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The article examines the effect(s) of the intent of the U.S. Congress for enacting a law in the interpretation by the U.S. Supreme Court of said law. Also cited are the comments by Justices John Paul Stevens and Antonin Scalia on congressional intent, the cases Zuni Public Schools v. Department of Education and Exxon Mobil v. Allapattah Services to illustrate the issue, and the systematic influence of congressional intent.

The article examines the politics of judicial retirement in Canada and Great Britain. It formulates a theory of judicial retirement for judges sitting on the courts of last resort in the countries. It estimates models of judicial retirement that incorporates personal, institutional and political factors to analyze the determinants of judicial retirements for judges appointed to the Supreme Court of Canada, and the Judicial Committee of the House of Lords.

The question of who wins and loses in appellate courts may be the most important question we seek to answer as judicial scholars. In fact, "Who gets what?" has traditionally been viewed as the central question in the study of politics generally. Therefore, understanding who wins in the courts is an essential component of a full appreciation of "the authoritative allocation of values" in society (Easton 1953). In this paper we examine the relationship between the status of litigants, especially the comparison of repeat player "haves" (RP) to one-shotters (OS) who are usually "have-nots," and their rates of success in top appellate courts in the common law world. A number of prior studies employing what is generally referred to as "party capability theory" have examined how the resources and litigation experience of litigants affect their chances for success. Using data from the highest courts of appeals across six countries we explore winners and losers in a comparative context. The results indicate that there is greater variation in who wins and who loses than party capability theory would suggest. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the past few years the literature on international conflict and foreign policy has seen a renewed interest in systematically examining the role of domestic institutions. Yet, the revived interest has excluded the influence of national courts on the pol ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper seeks to offer a starting point for building an understanding of the factors that influence public confidence in the courts of nations that are undergoing a transition from authoritarianism to democracy. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article identifies a broader definition of party capability theory by examining changes within the Australian High Court since 1970. The study is premised on an article written by Marc Galanter which hypothesized there would be differential success rates in litigation among parties who came from the "haves" as opposed to the "have-nots."

The article presents a study which examined the influence of presidential rhetoric on the political environment in which American federal judges operate. A dataset of all presidential references to judges from 1789 through 1993 is utilized to ascertain judicial behavior. The study provides a frequency count of the number of statements about judges and a model on the influence of presidential rhetoric over the collective ideology of the U.S. Supreme Court.

Are state supreme court judges influenced by the contingent attitudinal model, similar to their federal colleagues? Stated another way, do these judges render decisions according to their ideological preferences, or are they constrained by the language of state statutes? Using data from the Judge Level State Supreme Court Database, we analyze the votes of individual judges in 1995 to determine whether their behavior is constrained by legislation. Our results indicate that more detailed language (resulting in statutes with higher word counts) significantly limits the discretion afforded to liberal judges while simultaneously facilitating the ideological voting of their conservative colleagues. These results suggest a theoretically important way of thinking about judicial behavior. Rather than conceptualizing the legal model and the attitudinal model as competitors, the empirical evidence suggests that legal influences and ideological influences also work in tandem in among state supreme courts. These judges are influenced by the contingent attitudinal model and, occasionally, the traditional tension exists and statutory language constrains the judges from voting ideologically. However, in other instances these two influences operate in a more dynamic and interdependent manner and we observe statutory language facilitating the expression of ideological voting among the judges. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

By considering temporal changes in judicial influence in a number of cases in Eastern Europe and Latin America, we explain when the courts become viable political actors and why some courts assume an important policy-making role faster than others. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Examines the concept of judicial legitimacy in several countries formerly belonging to the Soviet Union. Discussion of institutional legitimacy; Impact of economic factos on political opinions; Measurement of the judicial institutions of the age of countries.

The article examines whether political control of the U.S. Supreme Court is possible and, if so, whether judicial independence is simply a myth. It attempts to provide evidence that both the president and U.S. Congress have the capacity to control or at least influence the court. It argues that with regard to both civil rights and specific economic legislation, Congress has the ability not only to constrain justices, but also to further promote judicial decisions that align with their policy preferences.

Presents a study which examined the struggle between the legislative and judicial branches from a different perspective by focusing specifically on attempts by U.S. Congress to constrain the behavior of federal judges. Overview of previous research on legislative-judicial interactions; Analysis of principal agent relationships in political science; Research design and methodology used; Impact of statutory constraint and individual ideology on appointment of judges.

The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and subsequent actions by the Bush administration, remind us that the federal courts often are required to resolve questions of individual rights in lieu of foreign policy concerns. This paper explores judicial influences in foreign policy litigation across all three levels of the federal judiciary to determine whether judges systematically rule in favor of foreign affairs when confronted with civil liberties challenges. Using an original dataset of federal cases from 1946-2000, the paper provides evidence that the federal judiciary is extremely deferential to governmental authority in the conduct of foreign relations. While the federal judiciary is prone to support foreign policy interests, it is important to understand the conditions under which these judges will rule in favor of civil liberties claims. An important influence is the ideological preferences of judges. The empirical results indicate that more liberal judges -- as measured by partisan affiliations of the appointing president -- are more likely to render decisions in favor of civil liberties. This result holds for each level of the federal judiciary, although the results are more pronounced in the Supreme Court, less so for the Appeals Courts, and the weakest for District Courts. A second important influence involves the presence of a national security defense. The empirical data suggest that lower court judges are significantly affected by these situations; systematically ruling in favor of foreign affairs. However, Supreme Court justices do not respond in a similar fashion; the presence of a specific national security defense is not significantly related to judicial decisions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Does the hierarchical relationship between the district courts and the courts of appeals influence decision-making at the trial level? Stated another way, are district court judges constrained by the appeals courts, according to the tenets of principal agency theory? Do these judges anticipate responses by appellate panels and condition their decisions based on these expectations? Using an original dataset of foreign policy cases from 1946-2000 and incorporating a strategic choice statistical framework to analyze a formal model, I discover that the District Courts are not constrained by the anticipated responses of the Appeals Courts. Whether one examines District Courts in isolation from other tribunals or within a hierarchical structure, conclusions regarding ideological voting remain consistent: Democratic judges are more likely to rule in favor of civil liberties than their Republican colleagues. Thus, the hierarchical structure of the federal judiciary does not appear to be a significant constraint to the District Courts as it seemingly is for the Courts of Appeals. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper contributes to the literature on U.S. foreign policy and judicial decision making by focusing on the role of the federal appellate courts since World War II. Specifically, the paper addresses the question whether appeals court judges are defenders of civil liberties or champions of national security. Using an original dataset of 300 cases randomly selected from 1946-2000 in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, I test whether specific institutional characteristics, legal challenges or case issues significantly affect whether appellate judges rule in favor of federal government interests or civil liberties claims. The empirical results indicate that for a majority of cases appellate judges support the interests of the federal government to the detriment of civil liberties. However, certain institutional characteristics will induce the courts of appeals to curtail federal interests. If Democratic judges dominate an appellate panel or if the lower courts ruled in favor of civil liberties, then the appeals courts will render decisions against the interests of the federal government. However, if judges must resolve a threshold issue or contend with a national security defense then the ruling will most likely favor federal interests. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the international norms that affect human rights decisions in criminal and civil cases. It states that increased rights protection is determined through structure of the court and agenda of the justices. It furthers states that international norms can modify state behavior through special mechanisms of socialization processes which may bring changes in the decisions of the court in criminal and civil cases.

There is a growing theoretical debate within the literature concerning the extent to which lower court judges anticipate how their decisions might be reviewed by the Supreme Court on appeal. Beginning with Songer, Segal, and Cameron (1994), and relying primarily on a principal-agent framework, scholars have produced conflicting evidence on whether the institutional structure of the judiciary impacts the decision-making process of lower court judges. We argue that one of the reasons for the theoretical disagreement is that previous analyses do not directly test whether lower court judges engage in strategic behavior. Our paper engages this discussion through the empirical test of a formal model depicting the relationship between the Courts of Appeals and the Supreme Court in a variety of issue areas. Using a dataset of appellate cases (from 1953 to 2002) that have been reviewed by the Supreme Court, plus a random sample of appellate cases that were not reviewed, we argue that the current literature on judicial hierarchies is limited because scholars have not modeled specifically the potential strategic interdependence between court levels. Our analysis borrows a statistical model from the IR literature on strategic anticipation and adapts it to the judicial hierarchy to demonstrate the impact of potential Supreme Court responses on the decision calculus of appellate judges. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Within the last decade, observers of the judiciary have witnessed an increased politicization of the courts within several countries, accompanied by a diverse range of public responses concerning the "judicialization of politics" (Tate and Vallinder 1995). Several scholars (see in particular Gibson, Caldeira, and Baird 1998) have examined this phenomenon; yet, a majority of the literature is based on studies of established democracies. Less attention has been paid to emerging democracies where a lack of citizen support may create or reinforce a pervasive cycle of distrust. We argue that it is essential for scholars to focus on these areas to determine whether hypotheses generated by research conducted in established democracies remain consistent.Our paper, consequently, expands on this literature by examining judicial confidence among countries in Africa. We argue that an African perspective on this question is vitally important for two major reasons. First, since public perceptions toward procedural fairness in the judicial system affect overall feelings toward government (Rohrschneider 2005), it is essential to examine a region where political instability has been more the norm than the exception. Second, several scholars note the importance of the 'rule of law' to democratic transition and consolidation (see Ginsburg 2003). Consequently, it is important to examine public perceptions on the efficacy of the rule of law in a region where democratic consolidation has been relatively fragmented and inconsistent. Data for this analysis comes from seventeen (17) sub-Saharan countries surveyed by the Afrobarometer. To examine perceptions of confidence in the judicial branch we focus on the linkages between judicial legitimacy, institutional support, and public opinion. We test specific hypotheses about these linkages using data collected in three waves (2000, 2002, and 2005), combined with relevant country-specific data on democratic performance and consolidation. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

To what extent are lower court judges anticipating how their decisions might be reviewed on appeal? Unfortunately, few empirical analyses concentrate on answering these important questions. This paper contributes to the debate by focusing on the anticipation of Supreme Court responses by judges on the Courts of Appeals. Do judges on the Courts of Appeals guess the preferences of Supreme Court justices when rendering decisions? Additionally, does this anticipatory behavior significantly impact or constrain the ability of these judges to maximize their personal policy preferences? To address these questions, I examine decisions rendered by the U.S. Courts of Appeals from 1953 to 1988, and their subsequent treatment by the U.S. Supreme Court, under a strategic choice statistical framework. Initially, the empirical results indicate that Appeals Court judges do anticipate responses from the Supreme Court, and adjust their behavior according to this perceived constraint. However, this constraint is not experienced by all appellate judges. During the Warren Court era it is apparent that the constraint is experienced by all appellate panels, regardless of ideology; yet, the likelihood of the Supreme Court granting certiorari is substantially higher for conservative decisions than for liberal ones. During the Burger Court era it is apparent that more liberal appellate panels experience this constraint to a higher degree that conservative appellate panels (and the likelihood of Supreme Court review increases substantially for liberal decisions). ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explores the influences - legal, political and strategic - of opinion writing in both the U.S. Supreme Court and the High Court of Australia. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper empirically tests a formal model of strategic interaction between judges on the U.S. Courts of Appeals and the Supreme Court. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Are state supreme court judges influenced by the model of contingent discretion, similar to their federal colleagues? Stated another way, do these judges render decisions purely in accordance with their sincere ideological preferences, or do legal factors - specifically the language of relevant state statutes - constrain their ability to vote according to their preferences? Numerous existing studies of judicial behavior focus on this tension between the attitudinal and legal models to determine the extent to which judges make decisions according to their individual ideological preferences or are constrained by legal factors.This paper contributes to the literature on judicial politics by incorporating a continuous empirical measure of legal constraint on judicial behavior. We posit that legal influences and ideological influences work in tandem among state supreme court judges. These judges are influenced by the model of contingent discretion and, occasionally, the traditional tension exists and statutory language constrains the judges from voting ideologically. However, in other instances these two influences operate in a more dynamic and interdependent manner and we observe statutory language facilitating the expression of ideological voting among the judges. Using data from the Brace and Hall State Court Database, we examine whether institutional differences across state high courts interact with potential statutory constraints (from both the state and federal level) to affect judicial behavior. By examining state court behavior we can draw inferences about the influence of statutory language on the judiciary across several institutional structures and legal environments. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While the constitutional role of the president in the process of selecting Supreme Court justices is limited to the initial selection of nominees, he does not simply select a nominee and then throw the candidate to the wolves of the Senate to be nurtured or devoured at their whim. Existing research looks at the impact of the ideological distance between a president (or his nominee) and the Senate on the president's strategic selection of whom to nominate, as well as on his decision to "go public" to defend his nominees. However this research fails to capture the nuances of the process. We argue that both the president and the Senate consider a legal and an ideological dimension when evaluating Supreme Court nominees, and that strategic presidents utilize rhetoric to shift Senate consideration of their nominee away from the more controversial dimension and toward the less controversial dimension. To analyze presidential rhetoric during the confirmation process we utilize an original dataset coding seven types of presidential statements about Supreme Court nominees between 1965 and 2005. We find strong evidence that presidents behave in strategic fashion determining both when and how they should "go public" in defense of their nominee based upon the political climate in the Senate. Additionally, we find that presidential rhetoric can impact the outcome of the final Senate confirmation vote, but that this impact is conditional upon both the political climate in the Senate and the types of statements that the president makes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]