Search

"The man on the Clapham omnibus" is an often cited but poorly understood name for the standard of reasonable care in tort. It originated in a 1903 decision in which this formula was used not to articulate a legal standard but to describe an average person whose views have no legal significance. This figure finds a cousin in another personification, as "the man who takes the magazines at home, and in the evening pushes the lawn-mower in his shirt sleeves." Both formulations have complex histories that help to underscore their inaptness as descriptors for the standard they are used to represent. These two examples also help to show, more generally, why a personified standard ("the reasonable person") tends to introduce problems that do not arise with a more abstract one ("reasonableness," "reasonable care"). Many critics have shown that the "reasonableness" standard is susceptible to problems of bias and framing. Personifying the standard invites the inappropriate use of individuated figures with particular features (e.g., a bus rider from a London suburb) that only worsen these problems. This article traces the history of these two standards, tries to explain how they moved from descriptive to normative use, and then turns to problems with personified standards more generally, showing how some superficially appealing reasons for using a personified standard prove to be unpersuasive. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This Article examines the criminal law defense of provocation in the U.S., which employs an objective reasonable person standard, as applied to recent Asian immigrants. It discusses approaches taken in other countries and describes the cultural defense. The Article concludes with different possibilities for a hypothetical Asian defendant who was provoked: Improving education about U.S. laws as a preventative measure, using expert cultural witnesses at trial, and taking the defendant’s characteristics into consideration during the sentencing stage.

This Article examines the criminal law defense of provocation in the U.S., which employs an objective reasonable person standard, as applied to recent Asian immigrants. It discusses approaches taken in other countries and describes the cultural defense. The Article concludes with different possibilities for a hypothetical Asian defendant who was provoked: Improving education about U.S. laws as a preventative measure, using expert cultural witnesses at trial, and taking the defendant's characteristics into consideration during the sentencing stage. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article is a critical analysis of a fundamental judicial ethic, the appearance of impartiality, an increasingly important public issue that is poorly understood and woefully underexamined in jurisprudence and academic literature. The ethic is pivotal to the determination of judicial disqualification, a/k/a recusal, and the public's fragile trust in the rule of law. The article explains how a mysterious metaphorical device, the "reasonable observer" (a descendant of the common law's "reasonable man") has been subjectively applied in a confusing and inconsistent manner in judicial disqualification cases. The unexamined approach has unwittingly undermined the plain text and the mandatory ethical obligation of recusal (i.e., a judge must disqualify when his or her impartiality might reasonably be questioned). The discussion: (a) analyzes the theoretical underpinnings of the reasonable person-observer analytical tool ("heuristic"); (b) explains how American jurisprudence has glibly transmogrified the appearance-recusal precept; (c) provides a unique and starkly contrasting analytical perspective demonstrating how select common law-based jurisdictions (Australia, Canada, Singapore, South Africa, United Kingdom) have painstakingly examined and applied the widely-recognized norm of appearance-based impartiality; and (d) synthesizes the preceding theoretical and jurisprudential information to support a proposal for a recalibrated metric and a pragmatic, clarifying heuristic. The article concludes with a model provision, in the form of a guiding "commentary," that summarizes the essential aspects of the appearance of bias precept. The article provides an interpretative approach that attempts to be faithful to the letter and spirit of the foundational judicial ethic. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the American medical system, patients do not know the final price of treatment until long after the treatment is given, at which point it is too late to say "no." I argue that without price disclosure many, perhaps all, tokens of consent in clinical medicine fall below the standard of valid, informed consent. This is a sweeping and broad thesis. The reason for this thesis is surprisingly simple: medical services rarely have prices attached to them that are known to the patient prior to treatment. Yet, for many patients, knowledge of the price is relevant to whether they would give consent. If informed consent requires that patients know all information about their treatment that is relevant to their decision, then consent to a medical intervention in the absence of the price is not informed consent. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the field of Law and Literature studies, contributions on poetry are rare. This article focuses on a selection of contemporary poetic works: Cornelius Eady's A Brutal Imagination (2001), Frédéric Boyer's Le Goût du suicide lent (1999), Maurizio Cucchi's Il disperso (1976) and Corrado Benigni's Tribunale della mente (2012). Their lyrical shaping of law establishes a difference from the model of "forensic" poetry that can be found in Charles Reznikoff's Testimony (1978–1979). Through them, this contribution shows how it is possible to challenge a reflection on the language of lyric poetry and that of law at the same time, if we interpret the lyric poetry as a non-narrative discourse. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The notion of relevance plays a role in many accounts of knowledge and knowledge ascription. Although use of the notion is well-motivated, theorists struggle to codify relevance. A reasonable person standard of relevance addresses this codification problem, and provides an objective and flexible standard of relevance; however, treating relevance as reasonableness seems to allow practical factors to determine whether one has knowledge or not—so-called "pragmatic encroachment." I argue that a fuller understanding of reasonableness and of the role of practical factors in the acquisition of knowledge lets us avoid pragmatic encroachment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In criminal cases of self-defense and provocation, and civil cases of negligence, culpability is often decided with reference to how a reasonably prudent person (RPP) would have behaved in similar circumstances. The RPP is said to be an objective standard in that it eschews consideration of a defendant's unique background or characteristics. We discuss theory and evidence suggesting that in morally relevant judgments, including those involving negligence, self-defense, and provocation, the tendency to rely on the self—on one's own values and predilections—dominates considerations of the RPP. We consider subjective standards that have been proposed as alternatives to the RPP and review research on this topic. We conclude by considering avenues for future research, particularly addressing conditions in which self-standards of reasonableness are most likely to prevail. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The standard of the reasonable person or its equivalent, in general, is used in many jurisdictions to determine fault in the form of negligence. Although the standard is predominantly objective it is also subjective in that the subjective attributes of the person against whom the standard applies as well as the subjective circumstances present at the time of the delict or tort lend themselves to an objective-subjective application. In South African law, before a person can be judged according to the standard of the reasonable person, the person must first be held accountable. If a person cannot be held accountable, then the standard does not apply at all. The general standard of the reasonable person cannot be applied to children, the elderly, persons with physical disabilities, persons with mental impairments or experts. Therefore, depending on the subjective attributes of the person against whom the standard is being applied, the standard may have to be adjusted accordingly. The general standard of the reasonable person would be raised when dealing with experts, for instance, and lowered when dealing with persons with physical disabilities. This contribution considers whether the current application of the standard of the reasonable person in South African law is satisfactory when applied generally to all persons, no matter their age, experience, gender, physical disability and cognitive ability. The application of the standard of the reasonable person in South African law is compared to the application of the standard of the reasonable person or its equivalent in the United Kingdom, the United States of America and France. Just as South African law applies the standard of the reasonable expert to experts, this contribution explores whether the South African law should be developed to use similar adjusted standards when dealing with children, the elderly, persons with physical disabilities and so on. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The 'reasonable person standard' (RPS) is often called on in difficult legal cases as the last resource to be appealed to when other solutions run out. Its complexity derives from the controversial tasks that people place on it. Two dialectics require some clarification: the objective/subjective interpretation of the standard and the ideal/ordinary person controversy. I shall move through these dialectics from the standpoint of an EV (ethics of virtues) approach, assuming that on this interpretation the RPS can perform most persuasively its tasks. The all-round model of phronetic agent that I present not only works better than competing models—such as the utilitarian–economic and the Rawlsian—in the law of tort but shows its best potentialities in other kinds of cases. In criminal law and matrimonial law cases the recourse to the EV approach offers through the virtues rich and substantial resources to evaluate conflictual cases. This approach makes the threshold of evaluation much closer to real life than competitors. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Reasonable person, relevant characteristics, realistic alternative, human trafficking, cannabis cultivation. [Extracted from the article]

The law of informed consent to medical treatment has recently been extensively overhauled in England. The 2015 Montgomery judgment has done away with the long-held position that the information to be disclosed by doctors when obtaining valid consent from patients should be determined on the basis of what a reasonable body of medical opinion agree ought to be disclosed in the circumstances. The UK Supreme Court concluded that the information that is material to a patient's decision should instead be judged by reference to a new two-limbed test founded on the notions of the 'reasonable person' and the 'particular patient'. The rationale outlined in Montgomery for this new test of materiality, and academic comment on the ruling's significance, has focused on the central ethical importance that the law now (rightfully) accords to respect for patient autonomy in the process of obtaining consent from patients. In this paper, we dispute the claim that the new test of materiality articulated in Montgomery equates with respect for autonomy being given primacy in re-shaping the development of the law in this area. We also defend this position, arguing that our revised interpretation of Montgomery's significance does not equate with a failure by the courts to give due legal consideration to what is owed to patients as autonomous decision-makers in the consent process. Instead, Montgomery correctly implies that doctors are ethically (and legally) obliged to attend to a number of relevant ethical considerations in framing decisions about consent to treatment, which include subtle interpretations of the values of autonomy and well-being. Doctors should give appropriate consideration to how these values are fleshed out and balanced in context in order to specify precisely what information ought to be disclosed to a patient as a requirement of obtaining consent, and as a core component of shared decision-making within medical encounters more generally. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Laura Odwazny and Benjamin Berkman have raised several challenges regarding the new reasonable person standard in the revised Common Rule, which states that informed consent requires potential research subjects be provided with information a reasonable person would want to know to make an informed decision on whether to participate in a study. Our aim is to offer a response to the challenges Odwazny and Berkman raise, which include the need for a reasonable person standard that can be applied consistently across institutional review boards and that does not stigmatize marginal groups. In response, we argue that the standard ought to be based in an ordinary rather than ideal person conception of reasonable person and that the standard ought to employ what we call a liberal constraint: the reasonability standard must be malleable enough such that a wide variety of individuals with different, unique value systems would endorse it. We conclude by suggesting some of the likely consequences our view would have, if adopted. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article deals with the problem of reasoning in the context of scientific rationality. As a variety of critical rationality, which includes the analysis a theory, that allows critical reflection and substantiation of facts. The author notes the need to distinguish between the concept of «rationality» and «reasonableness». Reasonableness becomes the foundation for the formation of reasoning. The formation of reasonable personalities is the main task of a rationally organized society. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]