of relational contracting and the macroeconomic analysis of recessions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper studies the effect of power asymmetry on resolution of social dilemmas in repeated play of linear public good games. The experiment uses a 2 × 2 design that crosses power symmetry or asymmetry in payoff-equivalent provision and appropriation games with positive (provision) or negative (appropriation) externalities. Power asymmetry combines privileged access to information with extended opportunity sets that allow for taking a public good provided or not-appropriated by others. Our data suggest that power asymmetry has a detrimental effect on efficiency, with the effect being more pronounced in the asymmetric-power appropriation game. Individual allocations to the public good increase in others' allocations, suggesting that individual allocations are not strategic substitutes. With power asymmetry, first movers earn less than the second mover in the appropriation game but not in the provision game. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We conduct a series of Cournot duopoly market experiments with a high number of repetitions and fixed matching. Our treatments include markets with (a) complete cost symmetry and complete information, (b) slight cost asymmetry and complete information, and (c) varying cost asymmetries and incomplete information. For the case of complete cost symmetry and complete information, our data confirm the well-known result that duopoly players achieve, on average, partial collusion. However, as soon as any level of cost asymmetry or incomplete information is introduced, observed average individual quantities are remarkably close to the static Bayes-Nash equilibrium predictions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper introduces an application of complex Clifford algebra in a representation of the quantum prisoner's dilemma. The authors propose a novel modification of the Eisert–Lewenstein–Wilkens protocol to represent a repeated version of the quantum game. This repeated modification allows to embed entanglement into players' strategy sets and to see how players will operate with it. The apparatus of complex Clifford algebra enables an intuitive representation of the suggested protocol and efficient computation of the resulting payoff functions. The presented findings provide a new point of view on the interpretation of entanglement as a measure of information transition between rounds of the game. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study investigates how people provide public goods in a network formation game. In this game, players form a network through bilateral linking, with or without a link cost; the players then contribute to a public good, which can benefit both themselves and their direct neighbors. Theoretically, two equilibrium goods provision strategies exist: splitting and alternation. Efficient networks are conditioned on a goods provision strategy and are less dense when the link cost increases. Our laboratory experiment indicates that subjects predominantly converge to splitting instead of alternation and can often form efficient networks. Subjects form fewer links under a higher link cost and tend to form too many links. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Central banks may soon issue currencies that are entirely digital (CBDCs) and possibly interest bearing. A strategic analytical framework is used to investigate this innovation in the laboratory, contrasting a traditional "plain" tokens baseline to treatments with "sophisticated" interest‐bearing tokens. In the experiment, this theoretically beneficial innovation precluded the emergence of a stable monetary system, reducing trade and welfare. Similar problems emerged when sophisticated tokens complemented or replaced plain tokens. This evidence underscores the advantages of combining theoretical with experimental investigation to provide insights for payments systems innovation and policy design. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In non-cooperative game-theory models, the Nash equilibrium concept is used to assess the outcome of rational decision-makers' strategic involvement. This method allows researchers to look into certain outcomes while keeping in mind people's self-interest restrictions. Participants, on the other hand, are not bound to provide accurate information when acting in their own self-interest. In this work, we investigate noncooperative behavior in a repeating game and suggest a new method in game theory for designing an observer. An average repeated non-cooperative Markov game with imperfect information is used to determine the categories of participants in this situation. A sequential technique, in which information is revealed a finite number of times, can approximate all of Nash's equilibria. By computing the derivative of the player's equilibrium with regard to his or her present type, we explain how to instrument the observer's design. The dynamic observer creates the imperfect information game. We study a Markov model extension that incorporates a new variable that reflects the product of the observer design and the distribution vector to solve the problem. The strategies and the observation kernel make up the observer design. In this approach, the approaches are first seen as mappings from private and reported states to lotteries over alternatives. We build equations to retrieve the variables of interest using the available type: observer, strategies, observation kernels, and distribution vectors. We provide a numerical example of an industrial organization in which enterprises compete on the market and decide on the amount of production they will produce simultaneously and independently of one another. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper presents empirical evidence and develops a repeated-game model for manufacturer–retailer relationships and demonstrates that these relationships limit the impact of regulations. Industry practitioners often emphasize the importance of manufacturer–retailer relationships in product distribution. In this paper, I formalize the industry's notion of a relationship with a repeated game framework and study its impact in the heavily regulated hard cider market. I present evidence that retailers and leading manufacturers coordinate with and offer preferential treatment to each other when setting assortments and wholesale prices. Based on this evidence, I develop a repeated game–based model to estimate each pair's coordination, which is linked to the manufacturer's performance at the retailer in the broader beer market. The results show the relationships increase new cider availability by 17.5% and 5.1%, respectively, for Anheuser-Busch InBev and MillerCoors, the two leading brewers. The relationship's effect is determined jointly by the degree of assortment distortion and the reduction in double marginalization. Although these relationships could improve welfare, they imply that current regulations in the alcoholic beverage industry fail to generate a level playing field for every manufacturer. History: Puneet Manchanda served as the senior editor. Supplemental Material: The data files and online appendix are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mksc.2023.1445. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Taxes are the most important source of public revenue. Therefore tax policies have great importance for public economy. Despite the modern tax theories and policies of 20th century, no permanant success has yet been achieved in solving the problems related to tax collection. For this reason, problems related to this field remain current on the agenda. Examining the substainability of the tax farming system, has great importance in terms of solving the tax problems of the 20th century. The main aim of this study is to examine the substainability of this tax system. For this aim, analysis is realized by a repeated game theoretical model. The findings of the repeated game theoretical model reveals that this tax system has an unsustainable structure. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper outlines some thoughts on relational contracts. Such a contract can involve an implicit agreement to behave in certain ways, that includes the use of explicit, legally enforceable contracts, which may be rewritten as play proceeds. The use of implicit contracts involves a series of challenges not encountered with a legal contract that irrevocably specifies all contingent behavior. What agreements are credible? What threatened punishments will withstand efforts to renegotiate? To what extent can a long-run player establish a reputation for a particular kind of behavior? Can information design and Bayesian persuasion usefully be viewed through this lens? [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Network attack and defence games are gradually becoming a new approach through which to study the protection of infrastructure networks such as power grids and transportation networks. Uncertainty factors, such as the subjective decision preferences of attackers and defenders, are not considered in existing attack and defence game studies for infrastructure networks. In this paper, we introduce, respectively, the attacker's and defender's expectation value, rejection value, and hesitation degree of the target, as well as construct an intuitionistic fuzzy goal-based attack and defence game model for infrastructure networks that are based on the maximum connectivity slice size, which is a network performance index. The intuitionistic fuzzy two-player, zero-sum game model is converted into a linear programming problem for solving, and the results are analysed to verify the applicability and feasibility of the model proposed in this paper. Furthermore, different situations, such as single-round games and multi-round repeated games, are also considered. The experimental results show that, when attacking the network, the attacker rarely attacks the nodes with higher importance in the network, but instead pays more attention to the nodes that are not prominent in the network neutrality and median; meanwhile, the defender is more inclined to protect the more important nodes in the network to ensure the normal performance of the network. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We examine how repeated interaction can facilitate coordinated turn-taking in a two-player infinitely repeated Volunteer's Dilemma. We conjecture that repetition creates an environment for players to coordinate on the Pareto efficient, but asymmetric pure strategy Nash equilibria of the stage game by taking turns volunteering. We consider three cost treatments: both players have the same cost; one player has a higher cost and this cost assignment is constant; one player has a higher cost and this cost assignment is random. We find that turn-taking is the dominant play when costs are symmetric. When costs are asymmetric, the low-cost player is more likely to volunteer. However, contrary to predictions, asymmetric randomly allocated costs do not perfectly coordinate turn-taking. When costs are asymmetric and constant over time, behavior is markedly heterogeneous. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We study repeated zero-sum games where one of the players pays a certain cost each time he changes his action. We derive the properties of the value and optimal strategies as a function of the ratio between the switching costs and the stage payoffs. In particular, the strategies exhibit a robustness property and typically do not change with a small perturbation of this ratio. Our analysis extends partially to the case where the players are limited to simpler strategies that are history independent―namely, static strategies. In this case, we also characterize the (minimax) value and the strategies for obtaining it. Funding: The project leading to this publication has received funding from the French government under the "France 2030" investment plan managed by the French National Research Agency [Grant ANR-17-EURE-0020] and from the Excellence Initiative of Aix-Marseille University–A*MIDEX. Y. Tsodikovich was supported in part by the Israel Science Foundation [Grants 2566/20, 1626/18, and 448/22]. X. Venel acknowledges the financial support of the French National Research Agency through Project CIGNE [ANR-15-CE38-0007-01]. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper develops a framework for studying repeated matching markets. The model departs from the Gale–Shapley matching model by having a fixed set of long‐lived players (firms) match with a new generation of short‐lived players (workers) in every period. I define history‐dependent and self‐enforcing matching processes in this repeated matching environment and characterize the firms' payoffs. Firms fall into one of two categories: some firms must obtain the same payoff as they would in static stable matchings, and this holds at every patience level; meanwhile, repetition and history dependence can enlarge the set of sustainable payoffs for the other firms, provided that the firms are sufficiently patient. In large matching markets with correlated preferences, the first kind of firms corresponds to "elite" firms that make up at most a vanishingly small fraction of the market. The vast majority of firms fall into the second category. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We study large‐population repeated games where players are symmetric but not anonymous, so player‐specific rewards and punishments are feasible. Players may be commitment types who always take the same action. Even though players are not anonymous, we show that an anti‐folk theorem holds when the commitment action is "population dominant," meaning that it secures a payoff greater than the population average payoff. For example, voluntary public goods provision in large populations is impossible when commitment types never contribute, even if monetary rewards can be targeted to contributors; however, provision is possible if noncontributors can be subjected to involuntary fines. A folk theorem under incomplete information provides a partial converse to our result. Along the way, we develop some general results on symmetric games with incomplete information and/or repeated play. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We consider a game of petty corruption between entrepreneurs and multiple bureaucrats. The potential value of the entrepreneur's project is stochastic and private, and it can be realized only if the project is approved by all the bureaucrats. The bureaucrats simultaneously make take-it-or-leave-it demands of bribes in exchange for approving the project. The entrepreneur can either pay the required bribes or seek costly legal recourse against non-approval. The paper shows that there are multiple equilibria in the one-shot game as well as in the dynamic version of the game in which a sequence of entrepreneurs applies to the set of bureaucrats to seek project approvals. We then characterize a compelling class of equilibria, namely the bribe-income-maximizing-equilibrium, and show that total bribe exchanged under such equilibria is non-monotonic in the cost of legal recourse. Hence, a small/incremental reduction to the cost of appeal is either ineffective or can backfire, i.e. increase the amount of corruption. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We study how discounting and monitoring jointly determine whether cooperation is possible in repeated games with imperfect (public or private) monitoring. Our main result provides a simple bound on the strength of players' incentives as a function of discounting, monitoring precision, and on‐path payoff variance. We show that the bound is tight in the low‐discounting/low‐monitoring double limit, by establishing a public‐monitoring folk theorem where the discount factor and the monitoring structure can vary simultaneously. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Imitation is simple behavior which uses successful actions of others in order to deal with one’s own problems. Because success of imitation generally depends on whether profit of an imitating agent coincides with those of other agents or not, game theory is suitable for specifying situations where imitation can be successful. One of the concepts describing successfulness of imitation in repeated two-player symmetric games is unbeatability. For infinitely repeated two-player symmetric games, a necessary and sufficient condition for some imitation strategy to be unbeatable was specified. However, situations where imitation can be unbeatable in multi-player games are still not clear. In order to analyze successfulness of imitation in multi-player situations, here we introduce a class of totally symmetric games called unexploitable games, which is a natural extension of two-player symmetric games without exploitation cycles. We then prove that, for infinitely repeated unexploitable games, there exist unbeatable imitation strategies. Furthermore, we also prove that, for infinitely repeated non-trivial unexploitable games, there exist unbeatable zero-determinant strategies, which unilaterally enforce some relationships on payoffs of players. These claims are demonstrated in the public goods game, which is the simplest unexploitable game. These results show that there are situations where imitation is unbeatable even in multi-player games.

Consider a stationary process taking values in a finite state space. Each state is associated with a finite one-shot zero-sum game. We investigate the infinitely repeated zero-sum game with incomplete information on one side in which the state of the game evolves according to the stationary process. Two players, named the observer and the adversary, play the following game. At the beginning of any stage, only the observer is informed of the state ξn and is therefore the only one who knows the identity of the forthcoming one-shot game. Then, both players take actions, which become publicly known. The paper shows the existence of a uniform value in a new class of stationary processes: ergodic Kronecker systems. Techniques from ergodic theory, probability theory, and game theory are employed to describe the optimal strategies of the two players. Funding: This work was supported by the Israel Science Foundation [Grant 591/21] and Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft [Grant KA 5609/1-1]. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We test whether the length of an indefinite horizon, or that the horizon is indefinite as opposed to finite, affects cooperation in repeated 3 × 3 Red Queen Games. With our participant population, and our experimental program and procedures, the length of the indefinite horizon significantly affects cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma. It also significantly affects cooperation in the Red Queen Game , but only after participants are experienced. The indefiniteness of the horizon does not significantly affect cooperation in either game. Our results highlight the importance of experience for cooperation in indefinite games with even slightly larger strategy spaces than the Prisoner's Dilemma. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An agent and a principal are engaged in an ongoing relationship, where the agent receives project opportunities of random value and is biased towards implementation. Each period, the principal elicits a (non-contractible) recommendation from the agent, compares it to a random outside option and decides whether to implement the project or not. The key distortions in the stationary decision rule used by the principal that will sustain honest reporting by the agent are (i) discrimination against best projects, so that sometimes very good projects are not implemented even if they would benefit the principal, (ii) general favoritism, where proposals other than the best are sometimes implemented even when they have negative value to the principal, and (iii) focused leniency towards average projects, where the bias towards implementation is larger for average projects than for bad or good projects. The first limits the agent's incentives to exaggerate by decreasing the effectiveness of exaggeration, the second increases the overall value of the relationship to the agent while the last targets the projects for which the incentive to exaggerate is the largest to sustain truth-telling. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We consider repeated games where the players behave according to cumulative prospect theory (CPT). We show that, when the players have calibrated strategies and behave according to CPT, the natural analog of the notion of correlated equilibrium in the CPT case, as defined by Keskin, is not enough to capture all subsequential limits of the empirical distribution of action play. We define the notion of a mediated CPT correlated equilibrium via an extension of the stage game to a so-called mediated game. We then show, along the lines of the result of Foster and Vohra about convergence to the set of correlated equilibria when the players behave according to expected utility theory that, in the CPT case, under calibrated learning the empirical distribution of action play converges to the set of all mediated CPT correlated equilibria. We also show that, in general, the set of CPT correlated equilibria is not approachable in the Blackwell approachability sense. We observe that a mediated game is a specific type of a game with communication, as introduced by Myerson, and as a consequence, we get that the revelation principle does not hold under CPT. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We use the Axelrod library for Monte Carlo simulations with agents of the First Generation, such that more uncertainty is introduced about the time-span and we compare the results of tournaments with fixed known number of stages versus uncertainty about the number of stages. We constructed a descriptive method by which we can highlight (from any extended list of agents, not only the First Generation) those agents that seem to have a different behaviour in repeated games with certainty about the number of stages, compared to an environment of repeated games with uncertainty about the end of the game. Piloting this descriptive method on 15 agents of the First Generation of the Axelrod Tournament, we arrive to a short list of (highlighted/selected) agents. The qualitative analysis of their algorithms leaded us to the conclusion that unfortunately they also 'act' purely mechanically from the point of view of time-span understanding. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We present a model that explains the process of strategy learning by the players in repeated normal-form games. The proposed model is based on a directed weighted graph, which we define and call as the game's dynamic graph. This graph is used as a framework by a learning algorithm that predicts which actions will be chosen by the players during the game and how the players are acting based on their gained experiences and behavioral characteristics. We evaluate the model's performance by applying it to some human-subject datasets and measure the rate of correctly predicted actions. The results show that our model obtains a better average hit-rate compared to that of respective models. We also measure the model's descriptive power (its ability to describe human behavior in the self-play mode) to show that our model, in contrast to the other behavioral models, is able to describe the alternation strategy in the Battle of the sexes game and the cooperating strategy in the Prisoners' dilemma game. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In infinitely repeated games, Nachbar (1997 , 2005) has shown that Bayesian learning of a restricted strategy set is inconsistent; the beliefs required to learn any element of such a set will lead best responses to lie outside of it in most games. But I establish here that Nash convergence of Bayesian learning requires only that optimal play (rather than any possible play) is learnable, and an appropriately modified notion of learnability is consistent in many of the games to which Nachbar's result applies. This means that rational learning of equilibrium is possible in an important class including coordination games, which I illustrate with two examples of positive learning results. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Satellite communication systems are increasingly facing serious environmental challenges such as malicious jamming, monitoring, and intercepting. As a current development of artificial intelligence, intelligent jammers with learning ability can effectively perceive the surrounding spectrum environment to dynamically change their jamming strategies. As a result, the current mainstream satellite communication anti-jamming technology based on wide interval high-speed frequency hopping is unable to deal with this problem effectively. In this work, we focus on anti-jamming problems in the satellite communication domain, and reformulate the power allocation problem under two kinds of confrontation scenarios as one-shot and repeated games model. Specifically, for the problem of multi-channel power allocation under a one-shot confrontation scenario, we firstly model the problem of allocating limited power resource between communication parties and a jammer on multi-channel based on a BG (Blotto Game) model. Secondly, a DO-SINR (Double Oracle-Signal to Interference plus Noise Ratio) algorithm is designed to approximate the Nash equilibrium of the game between two parties. Experiments show that the DO-SINR algorithm can effectively obtain the approximate Nash equilibrium of the game. For the problem of multi-channel power allocation under a repeated confrontation scenario, we firstly transform the problem into an online shortest path problem with a graph structure to make the problem solving process more intuitive, and then design the Exp3-U (Exp3-Uniform) algorithm which utilizes the graph structure to solve the multi-channel power allocation problem. Experiments show that our algorithm can minimize the expected regret of communication parties during online confrontation, while maintaining good operating efficiency. The two power allocation problems constructed in this paper are common problem formed in confrontation scenarios. Our research and analysis can simulate some actual confrontation scenarios of the satellite communication power allocation, which can be used to improve the adaptability of satellite communication systems in complex environments. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the context of repeated first‐price auctions, we explore how a bid‐rigging cartel can simultaneously overcome the difficulty of soliciting truthful private information about valuations and the difficulty of enforcing its internal mechanism. Focusing on the class of trigger‐strategy collusive agreements, we explicitly characterize the optimal collusive agreement for any given discount factor. Making use of the characterization, we also explore how a long‐run seller can use a reserve price to fight the cartel. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Zero-determinant strategies are a class of strategies in repeated games which unilaterally control payoffs. Zero-determinant strategies have attracted much attention in studies of social dilemma, particularly in the context of evolution of cooperation. So far, not only general properties of zero-determinant strategies have been investigated, but zero-determinant strategies have been applied to control in the fields of information and communications technology and analysis of imitation. Here, we further deepen our understanding on general mathematical properties of zero-determinant strategies. We first prove that zero-determinant strategies, if exist, can be implemented by some one-dimensional transition probability. Next, we prove that, if a two-player game has a non-trivial potential function, a zero-determinant strategy exists in its repeated version. These results assist us to implement zero-determinant strategies in broader situations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The growing importance of online social networks provides fertile ground for researchers seeking to gain a deeper understanding of fundamental constructs of human behavior, such as trust and forgiveness, and their linkage to social ties. Through a field experiment that uses data from the Facebook API to measure social ties that connect our subjects, we separate forward-looking instrumental trust from static intrinsic trust and show that the level of instrumental trust and forgiveness, and the effect of forgiveness on deterring future defections, crucially depend on the strength of social ties. We find that the level of trust under social repeated play is greater than the level of trust under anonymous repeated play, which in turn is greater than the level of trust under anonymous one shot games. We also uncover forgiveness as a key mechanism that facilitates the cooperative equilibrium being more stable in the presence of social ties: If the trading partners are socially connected, the equilibrium is more likely to return to the original cooperative one after small disturbances. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]