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Abstract As the COVID-19 pandemic unfolded in the spring of 2020, governments around the world began to implement policies to mitigate and manage the outbreak. Significant research efforts were deployed to track and analyse these policies in real-time to better inform the response. While much of the policy analysis focused narrowly on social distancing measures designed to slow the spread of disease, here, we present a dataset focused on capturing the breadth of policy types implemented by jurisdictions globally across the whole-of-government. COVID Analysis and Mapping of Policies (COVID AMP) includes nearly 50,000 policy measures from 150 countries, 124 intermediate areas, and 235 local areas between January 2020 and June 2022. With up to 40 structured and unstructured characteristics encoded per policy, as well as the original source and policy text, this dataset provides a uniquely broad capture of the governance strategies for pandemic response, serving as a critical data source for future work in legal epidemiology and political science.

Background Unsafe water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) contributes to a high burden of disease and exacerbates factors that promote the development of antimicrobial resistance (AMR). Enforceable policies are foundational to curbing inappropriate use of antimicrobials and providing safe WASH. While many countries have established National Action Plans for AMR that include provisions for WASH, few have codified these plans into legally enforceable policy. Here, we provide a comprehensive map and describe the current regulatory environment for WASH.Methods We conducted a comprehensive analysis of the WASH-related policies in 193 countries. Policies were identified, collated, and categorised into a publicly available repository.Results A total of 672 policies met the criteria for inclusion in the dataset. No category of WASH-related policies had been adopted by all countries included in the study. Policy categories that were potentially more difficult to enforce in light of economic and governance limitations tended to be more prevalent and diverse, whereas policies in categories that were highly resource intensive and specific were less universal. Countries with gaps in policy categories also tended to be regionally clustered. While countries in the South Asian and European WHO regions had nearly universal policy coverage across all countries, the presence of policies was inconsistent across countries in the African and Eastern Mediterranean regions.Conclusion While decision-makers should rely on knowing which policies work best to mitigate the burden of WASH-related disease and AMR development, they must first have a comprehensive understanding of the current regulatory environment. Researchers and decision-makers need to know which policies work best and under what circumstances. The global mapping of WASH policies, which may have implications for AMR development, serves as a foundation for future policy analysis for AMR.

IntroductionThe COVID-19 pandemic has raised concerns about the global capacity for timely outbreak reporting. However, gaps remain in our understanding of barriers and enablers to outbreak reporting, particularly at the local level. Field epidemiology training program (FETP) fellows often participate in the outbreak reporting process as part of both their training and the public health roles they assume after graduating; they therefore represent a potentially valuable source of information for better understanding these barriers and enablers. This study will investigate the barriers and enablers to outbreak reporting through a mixed methods approach that will encompass a review of the existing literature as well as surveying and interviewing FETP trainees and graduates from the Asia-Pacific region.MethodsThis study will begin with a scoping review of the literature to identify existing evidence of barriers and enablers to outbreak reporting. Based on our findings from the scoping review, we will administer a survey to FETP trainees and graduates from the World Health Organization Western Pacific and South-East Asian Regions and conduct interviews with a subset of survey respondents to investigate the survey findings in more detail. We will summarise and compare the survey results according to various country-level economic and political indicators, and we will employ thematic analysis to evaluate the interview responses. Based on the findings from the scoping review, survey, and interviews, we will construct a model to comprehensively describe the various barriers and enablers to outbreak reporting.ConclusionThis study will contribute to our understanding of the determinants of outbreak reporting across several geographic, political, and economic contexts by eliciting the viewpoints and experiences of persons involved with outbreak reporting, particularly at the local level. This information will help improve the outbreak reporting process, allowing for more timely reporting and helping prevent future outbreaks from becoming pandemics.

Background Health security funding is intended to improve capacities for preventing, detecting, and responding to public health emergencies. Recent years have witnessed substantial increases in the amounts of donor financial assistance to health security from countries, philanthropies, and other development partners. To date, no work has examined the effects of assistance on health security capacity development over time. This paper presents an analysis of the timelagged effects of assistance for health security (AHS) on levels of capacity. Methods We collected publicly available health security assessment scores published between 2010 and 2019 and data relating to financial AHS. Using validated methods, we rescaled assessment scores on analogous scales to enable comparison and binned them in quartiles. We then used a distributed lag model (DLM) in a Bayesian ordinal regression framework to assess the effects of AHS on capacity development over time. Results Strong evidence exists for associations between financial assistance and select capacities on a variety of lagged time intervals. Financial assistance had positive effects on zoonotic disease capacities in the year it was disbursed, and positive effects on legislation, laboratory, workforce, and risk communication capacities one year after disbursal. Financial assistance had negative effects on laboratory and emergency response capacities two years after it was disbursed. Financial assistance did not have measurable effects on coordination, antimicrobial resistance (AMR), food safety, biosafety, surveillance, or response preparedness capacities over the timeframe considered. Conclusion Financial AHS is associated with positive effects for several core health security capacities. However, for the majority of capacities, levels of funding were not significantly associated with capacity level, though we cannot fully exclude endogeneity. Future work should continue to investigate these relationships in different contexts and examine other factors that may contribute to capacity development.

The World Health Organization (WHO) notifies the global community about disease outbreaks through the Disease Outbreak News (DON). These online reports tell important stories about both outbreaks themselves and the high-level decision making that governs information sharing during public health emergencies. However, they have been used only minimally in global health scholarship to date. Here, we collate all 2,789 of these reports from their first use through the start of the Covid-19 pandemic (January 1996 to December 2019), and develop an annotated database of the subjective and often inconsistent information they contain. We find that these reports are dominated by a mix of persistent worldwide threats (particularly influenza and cholera) and persistent epidemics (like Ebola virus disease in Africa or MERS-CoV in the Middle East), but also document important periods in history like the anthrax bioterrorist attacks at the turn of the century, the spread of chikungunya and Zika virus to the Americas, or even recent lapses in progress towards polio elimination. We present three simple vignettes that show how researchers can use these data to answer both qualitative and quantitative questions about global outbreak dynamics and public health response. However, we also find that the retrospective value of these reports is visibly limited by inconsistent reporting (e.g., of disease names, case totals, mortality, and actions taken to curtail spread). We conclude that sharing a transparent rubric for which outbreaks are considered reportable, and adopting more standardized formats for sharing epidemiological metadata, might help make the DON more useful to researchers and policymakers.

A key security challenge with biosecurity threats is determining the responsible actor. In this Perspective, the authors review recent developments in using genetic sequence to assign a lab-of-origin and the potential protection it provides against misuse of synthetic biology.

Abstract The World One Health Congresses are biennial gatherings of approximately 1500 professionals from relevant international organisations, OIE, FAO, WHO, World Bank, leading scientific experts and researchers in the field of One Health, animal production and trade, food safety, animal health, human health and environmentology/ecology, government representatives in public health, human health, food safety, environmental health and global health security. The Congress is organized by the One Health Platform. This white paper summarizes highlights of the 5th International One Health Congress in Saskatoon, Canada, June 2018 and serves as a roadmap for the future, detailing several concrete action points to be carried out in the run-up to the 6th World One Health Congress in Edinburgh, Scotland, June 2020.

The COVID-19 pandemic has highlighted critical gaps in global capacity to prevent, detect, and respond to infectious diseases. To effectively allocate investments that address these gaps, it is first necessary to quantify the extent of the need, evaluate the types of resources and activities that require additional support, and engage the global community in ongoing assessment, planning, and implementation. Which investments are needed, where, to strengthen health security? This work aims to estimate costs to strengthen country-level health security, globally and identify associated cost drivers. The cost of building public health capacity is estimated based on investments needed, per country, to progress towards the benchmarks identified by the World Health Organization's Joint External Evaluation (JEE). For each country, costs are estimated to progress to a score of "demonstrated capacity" (4) across indicators. Over five years, an estimated US$124 billion is needed to reach "demonstrated capacity" on each indicator of the JEE for each of the 196 States Parties to the International Health Regulations (IHR). Personnel costs, including skilled health, public health, and animal health workers, are the single most influential cost driver, comprising 66% of total costs. These findings, and the data generated by this effort, provide cost estimates to inform ongoing health security financing discussions at the global level. The results highlight the significant need for sustainable financing mechanisms for both workforce development and ongoing support for the health and public health workforce.

Urbanisation will be one of the defining demographic trends of the 21st century—creating unique opportunities for sustainable capacity development, as well as substantial risks and challenges for managing public health and health emergencies. Plans and policies for responding to public health emergencies are generally framed at higher levels of governance, but developing, improving and sustaining the capacities necessary for implementing these policies is a direct function of local-level authorities. Evaluating local-level public health capacities is an important process for identifying strengths and weaknesses that can impact the preparedness for, detection of and response to health security threats. However, while various evaluations and assessments exist for evaluating capacities at other levels, currently, there are no readily available health security assessments for the local-level. In this paper, we describe a tool—the Rapid Urban Health Security Assessment (RUHSA) Tool—that is based on a variety of other relevant assessments and guidance documents. Assessing capacities allow for local-level authorities to identify the strengths and weaknesses of their local health security systems, create multiyear action plans and prioritise opportunities for improving capacities, effectively engage with development partners to target resources effectively and develop compelling narratives and a legacy of leadership. While the RUHSA Tool was not designed to be used in the midst of a public health emergency, such as the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, it may also be adapted to inform a checklist for prioritising what capacities and activities a city needs to rapidly develop or to help focus requests for assistance.

# Background An effective and dedicated legislative framework is necessary to give effect to the obligations under Articles 5 and 13 of the International Health Regulations (IHR) and is an indicator under the prevent pillar of the Joint External Evaluation (JEE) tool. Following the 2014-2016 Ebola crisis in West Africa, the President of Guinea established a new agency solely dedicated to preparedness and response to public health emergencies. This paper presents the results of a research project to assess the legal and regulatory basis for activities related to public health emergencies management across the Guinean government. # Methods A literature review, combined with in-country consultations, individual interviews and a stakeholder workshop was used to identify and analyze legislation related to the management of public health emergencies in Guinea. Once key gaps and overlaps between existing legal and regulatory documents were identified, we categorized them under the JEE key technical areas. We then identified and reviewed examples of best practices in health emergency legislation for corresponding technical areas from other African and Asian countries. # Results In 14 out of the 19 JEE technical areas, we identified key legislative gaps and potential areas of conflicting authorities within and between ministries. Most consequentially, we identified a lack of formal legislation or mechanisms to support information and data sharing within and between agencies and sectors as well as relevant authorities in neighboring countries, despite the benefits such mechanisms may offer for improved communication when public health emergencies threaten to cross borders. The legislative review also enabled the identification of possible gaps in corresponding foreign legislation, illustrating that this type of assessment may have larger regional or even global implications, in terms of identifying priority areas for future legislative development across diverse legal systems and access to resources. # Conclusions This legislative review allowed for the identification of numerous legislative gaps that, if filled, could support the government to be better equipped to protect the health and life of Guineans in health emergencies. Importantly, our paper serves to demonstrate the utility of legislative assessment as an essential and effective tool for strengthening health security capacity more broadly.

To guide One Health capacity building efforts in the Republic of Guinea in the wake of the 2014–2016 Ebola virus disease (EVD) outbreak, we sought to identify and assess the existing systems and structures for zoonotic disease detection and control. We partnered with the government ministries responsible for human, animal, and environmental health to identify a list of zoonotic diseases – rabies, anthrax, brucellosis, viral hemorrhagic fevers, trypanosomiasis and highly pathogenic avian influenza – as the country's top priorities. We used each priority disease as a case study to identify existing processes for prevention, surveillance, diagnosis, laboratory confirmation, reporting and response across the three ministries. Results were used to produce disease-specific systems “maps” emphasizing linkages across the systems, as well as opportunities for improvement. We identified brucellosis as a particularly neglected condition. Past efforts to build avian influenza capabilities, which had degraded substantially in less than a decade, highlighted the challenge of sustainability. We observed a keen interest across sectors to reinvigorate national rabies control, and given the regional and global support for One Health approaches to rabies elimination, rabies could serve as an ideal disease to test incipient One Health coordination mechanisms and procedures. Overall, we identified five major categories of gaps and challenges: (1) Coordination; (2) Training; (3) Infrastructure; (4) Public Awareness; and (5) Research. We developed and prioritized recommendations to address the gaps, estimated the level of resource investment needed, and estimated a timeline for implementation. These prioritized recommendations can be used by the Government of Guinea to plan strategically for future One Health efforts, ideally under the auspices of the national One Health Platform. This work demonstrates an effective methodology for mapping systems and structures for zoonotic diseases, and the benefit of conducting a baseline review of systemic capabilities prior to embarking on capacity building efforts. Keywords: Guinea, One Health, Zoonotic disease, Health systems assessment, Capacity building

With growing concerns about international spread of disease and expanding use of early disease detection surveillance methods, the field of syndromic surveillance has received increased attention over the last decade. The purpose of this article is to clarify the various meanings that have been assigned to the term syndromic surveillance and to propose a refined categorization of the characteristics of these systems. Existing literature and conference proceedings were examined on syndromic surveillance from 1998 to 2010, focusing on low- and middle-income settings. Based on the 36 unique definitions of syndromic surveillance found in the literature, five commonly accepted principles of syndromic surveillance systems were identified, as well as two fundamental categories: specific and non-specific disease detection. Ultimately, the proposed categorization of syndromic surveillance distinguishes between systems that focus on detecting defined syndromes or outcomes of interest and those that aim to uncover non-specific trends that suggest an outbreak may be occurring. By providing an accurate and comprehensive picture of this field’s capabilities, and differentiating among system types, a unified understanding of the syndromic surveillance field can be developed, encouraging the adoption, investment in, and implementation of these systems in settings that need bolstered surveillance capacity, particularly low- and middle-income countries.

Despite the importance of community health workers (CHWs) to health systems in resource-constrained environments, relatively little has been written about their contributions to pandemic preparedness. In this perspective piece, we draw from the response to the 2014 Ebola and 2015 Zika epidemics to review examples whereby CHWs contributed to health security and pandemic preparedness. CHWs promoted pandemic preparedness prior to the epidemics by increasing the access to health services and products within communities, communicating health concepts in a culturally appropriate fashion, and reducing the burdens felt by formal healthcare systems. During the epidemics, CHWs promoted pandemic preparedness by acting as community-level educators and mobilizers, contributing to surveillance systems, and filling health service gaps. Acknowledging the success CHWs have had in these roles and in previous interventions, we propose that the cadre may be better engaged in pandemic preparedness in the future. Some practical strategies for achieving this include training and using CHWs to communicate One Health information to at-risk communities prior to outbreaks, pooling them into a reserve health corps to be used during public health emergencies, and formalizing agreements and strategies to promote the early engagement of CHWs in response actions. Recognizing that CHWs already play a role in pandemic preparedness, we feel that expanding the roles and responsibilities of CHWs represents a practical means of improving pandemic and community-level resilience.

# Background Guangdong, which stands at the frontier of emerging infections, has developed an innovative system approach to this threat. The province of 110 million inhabitants, a major hub for domestic and international trade, includes mega-cities side-by-side with small-scale agricultural areas in a region from which recent strains of influenza and other respiratory viruses have emerged. Guangdong residents consume chicken and purchase it at live poultry markets, which can accelerate the emergence of influenza strains and transmission to humans. We describe Guangdong's approach to surveillance and public health emergency response. # Methods We use H7N9 as a case study to illustrate how Guangdong's system functions. # Results Guangdong's approach includes five core elements -- real-time surveillance, risk assessment, rapid response, active and accurate intervention, and multilateral communication. This requires partnerships among governmental agencies at all levels as well as healthcare professionals and residents. Risk management, for instance, involves not only provincial and local Centers for Disease Control, other government agencies, hospitals and clinics, and wholesale and live poultry markets. The implementation of Guangdong's risk management strategy depends, in part, on available resources and existing capacities. Guangzhou and a majority of Guangdong Province implement "control risk" level strategies. However, the city of Shenzhen (as well as neighboring Hong Kong), implement "eliminate risk." level strategies. # Conclusions Effective disease surveillance requires vertical and horizontal coordination among public health agencies. Similarly, disease prevention and control efforts also require partnerships with other governmental agencies at all levels, as well as with healthcare professionals and civil society. Guangdong Province has developed an approach for surveillance and control of H7N9 that may represent a robust and potentially scalable model for China and other nations.

Background: Recent infectious disease outbreaks have brought increased attention to the need to strengthen global capacity to prevent, detect, and respond to natural biological threats. However, deliberate biological events also represent a significant global threat, but have received relatively little attention. While the Biological Weapons Convention provides a foundation for the response to deliberate biological events, the political mechanisms to respond to and recover from such an event are poorly defined. Methods: We performed an analysis of the epidemiological timeline, the international policies triggered as a notional deliberate biological event unfolds, and the corresponding stakeholders and mandates assigned by each policy. Findings: The results of this analysis identify a significant gap in both policy and stakeholder mandates: there is no single policy nor stakeholder mandate for leading and coordinating response activities associated with a deliberate biological event. These results were visualized using an open source web-based tool published at https://dbe.talusanalytics.com. Interpretation: While there are organizations and stakeholders responsible for leading security or public health response, these roles are non-overlapping and are led by organizations not with limited interaction outside such events. The lack of mandates highlights a gap in the mechanisms available to coordinate response and a gap in guidance for managing the response. The results of the analysis corroborate anecdotal evidence from stakeholder meetings and highlight a critical need and gap in deliberate biological response policy.

BackgroundNeglected tropical diseases (NTDs) are communicable diseases that impact approximately 1 billion people, but receive relatively little research, funding, and attention. Many NTDs have similar treatments, epidemiology, and geographic distribution, and as a result, the integration of control efforts can improve accountability, efficiency, and cost-effectiveness of programs. Here, we examine the landscape of efforts towards NTD integration across countries with the highest burden of disease, and review the administrative management of integration in order to identify approaches and pathways for integration.Methodology and principal findingsWe utilized a standardized system to score countries for NTD endemnicity to create a list of 25 countries with the highest overall burden of NTDs. We then conducted a literature review to characterize the NTD control programs in the focus countries. Six countries were selected for key informant interviews to validate literature review results and gather additional data on opportunities and obstacles to NTD integration, from an administrative perspective. The majority of countries included in the study were located in Africa, with the remainder from Asia, North America, and South America. Multiple models and pathways were observed for the integration of NTD programs, in combination with other NTD programs, other diseases, or other health programs. Substantial heterogeneity existed with respect to the NTD control programs, and no country had integrated all of their NTD control efforts into a single program. NTDs that can be treated with preventative chemotherapy were frequently integrated into a single program. Leprosy control was also frequently integrated with those of other communicable diseases, and notably tuberculosis. Barriers to NTD integration may result from internal administrative obstacles or external obstacles.ConclusionsAlthough many countries have begun to integrate NTD control efforts, additional work will be required to realize the full benefits of integration in most of the countries examined here. Moving forward, NTD integration efforts must ensure that administrative structures are designed to maximize the potential success of integrated programs and account for existing administrative processes.

Designing and implementing effective programs for infectious disease control requires complex decision-making, informed by an understanding of the diseases, the types of disease interventions and control measures available, and the disease-relevant characteristics of the local community. Though disease modeling frameworks have been developed to address these questions and support decision-making, the complexity of current models presents a significant barrier to on-the-ground end users. The picture is further complicated when considering approaches for integration of different disease control programs, where co-infection dynamics, treatment interactions, and other variables must also be taken into account. Here, we describe the development of an application available on the internet with a simple user interface, to support on-the-ground decision-making for integrating disease control, given local conditions and practical constraints. The model upon which the tool is built provides predictive analysis for the effectiveness of integration of schistosomiasis and malaria control, two diseases with extensive geographical and epidemiological overlap. This proof-of-concept method and tool demonstrate significant progress in effectively translating the best available scientific models to support pragmatic decision-making on the ground, with the potential to significantly increase the impact and cost-effectiveness of disease control.

Our world is rapidly urbanizing. According to the United Nations, between 1990 and 2015, the percent of the world’s population living in urban areas grew from 43% to 54%. Estimates suggest that this trend will continue and that over 68% of the world’s population will call cities home by 2050, with the majority of urbanization occurring in African countries. This urbanization is already having a profound effect on global health and could significantly impact the epidemiology of infectious diseases. A better understanding of infectious disease risk factors specific to urban settings is needed to plan for and mitigate against future urban outbreaks. We conducted a systematic literature review of the Web of Science and PubMed databases to assess the risk factors for infectious diseases in the urban environments of sub-Saharan Africa. A search combining keywords associated with cities, migration, African countries, infectious disease, and risk were used to identify relevant studies. Original research and meta-analyses published between 2004 and 2019 investigating geographical and behavioral risk factors, changing disease distributions, or control programs were included in the study. The search yielded 3610 papers, and 106 met the criteria for inclusion in the analysis. Papers were categorized according to risk factors, geographic area, and study type. The papers covered 31 countries in sub-Saharan Africa with East Africa being the most represented sub-region. Malaria and HIV were the most frequent disease focuses of the studies. The results of this work can inform public health policy as it relates to capacity building and health systems strengthening in rapidly urbanizing areas, as well as highlight knowledge gaps that warrant additional research.

This paper describes the formation of a civil society consortium, spurred to action by frustration over the Ebola crises, to facilitate the development of infrastructure and frameworks including policy development to support a harmonized, African approach to health crises on the continent. The Global Emerging Pathogens Treatment Consortium, or GET, is an important example of how African academics, scientists, clinicians and civil society have come together to initiate policy research, multilevel advocacy and implementation of initiatives aimed at building African capacity for timely and effective mitigations strategies against emerging infectious and neglected pathogens, with a focus on biobanking and biosecurity. The consortium has been able to establish it self as a leading voice, drawing attention to scientific infrastructure gaps, the importance of cultural sensitivities, and the power of community engagement. The GET consortium demonstrates how civil society can work together, encourage government engagement and strengthen national and regional efforts to build capacity.

The revised International Health Regulations (IHR [2005]) conferred new responsibilities on member states of the World Health Organization, requiring them to develop core capacities to detect, assess, report, and respond to public health emergencies. Many countries have not yet developed these capacities, and poor understanding of the associated costs have created a barrier to effectively marshaling assistance. To help national and international decision makers understand the inputs and associated costs of implementing the IHR (2005), we developed an IHR implementation strategy to serve as a framework for making preliminary estimates of fixed and operating costs associated with developing and sustaining IHR core capacities across an entire public health system. This tool lays the groundwork for modeling the costs of strengthening public health systems from the central to the peripheral level of an integrated health system, a key step in helping national health authorities define necessary actions and investments required for IHR compliance.

Rapid population growth, urbanization, and the growing challenges faced by the urban poor require redefining the paradigm for public health interventions in the 21st century, creating new approaches that take urban determinants of health into consideration. The widening disparity between the urban poor and the urban rich further exacerbates health inequities. Existing tools for global governance of urban health risks fall short, particularly in the lack of formal mechanisms to strengthen collaboration and communication among national and municipal agencies and between their local and international non-governmental partners. There is also a clear disconnect between governance strategies crafted at the international level and implementation on the ground. The challenge is to find common ground for global goods and municipal needs, and to craft innovative and dynamic policy solutions that can benefit some of the poorest citizens of the global urban network.

Strong international health agreements and good planning created a structure and common procedure for nations involved in detection and evaluation of the emergence of influenza A (H1N1). This report describes a timeline of events that led to the determination of the epidemic as a public health emergency of international concern, following the agreed-upon procedures of the International Health Regulations. These events illustrate the need for sound international health agreements and should be a call to action for all nations to implement these agreements to the best of their abilities.