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Opracowanie dotyczy problematyki nadzwyczajnego obostrzenia kary sprawcy dopuszczającego się przestępstwa w warunkach czynu ciągłego. Koncentruje się na kilku kwestiach. Po pierwsze, podejmuje próbę oceny prawnokarnych następstw wynikających z wprowadzonego do ustawy karnej w 2020 roku przepisu art. 57b k.k. Ukazuje dwa oblicza tego unormowania. Z jednej strony zwraca uwagę na mankamenty, a nawet absurdy tej regulacji, które mogą ujawniać się w praktyce funkcjonowania tego przepisu. Z drugiej, wskazuje jego walory, doceniając niebagatelną funkcję tego przepisu w sferze możliwości kształtowania racjonalnego wymiaru kary. Po drugie, nawiązuje do kwestii temporalnych związanych z konstrukcją czynu ciągłego. Przypomina zarys toczącego się na gruncie doktryny, ale obecnego również w orzecznictwie sporu co do kwestii czasu popełnienia przestępstwa ciągłego. Zwraca uwagę na relatywizm towarzyszący ocenie tej kwestii. Przywołuje jednocześnie przykłady ilustrujące, jak różne w praktyce mogą być skutki stosowania prawa w razie przyjęcia jednej z będących w obiegu opcji interpretacyjnych. Po trzecie wreszcie, sygnalizuje zagadnienie następstw wejścia w życie regulacji przepisu art. 57b k.k. w kontekście tak zwanej kolizji ustaw w czasie w rozumieniu art. 4 § 1 k.k., rodzącej potrzebę wyboru ustawy dla sprawcy czynu zabronionego względniejszej.

The study deals with the politicization of the hooligan nature of the crime in the initial period of the functioning of this structure in the Polish social and legal reality after World War II. The political entanglement of such behaviors, their ideologization and perception through the prism of attacks on the foundations of the new socio-economic system was undoubtedly influenced by the origin of this circumstance. The politicization of hooligan behavior in the Soviet reality — from where this structure was transplanted into the native reality and ultimately the legal order — had had a long tradition at that time. Over two decades of experience in demonstrating the “class” nature of such behavior, its “counter-revolutionary” basis and the “anti-systemic” motivation of its perpetrators were reflected in the statements of some of the interpreters of hooliganism in Poland at the turn of the 1940s and 1950s. Analyzing the literature and judicial decisions from this period, attention was drawn to the scale of the politicized exegesis of this concept and its reminiscences in the later periods of its functioning in the domestic criminal law system. At the same time, the exponential trend was not omitted, which more or less firmly disregarded the relationship between hooliganism and politics.

W artykule podjęto próbę przedstawienia najistotniejszych zmian, jakie nastąpiły w przepisach chroniących życie i zdrowie człowieka wraz z uchwaleniem 13 czerwca 2019 roku nowelizacji kodeksu karnego. Zwraca uwagę ich dwutorowy charakter. Z jednej strony modyfikacje idą w kierunku obostrzenia na poziomie sankcji odpowiedzialności karnej za niektóre przestępstwa stypizowane w rozdziale XIX kodeksu karnego, w tym za cięższe odmiany zabójstwa, spowodowanie uszczerbku na zdrowiu, nieumyślne spowodowanie śmierci czy udział w bójce lub pobiciu. Z drugiej — nowelizacja wprowadza nowe typy przestępstw, nieznane także wcześniejszym kodyfikacjom rodzimego prawa karnego, jak przyjęcie zlecenia zabójstwa czy spowodowanie śmierci więcej niż jednej osoby, a także odmienną od dotychczasowej formułę odpowiedzialności za przygotowanie zabójstwa. Mając na uwadze zakres tych zmian, omawianą nowelizację uznać należy za najgłębiej ingerującą w stan prawny w zakresie ochrony podstawowych dóbr jednostki pod rządami kodeksu karnego z 1997 roku. Opracowanie zawiera prezentację założeń niektórych spośród przyjętych rozwiązań, analizę zasadności ich wprowadzenia, ocenę ich systemowej spójności, a także analizę następstw, jakie zmiany te mogą pociągać za sobą na płaszczyźnie zwiększenia efektywności zapobiegania i zwalczania przestępczości skierowanej przeciwko życiu i zdrowiu człowieka.

Opracowanie podejmuje problematykę nowego, wprowadzonego mocą nowelizacji kodek-su karnego z 13 czerwca 2019 roku, przestępstwa odpłatnego przyjęcia zlecenia zabójstwa (art. 148a § 1 k.k.). Nie ulega wątpliwości, że jest to rozwiązanie bezprecedensowe, nadające zasadzie ochrony życia i jej zakresowi zupełnie nowego znaczenia. Wyprowadza ono ochronę życia z dotychczaso-wych ram zachowań zabronionych chroniących to dobro, przesuwając ją na płaszczyznę zachowań, które nigdy dotąd nie były karalne, bardzo oddalonych od wystąpienia zamierzonego przez sprawcę skutku. Przestępstwo to, na co zwrócono uwagę już w toku prac nad nowelizacją ustawy karnej w licznych opiniach formułowanych przez przedstawicieli środowiska karnistycznego, budzi wiele wątpliwości, w tym takie, które wiążą się z poszanowaniem przez tę ustawową konstrukcji funda-mentalnych zasad prawa karnego. Kryminalizacja zachowań na tak odległym przedpolu naruszenia dobra prawnego może być w szczególności źródłem kontrowersji w kontekście gwarancyjnej funkcji prawa karnego. Przeprowadzona analiza ma na celu zwrócenie uwagi na kilka najistotniejszych kwestii dotyczących tego przestępstwa, między innymi jego charakteru prawnego, uzasadnienia jego typizacji, konstrukcji jego ustawowych znamion, możliwych przypadków zbiegu przepisów czy przestępstw, w których może pozostawać, trudności, jakie nowa konstrukcja może nieść dla praktyki wymiaru sprawiedliwości, a także samej potrzeby wprowadzenia omawianej „modyfikacji granic” prawnokarnej ochrony życia człowieka.

The article addresses the issue of murder preparation, its essence and legitimacy of penalisa-tion. Such behaviour in the criminal law system under the government’s subsequent codifications has remained unpunished. The change in this respect occurred along with the amendment to the Penal Code of 13th June 2019. The adopted modification of the principles of criminal liability on the “foreground of the foreground” of murder raises numerous doubts and controversies. The sub-ject of the study is an attempt to justify the introduced change and answer the question of how the applicable legal status was motivated over the space of almost a century and whether the legislator reasonably departed from the traditional model of impunity for homicide preparation.

On criminal-law issues of the assassment of an offender fleeing the scene of an traffic crimeOn the grounds of criminal-law research, the article tries to conduct a dispute analysis of the issues of a legal evaluation of “the fleeing” of a road traffic participant from the scene of the communication event. The subject of the analysis is not only the concept of “the escape” — its subjective aspect — but also its perception on the grounds of the past and the presently applicable legal solutions. Attention was drawn to the change in function that these circumstances fulfilled and to how, within years, its influence on justice in cases of communication crimes — from the circumstances restricting the dimension of punishment in the phase of judicial substantiation, via creation of the marks of the qualified type of forbidden act, to a general cumulative premise of extraordinary restriction of punishment. One of the leading ideas of this work is the case of the ratio legis regulation of the fleeing of the road traffic participant from the scene of the communication event. In light of the accepted legal solutions it is unclear what determines its object of protection, and so the protection of which legal goods this regulation serves.

REMARKS ON CRIMINAL LIABILITY FOR CONTINUOUS CRIME IN VIEW OF THE DRAFT AMENDMENT TO THE PENAL CODE OF 25 JANUARY 2019The study contains an analysis and evaluation of some legal solutions proposed in the draft amendment to criminal law of 25 January 2019, especially regarding the sentence, both statutory and judicial. Attention was paid to changes that constitute the most vivid manifestations of the tendency clearly outlined in the draft — expressed explicitly in the assumptions of the postulated changes — towards increasing the repressive norms of the Penal Code of 1997. This is carried out on three main levels — 1 increasing the severity of sanctions for individual, selected types of crimes, 2 extending the application of the extraordinary institution to tighten the penalties and 3 changes to the court directive on the sentence. The study focuses on changes concerning the foundations and rules of the extraordinary progression of punishment, in particular on the modification referring to criminal liability for an offense committed in the conditions of a continuous act covered by the formula of Article 12 § 1 of the Penal Code. In this case, the project provides for mandatory toughening of the penalty by raising the lower liability threshold by half, and the upper one by two. In this regard, both the arguments of the position approving such a solution and the views of the part of the criminal law doctrine which fully accepts the law adopted in the Penal Code of 1997 and which are binding in this respect are presented.

Remarks on the essence of a terrorist crime and penalty for it. Part IIThe paper is an attempt to draw attention to some of the most important aspects of the problem of terrorist crimes, a problem that is complex both in criminological sense and in terms of the legal dogma. The starting point for the reflections in Part I of the article is a historical analysis of the origins and evolution of the dogmatic and normative perception of and approach to the concept of terrorist crime — beginning with the legislation of the interwar period, through post-war provisions and ending with the regulations of the 1969 Criminal Code. The Central question of this part is an analysis of the normative form of the terrorist crime construct under Article 115 § 20 of the Criminal Code, its legal nature as well as consequences of the application of the analysed norms. The reflection of Part II of the paper encompasses issues concerning the consequences of a terrorist crime in terms of statutory and judicial penalties as well as other penal measures. In this part the author analyses, in particular, the question of extraordinary enhancement of punishment for terrorist crimes, including doubts that can be aroused in practice by the regulations concerning punishment progression applied to terrorists as well as the possibility and rules of applying other measures having an impact on the legal situation of the perpetrators of terrorist crimes.

Remarks on the essence of a terrorist crime and penalty for it. Part IThe study attempts to draw attention to some, the most important complex threads — both in the criminological and the dogmatic legal sense — problems of crime of terrorist character. The starting point of considerations conducted in part I of the article is the historical analysis referring to genesis and evolution of dogmatic and normative perception and understanding of the concept of terrorist offense — from the legislation of the interwar period through post-war regulations, until the regulation of the Penal Code of 1969. The central thread of this part of the study is the analysis of the normative shape of a terrorist offense construction in terms of art. 115 § 20 of the Penal Code, legal nature of this institution as well as the consequences at the level of application of the discussed regulations. Considerations taken in part II of the study cover issues regarding the consequences of committing a crime of a terrorist character in the sphere of statutory and judicial punishment and other penal measures. In this part of the analysis, the issue of extraordinary tightening of punishment was subjected in particular to a terrorist crime including doubts that in practice the provisions relating to the rule of progression of punishment of terrorists can cause, as well as the possibility and rules of using other institutions shaping the legal situation of the perpetrator of a terrorist offense.

The remarks on the legal character of the directive of the punishment for the series of crimesThe article considers the problem of punishment for the series of crimes. It raises the legal character of the rule of tightening the criminal responsibility as a consequence of committing crimes remaining in a confluence of events connected with the buckle of continuity. The main doubt accompanying such evaluation is connected with the answer to the question if the legal effects within the scope of punishment resulting from the art. 91 § 1 of the Penal Code express ordinary or extraordinary punishment. The dispute about the legal nature of the consequences resulting from that regulation has not only the theoretical-legal dimension. Accepting one of those options causes far-reaching legal consequences within the sphere of the application of the law practice. It decides about the scope of the legal responsibility and determines the relations with other statutory premises that modify its limits. In this context there are also the remarks considering the conditions of accepting the set of principles, resulting from art. 57 of the Penal Code, reforming those limits with the rule of punishment for the series of crimes. The analysis taken in the elaboration takes up the problem of the punishment for the continuous act defined in art. 12 of the Penal Code. Taking into consideration that this institution derives from the same, as the series of crimes, structure of the continuous act of crime that was in the Penal Code from 1969 the basis of the extraordinary tightening the punishment, there comes the question, whether resigning from modifying the principles of legal responsibility for the continuous act of crime can lead to an impression of the dissymmetry of penalty of both structures is the reasonable and rational solution.

A few remarks about the structure and the consequences of the series of crimes in the light of the amendment to the Penal Code of February 20, 2015The article concerns the problem of the legal structure of the so-called series of crimes. The attention is concentrated on the changes in terms of evidence of this institution introduced by the amendment to the Penal Code of February 20, 2015. The previous statutory formula of Art. 91 § 1 of the Penal Code was recalled, especially the annulled premise of the “similar way” of committing crimes bounded together in series, remembering at the same time the doubts and interpretative arguments which accompanied that interpretation. In the circle of interests remains also the issue of the statutory understanding of the requirement of identity of “the regulation whose criteria each of those crimes fully fulfill”, which forms the basis for the punishment given for the series of crimes. The arguments of the ideas competing in this matter were also recalled as well as the effects that might have been caused while implementing such practice. Taking the above into consideration the modifications within the statutory formula of the series of crimes were discussed. A special attention was drawn to the new premise of “using the same opportunity” and the consequences that are caused by introducing this premise for the scope of using this structure. The article also discusses the issue of the identity of the legal rule, required by the act, the reference to which in the amended legal state became the rule which was the basis for the punishment, and not, as it was commonly previously believed, the rule stating the basis for punishing for each of the crimes remaining in the series. In the margin of the analysis of the new shape of the premises of series there are remarks devoted to the punishment for the multiplicity of crimes embraced with the feature of continuity.