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The LHC Vacuum Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition application has been upgraded to fulfil the new requirements of Long Shutdown 2 and Run 3. The number of datapoint elements has been increased from 700k to 1.5M, which constitutes a challenge in terms of scalability. The new configuration of pumping station control hardware has led to an increase in the number of permanently connected PLCs from 150 to almost 300. A new concept has been developed and deployed, in which the PLC configuration is updated online. The goals were to automate, and to speed up periodic updates of the control system. Integrating of the wireless mobile equipment had led to the acquisition of expertise in dealing with temporary connections and dynamic insertion of device representation in the synoptic. Other new features include: the introduction of an innovative remote control and representation in synoptic panel of hardware interlocks, the development of a pre-configured notification system, and the integration of asset management into the user interface., Proceedings of the 18th International Conference on Accelerator and Large Experimental Physics Control Systems, ICALEPCS2021, Shanghai, China

Learning objectives Background Findings and procedure details Conclusion Personal information References, Learning objectives: The purpose of this paper is to review the imaging features of the main pathologies that affect the immuncompromised patient, its complications and possible pitfalls on cross-sectional...

Clinical History Image Findings Discussion Find Diagnosis Differential Diagnosis, male, 32 years, Clinical History: A 32 year-old male underwent maxillofacial surgery consultation for evaluation of a soft swelling lesion in the floor of the mouth present since childhood, but with recent growth. Final Diagnosis: Dermoid Cyst

Globalisation needs to be perceived by wine small and medium enterprises (SMEs) located in wine regions characterised by a terroir model as a challenge and an opportunity to innovate. The aim of this paper is to present a business strategy that can be adopted by wine SMEs located in regions with high production costs and where tradition and innovation are relevant factors to be introduced in the decision process. To achieve this goal, the case of five small wine producers (Douro Boys), located in the Portuguese conservative Douro Demarcated Region (DDR) that are adopting an informal horizontal network is presented. The conducted analysis allows us to conclude that Douro Boys is a very simple and informal structure of prospectors, with a high culture of innovation, searching for niches in international wine markets., http://dx.doi.org/10.7896/j.1118

Globalization is challenging the very core of cooperative governance and ownership decision, especially in Southern European countries, like Portugal, where a large number of producers are organized in traditional and Mediterranean-style agricultural cooperatives. This paper analyses the effects of governance and control variables related with size over two alternative indicators of performance: revenues transferred to members/patrons and capital structure. The results suggest that these cooperatives have difficulties being sustainable in the more competitive global wine markets, if they follow, essentially, a practice of maximum patronage refund, reducing their capacity to improve leverage and to finance more profitable, but risky, long run investments.

Leverage is one of the most important financial factors to the survival and viability of agricultural cooperatives (e.g., wine cooperatives) during a period of intense competition. Leverage is influenced both by the behavior of managers and cooperative members. An empirical study for the Douro Demarcated Region Wine Cooperatives (DDRWC) supports the hypothesis that managers have a positive influence in the determination of the equity/total assets ratio and that individualistic behavior of cooperative members has a negative influence in the value of this ratio. This paper suggests that there may be value in reconsidering cooperatives in the context of a so-called Mediterranean model.

In the past two decades the world has seen acceleration in the process of globalisation, affecting virtually all industries and consumers. The wine sector is no exception, witnessing increased exports and imports, decreasing consumption per capita in the producing countries, and a wave of direct foreign investment and mergers and acquisitions in the industry. Among European wine producers the Port wine can be seen as a representative case of globalisation and as a benchmark, because almost 90% of its production is exported. With this in mind, the main objective of this paper is to analyse the structure and behaviour of the Port wine chain in terms of industrial organisation and trade. To achieve this objective a survey about the role of organisations in national growth and descriptions of the European wine industry and of the Port wine chain was conducted. Moreover, we identify and characterise the dynamics of production, price and trade of the Port wine after World War II. Despite the Port wine activity having been subjected to cycles there has been a trend toward a continued increase in production and exports, stabilisation of real market prices and a slight increase in the real prices paid to grape growers, leading to positive economic effects for Port wine firms and grape growers. The pro-active behaviour of Port wine chain agents contributed to this result, namely exporters who were able to adopt market strategies to respond to the challenges of globalisation.

Over the last decade Portuguese Agricultural Credit Cooperatives (ACCs) have increasingly face survival challenges related to their difficulty in gathering equity. The main source of ACCs equity is the net benefit; thus, understanding how ACCs governance can work on correcting bad economic performance is of crucial importance to overcome this constraint. The main objective of this paper is to describe the governance control mechanisms in the ACCs. Five governance mechanisms are identified: board and chairman change (internal mechanisms), central ACC intervention by an agent or by management board replacement and merger. Empirical analysis proved that the internal governance mechanisms activity is not related to the ACC performance. Additionally: (a) ACCs with a central ACC agent and merged ACCs hold a weaker credit management and a heavy administrative costs structure and profitability problems; and (b) ACCs with a management board replacement by the central ACC hold a weaker credit management and present solvency problems.