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Peter Townsend (1928–2009) was one of the most important British social scientists of the twentieth century, best known for pioneering and innovative research on poverty, as well as his political campaigning, most notably for the Child Poverty Action Group. This article returns to Townsend's influential work on ageing, for which he first became widely known, during the 1950s and early 1960s. It does so to recover the ways in which his research, first in Bethnal Green at the Institute of Community Studies (ICS), and then at the London School of Economics, as well as the professional and political networks he built during this period, were rooted in and shaped by his home life in Hampstead. As will be shown, the most important figure in the interconnecting spheres of Townsend's career was his wife, Ruth (1927–2011), who not only was central to the construction of a way of life in which the boundaries between research, the domestic sphere, and politics were often so blurred as to be non-existent, but also made significant and underappreciated contributions to her husband's research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The «welfare state» is a slippery concept. For some scholars, it has a fairly narrow meaning. For many others, though, the welfare state is a much broader idea, covering not only fairly obvious social services but also an accompanying set of strategies for governing society, built around ideas such as full employment. For this reason, histories of the welfare state have always seemed most coherent when contained within clear boundaries, which have allowed scholars to frame their work with ideas about the nation and nationhood, among other things. As this review essay explores, however, an important challenge for future historiography is imagining what histories of welfare states look like without borders. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is often said that the advent of the Freudian talking cure around 1900 revolutionised the psychiatric setting by giving patients a voice. Less known is that for decades prior to the popularisation of this technique, several researchers had been experimenting with another, written practice aimed at probing the mind. This was particularly the case in France. Alongside neurologist Jean-Martin Charcot's spectacular staging of hypnotised bodies, 'automatic writing' became widely used in fin-de-siècle clinics and laboratories, with French psychologists regularly asking entranced patients to scribble down words to validate their nascent theories on the divided self. This article traces the emergence of automatic writing in French psychological discourse at the close of the 19th century. By focusing on the early work of Dr Pierre Janet and some of his contemporaries, it re-examines the role played by this practice in what Henri Ellenberger famously called 'The Discovery of the Unconscious'. It also considers the various levels of reconstruction at play in recent historical accounts. What does it mean to give subjects a (written) voice? How does automatic writing differ from the Freudian talking cure as respective expressions of the unspeakable? And how might these questions inform future historical practice? [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article, based on a presentation at the Future of the History of the Human Sciences workshop (2016), discusses some of the potential benefits and pitfalls of digital humanities (DH) tools and approaches for historians of the human sciences. It reviews some of the major approaches that form DH and draws on the author's experience as part of a team creating a large DH resource to consider the complications presented by these. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article began life as, and retains the character of, spoken argument for not allowing the neurosciences to shape the agenda of the history of the human sciences. This argument is then used to suggest purposes and content for the journal, History of the Human Sciences. The style is rhetorical, even polemical, but open-ended. I challenge two clichés about the neurosciences, that they intellectually challenge other areas of knowledge, and that they are reconfiguring the human with the notion of 'brainhood'. The suggestion is that the real challenges lie elsewhere; specifically with understanding the relations of different forms of knowledge and making it conceivable by political action, or simply mode of life, to implement one way of being human rather than another. The conclusion re-asserts the value of the heading, 'history of the human sciences', and of the value of the journal with this name, as a forum in which to reflect on the identity and relations of forms of knowledge about 'the human' in all their variety. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article is about the future of sociology, as transformations in the digital and biological sciences lay claim to the discipline's jurisdictional hold over 'the social'. Rather than analyse the specifics of these transformations, however, the focus of the article is on how a narrative of methodological crisis is sustained in sociology, and on how such a narrative conjures very particular disciplinary futures. Through a close reading of key texts, the article makes two claims: (1) that a surprisingly conventional urge towards disciplinary reproduction often animates accounts of sociology's crisis; (2) that, even more surprisingly, these same accounts are often haunted by a hidden metaphorical architecture centred on biology, vitality, vigour and life. The central gambit of the article is that, perhaps in spite of itself, this subterranean image of life actually hints at less reproductively conventional ways of understanding – and intervening in – sociology's methodological 'crisis'. Drawing, empirically, on the author's recent work on urban stress and, theoretically, on Stefan Helmreich's (2011, 2016) account of 'limit biologies', the articles ends with a call for a 'limit sociology' – a form of attention that could, similarly, expand rather than contract the present moment of transformation. At the heart of the article is a hope that thinking with such a limit may help sociologists to imagine a less deadening future than that on offer from a canonised discipline cathected by endless crisis-talk. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I reconstruct my own journey into the history of the human sciences, which I show to have been a process of discovering the metaphysical standing of the human. I begin with Alexandre Koyré's encounter with Edmund Husserl in the 1930s, which I use to throw light on the legacy of Kant's 'anthropological' understanding of the human, which dominated and limited 19th-century science. As I show, those who broke from Kant's strictures and set the stage for the 20th-century revolutions in science - from Hegel, to John McTaggart, to Max Weber - typically were pursuing crypto-theological questions about how a finite being can comprehend an infinite universe. This journey is about the 'common measure' of being human, which is what links Plato to Kuhn, but has been most consistently taken up by law. I suggest that in seeking this 'measure of man', we may discover that to be human is not necessarily to be Homo sapiens, which would suggest a radical reorientation of the history of the human sciences. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article argues that current programmes in the human sciences which adopt a multi-disciplinary approach to history need to be wary of treating the knowledge of the natural sciences as being independent of social influence. Such efforts to do 'Big History', 'Deep History' or co-evolutionary history themselves have a past, and this article suggests that potential practitioners could benefit from considering that historical context. To that end, it explores the career of Herbert John Fleure, a scholar whose career defied disciplinary classification, but who was concerned to understand how the human past and present could be understood as they combined in the physical and social context of their production, and what they implied for the possibility of a human future. It concludes by arguing that Fleure's major lesson for modern researchers is his confrontation of the contingent nature and political consequences of his conclusions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An ethnographic or ethnomethodological turn in the history of the human sciences has been a Holy Grail at least since Cooter and Pumphrey called for it in 1994, but it has been little realized in practice. This article sketches out some ways to explore the reception, use and/or co-production of scientific knowledge using material generated by mediators such as mass-market paperbacks, radio, TV and especially newspapers. It then presents some preliminary findings, tracing the prevalence and, to a lesser extent, use of selected social-science concepts in the USA and the UK from the 1930s to the 1970s. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]