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Building on previous research demonstrating that demographic growth of racial minorities increases realistic threat and prejudice among majority group members, we examined whether demographic increases of groups associated with symbolic threat (lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender [LGBT] and nonreligious groups) increased realistic threat, symbolic threat, and/or prejudice. In a single-paper meta-analysis across four studies, participants who read that LGBT groups were becoming more prevalent in the United States exhibited heightened perceptions of realistic threat and (especially) symbolic threat from these groups, which in turn predicted anti-LGBT prejudice. Two similar studies examining the growth of nonreligious groups demonstrated weaker effects. Implications for America's growing diversity and future directions for studying these effects are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The present study prospectively examines associations between citizens' perceived symbolic and realistic threat and mental health before and after refugee settlement in their neighbourhood. Citizens in two Amsterdam (the Netherlands) neighbourhoods participated in the study (N = 280). A follow-up measurement after the settlement of refugees was conducted in one neighbourhood (n = 66). Cross-sectional results confirm that higher levels of perceived symbolic and realistic threat were both associated with poorer mental health. A prospective longitudinal analysis showed no increase in realistic or symbolic threat, but mental health was poorer in citizens after refugee settlement. Higher threat perceptions among citizens in the area before the settlement of refugees predicted poorer mental health after the settlement. This association was stronger than the reverse association (poorer mental health predicting higher threat perceptions). Policymakers should consider experienced threat levels among citizens when developing and communicating refugee settlement policies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The COVID‐19 pandemic laid bare pre‐existing societal fault lines, placing immense strain on intergroup relations and giving rise to xenophobic sentiments. Drawing on Realistic Conflict Theory (RCT) and Social Identity Approach (SIA), our study examined how the public allocation of COVID‐19 variant vaccines could influence the dynamics between local citizens and migrant workers, and under what conditions. One key idea is that valued resource distribution that favour migrant workers may produce increased perceptions of realistic threats among local citizens which could lead to exacerbated negative attitudes and behaviours of high‐status local citizens towards low‐status migrants, whereas higher fairness perceptions of such resource distributions could potentially mitigate these negative attitudes and behaviours. To investigate these predictions, we employed a cross‐cultural approach and conducted an experiment in both an Asian country (Malaysia; N = 197) and a Western country (Australia; N = 210). We manipulated vaccine prioritisation, assessed local citizens' perceptions of the realistic threat and fairness of vaccine prioritisation, and measured their attitudinal responses towards migrant workers. Our results showed that the perceived unfairness in migrant‐favouring vaccine prioritisation, rather than realistic threat, negatively affected local citizens' perceptions of the migrant workers. We discuss the implications of these findings in the context of intergroup relations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Revista Interamericana de Psicología is the property of Sociedad Interamericana de Psicologia and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

In 2015, the inflow of immigrants to Europe increased dramatically. More than 1 million people fled from wars and conflicts in Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan, particularly affecting transit countries along the Western Balkan route. Of all the transit countries, the Hungarian government was particularly vocal in its negative attitude towards immigrants, launching several anti-immigration campaigns which had a detrimental effect on residents’ hostility towards these immigrants. In this study, we focus on the mechanisms behind this increased hostility in a transit-country context by combining insights from integrated-threat theory and contact theory. We find that perceptions of realistic and symbolic threat increased negative attitudes towards immigrants. Importantly, these threat perceptions were shaped by people’s positions in society and personal circumstances, in combination with their contact with immigrants. Specifically, in the harsh and negative Hungarian context, contact negatively influenced threat perceptions, especially amongst people who were at risk of experiencing negative consequences supposedly caused by the influx of immigrants. This in-depth country case study emphasises the importance of contextualising research findings on attitudes towards immigration in a broader social and political context.

People perceive immigration as a source of uncertainty in the host society, making them more susceptible to the most extreme ideological messages that threaten a peaceful relationship between immigrants and the host population. One such message is the idea that immigrants threaten ingroup prerogatives. This, in turn, is related to prosocial and contesting behavioral intentions (negatively and positively, respectively). Implementing inclusive integration policies can create conditions for the institutionalization of norms that promote tolerance and mitigate the negative effects of threat, which can be particularly relevant when the population perceives an economic decline. We address this phenomenon by proposing an analytic model that predicts that the perceived state of the economy and inclusive policies moderate the impact of uncertainty on realistic threat and prosocial and contesting behavioral intentions toward immigrants. We used a 2 (self-uncertainty about immigration: high vs. low) × 2 (perception of economic conditions: decline vs. stability) × 2 (integration policies: very inclusive vs. not very inclusive) between-participants design (N = 579). Results indicated that realistic threat mediated the influence of uncertainty on behavioral intentions. Importantly, the results also confirmed the impact of an economic decline on participants' realistic threat in an uncertain immigration situation and showed that integration policy influences the relationship between realistic threat and prosocial and contestation behavioral intentions. We discuss the implications of these findings for the literature on the role of uncertainty and legitimacy in anti-immigrant attitudes. Public Significance Statement: With an economic decline imminent, the progress made so far to develop a peaceful relationship between immigrants and the host population may be in jeopardy. The findings of this study suggest that integration policies can be an essential tool in the struggle for an inclusive society by suppressing people's intentions to challenge immigrants' integration, even when they feel that they threaten the nation's resources. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Influenced by the uprising against the oppressive regime in Tunisia. Syria has gone through a civil war which resulted in more than 3.6 million registered Syrian refugees seeking shelter in Ttukey since 2011 due to fear of their own safety. This sudden and unorganized mass movement has caused tensions between the local people in Ttukey and Syrian refugees, creating an enviioiunent for intergroup conflicts. It is well known by the literature that the attitude of local people towards refugees has a major role on the mentioned intergroup relationships as well as on the success of refugees’ adaptation into society. The ptupose of this study is to identify the negative attitudes towards refugees in Ttukey, and to examine the mediating role of the perceived threat level caused by the refugees in the relationship of ethnic and political identification and negative attitudes. This online study had a total of 526 (368 females and 158 males) university students at undergraduate level as participants between the ages 18-33 (Af = 22.36. SD = 3.26). According to the findings of the structural equation model testing, the individuals who identify themselves with Turkish identity and right-wing political orientations have perceived higher degr ee of realistic and symbolic threats due to Syrian refugees living hi Ttukey, which resulted in their having stronger negative emotions and negative stereotypes against the Syrian refugees and reducing them quality of contact with them. The findings of the study are expected to be of use to researchers who work on the subject of immigration. as well as professionals who develop and implement social policies related to these topics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Ankara Üniversitesi Dil ve Tarih-Cografya Fakültesi Dergisi DTCF Dergisi is the property of Ankara Universitesi Dil ve Tarih-Cografya Fakultesi (DTCF Dergisi) and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Uncertainty-identity theory (Hogg, 2000, 2007, 2012) postulates that people strengthen their adherence to, and identification with, extreme ideologies when they undergo an enduring uncertainty regarding their self-definition. Concomitantly, nationalist and extreme right-wing ideologies have been associated with the attribution of a threatening character to immigrant and refugee groups. We propose that self-uncertainty precedes the perceived threat posed by the latter groups, which in turn predicts adherence to nationalist attitudes. In one correlational (Study 1; n = 169) and one experimental study (Study 2; n = 309), we tested the mediational effects of perceived realistic and symbolic threat towards immigrants on the association between self-uncertainty and nationalist attitudes (belief in national superiority, support for anti-immigration laws and intention to vote for an anti-immigration party). In both studies, perceived realistic threat emerged as the most reliable mediator between self-uncertainty and nationalist attitudes. In addition (Study 2), we found a causal effect of self-uncertainty on realistic threat. We discuss the implications of these findings for social inclusion policies based on the reduction of uncertainty generated by immigration.

Two studies (N = 676) highlight the nuanced relationship between conservatism and adherence to COVID-19 policy and recommendations intended to slow the spread of the pandemic in the United States. Study 1 provided evidence that conservative Americans who felt uncertain about themselves and the future experienced elevated levels of symbolic threat (attacks to sociopolitical identity; e.g., the pandemic threatening American democracy) and realistic threat (concrete attacks to material resources or well-being; e.g., the pandemic threatening physical health) in comparison to their more certain counterparts. In Study 2, the association between this form of uncertainty and frequency of risky social behaviors (behaviors that increase the risk of virus transmission) was partially mediated by threat perception for Americans both low and high in conservatism. We discuss findings as an integration of the motivated social cognition framework and uncertainty-identity theory. While self-uncertainty was more associated with greater overall COVID-19 threat perception for Americans high (vs. low) in conservatism, threat perception and frequency of risky social behaviors were associated with self-uncertainty in a manner that is consistent with prevailing liberal and conservative norms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Introduction: The discourse on immigration and immigrants is central to contemporary political and public discussions. Analyzing online conversations about immigrants provides valuable insights into public opinion, complemented by data from questionnaires on how attitudes are formed. Methods: The research includes two studies examining the expressive and informational use of social media. Study 1 conducted a computational text analysis of comments on Singaporean Facebook pages and forums, focusing on how social media is used to discuss immigrants. Study 2 utilized survey data to examine the use of social media at the individual level, testing the relationships between cognitive ability, perceptions of threat, negative emotions towards immigrants, and social media usage within the Integrated Threat Theory framework. Results: Study 1 found that discussions about immigrants on social media often involved negative emotions and concerns about economic impact, such as competition for jobs and crime. Complementing these findings about perceived economic threats, Study 2 showed that individuals with higher social media usage and greater perceptions of threat were more likely to have negative emotions towards immigrants. These relationships were mediated by perceptions of threat and were stronger in individuals with lower cognitive abilities. Discussion: The findings from both studies demonstrate the role of social media in shaping public attitudes towards immigrants, highlighting how perceived threats influence these attitudes. This research suggests the importance of considering how digital platforms contribute to public opinion on immigration, with implications for understanding the dynamics of attitude formation in the digital age. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Generative Artificial Intelligence (AI) is a rapidly expanding field that aims to develop machines capable of performing tasks that were previously considered unique to humans, such as learning, reasoning, problem-solving, and decision-making. The recent release of several tools based on AI (e.g. ChatGPT) has sparked debates on the potential of this technology and garnered widespread attention in the mainstream media.Using a socio-psychological approach, in three studies (total N = 410), we demonstrate that when faced with Generative AI’s ability to reproduce the complexity of human cognitive capabilities, participants reported significantly higher negative emotions than those in the control group. In turn, negative emotions elicited by a specific type of AI (e.g. generative AI) were associated to the perception of threat extended to AI technologies as a whole, understood as a threat to various aspects of human life, including jobs, resources, identity, uniqueness, and value.Our findings emphasise the importance of considering emotional and societal impacts when developing and deploying advanced AI technologies and implementing responsible guidelines to minimise adverse effects. As AI technology advances, addressing public concerns and regulating its usage is crucial for the benefit of society. To achieve this goal, collaboration between experts, policymakers, and the public is necessary. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Uncertainty-identity theory (Hogg, 2000, 2007, 2012) postulates that people strengthen their adherence to, and identification with, extreme ideologies when they undergo an enduring uncertainty regarding their self-definition. Concomitantly, nationalist and extreme right-wing ideologies have been associated with the attribution of a threatening character to immigrant and refugee groups. We propose that self-uncertainty precedes the perceived threat posed by the latter groups, which in turn predicts adherence to nationalist attitudes. In one correlational (Study 1; n = 169) and one experimental study (Study 2; n = 309), we tested the mediational effects of perceived realistic and symbolic threat towards immigrants on the association between self-uncertainty and nationalist attitudes (belief in national superiority, support for anti-immigration laws and intention to vote for an anti-immigration party). In both studies, perceived realistic threat emerged as the most reliable mediator between self-uncertainty and nationalist attitudes. In addition (Study 2), we found a causal effect of self-uncertainty on realistic threat. We discuss the implications of these findings for social inclusion policies based on the reduction of uncertainty generated by immigration. Background: Immigrant populations in Europe have steadily increased since the 1970s. This increase stirred up European citizens' support for anti-immigration movements, claiming that immigration yields economic and cultural costs to native European populations. As a result, many countries have seen progress towards an inclusive society relatively compromised. In Portugal (where we conducted the present studies), immigration significantly increased from 1980 onwards. In 2021, when our most recent data were collected, 5.2% of the country's population was of foreign origin. We believe that this calls for an examination of the antecedents and correlates of nationalist and anti-immigration attitudes in a Portuguese sample. Why was this study done?: Psychological uncertainty is an aversive feeling, especially when it is important for individuals' self-definition. Individuals may attempt to reduce self-uncertainty by increasing their ingroup identification with a group that helps individuals deal with this uncertainty. This should be expressed in terms of negative feelings towards the outgroup (threat) and increased adherence to a nationalist position. The present study examines how immigration-related self-uncertainty felt by members of the host population generates perceived threat and negative attitudes towards immigration while strengthening belief in the host national superiority. What did the researchers do and find?: We conducted one correlational and one experimental study (respectively, Study 1 and Study 2). In Study 1, participants indicated their level of uncertainty regarding immigration, their feelings of threat, their belief in national superiority and their support for anti-immigration laws. In Study 2, we divided participants into two (High versus Low) uncertainty conditions. We measured the effect of uncertainty on the measures used in Study 1, as well as on participants' motivation to vote for an anti-immigration party. We found that uncertainty generates perceptions of realistic threat (i.e., threat regarding the nation's material resources), in association with stronger adherence to nationalist attitudes (belief in national superiority, support for anti-immigration laws and motivation to vote for an anti-immigration party). Symbolic threat (i.e., threat to the nation's values and identity) was related to these positions in a way similar to realistic threat but did not increase with higher uncertainty. What do these findings mean?: Our findings suggest that, when people are uncertain about immigration, they perceive that immigrants jeopardise the ingroup nation's material resources, and that they deserve less to share these resources. Perceived threat increases the former's belief in their ingroup nation's superiority, support for legislation that limits immigration, and a concomitant willingness to vote for anti-immigration political parties. Although social psychological research has long shown that people are resilient to factual information contradicting their beliefs, policymakers might consider counteracting nationalist and anti-immigration attitudes by emphasising the non-threatening and beneficial character of immigration to the host nation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

IntroductionThe discourse on immigration and immigrants is central to contemporary political and public discussions. Analyzing online conversations about immigrants provides valuable insights into public opinion, complemented by data from questionnaires on how attitudes are formed.MethodsThe research includes two studies examining the expressive and informational use of social media. Study 1 conducted a computational text analysis of comments on Singaporean Facebook pages and forums, focusing on how social media is used to discuss immigrants. Study 2 utilized survey data to examine the use of social media at the individual level, testing the relationships between cognitive ability, perceptions of threat, negative emotions towards immigrants, and social media usage within the Integrated Threat Theory framework.ResultsStudy 1 found that discussions about immigrants on social media often involved negative emotions and concerns about economic impact, such as competition for jobs and crime. Complementing these findings about perceived economic threats, Study 2 showed that individuals with higher social media usage and greater perceptions of threat were more likely to have negative emotions towards immigrants. These relationships were mediated by perceptions of threat and were stronger in individuals with lower cognitive abilities.DiscussionThe findings from both studies demonstrate the role of social media in shaping public attitudes towards immigrants, highlighting how perceived threats influence these attitudes. This research suggests the importance of considering how digital platforms contribute to public opinion on immigration, with implications for understanding the dynamics of attitude formation in the digital age.

Collective actions are the activities which are aimed at improving social group's conditions. Presented studies were conducted to examine if perceived threat is connected to the tendency to engage in collective actions, and if this relation is mediated by injustice appraisal and stronger identification with in-group. Four studies were conducted in two social contexts of collective action: newly formed woman's rights movement with a focus on opposing abortion ban in Poland, and progressive movements advocating equality of marriage for LGBT community. Both topics are strongly present in Polish social debate in recent years. Results show a significant link between perceived group threat and the tendency to participate in group action. This relationship is mediated by injustice appraisal and group identification–the more members of in-group and their allies perceived out-group as threatening, the stronger feeling of unjust treatment and identification with the discriminated groups. In turn identification is connected to the motivation to act collectively. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study examined when the realistic threat of COVID-19 leads to prejudicial social distancing. American participants reported social distancing preferences from Chinese or Italian people (out-group target) after viewing increasing or decreasing COVID-19 case numbers (threat level) in China or Italy (threat relevance). On the Bogardus Social Distance Scale, there was support for a disease avoidance hypothesis: greater social distancing preferences were expressed under higher than under lower relevant threats. Responses on a bespoke COVID-19 Social Distance Scale, however, supported an a priori prejudice hypothesis: greater social distancing preferences were expressed toward a Chinese than toward an Italian out-group. Moreover, responses on a separate bespoke Modern Social Distance Scale supported a complex prejudice hypothesis: greater social distancing preferences were expressed toward Chinese than toward Italian out-groups under higher than under lower threat, regardless of threat relevance. These findings suggest that the threat of COVID-19 may enable prejudice expression accompanied by the rationale of disease avoidance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Across three studies, conducted between Spring 2020 and Spring 2021, we tested whether exposure to an Asian American/Pacific Islander (AAPI) target person wearing a face mask would increase or decrease White Americans' perceived threat from and positivity toward AAPI individuals. Although results varied by study, a single‐paper meta‐analysis revealed that the masked (compared to unmasked) AAPI target resulted in greater positivity toward AAPIs, due to reduced perceptions of both symbolic threat to group values and realistic threat to group health. Positivity toward AAPIs did not reliably differ after exposure to a masked versus unmasked White target. Implications for interventions that encourage COVID‐safe behaviors and combat anti‐AAPI attitudes are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Makara Human Behavior Studies in Asia is the property of DADPPRI UI and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Literature in policing has mostly overlooked the antecedents of prejudice, especially those who choose a police career. Such a choice is important given the results of prejudice that might cause police misconduct toward regular migrants, irregular migrants, and refugees. This study aims to examine the factors that explain prejudice among police cadets toward other ethnic groups. This study's data come from a survey of 725 police cadets in three police vocational schools in Turkey. We employed structural equation modeling to examine the antecedents of prejudice toward foreigners within the framework of intergroup threat theory. More specifically, in this study, we included factors such as anomie, authoritarianism, and nationalism and participants' symbolic and realistic threat perceptions in shaping prejudice toward foreigners. The findings suggest that police cadets' realistic threat perception was the most salient antecedent of prejudice toward foreigners. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Previous research suggests that threat can bolster anti-immigration attitudes, but less is known about the effects of threat on ideological tolerance. We tested the hypothesis that realistic threats — tangible threats to e.g., the safety or financial well-being of one’s group — bolster support for right-wing extremists. In Experiment 1, participants (N = 200) learned that crime and unemployment rates were either increasing (high threat condition) or remaining the same (low threat condition). Consistent with our hypothesis, higher threat lead to a significant increase in tolerance for right-wing, but not left-wing, extremists. In a second, pre-registered extended replication experiment (N = 385), we added a baseline (no threat) condition. Additionally, attitudes to immigrants were examined as a mediator. This experiment produced non-significant threat effects on tolerance of right-wing extremists. Overall, the current research provides weak support for the hypothesis that realistic threats have asymmetric effects on tolerance of political extremists. However, consistent with previous research, people were more tolerant of extremists within their own ideological camp.

The purpose of this study was to investigate the effect of perceived threat from asylum seekers in EU (EUAS) on attitudes toward Israeli local outgroups, controlling for face to-face interaction with the latter. The study was conducted using an online survey of 1311 Israeli Jews. Realistic threat from EUAS was negatively related to positive attitudes toward three local outgroups, while the association between symbolic threat from EUAS and attitudes toward the local outgroups was insignificant. The effect of distant realistic threat was more pronounced than the effect of symbolic threat and the effect of face-to-face contact. Supplemental data for this article is available online at https://doi.org/10.1080/15562948.2021.1956668. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A prevailing theme in White nationalist rhetoric is nostalgia for a time when Whites dominated American culture and had unchallenged status. The present research examines a form of collective nostalgia called racial nostalgia and its association with negative intergroup attitudes and extreme ideologies (White nationalism). In Studies 1 and 2, racial nostalgia was associated with higher racial identity, anti-immigrant attitudes, and White nationalism. Study 2 revealed that racial nostalgia was related to extreme ideologies, in part, through perceptions that immigrants and racial minorities posed realistic/symbolic threats. Study 3 manipulated nostalgia using a writing prompt ("America's racial past" vs. "games of America's past") and an identity prime (prime vs. no prime). Racial nostalgia was higher in the racial prompt versus the games prompt condition, regardless of identity prime. Furthermore, there were significant indirect effects of the nostalgia manipulation on support for anti-immigrant policies and endorsement of White nationalism through increased racial nostalgia and its association with perceived threats. These findings show that racial nostalgia can be a maladaptive form of collective nostalgia linked to a sense of loss and threat, and can make people sympathetic to extreme racial ideologies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Two studies examined whether men's perception of the declining value of traditional masculinity activates social status, realistic, and symbolic threat, and in turn motivates opposition to feminist social movements. In Study 1, men's perception that their ingroup is losing value across several social spheres was associated with social status and realistic threat, both of which were associated with opposition to feminist movements. Study 2, an experiment, presented men with public opinion data showing a 30-year decline in the degree to which Americans value traditional masculinity or no decline. Information about the declining value of masculinity activated status threat, which motivated less support for feminist movements. Among men who highly identified as masculine, this same information reduced support for feminist movements through symbolic threat. In sum, perceived decline in the social value of traditional masculinity creates status anxiety about the ingroup's future and motivates compensatory reactions against gender equality. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Previous research suggests that threat can bolster anti-immigration attitudes, but less is known about the effects of threat on ideological tolerance. We tested the hypothesis that realistic threats — tangible threats to e.g., the safety or financial well-being of one’s group — bolster support for right-wing extremists. In Experiment 1, participants (N = 200) learned that crime and unemployment rates were either increasing (high threat condition) or remaining the same (low threat condition). Consistent with our hypothesis, higher threat lead to a significant increase in tolerance for right-wing, but not left-wing, extremists. In a second, preregistered extended replication experiment (N = 385), we added a baseline (no threat) condition. Additionally, attitudes to immigrants were examined as a mediator. This experiment produced non-significant threat effects on tolerance of right-wing extremists. Overall, the current research provides weak support for the hypothesis that realistic threats have asymmetric effects on tolerance of political extremists. However, consistent with previous research, people were more tolerant of extremists within their own ideological camp. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this 28-country study (N = 6112), we assessed how subjective perceptions and objective indicators of wealth were associated with majority group members’ perceptions of realistic threat related to immigration. Subjective wealth was assessed by individuals’ perceptions of their personal wealth (current/anticipated) and of their country´s wealth, whereas objective country-level wealth was assessed by GDP and HDI. Multilevel analyses showed that living in a country with a lower objective wealth and perceiving the country's relative wealth as low were associated with higher levels of perceived realistic threat. We also found that an anticipated decrease in personal wealth in the future was associated with higher threat perceptions only in low HDI countries. Our results suggest that perceived realistic threat is fostered by a perceived decline in the current wealth of the country, and country-level wealth may play a role in calibrating threat responses to anticipated personal wealth.

The use of social robots in service scenarios (e.g. in hotels) is expected to increase. Research has indicated that realistic threat and identity threat contribute to prejudice, discrimination, and conflict. Therefore, designing smart robots that can understand user needs and provide prompt service is critical. This study aimed to explore the relationships among perceived threat, negative attitudes toward robots, and usage intention, and to discuss how anthropomorphism moderates the relationship between negative attitudes and usage intention toward robots. We hypothesized that realistic threat and identity threat positively influence negative attitudes toward social robots; such negative attitudes have negative effects on usage intention; and anthropomorphism positively moderates said effect. A between-subjects factorial research design was employed; participants were randomly assigned to one of two conditions of robot anthropomorphic appearance. The stimuli were two pictures of service robots—one with a humanoid appearance and one without. After viewing one of the stimuli, participants filled in a questionnaire that assessed the realistic threat, identity threat, negative attitudes, and usage intention. When participants perceived the robot's appearance to be highly anthropomorphic, their negative attitudes toward it had a stronger negative effect on their usage intention than when they considered the appearance less anthropomorphic. Both identity threat and realistic threat significantly increased negative attitudes toward the robots; thus, the public's willingness to use these robots would be negatively affected. This study recommends that robotics companies consider how to decrease people's perceived realistic and identity threats as well as adjust robots' anthropomorphic appearance to people's tastes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Objective: The aim of this study is to develop and initially validate a psychometrically sound instrument to assess the extent to which Latinx immigrants are viewed as a threat. Method: Drawing on the integrated threat theory (ITT), we developed an initial pool of scale items to represent realistic and symbolic threats. Following best practices in scale construction, we used exploratory factor analysis followed by confirmatory factor analysis to identify, calibrate, and cross-validate the scale structure. A triadic random split of the sample (N = 958) of U.S.-born white college students was used to carry out the three-stage study. Results: Across all stages, findings support the unidimensionality of the 12-item Latinx Immigrant Threat Attitudes Scale (LITAS). Offering evidence of criterion validity, higher LITAS scores were associated with lower support for policies integrating unauthorized immigrants. Conclusions: The LITAS fills a significant gap in the measurement literature. The instrument supports the design and testing of interventions aimed at improving intergroup relations and the lived experience of Latinx immigrants in the United States. Contrary to the widely-used ITT, an undifferentiated, global notion of threat perception is salient; the implications of empirical divergence from the ITT are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article investigates the role social identity and values (e.g., universalism and security) play in perceived threat from Syrians from the perspective of internal migrants in Turkey. A process model connecting the key concepts of Integrated Threat Theory, Social Identity Theory, and a theory of value systems was proposed. We predicted that higher city identification would be related to higher perceived realistic threat (against physical resources) and symbolic threat (against cultural resources). We also predicted a positive indirect effect between city identity and threat through conservation values which are motivated to protect ingroup, and a negative indirect effect through self-transcendence values which are motivated to embrace outgroups. Internal migrants in İzmir (N = 219, age = 21-53 years, 50% men) responded to realistic and symbolic threat, city identity, and self-transcendence and conservation value scales. A Structural Equation Modelling analysis confirmed our hypotheses: Higher city identity predicted higher perceived threat from Syrians both directly and also indirectly through higher conversation values, but it predicted lower threat through Self-transcendence values. The contribution of the proposed process model in understanding prejudice toward Syrians and intergroup conflicts was discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

According to Gordijn (2002), prejudice does not only escalate because of how the ingroup feels towards the outgroup but also because of the perception the ingroup has about how the outgroup feels towards the ingroup, that is meta-prejudice. In a sample of 604 participants, this study explores the extent to which meta-prejudice predicts perceived threat and prejudice towards immigrants in Finland. In line with previous studies, results showed that meta-prejudice significantly predicted the perception of immigrants as a threat and feelings of prejudice towards immigrants. In addition, perceived threat significantly mediated the relationship between meta-prejudice and prejudice towards immigrants. Implications and recommendations for future research are discussed as well. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Attitudes towards immigrants in the United Kingdom are worsening. It has been posited that these attitudes may reflect covert racial and religious prejudices, particularly among conservatives. To investigate this, two studies examined the role that immigrant race (Black/White; Study 1) and immigrant religion (Muslim/non‐Muslim; Study 2) played in immigrant infrahumanization judgements, using political conservatism as a moderating variable. There was a moderating effect of political conservatism; however, it was not in the predicted direction. The results of both studies indicated that immigrant race (Black) and immigrant religion (Muslim) predicted greater infrahumanization when political conservatism was low. Conservatives infrahumanized all immigrants equally (and more than liberals), but liberals were more sensitive to racial/religious biases in their evaluations of immigrants. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The 2013 Gezi Park protests in Turkey, which are one of the major social movements in the last decade, have sharpened the sociopolitical polarization in the country. The present study employed a moderated mediation model in which symbolic threat, realistic threat, and perspective taking were examined as mediators between competitive victimhood and opposing groups' differential evaluations of the protests. Further, the pro‐Gezi versus the anti‐Gezi group membership was hypothesized to moderate the mediation effects. Proponents (N = 337) and opponents (N = 138) of the protests were asked to respond to the measures corresponding to the variables in the model. Results revealed that for protest supporters, competitive victimhood predicted evaluations of the protests through realistic threat, but not through symbolic threat; in contrast, for opponents, it predicted evaluations of the protests through symbolic but not realistic threat. Further, perspective taking turned out to be a weak mediator. The results are discussed in terms of the differential power relationships between the groups in the cultural and political domains. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Unwillingness for contact with outgroup members is a form of prejudice. In two studies, we tested the proposition that perceived competence has an indirect effect on willingness for intergroup contact through its effect on realistic threat, and that perceived warmth moderates this relationship. In Study 1, Hong Kong students (N = 144) rated the perceived warmth and competence of an outgroup, Mainland Chinese students, as well as the extent to which they perceived the group as presenting a realistic threat, and willingness for contact with them. In Study 2 (N = 205), we attempted to manipulate the warmth (high vs. low) and competence (high vs. low) of an unfamiliar outgroup, and tested the effects on realistic threat and willingness for intergroup contact. In both studies, we found an interaction effect between warmth and competence in the prediction of realistic threat. When the outgroup was perceived as warm, competence was found to have a negative association with realistic threat (Study 1), whereas when the outgroup was perceived as lacking warmth, competence was found to have a positive association with realistic threat (Study 2). In both studies, perceived warmth moderated the indirect effect of perceived competence on willingness for intergroup contact. Implications for the role of warmth and competence stereotypes in threat perception and prejudice are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this study we examined whether the shifting function can be modulated by intergroup threat, and if so, how this works. We conducted 2 experiments, using a task-switching paradigm, the results of which provide converging evidence that intergroup threat can impair the shifting function. Results showed that participants in the threat condition in each study (Study 1 symbolic threat: n = 29; Study 2 realistic threat: n = 29) experienced greater shifting costs than did those in the control condition (Study 1: n = 29; Study 2: n = 28). Further, group identification moderated the depletion effect in the intergroup threat condition, with participants closer (vs. less close) in group identification showing greater switching costs following the intergroup threat intervention. In sum, these results suggest that intergroup threat could deplete switching ability, and this effect could be influenced by group identification. In future studies researchers should investigate more kinds of intergroup threat than those we used in this study to assess the generalizability of our findings. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The aim of this paper is threefold. First, based on ongoing theoretical discussions on the dimensionality of Islamophobia, this study analyzes whether Islamophobia empirically constitutes a one-dimensional construct or rather a multidimensional construct consisting of anti-Muslim prejudice and anti-Islam sentiment. Second, the effects of symbolic, realistic, and terroristic (safety) threats on Islamophobia were analyzed concurrently. Finally, within the framework of the revised Integrated Threat Theory (Stephan & Renfro, 2002), and in order to test the mediating effect of threats, SDO is tested as an antecedent of perceived threat and Islamophobia. Respondents from Berlin (N = 355) participated in an online survey. The results indicate that Islamophobia empirically constitutes a two-dimensional phenomenon, consisting of anti-Muslim and anti-Islam sentiment. Whereas symbolic threat is related to both types of Islamophobia, realistic threat is associated only with anti-Muslim prejudice, and terroristic threat is associated only with anti-Islam sentiment. Finally, the results indicate that the relationship between SDO and both dimensions of Islamophobia is mediated by threats. Symbolic threats mediate the relationships between SDO and both dimensions of Islamophobia. Realistic threats mediate the relationship between SDO and anti-Muslim prejudice and terroristic threats between SDO and anti-Islam sentiment.

The 7th round of the European Social Survey (ESS) from 2014-15 includes a partial repetition of the immigration module from the first ESS wave (2002-03) with information on individual attitudes toward immigration and immigrants in both old and new immigration societies. The goal of the present study is to test whether and to what extent questions in the module are equivalent across ESS countries. We performed two types of measurement equivalence tests: exact and approximate. Whereas the exact approach requires that measurement parameters are exactly equal across groups, the approximate and newer approach suggests that it is sufficient that measurement parameters are approximately equal to allow a meaningful comparison across groups. Our findings suggest that two measurement scales, allowing immigrants into the country and realistic threat, are approximately invariant across most ESS countries.

The current study investigates the role of individual and intergroup factors in predicting Muslims’ tendency to attribute domestic terrorism in Indonesia to an external cause (i.e., The West) or an internal cause (i.e., radical Islamist groups). The results (N = 308) showed that intergroup factors of symbolic threat and realistic threat directly increased the external attribution and conversely decreased the internal attribution. Within the context of the current research, symbolic threat refers to Muslims’ perception that the norms and values of the West undermine Islamic identity. Realistic threat denotes Muslims’ perception that the economy and technology of the West undermine Islamic power. The individual factor of Islamic fundamentalism, which has to do with Muslims’ belief in the literal interpretation of and strict guidelines to Islamic doctrines, indirectly predicted both external attribution and internal attribution of terrorism as hypothesized, via the extent to which Muslims perceived the West as posing a symbolic threat, but not a realistic threat to Islamic existence. Uncertainty avoidance, a cultural dimension that describes the extent to which people view clear instructions as a pivotal source of concern to deal with societal problems, also significantly increased perceived symbolic threat and realistic threat, and this cultural dimension mediated the effect of Islamic fundamentalism on each of the intergroup threats. Finally, we found that the level of Islamic fundamentalism was dependent upon cognitive response, but not emotional response to mortality salience. The cognitive response to mortality salience denotes what Muslims are thinking about in coping with their own death whereas the emotional response denotes what Muslims are feeling about such issue. In particular, we found the cognitive response, but not the emotional response to mortality salience significantly gave rise to Muslims’ Islamic fundamentalism. These findings shed light on the importance of combining individual factors and group factors in explicating the dynamics of Muslims’ tendency to make attributions of causes of domestic terrorism. We discuss theoretical implications and study limitations, as well as practical actions policy makers could conduct to deal with Muslims’ Islamic fundamentalism and reduce the extent to which this particular group perceives the West as threatening their existence.

According to Intergroup Threat Theory (Stephan, Ybarra, & Rios, 2015), perceived threats from outgroups can be categorised into realistic threats (to the ingroup's power, resources, or well-being) and symbolic threats (to the ingroup's values, identity, or way of life). Although many studies have documented correlations between such threats and intergroup attitudes, experimental and quasiexperimental tests of Intergroup Threat Theory are relatively sparse. In the present article, we review our own and others' research on manipulations, moderators, and consequences of realistic and symbolic threat, with close attention to the ways in which these threats are similar vs. different. Given the growing racial, ethnic, and cultural diversity in the Western world, understanding how and under what conditions each type of threat can be causally induced is critical to reducing threat and ultimately improving intergroup harmony. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: Consistent with the theory of malleable ideology, research has shown that, under intergroup threat, antiegalitarian individuals will exploit the malleable character of color blindness and strategically claim to be strong supporters of it. In three studies conducted in France, we found no support for this theory when measuring color blindness but strong support when using measures of laïcité, an ideology of secularism. Indeed, those who score low on social dominance orientation (SDO) were more likely to support laïcité than antiegalitarian individuals. However, a situational threat (Study 1), a symbolic threat experimentally induced (Study 2), and a perceived symbolic threat (Study 3) were all related to increased support for laïcité by people high in SDO, without affecting those low in SDO. Thus, laïcité is a malleable ideology that can be adopted by individuals having contrasting motivations, as color blindness in the United States. Implications for the role of exact and conceptual replications in the development of a psychological science are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The increasing adoption of human-like intelligent robots in various services has raised significant social and ethical concerns about their future implications. This study investigates how consumers' perceptions of the future development of anthropomorphic features in service robots influence their expectations and acceptance of this emerging technology. Focusing on human-like appearance and mind, we utilize the expectancy-value theory to propose a conceptual framework that delves into consumers' paradoxical expectations. Through a survey of 486 participants, we examine how these perceptions, combined with levels of technology anxiety, shape psychological expectations and subsequently impact the willingness to adopt service robots. Our findings highlight that consumers' perceptions and anxiety levels predict paradoxical expectations, which in turn influence acceptance. This study contributes by introducing a novel framework, exploring the human-like mind in robot anthropomorphism, and addressing the intricate interplay between consumers' perceptions and service robots. • Consumers' perceptions of future robotic humanlike features predict their expectations. • The levels of technology anxiety are related to individual's expectations. • Two kinds of expectations (EPE and ERT) are related to willingness to accept service robots. • The expectancy-value model provides a reasonable explanation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]