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This paper answers the following question: How does Congress attempt to force agencies to enact regulatory policies that are responsive to Congress' desires? We argue that Congress selectively writes procedural constraints into legislation when it delegates authority to regulatory agencies. In this paper, we hypothesize and empirically verify the three situations in which Congress is most likely to impose such constraints. We find that Congress is more likely to impose procedural constraints on agencies under three circumstances. First, when agencies are more ideologically extreme, legislation is more likely to require procedural constraints as a check against extreme regulatory policies. Second, when Congress delegates authority in complex, multidimensional policy areas, it is more likely to include constraints on agencies. Finally, when Congress is lobbied by a heterogeneous array of special interest groups, it is more likely to impose constraints on agencies than when lobbying activity is relatively homogenous or non-existent. These findings add to our understanding of congressional delegation and the policy process. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Judicial deference to administrative agencies has attracted much scholarly attention. Myriad articles debate the normative merits of different deference regimes. Much of this work implicitly assumes that deference regimes influence judicial review of agency behavior, but no studies to date have tested this assumption. This assumption requires greater justification since judges may apply deference doctrines strategically. Such strategic behavior is possible because deference doctrine is frequently ambiguous (e.g., the scope of Chevron). Even if deference regimes were precise, consistently applying them in complicated cases would be difficult. This study analyzes whether judges apply deference doctrines strategically by manipulating deference to support an outcome. The study uses the Eskridge and Baer (2008) dataset to estimate ideal points of justices over deference regimes in non-contentious cases. The study then uses these estimates to predict votes in contentious cases, where the incentive to behave strategically is greater. Preliminary results indicate that the deference ideal point is an insignificant predictor of votes in contentious cases, supporting the theory that justices apply deference doctrines strategically. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How does Congress attempt to force agencies to enact regulatory policies that are responsive to Congress' desires? We argue that Congress selectively writes procedural constraints into legislation when it delegates authority to regulatory agencies. We hypothesize and empirically verify the three situations in which Congress is most likely to impose such constraints. By delegating authority to agencies, Congress gains regulatory expertise at the expense of ceding control. When this risk is high, we expect Congress to strategically constrain agencies by mandating that agencies form and consult an advisory or negotiated rulemaking committee in the creation of a new regulatory policy. Advisory committee recommendations are not binding, but agency disregard frequently attracts interest group, media, and congressional attention. These informational constraints are important because virtually all agency decisions must be justified with a factual record subjected to judicial review.We find that Congress is more likely to impose procedural constraints on agencies under three circumstances. First, when agencies are more ideologically extreme, legislation is more likely to require procedural constraints as a check against extreme regulatory policies. Second, when Congress delegates authority in complex, multidimensional policy areas, it is more likely to include constraints on agencies. Finally, when Congress is lobbied by a heterogeneous array of special interest groups, it is more likely to impose constraints on agencies than when lobbying activity is relatively homogenous or non-existent. These findings add to our understanding of congressional delegation and the policy process. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]